Mohanan vs Vakil Chand Johr and Others

Narayana Pillai, J.—The Appellant is a workman. He sustained an injury. For compensation for that he preferred a claim under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923, for short, the Act, before the Commissioner. Section 10(1) of the Act makes the claim statute-barred after two years. The claim preferred by the Appellant was long after that. The extent of delay was about 10 months. Under the last proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act it is open to the Commissioner to entertain a claim even after it has become statute-barred if he is satisfied that the failure to prefer the claim in time was for sufficient cause. The Appellant filed a separate application to condone the delay. As there was no sufficient cause to prefer the claim in time the Commissioner found it to be barred by time and refused to go into the merits of the claim. This appeal is from that order.

According to the Appellant during the relevant period he was under treatment, during that period he had demanded payment of compensation and the employer had agreed to give him the same. It is seen from the records produced in the case that the treatment undergone by the Appellant had ended several months before he preferred the claim and that after undergoing treatment he was attending to his normal work in the establishment. Except his interested statement, which is not reliable, there is nothing to show that he had made demands to the employer for compensation and the employer had agreed to give him the same. Therefore there was no sufficient cause for him for not preferring the claim in due time and the Commissioner was right in finding that the claim was barred by limitation.

Mr. K. Janardhanan, appearing for the Appellant did mount an argument that the Commissioner was incompetent to decide the question of limitation at the stage it was done. He strenuously argued that the proceeding had progressed to such an extent that the Commissioner was incompetent at that stage to terminate it on the ground of bar by limitation. This raises a point on Section 10(1) of the Act. The prohibition in it read with the last proviso to it is to entertainment and decision of the claim if it is not preferred in due time unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the failure to prefer the claim in due time was for sufficient cause.

The procedure to be followed by the Commissioner in the proceeding before him is provided in the Rules framed under the Act. After he receives the application and before he issues notice on it to the opposite party he is empowered to dismiss the application at two stages. On receiving the application he may examine the applicant on oath. After considering the application and the result of the examination if he is of opinion that sufficient grounds do not exist for proceeding with the application he can summarily dismiss it. If he does not do so he can call upon the applicant to produce evidence in support of the application. Evidence adduced by the applicant thereafter may be considered by the Commissioner and if he is of opinion that there is no case made out for the relief claimed he can then also dismiss the application. These powers given are to be exercised by him even before issue of notice to the opposite party. If he does not dismiss the application either summarily or after considering the evidence of the applicant he has to issue notice to the opposite party and can invite his written statement. On material propositions of fact and law in dispute the Commissioner has to raise issues. Thereafter trial starts. The Commissioner may then give opportunities to the parties to adduce evidence. The Commissioner is competent to try some issues preliminarily. At the end of the trial he has to record a judgment and pronounce his decision.

In the instant case issues were framed and evidence was let in by both parties. One issue raised was about limitation. That issue was preliminarily considered. The Commissioner decided that against the Appellant and refused to go into the merits of the claim.

Mr. K. Janardhanan argues that if the proceeding had to be disposed of on the ground of bar by limitation that should have been done before written statement was filed and issues were raised. According to him the Commissioner should not have reserved it for decision after issues were raised and evidence was let in because there is strict prohibition to that effect in Section 10(1) of the Act read with the last proviso to it. He says that the claim was entertained when notice was issued to the opposite party on the application and that thereafter the Commissioner was incompetent to go into the question of limitation. The position taken up by him is that the ''entertainment'' of a claim is ''admission'' of the claim and the claim is admitted the moment the Commissioner issues notice on the application to the opposite party. However striking this argument is at first blush it cannot survive close examination.

Originally the period of limitation prescribed for preferring claim u/s 10(1) of the Act was six months. That was at first extended to one year by Amendment Act 9 of 1938 and later to two years by Amendment Act 8 of 1959. Originally the prohibition was to admission of the claim. By Amendment Act 9 of 1938 the word "admit" occurring in Section 10(1) of the Act including the last proviso to it was deleted and the word "entertain" was substituted. That is not without significance. It was not done to obfuscate the law.

The words ''admit'' and ''entertain'' have different connotations. The import of the word ''entertain'' was considered by the Supreme Court in Lakshmiratnam Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax 1968 S.C. 488 in interpreting the proviso to Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which contained a prohibition against entertainment of appeal from assessment if a condition was not satisfied. The controversy was about the stage at which the appeal could be said to be ''entertained'', whether it was at the stage of filing or admitting or the hearing and disposing. Certain previous decisions of the Allahabad High Court holding that the word "entertain" meant "adjudicate upon" or "proceed to consider on merits" were approved by the Supreme Court in its decision. The meaning of the word as given in dictionary "to deal with or admit of consideration" was also considered there. What was held there was that the word ''entertainment'' meant the point of time when the appeal was being considered. That decision was followed by the same Court in Hindus than Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu 1970 S.C. 1384 in interpreting the word ''entertain'' appearing in Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC as amended by the Allahabad High Court. The same meaning was given to the word ''entertain'' occurring in Section 32 and the second proviso to Section 77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act in two decisions of this Court, Kadir Mohammed v. Augusty Varghese 1969 KLT 739 and Ouseph Mathew v. Gouri Pappan and Ors. O.P. No. 4468 of 1975. Thus "entertain" is a legal term which has been used in several statutes and which has received judicial interpretation as meaning "to admit of consideration".

Critical refinements and subtle distinctions apart, in the popular sense also the words "admit" and "entertain" have different meanings. "Admission" to a room is different from "entertainment" in that room. You have to be admitted to a room before you are entertained there. Even if you are admitted you may not be entertained there.

In the context in which the word "entertained" is used in Section 10(1) including its last proviso in the Act it means ''admit to consideration''. The Commissioner was competent to decide the question of limitation at the stage it was done.

Accordingly this appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.