Mrs. Mohini Suraj Bhan vs Vinod Kumar Mittal

S.P. Goyal, J.—The Petitioner filed this petition for ejectment of the Respondent on the ground that she needed the demised premises for her own occupation. The case set up in the petition as well as in her statement is that after the death of her husband which took place in August 1980, she wants to move to her own house alongwith her children as she feels that the would be better placed at Chandigarh where she had been living for more than 15 years during the life-time of her husband. It was further pleaded that Mrs. Punam Sarin, the daughter of the Petitioner, whose marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce was at present pursuing her further studies in California and likely to return to India after completing her studies in the year 1983 and live with the Petitioner at Chandigarh. Mr. V. K. Chaudhary, one of her sons, was stated to have suffered mental illness and v. as likely to come to India and live with her at Chandigarh. Similarly, it was stated that the second son of the Petitioner who is employed as Financial Director in Ford Michigan and the third son who is carrying on business at New Delhi would be coming to Chandigarh and staying with her. So, it was contended that she needed the premises in dispute for her own occupation and the occupation of her children. The Rent Controller after appreciating the evidence led by the parties upheld her plea and ordered ejectment. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reverted the finding of the Rent Controller and dismissed the petition. Aggrieved thereby the owner has come up in this revision.

A perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Authority would show that it has taken into consideration all the facts and circumstances proved on the record and after detailed discussion recorded its finding. The finding recorded is essentially a finding of fact but was sought to be challenged on the ground that the Appellate Authority had relied on one sentence in the statement of the Petitioner instead of considering her statement as a whole. The sentence referred to read as under:

We will think after the house in dispute is vacated whether to shift to Chandigarh or not.

However, the contention of the Learned Counsel is wholly misconceived. No doubt, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant in the lower Court argued that the above sentence indicated the real thinking of the Petitioner and that the did not require the premises bonafide for her own occupation, but the Court did not rely on the above statement of the Petitioner and instead observed that the Court will not be carried away by that statement alone. After making this observation, the Appellate Authority discussed all the evidence and the circumstances of the case and then recorded its finding. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the Appellate Authority was influenced by the above noted sentence in any manner while recording its finding.

It was next contended that the finding of the lower Appellate Court has been influenced to a large extent by the incorrect statement of fact that the ground floor of the house in dispute was let out in September 1980 at an increased rent of Rs. 400/- per month whereas it was let out in September 1979 prior to the death of the husband of the Petitioner. No doubt, this was one of the facts taken into consideration and while discussing the evidence it was observed that the ground floor of the house had been let out a year and half prior to the making of the application But even if the house was let out more than two years prior to the filing of the application, that would hardly make any difference. The fact remains that when ground floor of the house fell vacant, it was let out at considerable enhanced rent. If the Appellate Authority had non suited the Petitioner on the ground that she had let out the premises after the enforcement of the Act without reasonable cause and thus failed to satisfy all the ingredients as envisaged by Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, there would be some merit in the contention raised because the time of the letting out of the ground floor would have assumed importance Instead the Appellate Authority rightly did not non-suit her on the ground that the ground floor of the demised premises which had become available to her for occupation was let out by her without a reasonable execute and took this fact into consideration only for judging her bona fide need to occupy the premises in dispute. No fault, therefore, can be found with the finding of the Appellate Authority on this score as well.

Although it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence unless the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority suffers from some legal infirmity or is highly improper, but on the insistence of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner I persused her statement and found that the conclusion drawn by the lower Appellate Court was quite reasonable and appropriate. The Petitioner is more than 67 years old and residing with her son in New Delhi. Her story that her divorced daughter or her son V. K Chaudhary was likely to shift to India and reside with her at Chandigarh is highly improbable. Her daughter, admittedly was doing her Ph. D in U. S. A. and maintaining herself on her own. The statement of the Petitioner that she was sending Rs. 1,500/- to her has not been supported by any documentary evidence. Moreover, this meagre amount would hardly be of any help to her. Although she was expected to complete her studies in the year 1983, she has not till today returned to India. So far as V. K. Chaudhary is concerned, he is an immigrant to U. S. A. and residing there for the last 15 years. His wife is a Dentist and it is well-known that it is a very lucrative profession there. He himself is still working as Engineer in U. S. A., which shows that the story of his mental ailment is nothing but a vain excuse. The son with whom she is residing in Delhi is carrying on his business there. The statement of the Petitioner that she wants to live at Chandigarh because of her long association is nothing but a mere desire and wish. Neither she is likely to shift to Chandigarh in her advanced age nor there is any need to do so To overcome this situation, the Petitioner moved an application for additional evidence to show that the landlord of the house in which she was residing in Delhi has moved an ejectment petition against her. The mere moving of the petition for ejectment is of no consequence and the Petitioner is residing as of right in the house at Delhi Consequently till she is ordered to be ejected therefrom by a competent Court she would not have any cause to claim ejectment of her own tenant from the house in dispute. The evidence sought to be adduced therefore has no relevancy at this stage and the prayer is accordingly declined.

Some indication about the real intention of the Petitioner is provided by the letter, Exhibit R-1, which was written by her husband on September 27, 1979. The ground floor of the house in dispute which was on lease at a monthly rent of Rs 850/ fell vacant and was again leased out at the rate of Rs. 1,400/- per month. The husband of the Petitioner wrote the said letter asking the Respondent to increase the rent of the first floor in his possession in the same proportion in which the rent of the ground floor had been increased. The first floor is fetching only Rs. 500/- per month which looking to the prevailing conditions is extremely on the lower side. It is this fact which appears to have actuated the Petitioner to institute these proceedings. If she had really intended to shift to Chandigarh after the death of her husband she should not have waited for two years and moved a petition soon after August, 1980.

Apart from the fact that I have concurred with the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Authority, even if I was of a different view it would not have been open to me to interfere with the finding of fact on reappraisal of the evidence. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, , has defined the limits of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in the following terms:

In fact it has to be noticed that u/s 25 the High Court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy itself u/s 25 appears to be that the power conferred oh the High Court u/s 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority.

As no impropriety and legal infirmity in the finding of the Appellate Authority could be made out, the finding recorded would be binding on me and not open to challenge on the ground that a different view of the evidence produced was possible.

Before parting with the judgment, I may mention that a large number of authorities were cited by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner in which bona fide need of the landlord had been upheld. An equal number of authorities were cited by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent in which the plea of the landlord was negatived. It passes my comprehension as to how there could be a binding precedent on a question of fact. In all those decisions on the peculiar facts of the case involved a finding of fact was arrived at which would neither be a decision on any question of law nor provide any precedent for the decision of this case. I, therefore, do not propose to burden this judgment with a detailed discussion of these decisions.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition must fail and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.