M/s. Arora Hardware Store and Another vs Shri Sudershan Kumar Wadhwa

Surya Kant, J.—This revision petition is directed by the tenants against the eviction order dated 01.12.2006 passed by the Rent Controller, Amritsar, which has been further upheld by the Appellate Authority, Amritsar, vide the judgment dated 27.07.2009. The petitioners have been ordered to be evicted from the demised shop, forming part of the building No.1544-A/XII, Khanna Shumari No. 1544/12-A, Chowk Regent Talkies, Amritsar. The above-stated eviction order has been passed in an eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short ''the Act''), primarily on the ground of his personal necessity for the demised premises.

In his eviction petition, the respondent averred that his mother Smt. Kailash Wati Wadhwa who was owner of the demised shop, inducted petitioner No.1-firm as a tenant in the said shop at a monthly rent of Rs.600/-. The rent note dated 27.05.1983 was also executed by the petitioners in favour of Smt. Kailash Wati Wadhwa. The respondent further averred that his mother-Smt. Kailash Wati Wadhwa had executed a registered Will dated 12.09.1990, bequeathing the demised shop to the respondent. After the death of his mother-Smt. Kailash Wati Wadhwa, the respondent became the absolute owner of the demised shop and the petitioner-tenants have also attorned him as their landlord. The respondent sought the petitioners'' eviction, inter-alia, on the grounds that: (i) the petitioners are in arrears of rent w.e.f. 28.05.2002; (ii) the petitioners have materially impaired the value and utility of the demised shop by constructing pacca wooden ceiling and have reduced the carpet area, and that (iii) the demised shop is required by the landlord for his bonafide personal necessity, namely, for the use and occupation of his son Puneet Kumar Wadhwa.

Elaborating the ground of personal necessity, the respondent averred that he is a retired Government Officer who served the agricultural department till the year 2000 and is presently sitting idle and has no work to do; his son, namely, Puneet Kumar Wadhwa, has got the agency of Life Insurance Corporation but he has no office premises of his own to carry on the insurance business; the respondent requires the demised shop so that his son Puneet Kumar Wadhwa can operate his business from the said shop and while his son would visit the field area to fetch the insurance business, the respondent himself will attend the office and look after the business activities.

Upon notice, the petitioners contested the eviction petition and denied all the allegations, except admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and late Smt. Kailash Wati Wadhwa. The petitioners disputed the Will dated 12.09.1990 and denied that the respondent had become their landlord. They also refuted the allegation of impairment of value and utility of the shop and further averred that the LIC Agency given to the son of the respondent has already been terminated and as such the demised shop is not required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. The petitioners, however, tendered the arrears of rent and as such the first ground of eviction did not survive.

The Rent Controller, Amritsar, though held the respondent to be owner-cum-landlord of the demised shop but his plea regarding impairment of value and utility of the demised shop by the petitioners was not accepted.

So far as the plea of personal necessity is concerned, the Rent Controller held that the landlord''s son does not have any business premises to run the LIC business and the respondent, who is a retired government officer, is also sitting idle and can help his son in running the LIC Business from the demised premises. With these findings, the third ground of eviction survived and the consequential eviction order dated 01.12.2006 was passed.

The petitioners went in appeal which has also been turned down by the Appellate Authority vide the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2009, giving rise to this revision petition.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at some length and perused the impugned orders also.

The solitary contention pressed into aid on behalf of the petitioner-tenants is that since the LIC Agency given to the son of the respondent-landlord was subsequently terminated, the observations made by the Appellate Authority that inter-se claim between the parties requires to be decided on the basis of the fact and situation as it existed at the time of filing of the eviction petition, is erroneous in law and it was imperative upon the Courts below to take notice of the subsequent events. Counsel for the petitioners argues that there being no LIC agency of with the son of the respondent-landlord the very basis of necessity pleaded, was disappeared and no eviction order could be passed on that count.

After giving my thoughtful consideration to the contentions, I find the same de-void of any merit. The basic principle is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the fact and situation as on the date of institution of the suit/petition. Nevertheless, the Courts can take into account the subsequent events in three circumstances as elucidated by the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and Another Vs. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) by LRs. and Another, , namely, (i) the relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (ii) it is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten the litigation; or (iii) it is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties.

In the instant case, the primary and foremost plea taken on behalf of the respondent-landlord is that his son Puneet Kumar Wadhwa does not own any business premises, though he was working as LIC Agent at the time of institution of the eviction petition. The respondent-landlord pleaded personal necessity pointing out that he has retired from the government service in the year 2000 and is sitting idle and wants to help his son in running the LIC business. In my considered view, the subsequent events which would have deterred the Court to decline any relief to the respondent-landlord could be like; (i) the employment of the respondent''s son on some regular establishment which would have necessitated the closure of business activity by him; (ii) the purchase of any other commercial property by the respondent-landlord or by his son wherein he could conveniently start the business activities and (iii) any unforeseen circumstance which would have compelled the respondent-landlord or his son not to start or continue his business.

The termination of LIC Agency earlier granted to the son of the respondent-landlord is not such a subsequent event which, if overlooked would render the relief of eviction "inappropriate". In my considered view, the fact that the LIC Agency is no longer allotted to the son of the respondent, worsens the situation for the petitioners as the demised shop is now badly needed by the respondent-landlord for the start of one or the other business by his son to earn livelihood as he too, in the absence of any known source of livelihood, he is sitting idle like his father. For the reasons afore-stated, no interference with the impugned orders is called for by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Dismissed.