Mota Singh vs Sukhdev Singh

R.N. Mittal, J. (Oral)

This revision petition has been filed by Mota Singh and another against the order of the Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Nabha, dated 18th September, 1985.

Briefly the facts are that Sukhdev Singh (respondent in the revision petition) filed a suit titled as Sukhdev v. Mota Singh'' for permanent injunction against Mota Singh restraining him from alienating the land in dispute on the ground that the latter had entered into an agreement with him for its sale. It was alleged that the necessity to institute the suit for injunction arose as the date prescribed in the agreement for execution of the sale deed had not reached. In the suit he also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for granting adinterim injunction that the said Mota Singh should not alienate the property till the disposal of the suit. The trial Court granted the adinterim injunction as prayed for vide order dated 7th November, 1981. Thereafter Mota Singh transferred the land to Gursharan Singh (now petitioner No. 2 in the revision petition) sometime in February 1982. On 10th June, 1982 Sukhdev Singh respondent filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code for initiating contempt proceedings against Mota Singh and Gursharan Singh petitioners on the ground that Mota Singh had transferred the property in spite of the injunction order, in favour of Gursharan Singh. The suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 24th January, 1983.

The petitioners filed an application before the Court that in view of the dismissal of the suit no proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A could continue against them. Consequently the application for initiating the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A could not continue. It was opposed by Sukhdev Singh respondent who inter alia pleaded that the breach of the injunction order had been committed by the petitioners and therefore they were liable to be punished under the aforesaid rule. He also pleaded that he filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement on 15th July, 1982 in which he made an application for adinterim injunction against Mota Singh and Gursharan Singh that they should not transfer the property during the pendency of the suit. That application was allowed by the trial Court.

The Court dismissed the application of the petitioners vide the impugned order. They have come up in revision to this Court.

It is contended by Mr. Singla that after the first suit of Sukhdev Singh respondent had been dismissed the adinterim injunction issued by the trial Court automatically came to an end and consequently no action can be taken against the petitioner for the breach committed by petitioner No. 1 by alienating the property during the continuance of the adinterim injunction. In support of his contention he places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sheo Kumar Saxena v. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh, Gonda, AIR 1983 Allahabad 180 and Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh, 1985(1) PLR 204.

I have heard the learned counsel at a considerable length. However, I agree with the contention of Mr. Singla. It is not necessary to elaborate the point as the matter has been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in Rachhpal Singh''s case (supra). It was observed by the learned Bench that the provisions of Rule 2A are meant for enforcing an adinterim injunction and not for punishing the person guilty of such disobedience. It was further observed that consequently the continuance of the proceedings under the aforementioned rule would not be justified after the adinterim injunction had been vacated. While making the above observations, the learned Bench placed reliance on Sheo Kumar Saxena''s case (supra). I am in respectful agreement with the above observations. It is wellsettled that after the suit for injunction is dismissed the adinterim injunction comes to an end. Consequently the above observations will apply to the cases where adinterim injunction order is not vacated expressly but stands vacated by dismissal of the suit.

Faced with this situation, Mr. Ajmer Singh, Senior Counsel has contended that the facts of the present case are distinguishable as a second suit had been instituted by the respondent in which again an injunction order had been obtained by him. This was done during the pendency of the first suit. Therefore the dismissal of the first suit will not make any difference. I regret my inability to accept this submission. The application under Order 39 Rule 2A was filed by the respondent for the breach of the injunction order the first suit. Consequently the adinterim order granted in the later suit cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of deciding that application.

For the foregoing reasons I accept the revision petition, set aside the order of the trial Court and dismiss the application of the respondent under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. No order as to costs.