Mohan Ashraf and others vs Main Singh

(1) Four Kanals of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 866/700/150 and 875/700/150 situate in village Betote, Tehsil Ramban, was sold by Thakur

Parshotam Singh son of Thakur Panjib Singh, a Rajput of Jammu, to Sardar Mian Singh, respondent therein, by means of sale deed dated Beisakh

24, 2011 (Samvat). A civil suit being suit No. 16 of 1955 for declaration to the effect that the said land belonged to the joint family consisting of

himself and his father, Thakur Parshotam Singh, and since the sale was without any valid necessity it was void and ineffectual against his rights as

also for possession or in the alternative for a decree for possession on the basis of a right of prior purchase, was brought by Bejinder Singh, minor,

against his father and Sardar Mian Singh, in the court of the Munsiff. Ramban. Another civil suit for possession of the said land on the basis of a

right of prior purchase was brought in the same court by Noor Mohammad, the predecessor ininterest of the petitioners, herein, Vide Order dated

March 27, 1959 passed under Section 27 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, the Munsiff, Ramban, joined Noor Mohamad as a party defendant

to the aforesaid suit No. 16 of 1965 brought by Bejinder Singh minor Eventually on November 7, 1967, a compromise was arrived at between

Noor Mohammad and Sardar Mian Singh by virtue of which Noor Mohammad agreed to relinquish his right of prior purchase in respect of the

aforesaid sale and give up his claim regarding costs incurred by him on the litigation on payment of Rs. 3900 by Mian Singh Out of this sum, of Rs.

3900, Rs. 700 was paid to Noor Mohamad at the time of the compromise and with regard to the belance of Rs. 3200 it was agreed by Sardar

Mian Singh that he would pay Rs. 1500 in the month of January, 1964, and the rest in the month of April, 1964. As Sardar Mian Singh failed to

pay any of the aforesaid instalments, Noor Mohamad brought a civil suit, being suit No. 44 of 1966, in the court of the Sub Judge, Ramban, for

the recovery of Rs. 3200.

(2) On an objection being taken on behalf of Sardar Mian Singh that he being an agriculturist as defined by Section 2 (1) of the Agriculturists Relief

Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,' the suit was triable under the Act, the trial court framed the following issue :

''Whether the defendant is an agriculturist?

O. P. D

(3) On a consideration of the evidence, adduced by the parties in respect of the aforesaid issue the trial court held the defendant to be an

agriculturist within the meaning of the aforesaid Section of the Act vide its order dated June 2, 1972.

(4) Aggrieved by this order, Noor Mohamad filed a revision application before this court. On the matter coming up for hearing before the Hon'ble

Chief Justice, it was contended on behalf of the plaintiffpetitioner that the last clause of Section 3 (b) of the Act, had no applicability to the present

case, as there was no written engagement for payment of money. Being of the plaintiffpetitioner that the last clause of Section 6 (b) or the Act, had

no applicability to the present case, as there was no written, engagement for payment of money. Being of the view that the case involved a

substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the Act and required an authoritative pronouncement, his Lordship

directed the matter to be placed before this bench. This is how the revision is before us.

(5) Appearing in support of the revision petition, Mr. Kotwal has reiterated as there was no written engagement for payment of money, the

defendant could not invoke the last clause of Section 3 (b) of the Act.

(6) We regret we cannot accede to this contention. In Webster's Third Intentional Dictionary, the word ""engagement"" has been defined as meaning

''agreed upon.

(7) The words ''written engagement"" have also been the subject matter of decisions in a number of cases. The Sind Chief Court in Rakhianlkhan

Khan Mohd v Chotiram Kaliandas AIR 1944 Sind, 176 while interpreting identical provisions of clauses (w) and (x) of Section 3 of the Dekhan

Agriculturists Relief Act, J879, held :

The words of clauses (w) and (x) are very wide. The object of the legislature appears to be to include within els. (w) and (x) all claims of

pecuniary character arising out of contracts, whether written or unwritten and to bring them within the special jurisdiction created by the Act. The

claim of the plaintiff is now undoubtedly one for money arising out of a written agreement for the payment of money. In para 3 of Ex. 146 the

Zamindar binds himself to pay off his previous debt, and the appellant relies on this paragraph to bring the suit within clause (w).''

(8) A Full Bench of this court in Mohamad Abdullah Dar and anr v. Mohamd Akber, 1972 J and K Law Reporter, 462, observed :

Although the Act was primarily intended to relieve agricultural indebtedness and to deal with transactions between money lenders on the one hand

and the agriculturists debrors on the other, the scope of the Act goes beyond the object declared in its preamble and extends also to transactions in

which there is an undertaking or promise, whether verbal or written for payment of money, the language of the last portion of Section 3 of the Act,

is wide enough to cover even partnership transactions provided the r undertaking to pay money can be spelt out from the instrument of partnership

or other relevant material.

(9) In B. K. Thapar and ors v. Sudhir Kumar and ors, AIR 1965 J&K 13, it was held that aeonsent decree is nothing but an agreement with the

command of the court superadded to it.

(10) In other words the inherent nature of the compromise is not lost by the consent decree that is passed on the basis thereof. In view of the

categoric observations made in the above noted decisions we have no hesitation in holding that the document on the basis of which the present suit

was brought in the trial court did contain an undertaking or promise to pay money and as such was tantamount to written engagement for payment

of money as contemplated by the last clause of Section 3 (b) of the Act.

(11) On merits Mr. Kotwal does not dispute the correctness of the findings returned by the learned Sub Judge that the defendant is an agriculturist

within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Act.

(12) In the result the reference is answered accordingly and the revision application is dismissed but without any order as to costs.