High CourtsSingle Bench(2018) 08 BOM CK 0168

Mr. Edgar Melo Furtado s/o Alberto Melo Furtado vs State of Goa

Bombay High Court · Decided on 10 August 2018

HON’BLE JUDGES
Nutan D. Sardessai, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Appeal From Order No.22 Of 2018

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Judgment

127 paragraphs · 2,840 words
1.

Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Advocate for the parties.

2.

Admit.

3.

Shri  Amogh Prabhudessai, learned Additional Government Advocate waives service of notice on behalf of the respondents.

4.

The original plaintiffs aggrieved by the order dated 26/3/2018 passed by the learned Ad-hoc District Judge- I, FTC, Mapusa dismissing their

application for temporary injunction is in appeal under Order XLIII rule 1 CPC against the respondents who are the defendants before the Trial Court.

The parties would be referred to as the plaintiffs and defendants for brevity's sake hereinafter.

5.

It was the case of the plaintiff No.1 that he was the coowner of the property bearing Survey No.76/1-B2 admeasuring 8102 sq.mts. being a part of

the large property known as 'Odlem Sorgul' situated at Pilerne while the plaintiff No.2 was the co-owner of the plot No.'A' admeasuring 17100 sq mts.

forming a part of the same property bearing Survey Nos.76/1-B which are the suit properties for brevity's sake hereinafter. Their names were

recorded in the Survey records as co-owners. There was no public road demarcated in the survey plan of the said property nor was there any nullah

passing through the said properties as per the survey plan. The plaintiff No.1 visited the suit properties on 25/10/2016 and was shocked to notice the

construction work carried out by the defendants No.2 through its contractor who had excavated a part of the suit properties indicating that the

defendant No.2 had started a construction of the nullah through the suit properties. The plaintiffs were shocked to learn of the said development as

the part of the suit properties were neither acquired by the defendants nor was their consent obtained for carrying out the work of the construction

of the nullah. The contractors of the defendant No.2 continued to carry on the work despite the request for which they were constrained to lodge a

police complaint highlighting the act of illegal encroachment and tresspass. The Assistant Engineer in the course of the inquiry informed that the

work was carried out at the instance of the Village Panchayat of Pilerneâ€"Marra which had made a representation that the properties belonged to

the Communidade of Pilerne and it had given an NOC for carrying out the works in the suit properties.

6.

The plaintiffs were constrained to file a Writ Petition bearing Stamp No.3558/2016 challenging the illegal construction carried out by the defendant

No.2 and by an order dated 01/12/2016, the petition was disposed off as withdrawn with the directions to file appropriate proceedings. The plaintiffs

filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction to restrain the defendant No.2 from constructing the nullah without following the due procedure of

law in their property and violating their proprietary rights. They had also filed an application for temporary injunction seeking ex-parte ad-interim

relief. The defendants filed their written statement seeking the dismissal of the suit apart from the reply to the temporary injunction. The learned

District Judge on hearing both the parties was pleased to dismiss the temporary injunction application which was liable for interference on grounds that

it was contrary to law and patently illegal, suffered from a total non-application of mind inasmuch as the learned District Judge had misconstrued the

material on record while holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the grant of temporary injunction.

7.

The District Judge failed to take into consideration the survey plan where there was no existing nullah demarcated therein. The learned District

Judge completely misdirected itself by mechanically relying upon the written statement of the defendants contrary to the survey records clearly

establishing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs as well as the non-existence of any nullah in the suit property. The learned District Judge

failed to take into consideration that there was no express or implied consent given by the plaintiffs to the defendants or any other person to carry out

the construction. The learned District Judge fell in error on such and similar grounds taken in the appeal memo and therefore the impugned order was

liable for interference.

8.

Heard Shri Shivan Desai, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs who submitted that the plaintiffs were the owners in possession of the Survey holding

76/1B-2 and 76/1B at Pilerne which was amply demonstrated from the survey records form I and XIV apart from the Deed of Partition. The

defence taken by the defendants was that a nullah was existing and besides they were supported by the NOC issued by the Communidate of Pilerne

in respect of the Survey No.76/1 which was admittedly not the subject matter of the suit.  The plaintiffs were the coowners in possession and

enjoyment of the Survey holding No.76/1B and 76/1B-2 which did not in any manner relate to the property of the Communidade bearing Survey

No.76/1. He adverted to the impugned order and submitted that the learned District Judge had placed overmuch reliance on the NOC of the

Communidade while disbelieving the case of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, there was no acquisition of the plaintiff's property and therefore they could not

do any work of excavation which amounted to an act of interference with their proprietary rights. He placed reliance in Tukaram Kana Joshi and

others v/s. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others [(2013)Â 1 SCC 353].

