Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee vs Probodh Chandra Roy Choudhury

Purushottam Chatterjee, J.—This second appeal is on behalf of the Defendant in a suit for ejectment in a case relating to West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956. Mr. Ganguly appearing on behalf of the Appellant has drawn my attention to the fact that this is the fourth suit, which has been instituted by the landlord against the tenant. The first suit was instituted in 1950 and that was dismissed. The second suit was instituted in 1952. The third suit was instituted in 1953 and the present was thereafter instituted in April, 1956.

The first point that Mr. Ganguly urges is that, the landlord as his very conduct shows, is not in so much need as to occupy the present premises. He says that in these various suits he has taken the following grounds for ejectment, default, bona fide requirement, breach of provisions of Section 108(m)(o) and (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. In another suit he took this very question but that also failed. There has been no subsequent change of events and the suit is mala fide. This very suit was instituted on three grounds default, violation of the provisions of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of the Transfer of Property Act and own appeal. The appeal court sent the matter back for decision on case as well the trial court dismissed the suit. There was an the question of default without expressing any opinion what souse and occupation. Only the last one has succeeded. In this ever on the other matters but at the same time setting aside the judgment and decree. The trial court thereafter did not consider the question of bona fide requirement but merely expressed his opinion on the question of default and the appeal court has finally held the question of bona fide requirement in favour of the Plaintiff. On these facts Mr. Ganguly says the unavoidable? conclusion of fact is that the Plaintiff had no requirement for his own use and occupation and it would also prove the mala fide of the landlord; at least it would conclusively prove that there was no bona fide requirement. The whole intention was to eject the Defendant by any means whatever. These are all the facts, which have been considered by the court of appeal below and having considered these he has not come to a finding that the ground of personal use and occupation is a mere show and there is, in fact, no reality in it. He has, on the other hand, it is stated, not given very much importance to it. What importance is to be given to a particular circumstance is a question of fact and what conclusion should be made from that fact is also another question of fact. Final court of fact has not come to any decision in favour of the Defendant on the point. The second ground taken is that four rooms in the, ground floor were let out. The appeal court considered as if it was not four but two. Mr. Ganguly says that this is a very serious error of fact, which the appeal court made, and the matter should, therefore, be sent to the appeal court. But the appeal court considered this fact and found that no adverse conclusion can be necessarily made from that fact and the appeal court referred to a decision of this High Court in Sumatibala Sen v. Herembo Kumar Roy (1955) 60 C.W.N. 783. According to the appeal court the very fact of re-letting is not by itself sufficient to prove the mala fide. The question whether there were two rooms or four rooms is not important because the question is whether that by itself does not prove mala fide. It is also stated by Mr. Ganguly that in a previous suit the ground of bona fide requirement was taken but withdrawn. According to Mr. Ganguly, all the previous proceedings, the fact of re-letting, the fact of withdrawing the claim for ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement all can lead to one conclusion, viz., it was not for requirement that he filed the suit but for ejecting the Defendant by making a show of requirement. This again is a question of fact and the appeal court lias not drawn any conclusion of mala fide offer having considered all these questions of fact. It is not possible for me to interfere u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question of law that was next argued by Mr. Ganguly is a question of interpretation of Section 13(1)(f) of the premises tenancy Act of 1956.

The fact relevant for this purpose is that the Plaintiff instituted the suit as an executor. Legatees to this property are the Plaintiff and his two brothers. The position, therefore, is that the executor instituted the suit for the benefit of the legatee, who does alone require it. The question then comes is legatees require it for their own use and occupation. The trial court has come to a finding that the other two legatees do not require it. The appeal court has not reversed that finding.

The appeal court has held that it is the executor, who is also a legatee who does alone require it. The question then comes is, if the executor holds the property for the benefit of the three legatees and if it is not required by two of the legatees, whether the executor is entitled to the benefit of Clause (f) if he proves the requirement of himself as a legatee. The fact established is that he has proved the requirement of himself as a legatee. The relevant portion of Section 13(1)(f) for the present purpose is "where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord "* * for the occupation of any person for whose "benefit the premises are held." According to Mr. Ganguly, occupation of any person refers to the occupation of all the persons for whose benefit the premises are held. According to Mr. Ganguly, the beneficiaries are a class of persons and the requirement must be the requirement of that entire class and unless that is proved, Clause (f) is not complied with. It must be positively proved that all of. them require it. If some of them do not require it then Clause (f), according to Mr. Ganguly, does not apply.

