Mohinder Pal Singh vs Dda and Another

Valmiki J Mehta, J.

IA No. 17266/2012(exemption)

Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

CS(OS) No. 2843/2012

Plaintiff claims to be the son of Sh. Kewal Singh and Smt. Dalbir Kaur. The suit seeks declaration, possession and injunction with respect to a property bearing no. 1/31, Shanti Niketan, New Delhi situated on a plot admeasuring of 2000 sq.yds. As per para 2 of the plaint, the father of the plaintiff died way back on 18.10.1991 i.e. roughly about 21 years back. Para 5 of the plaint further states that with respect to the suit property a registered perpetual sub-lease deed has been executed by the DDA in favour of the mother of the defendant no. 2 i.e. one Mrs. Shamie Singh way back on 26.5.1969. By the suit the plaintiff effectively seeks cancellation of this registered perpetual sub-lease deed in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh executed on 26.5.1969 by the defendant no. 1/DDA. As already stated above, father of the plaintiff, Sh. Kewal Singh died on 18.10.1991 i.e. roughly about 22 years after the lease deed dated 26.5.1969 was executed in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh which as per the plaint was wrongly executed in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh, the alleged second wife of Sh. Kewal Singh. The father of the plaintiff was fully entitled to challenge the so-called illegal lease deed executed by the DDA in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh, but the father who lived for about 22 years after execution of this perpetual sub-lease deed dated 26.5.1969, yet he did not take any action to challenge this sub-lease deed in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh. As per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if a document stands against a person, cancellation of the said document has to be sought within 3 years. Counsel for the plaintiff states that the father, Sh. Kewal Singh did take steps to get the sub-lease deed dated 26.5.1969 cancelled, but he does not know the fate thereof. If that be so the issue is far more worse because what the father of the plaintiff could not do, the present plaintiff/son of Sh. Sh. Kewal Singh cannot do 21 years after the death of his father and about 43 years after the execution of the perpetual sub-lease deed dated 26.5.1969.

The object of law of limitation is two-fold. First is that there must be an end to litigation in public interest. Secondly, by passage of time valuable evidences are lost, and therefore, if there are legal rights existing they have to be exercised within the limitation period prescribed. The subject suit effectively seeking cancellation of perpetual sub-lease deed executed in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh, the mother of defendant no. 2 is therefore quite clearly grossly barred by limitation.

The counsel for the plaintiff argues that in favour of Sh. Kewal Singh there was a perpetual sub-lease deed dated 23.10.1967, and therefore, summons in this suit should be issued. I cannot agree because even if there is a perpetual sub-lease deed dated 23.10.1967 in favour of Sh. Kewal Singh, however as per para 5 of the plaint there is a subsequent perpetual sub-lease deed dated 26.5.1969 in favour of Mrs. Shamie Singh and which stands till date. What the father of the plaintiff could not do surely the plaintiff/son cannot do.

In view of the above, the suit being grossly barred by the limitation is accordingly dismissed.

IA No. 17265/2012(u/ O.39 R. 1 & 2 CPC)

Since the suit has been dismissed, no orders are required to be passed in this application and the same is dismissed as such. Copy of this judgment be sent by post as also the High Court Process Serving Agency to the defendants.