Mohd. Asdullah Wani @APPELLANT@Hash Principal District & Sessions Judge, Ramban And Others

This is a petition filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K against the order dated 26.07.2018, passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Ramban. By virtue of the order impugned, the Appellate Court has set aside the order of the Trial Court, vacating the order of status-quo and further directed the maintenance of status-quo on the spot till disposal of the suit.

It is pertinent to mention that the basis for the Trial Court in vacating the order of status-quo was the fact that the Trial Court was persuaded in regard to the possession of the petitioner herein over the land measuring 02 kanals and 18 marlas, based upon the Khasra Girdawari for the year 2016. However, the Appellate Court while considering the same Khasra Girdawari had noticed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ramban dated 27.02.2016, based upon which Sehat Kasht Intqal No. 554 in favour of the petitioner had been cancelled.

It appears that the entire controversy centered around the Khasra Girdawari of 2016, which both the fora below have discussed and considered while passing their respective orders. The status-quo now ordered to be maintained by the Appellate Court is based upon reasons, which cannot in any manner be said to be perverse. It cannot be said that the Appellate Court in passing the order had failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it.

The scope and ambit of the powers exerciseable by the High Courts in their supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is analogous to Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, is no longer res integra. p

The Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and anr v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010)8 SCC 329, placed reliance upon a constitution bench judgment of the Apex Court in Waryam Singh & anr vs. Amarnath &anr, AIR 1954 SC 215 and crystallized the parameters for such an exercise as under:

(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. This history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority".

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice has been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Courts. Jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exceeded just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."

Having considered the matter in depth, it appears that neither do the orders of the courts below suffer from any perversity in law, nor can the same be said to be suffering from any jurisdictional error. The petition is found to be without merit and is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected IA.