Mr. Ganguly refers to a recent decision of this High Court in Amarendra Nath Roy Choudhury v. Kanika Devi (1959) 64 C.W.N. 29. The decision was in second appeal No. 1581 of 1958 decided on the 27th April, 1959, by Renupada Mukherjee, J. who referred to a case in Mcintyre v. Hardcastle [1948] K.B. 82 : [1948] All. E.R. 696 where it has been held by the Court of Appeal that "where there are two or more joint "beneficial owners, possession of dwelling house could be "obtained u/s 31(a), Schedule I, para, (h) and (i) of Act of "1933 only if the dwelling house was required for occupation as "a residence for both or. all of them." Accordingly, the landlords'' claim in Maintyre''s case failed as it was not so required for all of them. We pointed out to Mr. Ganguly that the Act of 1933 in England and our Act are not the same. Even in England Somervel, L.J. in Baker v. Lewis [1946] 2 All. E.R. 592, 595 observed "I am not in any "way implying or suggesting that para, (h) is only applicable "in the case of joint owners where they are desiring.... "dwelling house for occupation as a residence for all of their "number." Asquitch, L.J. was also a party to the decision in Baker v. Lewis. Tachker, L.J. agreed in the case of Mcintyre v. Hardcastle [1948] K.B. 82 : [1948], All. E.R. 696 with the views of Asquitch, L.J. The reason for this decision in Mcintyre''s case is that in the English Act a landlord may require it for the residence of "himself". But in our act the words "for himself" are not there. In pur Act, the requirement is of "any person for whose benefit it is held". Under the English law, if there are more than. one landlord, the requirement must be of "themselves". This is the result of the aforesaid decision in Mcintyre''s case because the word "himself" must be read in case of plurality of landlords as "themselves" and if all the landlord do not require it, they do not prove that they require it for "themselves". But I must point out that this part of the English: Act has not been incorporated into our Act. In the English Act it has been defined for whose occupation the house must be required and certain members of the family have been enumerated and that would prove that nobody can require a house for the use of any other relations. In our Act there is no such restriction. As I have pointed out above, the words in our Act are "for the benefit of "any person" and there is no further provision similar to that as in the English Act. In my opinion, therefore, the principle underlined the decision in Mcintyre v. Hardcastle [1948] K.B. 82 : [1948] All. E.R. 696 would not apply for the reason there is no question of principle but a question of interpretation of the Act. There being a distinction in the two sections there is no question of following the interpretation. Referring back to the judgment of Renupada Mukherjee, J. in Amarendra Nath Chowdhury case (supra), I find that the said decision is no authority for the present purpose.

Mr. Justice Mukherjee had not to interpret the words of the statute which are for me to interpret now. Proceeding now to the question of interpretation of this section, the sole question is whether the word ''any" should he interpreted to include "any one"'' of persons for whose benefit premises are held. The Legislature has used "any" instead of the word "all". If the Legislature intended to use the word "all", they might have said so; while interpreting these words, we must proceed on the basis that the language used by the Legislature is the true depository of the Legislative intent. That has been decided by the Supreme Court in Darshan Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, . It has been urged that the Legislature has not used the words "any one of "the beneficiaries", therefore, it should not be understood to mean "any one" of such beneficiaries, for it is not the duty of the court to strain the meaning of the words used by the Legislature to fill in the gaps in the provisions of any enactment. The Supreme Court has held also in Shrimati Hira Devi and Others Vs. District Board, Shahjahanpur, . If the words "any one of the persons" had been used, then that would at once exclude the case where all of them require it. The word "any" by itself does not mean "all" nor does it mean merely "any one" but includes both. It may include "all", it may also include "any one" or, in other words, the word "any" may be understood in two senses either in a wider sense or in a restricted sense. It is indeed true the Supreme Court has held that the duty of the court is to give effect to the natural meaning of words used in a statute and the court should not depart from that natural meaning unless there is some absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended or unless the natural meaning leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, . The question then is, if the same word is capable of a restricted meaning and a wider meaning, which of the two meanings should be preferred: In order to consider whether a restricted meaning or a wider meaning is to be imported, purpose of the provisions has to be considered. I have already shown that, if the word "any" means "any one" then a case of "all" is excluded; whereas, if the word "any" means "all" then "any one" is excluded; the Legislature has used a word, which has a wider meaning. There is no reason to suppose that a restricted meaning was intended.

Ordinarily, as a rule of construction, wider meanings are frequently given. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense�sometimes even in a sense more wide than it etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out factually a legislative intent or to use Lord Cokes words "to suppress the mischief and advance remedy" (Maxwell, page 280, 9th Edition), we must remember Section 13 is a mischief to the landlord and this mischief is remedied by the clauses therein, including Clause (f) and, therefore, Clause (f) should be understood so as to advance the remedy rather than to retard it. In that view of the matter, I would hold that the word "any" includes not merely all beneficiaries but any or more of such beneficiaries. The last point of Mr. Ganguly thus fails.

The result is that the appeal is dismissed, but, as the Plaintiff''s requirement has waited 10 years from the institution of the suit in 1950, I find no great harm would be done if the Defendant is granted one year''s time to vacate, provided the Defendant goes on depositing in the trial or in the executing court sums equivalent to rent within 15th of every next month beginning from the month of July on to be paid by the 15th August and so on till the period of one year expires. The Defendant Appellant must deposit all the costs of all the courts within three months from the date either in the trial court or in the executing court except so far as has already been deposited by him on account of costs. On failure of any of these conditions the decree would become executable at once.

In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs.