M.R.G. and Bros. Bus Service vs Kandaswami Chettiar and Another

Velu Pillai, J.—The First respondent had been operating a stage carriage, having registration number M.D.E. 2317, on the--route Pollachi to Gopalapuram--within the Madras State, under a permit granted to him by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras. On June 13, 1960, he made an application to the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat at Trichur, for a temporary permit for the aforesaid stage carriage, to operate on the route--Gopalapuram to Kozhinjampara--within the Kerala State which was granted on June 18, 1960, and a temporary permit was issued to him, copy of which is Ext.P. 3. The timings allowed to him on the route covered by the temporary permit, were in co-ordination with those allowed to him under his pucca permit for the route Pollachi to Gopalapuram. The petitioner who is an operator of stage carriages, on the interstate routes of Pollachi to Palghat via Gopalapuram and Kozhinjampara, and Pollachi to Pudur via Gopalapuram and Kozhinjampara, has preferred this petition to quash the temporary permit granted to the first respondent. The petitioner''s learned counsel did not question the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, to issue a temporary permit within its area; on the contrary, its jurisdiction was conceded in the following terms, in the additional affidavit filed for the petitioner:--

Therefore it can be taken that normally and subject to relevant provisions of law the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat can grant a temporary permit from the State border on the route Gopalapuram to Kozhinjampara

His only point was, that the temporary permit having been granted to a particular stage carriage, operating under the pucca permit and the timings being adjusted as stated above, what was granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat and was achieved by the first respondent, was really an extension of the route Pollachi to Gopalapuram, up to Kozhinjampara, and this constituted a colourable or mala fide exercise of his jurisdiction. There was also some controversy whether the application of the first respondent to the Regional Authority, Palghat was for a temporary permit, or was for a variation of the route Pollachi to Gopalapuram by extending it to Kozhinjampara. On a perusal of the application, Ext.P. 1, and the covering letter, Ext.P. 1(a), I am satisfied, that the application was professedly for a temporary permit. Ext.P. 1 quoted Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which may be referred to for brevity as the ''Act'', setting fourth, the purpose as "temporary service", and the duration of the permit as four months; in the second paragraph of Ext.P. 1(a) it was mentioned specifically that Ext.P. 1 was for a temporary permit to meet a temporary need. Ext.P. 2, the order granting the temporary permit, specified the need, as "the seasonal business mentioned in the application" and the duration of the permit as four mounths. This is a temporary need recognised by Section 62, clause (b) of the Act. Moreover, as contended, an application for the variation of the route Pollachi to Goplapuram, has to be made to the Authority in the Madras State which sanctioned the permit for that route, though it may have to be validated by appropriate procedure in the Kerala State; but Ext.P. 1 was addressed to the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat. I therefore hold, that the application was for the issue of a temporary permit, which was accordingly granted.

As contended, the first respondent had two rights under the Act, one, to obtain a temporary permit to meet a temporary need u/s 62, and the other to obtain a variation of the route covered by his pucca permit u/s 57(8) of the Act. It may so chance, that a temporary permit may relate to a route, which is in continuity with another route for which he may hold a permit, but on that ground, I think it does not cease to be a temporary permit. Nor can the right to such a permit be made to depend upon the identity of the stage carriage, which it is intended to operate in pursuance of it, or upon the timings which may be fixed to suit the convenience of the travelling public better. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the first respondent, Section 62 which regulates the grant of temporary permits, does not impose restrictions of the above character, although two provisos dealing with other conditions form part of it; in other words, there is no proviso or limitation in Section 62 or anywhere in the Act, that a temporary permit shall not be granted so as to operate as an extension or variation of a route.

In support of the contention, that the action of the Regional Transport Authority was a colourable exercise of Jurisdiction, the petitioner has explained in his affidavits, that its underlying object was to evade the provisions of Section 63 and 63A of the Act. Section 63A has no relevance, and the learned counsel did not rely upon it; in my opinion, the application of Section 63 is remote.

Sub section (1) of Section 63 provides, that a permit, granted by the Regional Transport Authority of one region, in order to be valid in another region, has to be countersigned by the corresponding Authority of the latter region; sub-section (2) enables the Authority when countersigning a permit, to attach any condition to it, which it might have imposed, if it had itself granted the permit or to vary any condition attached to the permit, and sub-section (3) enacts, that except in the case covered by the proviso to it, which, it was not contended, has any application here, the provisions in Chapter IV of the Act relating to the "grant etc. of the permits", shall apply also to the "grant etc. of counter-signatures of permits." In other words, Section 63 relates to the procedure of counter-signing of permits. I find great difficulty to hold, that the Regional Transport Authority exercised the jurisdiction u/s 62, which it undoubtedly possessed, in order to circumvent, as it were, the need for countersigning. It was not contended before me, that there was no real need or that the need was not temporary.

The learned counsel placed considerable reliance on the observations made by a learned single Judge of this Court, in G.B. Transports v R.T.A. Trichur 1959 K.L.J. 1247 that "there is no provision in the Act for allowing temporary variation of a permit". In that case, the application was in terms, for a permanent variation of a route Chittur to Trichur, as Chittur to Guruvayur via Trichur, and was allowed after following the prescribed procedure. On revision, the State Transport Authority set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority, and the applicant moved this Court by a writ petition for quashing the order of the State Transport Authority. Pending the decision of that petition, the Regional Transport Authority granted "a temporary permit to the applicant u/s 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act for variation of the route as Chittur to Guruvayoor via Trichur". A second writ petition was filed in this Court to challenge the temporary permit. The matter was considered from two stand points, first, as a temporary variation of the route and in that context, the observations relied on were made. In that case, the Authority granted the temporary permit "for variation of the route", but here it was not so. It strikes me, that Section 57(8) of the Act speaks only of a variation, and nothing in it precludes a further variation. It is sufficient to note, that this distinction has no application to the present case. The second aspect discussed in the judgment of the case cited was, whether the need relied on by the Regional Transport Authority was a temporary need within the scope of Section 62 and this was answered in the negative. The consideration of the two aspects separately suggests, that the learned Judge treated them as distinct. After all, to establish a case of evasion of the Statute or of keeping outside its provisions:

It is, however, essential not to confound what is actually or virtually prohibited or enjoined by the language with what is really beyond the enacting part, though it may be within the policy, of the Act, for it is only to the former case that the principle under consideration applies, and not to cases where, however manifest the object of the Act may be, the language is not co-exlersive with it"--See Maxwell on Interpretaion of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 117.

For the foregoing reasons, I am not prepared to hold, that the Regional Transport Authority acted illegally or mala fide in granting the temporary permit to the first respondent. This petition is dismissed, but without costs.