Moti Ram vs State of H.P.

H.S. Thakur, J.—The Appellant Moti Ram has been convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shimla, for an offence u/s 302 I.P.C. and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

Aggrieved by the said order and judgment, the Appellant has filed this appeal.

The learned Sessions Judge has set out in detail the entire evidence on record as also the case of the prosecution in the judgment delivered by him and we do not think it necessary to reproduce the same over again. All the same, it is desirable to state the relevant facts.

The prosecution case in short is that on 28-4-1982 at about 9.15 in the morning, Jattoo Ram (PW. l) of village Basara made a report at Police Station, Rampur. It is stated by him that he is a resident of village Basara and is also a Panch of Dhar Gora Panchayat. He reported that at 7.00 in the morning Manohar Dass (PW. 3) a resident of the same village came to him and informed him that his sister-in-law Smt. Shari Devi had been murdered by his brother Moti Ram and asked him to visit the spot. He thereafter went to the spot and saw the dead body of Smt. Shari Devi lying there and also noticed various marks of injuries on her legs and saw blood at the spot as also a ''drat'' lying nearby. F.I.R. Ex. PA was recorded by the police and the investigation was started. The police visited the spot and found the dead body lying in a ''Khalwara'' situate outside the house of the Appellant. At that time, the police also found that the deceased was wearing only a shirt and her legs were naked. Nine injuries were found on the dead body which were caused by a sharp edged weapon. ''Drat'' Ex. P.1. was found at a distance of two feet from the dead body. Blood was also found all around as also on the floor of the room of the Appellant. Photographs of the dead body were taken and the earth besmeared with blood was also taken into possession. The ''drat'' too lying nearby was taken into possession. Three pieces of wood besmeared with blood were also taken into possession.

During the course of investigation, it was found that the Appellant along with his wife and two minor sons, aged 5 and 2 years, was residing in his ''Dogri''. He was not having cordial relations with his wife as he doubted her chastity. His wife due to her strained relations had gone to her parents'' house but with the intervention of the sister of the Appellant, she returned to the house of the Appellant after he had assured not to say anything to her. Even thereafter, the relations between the Appellant and his wife were not cordial. On 27-4-1982, after taking meals, the Appellant, the deceased and their minor sons went to bed. After sometime, the Appellant had some quarrel with the deceased. The Appellant took out a ''drat'' and gave the deceased ''drat'' blows on her leg and, in-order to save her life, she ran out of the house. The Appellant followed her with ''drat'' in his hand and gave repeated blows to her who fell outside in the''Khalwara''. Even thereafter, the Appellant gave more blows of ''drat'' to her. She died in the ''Khalwara'' and the Appellant after throwing ''drat'' there, took both of his minor sons with him and went to the nearby ''Dogri'' of his real brother, Pad am Dass, where his Anr. brother, Manohar Dass (PW.3) also along with Smt. Bishi Devi (PW.5) was sleeping. The Appellant called Manohar Dass, who woke up. The Appellant handed over his two minor sons to him and told him that "Usne Apni Gharwali Ki Lash Dal.Dee Hai" and also said that he was going to the river. Manohar Dass saw some blood on the hand of the Appellant which also dropped on the wooden floor. He even found blood on the clothes of the Appellant. The Appellant thre attned Manohar Dass (PW) that in case he raised any alarm, he too would be put to death. Thereafter, the Appellant left the room and went away.

Manohar Dass on the next morning visited the spot and saw the dead body of the deceased lying on the ''Khal-wara''and a ''drat'' near the dead body. He reportel the matter to Jattoo Ram (PW. l). During investigation, the police took into possession blood-stained pieces of wood from the verandah and the room of Manohar Dass. The Appellant revealed to Rattan Dass (PW.7) that he had been ruined and his sons had also been ruined and that his wife was dead. Rattan Dass asked the reasons of the death of his wife. The Appellant told that he had killed his wife. Ram Singh (PW.8) has deposed that the Appellant confessed that he had murdered his wife with a ''drat''. Rattan Dass (PW 7) and Ram Singh (PW.8) are stated to have handed over the Appellant to the police.

On the arrest of the Appellant, injury on his left thumb was found and he was medically examined. Phanku Ram (PW9) also deposed that the Appellant had admitted his guilt of murdering his wife. The dead body was sent for post-mortem and, according to the report of the doctor, the death was caused due to excessive haemorrhage as a result of multiple injuries caused by a sharp edged weapon. The clothes of the Appellant, the ''drat'', blood-stained earth and blood-stained pieces of wood were sent for chemical examination. All these articles were found to contain Wood. Pieces of blood-stained wood were found to contain human blood whereas the blood on other items could not be detemined as the blood on these articles had been disintegrated.

The prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses. The learned trial Court has reproduced the entire evidence on record but it is not necessary to reproduce the same over again.

The only contention that has been pressed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that from the evidence on record, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the offence committed (by the Appellant does not fall u/s 302 IPC but the offence, if any, committed by him falls u/s 304 Part-II I.P.C

The learned Counsel for the Appellant in support of his contention has referred to the decision in Jayappa Dattu Rajage and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, A perusal of the decision shows that the doctor who carried out the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased revealed two contused lacerated wounds over the right frontal and fronto parietal region of the skull, one contused lacerated wound over the right eye-brow region, two contused lacerated wounds over the right leg and innumerable abrasions all over the body. On the basis of the injuries found on the dead body, the doctor opined that the deceased has died as a result of shock and haemorrhage due to subdural haematoma and fractures of the bones. He further opined that the injuries were not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, even cumulatively. He also opined that the haematoma all over under the scalp might have been due to the contused lacerated wounds over the right frontal and fronto parietal regions. In his cross-examination, the doctor stated that every head injury need not result in haematoma. He admitted that the post-mortem examination made by him showed that the deceased had consumed alcohol and that the consumption of alcohol results in dilation of blood vessels and if a person in a drunken condition sustained head injury haematoma might occur because of dilation of blood vessels. The opinion of the dector was that the death was due to shock and haemorrhage due to subdural haematoma and fractures. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:

...Even if the nature of injuries was such that they were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, they could certainly be said to be the result of acts so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury is likely to cause death, so as to fall within the fourth limb of Section 300. We are not here concerned with the question whether the acts of the accused resulting in the injuries received by the deceased fall within the fourth limb of Section 300 as there is no appeal by the State to this Court. It can, however, be said, without any hesitation, that the acts of the Appellants resulting in the injuries to the deceased were done with the knowledge that they would cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. The High Court was not in error in convicting the Appellants u/s 304 Part-II read with Section 34.

It is contended by Mr. M.S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate-General, that the Appellant has been rightly convicted for the offence u/s 302 I.P.C. He has referred to the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another, The relevant observations may be extracted for a ready reference :

The principal question that falls to be considered in this appeal is, whether the offence disclosed by the facts and circumstances established by the prosecution against the Respondent, is ''murder'' or culpable homicide not amounting to ''murder.

In the scheme of the Penal Code, ''culpable homicide'' is genus and ''murder'' its specie. All ''murder'' is ''culpable homicide'' but not vice versa. Speaking generally ''culpable homicide'' sans ''special characteristics of murder'' is ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder''. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ''culpable homicide of the first degree''. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ''murder''. The second may be termed as ''culpable homicide of the second degree''. This is punishable under the 1st part of Section 304. Then, there is ''culpable homicide of the third degree''. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

The academic distinction between ''murder'' and ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder'' has vexed the Courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.

Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Cls. (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ''intention to cause death'' is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender''s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.

Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Ins tances of cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an inten tion to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.

In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ''likely to cause death'' occurring in the correspond ing Clause (6) of Section 299, the words ''''sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of ''probable'' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words ''bodily injury....sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death'' mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the [ordinary course of nature.

For cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874, is an apt illustration of this point.

In Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, Vivian Bose,J., Speaking for this Court, explained the meaning and scope of Clause (3), thus (at page 1500) (of SCR) : (at page 467 of AIR):

The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case u/s 300, "3rdly". First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the inquiry proceeds further, and, fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point".

"21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a Court is confronted with the question whether the offence is ''murder'' or ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder'' on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of Anr. . Proof of such casual connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of ''murder'' contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder'', punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder'' punishable under the First Part of Section 304, Penal Code.

The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages."

The High Court has held that the accused had no intention to cause death because they deliberately avoided to hit any vital part of the body, and confined the beating to the legs and arms of the deceased. There is much that can be said in support of this particular finding. But that finding-assuming it be correct-does not necessarily take the case out of the definition of ''murder''. The crux of the matter is, whether the facts established bring the case within clause Thirdly of Section 300. This question further narrows down into a consideration of the two-fold issue:

(i) Whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the accused ?

(ii) If so, were they sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature ? If both these elements are satisfactorily established, the offence will be ''murder'', irrespective of the fact whether an intention on the part of the deceased to cause death, had or had not been proved.

Question arose whether in such a case when no significant injury had been inflicted on a vital part of the body, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis, and the accused could not be said to have the intention of causing death, the offence would be ''murder'' or merely ''culpable homicide not amounting to murder''. This Court, speaking through Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was), after explaining the comparative scope of and the distinction between Sections 299 and 300, answered the question in these terms :

The injuries were not on a vital part of the body and no weapon was used which can be described as specially dangerous. Only lathis were used. It cannot, therefore, be said safely that there was an intention to cause the death of Bherun within the first clause of Section 300. At the same time, it is obvious that his hands and legs were smashed and numerous bruises and lacerated wounds were caused. The number of injuries shows that every one joined in beating him. It is also clear that the assailants aimed at breaking his arms and legs. Looking at the injuries caused to Bherun in furtherance of the common intention of all it is clear that the injuries intended to be caused were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, even if it cannot be said that his death was intended. This is sufficient to bring the case within 3rdly of Section .300.

The ratio of Anda and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan, applies in full force to the facts of the present case. Here, a direct casual connection between the act of the accused and the death was established. The injuries were the direct cause of the death. No secondary factor such as gangrene, tetanus etc. supervened. There was no doubt whatever that the beating was premeditated and calculated. Just as in Anda''s case, here also, the aim of the assailants was to smash the arms and legs of the deceased, and they succeeded in that design, causing no less than 19 injuries, including fractures of most of the bones of the legs and the arms. While in Anda''s case, the sticks used by the assailants were not specially dangerous, in the instant case they were unusually heavy, lethal weapons. All these acts of the accused were preplanned and intentional which, considered objectively in the light of the medical evidence, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The mere fact that the beating was designedly confined by the assailants to the legs and arms, or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, will not exclude the application of clause 3rdly of Section 300. The expression "bodily injury" in clause 3rdly includes also its plural, so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures up to such sufficiency. The ''sufficiency'' spoken of in this clause, as aheady noticed is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional the case would fall under Clause 3rdly of Section 300. All the conditions which are a pre-requite for the applicability of this clause have been established and the offence committed by the accused in the instant case was ''murder''.

The other decision to which reference has been made is, in Bakhtawar and Another Vs. State of Haryana, Briefly, the facts of that were that the deceased while ploughing his land noticed the accused cutting bushes from his ''Johari'' and taking it to the land which was in their possession. Thereupon, the deceased prevented the accused from doing so whereupon the accused launched an attack on him. One of the accused inflicted injuries on his arm and other parts of the body with a ''lathi'' and the other gave blows on his head from wrong side of a ''gandasi''. Two of the witnesses, who were near to the place of occurrence, extricated the deceased from the clutches of the accused who ran away towards their fields. The deceased who had become unconscious as a result of the injuries reported the matter to the village Sarpanch. The deceased was removed to civil hospital where he succumbed to his injuries shortly after admission. The doctor who performed the autopsy had found. 12 injuries on the body of the deceased and opined that two of the injuries which were grievous were sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. On a consideration of the evidence, the Sessions Judge found that the Appellant did not have the intention of causing the murder but had only knowledge that the injuries caused by them were likely to cause death. Accord ingly, the accused were convicted u/s 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. The accused and the State preferred appeals. The High Court, however, found that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused u/s 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. The accused preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. On the aforesaid facts, their lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:

The evidence of these two eye witnesses is trustworthy and there is no reason to discard the same. The evidence of these two witnesses receives ample corroboration not only from the statement of Risal Singh (P.W. 8) but also from the testimony of the doctor who has opined that out of the injuries detailed above, injuries Nos. 11 and 12 were grievous and were sufficient to cause the death of the decease d. For the commission of the offence of murder it is not necessary that the accused should have the intention to cause death. It is now well settled that if it is proved that the accused had the intention to inflict the injuries actually suffered by the victim and such injuries are found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the ingredients of clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code are fulfilled and the accused must be held guilty of murder punishable u/s 302 of the Code. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, and State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another, . There is no doubt in our mind that the accused in the present case had the intention to cause the injuries found on the body of the deceased. As already stated, those injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The ratio of the two decisions just above cited, therefore, applies fully to the facts of the instant case.

We may now consider the facts of the case in hand and the impact of the decisions referred to above. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has not disputed the facts and the conclusion of guilt arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. However, as mentioned earlier above, he has contended that the offence, if any, proved against the Appellant falls within the purview of Part-II of Section 304 and not u/s 302 IPC. The doctor who performed the post-mortem has found the following injuries on the person of the deceased :

(i) Incised wound-10 cm x 5cm x 6cm was present over posterior aspect of left leg. Margins of wound were clean cut, gaping of wound was present. Muscles were severed through, wound was bone deep, bone was exposed, direction of the wound was from behind forwards.

