Mohd. Imthiazuddin and Others vs E. Balaveera Raghavaiah

P.S. Mishra, C.J.—Heard learned counsel for the appellant.

It appears in a suit for specific performance of contract, appeal came before this Court. A learned single Judge granted an order of temporary injunction putting the owner of the property to the condition that he would not make any construction upon the disputed land. Alleging, however, that the said order was violated by the owner of the property, the appellants herein, filed a petition to take action for the alleged wilful disobedience of the Court''s order was filed. The learned single Judge issued and interim direction in the contempt proceeding on 26-9-1995 to the following effect :

"However, in order to dispose of this Contempt Case without further enquiry into the extent of the suit property, it is assumed that the Masjid portion is outside the suit property inasmuch as the area of the rest of the property is more that 3000 sq. yds. which is the area agreed to be transferred to the petitioner by the respondents in respect of which suit for specific performance is being agitated. According to the respondents the permanent construction was carried on only in the Masjid area outside the suit property and, therefore, the respondents have not committed any contempt. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner points out that in the counter affidavit itself it is admitted that temporary structures have been put upon on the suit land outside the Masjid area which constitutes the violation of the direction not to alter the nature of the property. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that these temporary structures have been made only to facilitate the running of a school of a neighbour for lack of space and since they are only improvised sheds they can be removed at any time and an undertaking to that effect has also been filed and according that undertaking, the contempt case be closed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the Contempt Case is closed according the undertaking of the respondents, it would be granting a premium on violation of the order of this Court. I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the improvised structures alter the nature of the suit property and constitutes violation of the direction of this Court. The respondents must, therefore, purge themselves of the contempt by making restitution before seeking any lenient treatment. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the improvised structures will be removed immediately. I grant three weeks time for making the restitution and reporting compliance."

The contemners, it seems, reported compliance of the direction of the learned single Judge, but the petitioner contested the said claim. The learned single Judge has upon the same passed the impugned order, dated 1-12-1995, which is to the following effect :

"The bone of contention between the parties is whether my order, dated 26-9-1995, has been complied with or not.

The learned counsel for the respondents submits that it has been complied with by removing all the temporary structures except two small sheds meant for security guards.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire land should be kept vacant, and nothing should remain on the ground. Since both sides are not agreeing on the actual situation, I deem it fit to direct the learned II Addl. Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, to inspect the property and if the order is not so far complied with, to see that it is complied with under his supervision within a period of four weeks."

Two contentions have been raised before us in the appeal against the said order :

(1) that learned single Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction in making the impugned order; and

(2) that in any case the two temporary Structure referred to in the impugned order were in existence from before and they are meant only for temporary user by a guard to see that the vast extent of vacant land is not grabbed by land grabbers.

The first contention, in our opinion, is totally misconceived. Contempt proceedings are not criminal proceedings, but are summary proceedings and the High Court can evolve its own procedure. The power of the Court of Record under Art. 215 of the Constitution of India is not limited to imposing punishment upon the contemner but the main purpose of this power if the court is to see that the order of the court is given effect to. It appears from the above, that the appellant has been found to have violated the injunction order and the learned single Judge has made orders in the proceeding for contempt to restore status quo ante. Learned single Judge is perfectly justified in making the impugned order.

The purpose for which construction has been made in violation of the order of the Court can hardly justify the disobedience. We are not in a position to accept the statement at the Bar that violative constructions were made before the injunction order issued.

In Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, to which one of us (P.S, Mishra, J. as I then was) was a member, it has been clearly laid down that the power of the Court of Record to pass order for restoration of status quo ante is available not only in a civil contempt but a criminal contempt as well. The Full Bench has held that in cases of violation of or disobedience to orders of the Court, the court can grant temporary mandatory injunction pending a contempt petition or independent of it and pending a decision on the desirability of issuing a temporary mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante, the court can pass such orders or give such directions of interim nature for restoration of status quo ante or to ensure that until issue of the grant of mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante, no injury is caused.

Ordinarily no right or interest in a property is recognised in favour of the person who holds an agreement for sale. What will be the effect, however, of delivery of possession under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is also spelled out in the said provision itself that it creates no interest or title. It does not, however, mean that no injunction can be issued at all to maintain status quo and that owner cannot be put, in any circumstance, to such conditions which the court deems fit and proper. Since we are not required to examine the validity of the order of injunction in the instant appeal for which remedy is elsewhere, we have no reason to interfere with the direction of the learned single Judge.

The appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.