9.

Shri A. Prabhudessai, learned Additional Government Advocate for the defendants adverted to the impugned order, submitted that a tender notice

was issued on 20/04/2015 and the work started in May,2016.  The suit and the application for injunction suffered from delay and laches and on

that ground too the appeal had to be dismissed. This Court had to consider the impact on public projects and in that context he placed reliance in

Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and others v/s. Pune Municipal Corporation and another [(1995) 3 SCC 33] and pressed for the dismissal of the

appeal.  Shri Shivan Desai, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs in reply submitted that the Civil Suit was filed in January, 2017 and prior to that he

had approached this Court in a Writ Petition which was disposed off with a direction to pursue appropriate remedies. Moreover he was secured

with the order of status quo before the Trial Court. The acts of the defendants were highhanded and in colourable exercise of powers and on all these

counts the appeal had to be allowed and the impugned order had to be quashed and set aside.

10.

i would consider their submissions, the judgments relied upon and the records relevant to the case and in the light thereof decide the appeal

appropriately without overlooking the settled principles culled out in Wander Ltd. And another v/s. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. [1990 (Supp) SCC 727]

holding that being an appeal in principle, the Appellate Court would not substitute its discretion for that exercised by the Trial Court only because a

different view is possible.

11.

The Survey records produced by the plaintiffs clearly show their names recorded as occupants in respect of the Survey holding No.76/1B-2 and

76/1B with no name of the Communidade of Pilerne either recorded as a co-occupant or in the other rights column in respect of any of these Survey

holdings. The Survey Plan produced in respect of these two Survey holding No.76/1B-2 and 76/1B also does not show the existence of any nullah

to substantiate the case of the respondents on the existence and on continuity of the nullah through the property of the plaintiffs so as to entitle them to

continue with the construction activities carried out therein. The basic premise on which the defendants assert the right to carry on the construction

activity of the nullah in the suit property stems from the Certificate issued by the Communidade of Pilerne dated 15/11/2014 pursuant to which its

attorney had certified on going though the records of the Communidade that the land bearing Survey No.76/1 of village Pilerne was under the

ownership of Communidade and as proposed by the Panchayat, the Communidade had no objection under the Government of Goa under the Water

Resource Department for cleaning of the nullah with RCC slab covering the existing nullah starting from the Jivottam Math to the house of Chipkar.

Therefore to all intents and purposes, the NOC issued by the Communidade of Pilerne cannot at all support the case of the defendants to carry out the

construction in the plaintiffs' properties surveyed under No.76/1B-2 and 76/1B when the NOC pertains to the Survey No.76/1.

12.

There was also no dispute that there was no acquisition of the property of the plaintiffs by the defendants and therefore carrying out any

construction/excavation activities in order to lay the nullah cannot be sought to be legalised on the premise that it would impact a public project. In

Mahadeo Shelke (supra), a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the plaintiff seeking injunction must show a prima facie case, triable issue

and the balance of convenience for granting the injunction.  In the facts of that case the Pune Municipal Corporation had undertaken the widening

of the road to remove traffic congestion and initiated proceedings under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring two storied

building belong to N.H. Naik at Kotwal Chowk and after its publication in the Gazette an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on

14/12/1970 and compensation was deposited and paid to the owner. Pursuant thereto possession was taken on 13/03/1971 by the competent Officer

and handed over to the Corporation.  However, the appellant/tenants who entered into the leave and license agreements with the Corporation

were allowed to get into possession and after the expiry of the said period, proceedings were initiated for their eviction and an order in that behalf

came to be passed. They called the order of eviction in question and went in appeal and Writ Petition but were unsuccessful. The Court ultimately,

confirmed the order of eviction.  Subsequently, they filed a petition and sought permanent  injunction from dispossession and for ad-interim

injunction which the Civil Court refused to grant by his order dated 27/04/1973. The Joint Judge however in appeal allowed the same and granted

injunction pending the disposal of the suit which was set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution giving rise to the appeal by

special leave.

13.

