High CourtsSingle Bench

M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur and M.P. Electricity Board vs Laxman, Bhima and Laludas

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 19 June 2013 · Citation: (2013) 5 MPHT 51 : (2013) 3 MPLJ 459

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Seth, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 1 of 1999

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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 930 words

S.K. Seth, J.—This appeal is by the defendant No. 1 and 2. They are challenging JUDGMENT and DECREE passed by the trial Court whereby the suit was partly decreed in favour of Laxman to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000/- which he is entitled to get from appellants as compensation for the death of his two minor sons due to electrocution. Briefly stated, relevant facts culled out from the pleadings are these.

2.

Laxman had two sons, viz. Gordhan and Shantu (since deceased). Both were minors and that on 18.3.1992 they died due to electrocution as a result of live electricity wire came in contact with a flowing river. Laxman claimed that children were unaware of the electric current in the river water and on the bank where the cattle were grazing. He stated in para 6 and 7 of the plaint:

3.

It was accepted that a temporary connection for three months was given to Respondent No. 2 but it was duly disconnected after expiry of three months and much before the date of the accident, therefore, appellants No. 1 and 2 are not responsible and liable to pay any compensation, Respondent No. 2 in his written statement submitted that after the temporary connection expired he had left the motors, wires etc. in the field and taking advantage of his temporary absence from the village, respondent No. 3 illegally abstracted electricity from the main supply lines, therefore this respondent was not at all liable. Respondent No. 3 denied these allegations and submitted that children died due to current in the river water, for which he had nothing to do and therefore, he was also not responsible to compensate the appellant.

4.

With these pleading parties went to trial and adduced evidence.

5.

Learned trial Court on due consideration of evidence reached the conclusion that the children died accidentally due to electrocution because the current had spread over the river water and the bank. That the children were unaware of this when they came in contact with the current and accidentally died. There was negligence on the part of appellants as no steps were taken to prevent the illegal abstraction of energy from the supply lines. In view of these findings learned trial Court awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- to Laxman against appellants as compensation and Rs. 10,000 against Bhima. Thus, in all, Court awarded a sum of Rs. 1,10,000/- as compensation for death of two sons due to electrocution.

6.

We heard arguments at length. Perused the record of the trial Court. Learned counsel has taken us through the entire pleadings and evidence in support of his argument that liability was wrongly fastened on the appellants. He submitted that when, after a temporary connection is duly disconnected and then somebody does mischief or theft resulting in accident, under these circumstances MPEB cannot be held responsible. He further submitted that "Principle of strict liability" is inapplicable to the facts of the case. Lastly he submitted that apportionment is arbitrary, illegal and as such is unsustainable in law.

7.

On a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we find that the Court below has properly appreciated the evidence and recorded correct findings of fact. These findings cannot be categorised as perverse, arbitrary or worthless. They are based on proper analysis and the inferences drawn are not preposterous. Facts established in the case fully attract the well accepted principle of "strict/absolute liability" laid down by Blackburn J. in Ryland vs. Fletcher (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265. It is now well established that the:

Neighbour who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as remained confined to his own property, but which he known to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour''s, should be obliged to make good the damages which ensues if does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there, no mischief could have occurred, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stench..... (Quoted from Salmonds & Heuston on Law of Torts, Eighteenth Edition p.299)

8.

In view of the settled position of law and the finding of facts recorded by the Court below on the evidence adduced by the parties during trial, in the considered view of this Court there is no merit and substance in the appeal. Before parting with the case we must deal with another point. Court below found that no evidence was adduced by the appellants to show what steps were taken to prevent the theft of electricity. It is a matter of common knowledge that there is wide and gaping gulf between the demand and supply and distribution of energy. In these circumstances nefarious activities gain prominence and people indulge in illegal and unauthorised use of energy and despite prophylactic measures, so far the appellants have not been able to eradicate or curb theses tendencies. It was therefore, all the more necessary for appellants to exercise better vigilance and proper care to prevent the theft or unauthorised theft of electricity to prevent such type of mishaps. Having failed to do so, appellants cannot turn around and say that they are not liable. We find no fault with the apportionment of liability. Accordingly the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.