Mr. A.S. Manjrekar vs Bombay Port Trust and Another

Anoop V. Mohta, J.—The petitioner has challenged the Awards dated 12.03.1996 (Part I) and 15.07.1996 (Part II) by respondent No. 2, whereby the action of the respondent/Bombay Port Trust in dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 08.01.1990 after due inquiry was upheld. By order dated 08.08.1997, this Court has admitted the matter and expedited the hearing.

The matter is called out from the final hearing board.

Heard the parties and taken note of written submissions filed by them.

The petitioner was working as watchman since 14.10.1982. On 06.07.1998 when he was on duty, the police arrested as he was in unauthorised possession of one oil tin. The said oil tin was marked "Refined oil-United States of America". He was arrested and released on bail and ultimately the Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the petitioner u/s 381 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) along with one Mr. Laxman Bhimji Das, the Superintendent of BPT by order dated 10.02.1989.

In view of Regulation 7.3 of the BPT Employees (CCA) Rules & Regulations, 1976 vide Order dated 19.07.1989 though earlier suspension order was withdrawn and he was permitted to resume working with effect from 20.03.1989. The respondent/Trust issued a charge-sheet dated 07.03.1989 having charges of similar nature along with others. The alleged misconduct falls under Regulation 22(2)(b) of the BPT Rules and it also violates Regulation 3.1 of the BPT Regulations, 1976 for lacking integrity and devotion to duty. As reply dated 13.04.1989 was not satisfactory, a departmental inquiry was held. The inquiry was commenced on 24.05.1989 and completed on 10.08.1989. The inquiry report found the petitioner guilty. Therefore, a show cause notice dated 5.10.1989 was issued proposing the penalty of dismissal. The petitioner resisted and denied the same by letter dated 18.11.1989. However, considering the material available on record read with the evidence, by order dated 01.01.1990 the petitioner was dismissed from the service. The Appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 07.12.1990.

An industrial dispute was raised and referred by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, for adjudication of Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2. An Award dated 12.03.1996 (Part I) was passed. It was held that the departmental inquiry was in accordance with the law and did not suffer from any breach of principles of natural justice. Thereafter the Award dated 15.07.1996 (Part II) was passed and thereby maintained the order of dismissal by holding it to be just, legal and proper.

The main submission raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner by relying on various judgments and basically contended that on similar charges the action of dismissal is illegal, perverse and bad in law as the learned Magistrate has acquitted the petitioner on similar charges. The inquiry was not in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice.

The respondent/Trust has supported the impugned Awards on all counts and made their submissions based upon the various Authorities.

(a) The Apex Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Sing 2006 (109) FLR 852 has considered the scope of judicial review in respect of punishment imposed on an employee, held thus:

It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed....

(b) In The Employers Management West Bokaro Colliery of TISCO Ltd. Vs. Concerned Workman, Ram Pravesh Singh, the Apex Court has again concerned the scope of disciplinary proceedings as against acquittal in a criminal proceeding and held thus:

...It has repeatedly been held by this Court that the acquittal in a criminal case would not operate as a bar for drawing up of a disciplinary proceeding against a delinquent. It is well settled principle of law that yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the one in disciplinary proceedings. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.

(c) In Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh Vs. Management of Usha Breco Ltd. and Another, the Apex Court has observed as under:

In a departmental proceeding, standard of proof is not that misconduct must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt but standard of proof is as to whether the test of preponderance of probability has been met....

(d) In Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida and Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 385 the Apex Court held that "the standard of proof required in the departmental proceeding is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the same does not bar departmental proceedings...."

(e) In Workmen of Balmadies Estates Vs. Management Balmadies Estate and Others, the Apex Court again held as under:

...The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiry is not required to be made by applying the same yardstick as a civil court could do when a lis is brought before it. The Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry so far as the domestic enquiries are concerned, though the principles of fairness are to apply. It is also fairly well settled that in a domestic enquiry guilty may not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the proof of misconduct would be sufficient. In a domestic enquiry all materials which are logically probative including hearsay evidence can be acted upon provided it has a reasonable nexus and credibility.

(f) Similarly, in Manager, R.B.I., Bangalore Vs. S. Mani and Others, the Apex Court considered the effect of acquittal in a criminal case and held that merely acquittal of an employee in a criminal case would not entitle him for reinstatement.

It is clear from the above that (a) merely because an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, that would not debar the employer to initiate or continue a departmental proceeding and/or to drop the charges so levelled in the event an order of acquittal is passed, (b) the standard of proof in a criminal case can be based upon principle of "beyond all reasonable doubt", (c) the standard of proof is required in departmental proceeding is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge; (d) If there is a acquittal in a criminal case the same does not mean that the departmental proceeding so initiated should be dropped; (e) the criminal proceeding as well as departmental proceeding can run together; (f) The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiry may not be strict as per Civil Court. The Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry though the governing principle of fairness and the natural justice just cannot be overlooked. The relevant material and the evidence available on record need to be taken note of in the domestic enquiry having reasonable nexus and credibility including the hearsay evidence if available and (g) Merely because there is acquittal order in a criminal case, that itself would not entitle the employee the order of re-instatement in each and every matter. It also depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The order passed in criminal proceeding may be taken note of in the departmental proceeding, but that itself is not sufficient to dismiss the departmental proceeding and/or not to take action based upon the charges so levelled if it falls within the ambit of respective service conditions.

