High CourtsDivision Bench

Mohan Lal vs State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 1 October 2012 · Citation: (2012) 10 P&H CK 0172

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rameshwar Singh Malik, J · Jasbir Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 313, 378(4) · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 307, 34, 427
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CRM A 663-MA of 2012 (O and M)
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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 1,784 words

Jasbir Singh, J.

CRM No. 46060 of 2012

1.

This application has been filed for condonation of 680 days delay in filing the application seeking leave to file an appeal. The application is accompanied by an affidavit. In view of reasons mentioned therein, it is allowed and delay stands condoned.

CRM A 663-MA of 2012(O&M)

This application has been filed u/s 378(4) Cr.P.C. seeking leave to file an appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 27.7.2010.

2.

Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were named as accused in FIR No. 64 dated 10.9.1998 registered in Police Station Badhni Kalan, district Moga for commission of offences under Sections 307, 427/34 PC. It was an allegation against them that on 17.6.1998, they in furtherance to common intention had made an attempt to commit murder of Mohan Lal. Chamkaur Singh - respondent No. 2, to fulfill that object struck his truck bearing No. PB04E-9632 against Car No. DIA No. 3861 being driven by the complainant. The trial Judge has noted down the following facts regarding case of the prosecution:-

that on 10.8.1998 complainant Mohan Lal submitted a written application Ex. P1 to IG Police, Patiala for taking action against Chamkaur Singh on the allegations that on 17.6.1998 at about 4.30 p.m. Chamkaur Singh had struck a truck No. PB04E 9632 in the car driven by the complainant due to which back portion of the car had badly damaged. It is also alleged in Ex. P1 that at that time, accused was accompanied by 4-5 more persons and complainant himself had run away from the spot. It is also asserted in Ex. P1 that in fact the complainant has been running the business of "committees" and Rs. 2,50,000/- were due towards accused Chamkaur Singh but on demand he refused to return this amount. Therefore, the complainant submitted an application on 11.3.1997 to SSP Moga and due to this he suspected that accused wanted to kill him.

3.

On receipt of application (Ex. P1), an inquiry was conducted by SSP Moga. The allegations were found to be false. A report to cancel the FIR was submitted, which was rejected by the concerned Magistrate. The investigation was again initiated against respondent Nos. 2 to 4. The investigating officer after completing legal formalities and getting legal opinion submitted a final report in Court. Copies of the documents were supplied to the above respondents as per norms. Vide order dated 27.1.2006, the case was committed to the competent Court for trial. Respondents were charge sheeted to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution produced ten witnesses and also brought on record documentary evidence to prove its case.

4.

On conclusion of prosecution''s evidence statements of the accused were recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. Incriminating material existing on record was put to them which they denied, claimed innocence and false implication.

5.

The trial Court has rightly taken the delay in getting the FIR recorded against the prosecution. In this case, the complainant filed an application (Ex. P1) on 10.8.1998, wherein it was mentioned that an attempt was made to kill him on 17.6.1998. There is nothing on record to show that during the intervening period, any complaint was made to the concerned police station. In application (Ex. P1), except Chamkaur Singh - respondent No. 2, others were not named, despite a fact that all the accused were well known to the complainant. Photographs of the damaged car were not brought on record. Further, registration number of the car was also not given in complaint (Ex. P1). Regarding motive, nothing came on record. It was also noted by the trial Judge that in the first inquiry conducted by senior police officials, the respondents were exonerated. It was also noted that when appeared in the witness box, the complainant had made many improvements regarding facts given in complaint (Ex. P1). Furthermore, brother of the complainant, namely, Madan Lal (PW3) did not support case of the prosecution. To give benefit to the respondents, it was further observed as under by the trial Court:-

19.

It seems that the names of accused Jagga Singh and Ranbir Singh have been added much later. In Ex. P1, it is mentioned that accused was accompanying 4-5 persons. In the cross examination PW1 has admitted that he came to contact with accused Chamkaur Singh 3-4 years prior to the occurrence and he came to contact with driver of Chamkaur Singh one year of the occurrence and he also knew his brother. In these circumstances non mentioning of the names of accused Jagga Singh and Ranbir Singh in Ex. P1 is fatal.

20.

PW1 made one more material improvement in his court statement by stating that after the occurrence, the complainant stopped his car at a little distance and he had seen that Chamkaur Singh had coming towards him with an iron rod, at that time he could not came to know about the names of persons and later on he came to know that they were co-accused Ranbir Singh and driver Jagga Singh. He did not explain from which source and on which date he came to know the names of driver Jagga Singh and Ranbir Singh brother of Chamkaur Singh. This statement was recorded on 25.7.2007. The occurrence had taken place on 17.6.1998. Surprisingly, he deposed this fact after more than nine years. More interestingly, after receipt of Ex. P1 SP Head Quarter recorded statement Ex. P2 of complainant although no date is mentioned underneath Ex. P2 when it was recorded yet it can be taken that it was recorded after 10.8.1998 but names of Ranbir Singh and Jagga Singh are not mentioned in this document. It seems that in order to put pressure upon accused Chamkaur Singh to make payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- firstly application Ex. P1 was submitted to IG Police Station, when it became futile then brother and driver of Chamkaur Singh were arraigned.

6.

The trial Court has thrashed the entire evidence in a threadbare manner. Discrepancies in the case of the prosecution were rightly noticed and accordingly, benefit of acquittal was awarded in favour of the respondents. This Court feels that the order passed is perfectly justified.

7.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Cri) 748, held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court.

8.

A Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Hansa Singh, 2001(1) RCR (Cri) 775, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has opined as under:-

We are of the opinion that the matter would have to be examined in the light of the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, , which are that interference in an appeal against acquittal would be called for only if the judgment under appeal were perverse or based on a mis-reading of the evidence and merely because the appellate Court was inclined to take a different view, could not be a reason calling for interference.

9.

Similarly, in State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, and in Chandrappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, , it was held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused has to be adopted by the Court.

10.

In Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, 2011(9) SCC 479, decided on September 5, 2011, the Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:

An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed.

11.

Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Shera Ram @ Vishnu Dutta, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

7.

A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.

8.

The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for.

12.

Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments were discussed and then it was opined as under:-

10.

There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience.

13.

Counsel for the applicant has failed to indicate any misreading of oral as well as documentary evidence on record by the trial Court. No case is made out for interference. Dismissed.