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Judgment
1.Heard Mr. A. Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G. Baishya, learned counsel for the respondent.
By this petition under Section 5 R/W Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner has prayed for condonation of 118 days delay in preferring the
second appeal.
The respondent herein filed a suit being Title Suit No. 6/2004, wherein a preliminary objection was raised and the learned Trial Court rejected the
plaint. Against the said order of rejection of the plaint being a deemed decree, the plaintiff/respondent preferred an appeal before the learned District
Judge. Learned District Judge allowed the appeal by setting aside the decree of the learned Trial Court and against the said appellate order of the
learned District Judge, the present appellant/defendant filed a civil revision petition being CRP No. 37/2006 before this court. This court in the said
CRP No. 37/2006 held that the rejection of plaint being a decree and against the first appeal of such decree, second appeal shall lie and not revision
and the present appellant/petitioner was allowed to withdrawn the revision petition with leave to prefer the second appeal. This is how, the
appellant/petitioner has preferred the second appeal along with the instant petition under Section 5 R/W Section 14 of the Limitation Act praying for
condonation of delay of 118 days.
The cause of delay has been explained in paragraphs-6, 7 & 8 of the petition. It is stated in the application that after obtaining the certified copy of
the order passed in the revision petition, learned counsel tried to contact the petitioner, but could not contact him immediately on the same day.
However, learned counsel could contact Sri Sarat Ch. Panjikar, who was the petitioner only after 2/3 days of the order, passed by this Court. Said
Sarat Ch. Panjikar informed the company on the last part of February and immediately thereafter the company took a decision to prefer an appeal and
accordingly the concerned advocate was contacted and vakalatnama was furnished and this process took 25 days after withdrawal of the revision
petition. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though technically there has been a delay of 118 days, in fact, there was a delay
of 25 days from the date of withdrawal of the revision petition, which was filed earlier and also submitted that there was no negligence or lack of
bonafide on the part of the petitioner in preferring the second appeal. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on
the following decision.
Shakti Tubes Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2009 STPL (LE) 41079 SC
State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (D) through LRS & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592
Learned counsel Mr. G. Baishya, representing the respondent objecting the petition submits that there was negligence and lack of due diligence on
the part of the petitioner and that the explanation of delay offered by the petitioner were vague and therefore petitioner is not entitled to condonation of
the delay in the instant case. To buttress the submission, learned counsel for the respondent placed the following decisions:
Union of India Vs. Wood Crafts products Ltd reported in 2001 (1) GLT 34
P.K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556
Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sahadev Ghosh reported in 2005 (3) GLT80
I have considered the above authorities dealing with the principle of construing the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in the context of facts
situation of each case. The common thread pausing through the above authorities is that the explanation given for delay should be reasonable and
there should not be gross negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide on the part of the party seeking condonation of delay. It is no doubt true, that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction, but if a party is found lacking due diligence or guilty of negligence, delay
should not be condoned in a routine manner. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it needs to be seen whether there was
indeed any negligence or lack of due diligence on the part of the petitioner. It appears from the averments made in the petition, that immediately after
the appellate order was passed by the learned District Judge, the petitioner approached this Court by filing a civil revision petition. However, ultimately
it was found to be not appropriate forum and consequently, the petitioner had to withdraw the petition and filed the second appeal along with this
petition. Filing of revision against the appellate order immediately without delay clearly demonstrated the diligence of the petitioner. If this aspect is
taken into consideration, then, in fact there was a delay of only 25 days from withdrawal of the revision petition, which in the facts and circumstances
of the case cannot be considered as inordinate delay.
Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, provides that if the party approached a wrong forum on good faith, the
period consumed during the prosecution in the said forum shall be excluded from the period of limitation.
The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Balkishan Mathur (D) through LRS & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 while emphasizing the fact
that the expression like sufficient cause having no fixed connotation and has to be understood in the context of facts and circumstances of a particular
case observed as under:
 “It is correct that condonation of delay cannot be a matter of course; it is also correct that in seeking such condonation the State cannot claim
any preferential or special treatment. However, in situation where there has been no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides this
Court has always taken a broad and liberal view so as to advance substantial justice instead of terminating a proceeding on a technical ground like
limitation. Unless the explanation furnished for the delay is wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered or if the delay is inordinate
and third party rights had become embedded during the interregnum the Courts should lean in favour of condonation.â€
There is no material on record to attribute any lack of good faith on the part of the petitioner in preferring the revision and therefore, the petitioner
would certainly be entitled to exclusion of the period taken in pursuing the civil revision. After exclusion of the period, during which the petitioner was
prosecuting the civil revision, there shall be a delay of 25 days, which has been explained as indicated above. What is important is that sufficient cause
has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any rigid or inflexible criteria for the sufficient cause. When the
petitioner in the instant case filed the revision petition immediately after the order of the District Judge without any delay and there is no material to
attribute any malafide or negligence on the part of the petitioner, the explanation given by the petitioner for the actual delay of 25 days in the facts and
circumstances can be accepted as sufficient cause having regard to the settled principle that the expression sufficient cause should be construed
liberally in order to further the cause of substantial justice.
Being of the above view, the petition for condonation of delay is allowed. The delay stands condoned. Office to register the connected appeal and
list accordingly.