In Mahadeo Shelke (supra), the Apex Court considered another two Judge Bench judgment in Dalpat Kumar v/s. Prahlad Singh [(1992) 1 SCC

719] which reiterated the three predicates for the grant of injunction namely “prima facie caseâ€, “balance of convenience†and

“irreparable loss and injury†and being not rhetoric phrases for incantation but words of width and elasticity, intended to meet myriad situations

presented by men's ingenuity in the given facts and circumstances and should always be hedged with the sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet

the ends of justice.  Considering the factual matrix the Apex Court observed at paragraph 14 that “It would thus be clear that in a suit for

perpetual injunction, the court should enquire on affidavit evidence and other material placed before the court to find strong prima facie case and

balance of convenience in favour of granting injunction otherwise irreparable damage or damage would ensue to the plaintiff. The court should also

find whether the plaintiff would adequately be compensated by damages if injunction is not granted. It is common experience that injunction normally

is asked for and granted to prevent the public authorities or the respondents to proceed with the execution of or implementing scheme of public utility

or granted contracts for execution thereof. Public interest is, therefore, one of the material and relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing

to grant ad interim injunction.â€​ Â

14.

Mahadeo Shelke (supra), further held at paragraph 15 that Public purpose of removing traffic congestion was sought to be served by acquiring the

building for widening the road. By orders of injunction, for 24 years the public purpose, was delayed. As a consequence execution of the project had

been delayed and the costs now stood mounted. It was in that context the Apex Court observed that the Courts in the cases where injunction are

to be granted should necessarily consider the effect on public purpose thereof and also suitably mould the relief. This judgment is clearly

distinguishable on facts inasmuch as there was acquisition of the property by the Government unlike the present case where there has been no

acquisition at the instance of the defendants and quite on the contrary based on same NOC issued by the Communidade, the defendants have

undertaken the work of carrying out the construction of the nullah in the property of the plaintiff, much to their chagrin.

15.

In Tukaram Joshi (supra), the Ho’ble Apex Court observed at paragraph 8 that even after the right to property ceased to be a fundamental

Right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in

accordance with the law. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of an

executive fiat or order or administration caprice.  It held at paragraph 9 that “The right to property is now considered to be, not only a

constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right, although, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are

considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however,

human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new

dimension.†In the case at hand there had been no acquisition and the question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity,

which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The

matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and

interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. This judgment

squarely supports the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants are not entitled to interfere with the plaintiffs possession without the acquisition of the

land assuming that the work undertaken is for a public purpose.

16.

In so far as the plea of delay and laches is concerned, the plaintiffs had pursued their remedy in Writ Petition and it is only when the petition

came to be disposed off with a direction to pursue their remedies by filing appropriate proceedings did the plaintiffs file the suit seeking the relief of

injunction amongst others. The learned District Judge however in her wisdom proceeded to hold for no explicable reason that the Survey Plan did not

reflect the existence of the nullah due to same technical mistake grossly believing the case of the defendants unlike that of the plaintiffs who had

shown their proprietary right to the suit properties and established the nonexistence of the nullah in question.  The learned Judge also for no

reason proceeded to hold that the question of taking the plaintiffs NOC or consent did not arise as the defendants had obtained the consent of the

owners when it was otherwise shown that the Certificate issued by the Communidade dated 15/11/2014 pertained to a totally different Survey holding

No.76/1 unlike the suit property surveyed under Nos.76/1-B2 and 76/1B. The learned Judge found favour with the case of the plaintiffs that their

names stood recorded in the occupants column for 76/1B and 76/1-B2 and that the Family Deed of Partition also placed on record showed their

rights to the said properties. However for no reason, the learned Judge went on to hold that the plaintiffs were not the absolute owners of the said

property and held quite on the contrary that the documents produced by the defendants were on a better footing since they had placed an affidavit

cum irrevocable NOC from the land owners in respect of the property bearing Survey No.76/1. The learned Judge proceeded off  at a tangent

and was carried away by the Certificate issued by the Communidade to hold against the plaintiffs. The impugned order is therefore fraught with

illegalities and perversity and therefore the intervention of this Court is required to set right the same considering also the principle laid down in

Wander (supra). In the result, therefore i pass the following:

O R D E R

 The appeal is allowed and the impugned order denying the relief of injunction in the plaintiffs favour is quashed and set aside and the plaintiffs

secured by an order of injunction as prayed for.