The reliance was placed on the judgments of M. Paul Anthony (Capt.) v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. 1999 I CLR 1032; Ramkrishna Shivram Gadekar v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai and Anr. 2009 II CLR 866; Borosil Glass Works Ltd. v. M.G./Chjitala & Richard M. D''souza 1974 LLJ 184 and Jaywant Bhaskar Sawant v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay and Ors. 1994 II CLR 737. The facts and circumstances in all the above cases are totally different and distinguishable specially in view of above Supreme Court''s finding as recorded above.

The Supreme Court judgments so relied by the learned Counsel for the respondents were not available and were considered in subsequent judgments of this Court. It is clear that once there is an order of acquittal based upon the similar charges, it is necessary for the Enquiry Officer to take note of relevant factors before dealing with the similar charges again and/or while passing the order against the same employee, but subject to service conditions. The employer, if not debarred from continuing with the departmental enquiry and/or is not under obligation to drop the proceeding and/or reinstate such employee immediately after acquittal order and specially considering the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the nature of charges so levelled and as in the present case, after holding due inquiry, by following the principles of natural justice, if the petitioner found to be guilty as charges were prov ed and as those amount to misconduct falls within the ambit of the service conditions so referred above, the submissions so raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, are unacceptable as after going through the charges so raised and the reasoning so recorded by the Enquiry Officer and by the Presiding Officer in both these Awards and as there is no perversity and there is no illegality, the Awards so passed, in my view, in the present facts and circumstances are well within the frame work of law and the record and need no interference.

This Court, under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not sitting as an Appellate Court and/or to review the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. The Court needs to consider, whether action taken by the respondent/Trust is well within the frame work of respective service conditions and the principles of natural justice. If it found the case against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent and specially the Tribunal Member has considered even the order of acquittal and passed the order and maintained the order of dismissal, the submission that the writ Court bound to set aside the order of dismissal is unacceptable though the acquittal order was not challenged by the respondent/Trust.

The well reasoned order given by the Inquiry Officer on 26.09.1989 by holding that Charge No. 1 against the petitioner/worker was proved and further report is not perverse and maintained the dismissal action of the Trust. The relevant observation, apart from the FIR and/or failure to prove the panchanama as panch witness turned hostile to the prosecution and thereby the prosecution unable to corroborate only the relevant witness P.W. 3-Ashok, referring to a Circular of the Trust based upon the conditions dated 6.7.1987, is as under:

...It clearly speaks out that even if the cargo or any other property and/or any other material belonging to and/or in the custody of the port trust is found lying in abandoned condition, intact or loose it should not be touched for shifting from one place to another place for the purpose of safe storage prior to lodgment of a complaint with the police. It is further observed that contravention of the above stipulation shall be charged for violation of the order and or for contending the theft of the cargo from the docks. It is tried to suggest that this circular was not brought to the notice of security department. No doubt there is no endorsement that it is sent to the security department. But it can be seen that this circular is important one. It was sent to shed superintendent staff offices having 200 copies for distribution. That clearly goes to show that it must have been sent to the security department or even if not sent they are widely published on the notice boards and the worker must be aware of this type of circulars. As this is so there was no reason for the worker to touch the tin which was according to him thrown by unknown person and ran away.

It is tried to submit that from the testimony of Das it reveals that many of the tins were already taken away by the consignee. It means they are available in the market. From the marking of the tin it reveals that the tins were not for sale. Not only that it is not the case of the worker that he purchased the tin from a particular shop. He was found in possession of that tin in the premises of the BPT. That speaks against the worker. The tin was not found at its proper place where other consignment was lying. That itself goes to show that it was removed by somebody. It am not here to decide whether there was a theft or not. But the fact remains that the tin was in possession of the worker which is contrary to the circular issued by the BPT. Further from that testimony of Ashok Raorane it has to be said that the tin was in the bag of the worker and was from the shed of the BPT.

In the impugned order, the learned Judge has taken note of the order of acquittal so relied upon and dealt with the aspects in detail. Even otherwise, once the departmental inquiry is conducted in accordance with law and the reasoning supports the case of respondent/Trust that the petitioner is guilty of charges and that amounts to misconduct as contemplated under the Service Conditions and, therefore, the punishment so imposed as per the service conditions just cannot be set aside after so many years merely because there was acquittal order passed by the Magistrate specially in the present facts and circumstances of the case as the learned Judge has even considered those aspects in detail. The Court cannot compel the employer to continue such employees against whom, after holding due inquiry, they able to prove the charges independently and irrespective of the criminal proceedings. If both the proceeding can run together, it also means the different and respective principles of assessments of evidence and material apply and if, after due inquiry, the employer in view of the departmental inquiry report uses discretion and take action of dismissal of such employee within the frame work of service conditions, I see there is no reason that Court should interfere with the same as there is no case of perversity and/or any illegality. In such circumstances. The scope of judicial review is quite limited and restricted. Therefore, in my view, there is no case of interference.

In view of above, the Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.