(ii) Incised wound 13 cm x 7cm x 6cm was present over posterolateral aspect of left thigh, margins of wound were clean cut, gaping was present. Muscles were severed through, direction of the wound was from behind forward. (iii) Incised wound 10 cm x 5.5 cm x 4cm was present over left poplital region, margins were clean cut, gaping of wound was present, direction of wound was from behind forwaids. (iv) Incised wound 7 cm x 3cm x 1 cm was present over anteromedial surface of left leg in upper l/3rd, margins were clean cut, direction of the wound was from above downwards, (v) Incised wound 5.5 cmx 1 cm. x 0.5 cm was present over anteromedial surface of left leg in lower l/3rd. (vi) Incised wound 18cm x 7cm x 8cm was present over anteromedial surface of right thigh, margins were clean cut, muscles were severed through, direction of the wound was below upwards. (vii) A small incised wound 2 cm x 2cm x 0.5 cm was present over medial aspect of right foot. (viii) Incised wound 5cm x 3cm x 2cm were present over ulner side the right wrist joint cavity was exposed.

(ix) Incised wound 4cm x 2cm x l cm was present over posterior aspect of left shoulder.

The doctor has opined that the individual died of excessive haemorrhage as a result of sustaining multiple injuries caused by a sharp edged weapon. According to him, injuries No. 1 to 3 and 6 were individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. He has further stated that all these injuries were dangerous to life. He has, however, opined that within 5 to 10 minutes of the receiving of the injuries on the person of the deceased the medical aid could not be given to the deceased on the basis of which she could be saved. The doctor has also opined that these injuries could be caused by ''drat'' Ex. P. 1 from sharp-edged side.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge has scanned the entire evidence and has enumerate 1 the facts and circumstances which established the offence of murder against the Appellant. The evidence shows that the Appellant had strained relation with his deceased wife. On the fateful night, the Appellant had some quarrel with the deceased. He took out a ''drat'' which is a sharp-edged weapon and gave blows with it on the leg of the deceased. The deceased in order to save her life tan out of the house. She was followed by the Appellant with ''drat'' in his hand and gave repeated blows to her who consequently fell in the ''Khalwara'' (thrashing floor). Even thereafter, the Appellant continued to give ''drat'' blows to the deceased. All such blows were given from the sharp-edged side of the ''drat''. The deceased, as referred to above, died in the ''Khalwara'' due to haemorrhage as a result of sustaining multiple injuries. The opinion of the doctor that the deceased died due to such injuries is not disputed. In the opinion of the doctor, the injuries No. 1 to 3 and 6 were individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased and that all these injuries were dangerous to life. The case apparently falls within the purview of Clause (3) of Section 300 of the Penal Code. In order to constitute such offence, it is not necessary that an offender should have intended to cause death but in the eye of law so long as the'' death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the offence of murder is established. The decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the Appellant in Jayappa Dattu''s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that Case, the doctor had opined that the injuries were not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature even cumulatively. The doctor had further found that the deceased had consumed alcohol and that the consumption of alcohol results in dilation of blood vessels and if a person in a drunken condition sustains head injury haematoma might occur because of dilation of blood vessels.

In our opinion, if a person knowingly causes injuries which are more likely to cause death than not in the ordinary way his offence falls under either Clause (2) or (3) of Section 300 Penal Code, and that when a person dies as a result of ''merciless beating'' the offence is one of murder. In fact, there is no radical difference between the offence of culpable homicide and murder. The causing of death is common to both the offences. The act which caused it is the act of the offender in each case. There must necessarily be crimmal intention or knowledge in both cases. The true difference, then, lies in the degree there being the greater intention or knowledge of the fatal result in the one case than in the other. This difference is attempted to be accentuate 1 by the four clauses describing the offence u/s 300 Penal Code. In a case u/s 302 what Courts have to see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused know to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention or some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. It is not necessary for the application of Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. that the injury must be such as would, make it impossible for the injured to escape death. All that is required is that the injury intended must be such as would in the ordinary course of nature be sufficient to cause death. There may be a case in which even though the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the injured may escape death, but if he dies as a result of such an injury, the offence would be covered by Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. and be murder. If, however, the injuries of such a nature as are only likely to cause death and would not in the ord inary course of nature be sufficient to cause death, it would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The case in hand does not fall under any of the exceptions as enumerated u/s 300 I.P.C. It is established beyond any reasonable doubt that the Appellant, who is a young man,! slaughtered the deceased in a merciless manner. He gave ''drat'' blows from the sharp-edged side on her legs. She tried to save her life and ran outside the house with fresh injuries, she was chased by the Appellant and gave her repeated blows on which she helplessly fell down in the ''Khalwara''. Even thereafter, ''drat'' blows were given to her and ultimately she died due to excessive haemorrhage as a result of sustaining multiple injuries. The opinion of the doctor, who performed the post-mortem, is that the probable time that elapsed between injuries arid death is 5 to 10 minutes.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles of law as laid down in the cases referred to above, we have no alternative but to affirm the decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

The result of the above discussion is that the appeal is dismissed and the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is affirmed.