Mohd. Vaheed Khan vs Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh and Others

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, C.J.—The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench dated 25.09.2000 in O.A. No. 354-HR of 1998 and two other connected O.As to the extent that while allowing the prayer of the original applicants seeking appointment as Assistant Supervisor Telegraph Traffic (in short A.S.T.T.), the monetary benefits qua the applicants have been restricted to the period post the date of the order. The petitioner and the other original applicants were working in the Telegraph Wing of Haryana Telecom Circle as Telegraphist since designated as Senior T.O.A. (Telegraphy) and after rendering five years'' service became eligible to appear in the departmental competitive examination for the post of A.S.T.T. now designated as Telegraph Traffic Supervisor against 75% departmental quota. It was their case that the minimum marks were obtained by them in the qualifying examination, while their juniors were promoted, they were not so promoted.

In a similar case in O.A. No. 1006-HR of 1993 decided on 21.02.1997, relief had been granted and SLP had been dismissed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court.

In the aforesaid circumstances, the Tribunal observed as under in the operative paragraph of the impugned order:-

The applicants in these three cases are now primarily seeking that they are entitled to appointment as A.S.T.T. as candidates lower in merit than them have been appointed as A.S.T.T. The contention has merit. Candidates lower in merit of the competitive examination have been admittedly offered appointment as A.S.T.T. The applicants, thus, are entitled to appointment as A.S.T.T. being higher in merit. The OAs are, thus, allowed and the applicants shall be promoted and given all the notional benefits as were granted to the applicants in the earlier O.A. No. 1006-HR of 1993. They shall, however, be paid their salaries in the upgraded post of A.S.T.T. from the date of this order and not from the date of filing of the OAs as they approached this Tribunal quite late and after the decision of the said earlier O.A. The order shall be implemented within three months from the date of receipt thereof by the respondents. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

It appears that while the two other original applicants accepted the judgment, the petitioner is still not satisfied as he seeks the financial benefit from the date his juniors were promoted. The alternative submission advanced before us by learned counsel for the petitioner is that it should be made available at least from the date of filing of the O.A. In this behalf, learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sh. Rattan Singh and Others Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, V, where observations have been made that when judgment is in rem and the Court has granted relief to a large number of similarly situated employees, it is expected from a welfare State to apply those decisions to all similarly situated persons without compelling them to knock the doors of the Courts which amounts to wastage of time and public money.

In the facts of the present case, the judgment relied upon by the original applicants was in an O.A. filed in the year 1993 and decided in February, 1997. The O.A. in the present case was filed in the year 1998. The original applicants had not worked in the promoted post and on that ground alone it was permissible for the Tribunal to have denied them the benefits for the said period. Interestingly, the judgment of the Tribunal relied upon by the original applicants which was affirmed right till the Hon''ble Supreme Court itself did not grant all arrears and that aspect was examined by the Division Bench of this Court in the process of scrutiny of that judgment in CWP-16247-2000 decided on 27.02.2001 (against which SLP was dismissed) by observing that the benefit of arrears from the date of deemed promotions had to be rejected as they had not worked on the post. Not only that, in the present case the petitioner chose to come to the Court not when the cause of action arose, but after the judgment was delivered in the matter which forms the basis of his grievance with the prayer for parity.

We, thus, find no infirmity in the impugned order so as to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed.