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M/s. Emerald Industries, S-553, Greater Kailash vs Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd.

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 3 October 2017 · Citation: (2017) 10 RAJ CK 0017

HON’BLE JUDGES
Arun Bhansali
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
780 of 2001

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

292 paragraphs · 3,313 words
1.

This appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is

directed against the judgment dated 15/1/2001 passed by the

Addl. District Judge No.2, Udaipur (''the trial court''), whereby, the

prayer made by the appellant to set aside the award dated

6/3/1995 has been rejected.

2.

The appellant is a contractor experienced in civil engineering

with specialization in construction of Mine Haulage Roads. The

respondent, Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. (''RSMML''), is a

Government of Rajasthan undertaking; the respondent RSMML

invited tenders for construction of mine haulage road including

cross drains, retaining walls, toe walls etc.; the appellant along

with other tenderers submitted its tender; the tenders were

opened on 30/6/1989; after negotiation, a Telex of Intent dated

28/10/1989 awarding the contract to the appellant was received

by the appellant on 3/11/1989 requiring the completion of

tendered work within a period of 12 months from the date of telex

i.e. 28/10/1989 and the gross value of the contract was

Rs.1,17,73,506/-.

3.

On a dispute having arisen between the parties, one Mr.

V.C.Puri was appointed as sole arbitrator by the Managing Director

of RSMML on 15/11/1991. The appellant submitted his claim in

January, 1992, which was responded by the RSMML on 3/2/1992,

a rejoinder by the appellant was submitted on 4/5/1992. The

Arbitrator formulated 10 points for determination i.e. ''A'' to ''J'' and

by his award dated 6/3/1995 awarded a sum of Rs.1,48,000/-

and Rs.3,67,000/- towards claim ''B'' and ''H'', respectively, rest of

the claim was rejected.

4.

The award was filed in the court under Section 14 of the Act

and the learned District Judge issued notices to the parties. The

appellant filed his objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act

seeking setting side of the award/modification of the same. By the

impugned judgment dated 15/1/2001, the application filed by the

appellant was rejected and the award was made rule of the court.

Feeling aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the

appellant.

5.

Learned counsel for the appellant made submissions

questioning the legality and validity of the award as well as the

judgment of the trial court, the findings recorded by the Arbitrator

on various issues were contested. It was submitted that the main

issue relating to claim of the appellant pertain to controlled

blasting undertaken by him and the payment in terms of the

agreement for the said controlled blasting. It was submitted that

the Arbitrator in his award, though held in favour of the appellant

that it was entitled to the additional amount payable for controlled

blasting, on account of minutes of meeting dated 16/3/1990, the

said claim has been rejected. It was submitted that after the

minutes of meeting dated 16/3/1990 were recorded, a detailed

Letter of Intent dated 6/4/1990 was issued by the respondent

superseding all other correspondence and further in agreement

dated 6/4/1990 executed between the parties, there was no

reference to the minutes dated 16/3/1990 and, therefore, once

after the meeting dated 16/3/1990 when detailed Letter of Intent

has been issued and agreement entered into between the parties,

the same contain the final terms and conditions between the

parties and as such, the Arbitrator was not justified in relying on

the minutes of meeting dated 16/3/1990 and, therefore, the

conclusion arrived at by the Arbitrator and upheld by the trial

court deserve to be quashed and set aside.

6.

With respect to claim ''B'' relating to land filling work beyond

the contract requirement done by the appellant, it was submitted

that the Arbitrator instead of claim of Rs.31,29,875/- has awarded

a sum of Rs.1,48,000/- only by relying on the contract document

of one M/s. R.K.Singhvi, which document was not part of the

record and, therefore, the findings/award of the Arbitrator in this

regard cannot be sustained.

7.

Qua claim ''C'' pertaining to construction of approach roads

outside the contractual responsibility, it was submitted that the

Arbitrator was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the

construction of approach roads were part of the contract and with

reference to condition 17.4 and Special Conditions 3.3. and 3.4 it

was emphasized that the Arbitrator was not justified in denying

the amount towards construction of approach roads. Further, the

determination made by the trial court was also not justified.

8.

Learned counsel made submissions pertaining to claim ''D'',

''E'', ''F'', ''G'' & ''I'' also questioning the denial of the claim by the

Arbitrator on several grounds. It was prayed that the award

impugned to the extent the same has rejected the claim of the

appellant deserves to be set aside and the judgment passed by

the trial court making the same rule of court also deserves to be

set aside.

9.

Reliance was placed on Young Achievers vs. IMS Learning

Resources Pvt. Ltd . : (2007) 5 SCC 692, Rajasthan State Mines &

Minerals Ltd. vs. Eastern Engineering Enterprises & Anr . : (1999)

9 SCC 283, V.G.George vs. Indian Rare Earths Ltd. & Anr . :

(1999) 3 SCC 762 and D.C.M. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of

Delhi & Anr . : (1997) 7 SCC 123.

10.

At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the respondent

submitted that the appellant though has made submissions

pertaining to all the claims rejected by the Arbitrator, before the

trial court, objections were confined to three claims only i.e. claim

''A'', ''B'' & ''C'' and, therefore, now the appellant cannot be permitted

to raise objections pertaining to all other claims. Submissions

were made that though the agreement was entered into between

the parties on 6/4/1990, pursuant to the Letter of Intent, the

appellant had already commenced the work in November, 1989

and during the said period, on the issue pertaining to controlled

blasting having arisen, the minutes dated 16/3/1990 came into

existence dealing with the said aspect. It was submitted that the

conduct of the appellant in working under the said minutes dated

16/3/1990 by not claiming bill amount in running bills and raising

demand in final bill clearly creates estoppel against the appellant

and, therefore, the Arbitrator as well as the trial court were

justified in rejecting the claim.

11.

Further submissions were made that the entire agreement

relied on by the appellant does not even deal with the aspect of

controlled blasting and it is only the minutes dated 16/3/1990

which deals with the aspect of controlled blasting and on that

count also the appellant cannot claim any amount as the minutes

dated 16/3/1990 have to be read as a whole and not in piecemeal.

12.

With respect to claim ''B'', it was submitted that the Arbitrator

awarded the amount by relying on the material which came before

him during the course of arbitration including the contract of M/s.

R.K.Singhvi. Other than the said material, there was no material

available before the arbitrator to determine the claim made by the

appellant and, therefore, the arbitrator was justified in relying on

the said contract of M/s. R.K.Singhvi. It was further submitted

that the awarded amount under claim ''B'' is essentially a question

of fact which has been determined by the Arbitrator and upheld by

the trial court, which does not call for any interference.

13.

With respect to claim ''C'' pertaining to construction of

approach road outside the alleged contractual responsibility, it was

submitted that the Clause 17.4 of general obligations as well as

Special Conditions 3.3. and 3.4 takes care of the said claim raised

by the appellant, which has been appropriately dealt with by the

Arbitrator and no interference in the said finding is called for.

14.

Reliance was placed on Kanchan Udyog Limited vs. United

Spirits Ltd . : (2017) 8 SCC 237, Cauvery Coffee Traders,

Mangalore vs. Hornor Resources Co. Ltd . : (2011) 10 SCC 420,

Harish Chandra & Co. vs. State of U.P . : (2016) 9 SCC 478,

Union of India & Ors. vs. M/s. Onkar Nath Bhalla & Sons : AIR

2009 SC 3168.

15.

I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel

for the parties and have perused the material available on record.

16.

So far as the challenge laid by the appellant to all the claims,

which have been rejected by the Arbitrator i.e. claim ''A'' to ''J''

except claim ''H'' is concerned, a bare look at the judgment dated

15/1/2001 of the trial court reveals that in para 7 the trial court

has noticed the objections raised by the appellant and the said

objections pertain to claim ''A'', ''B'' & ''C'' only and the trial court has

dealt with only those objections and having rejected those

objections, made the award rule of court.

17.

In the memo of appeal, grounds have been raised

questioning the validity of rejection of all the claims up to ground

''O'', thereafter, one page 39-A between para 39 and 40 has been

inserted raising a ground that the lower court erred in law in not

considering the objections raised in the objection petition of the

appellant and the lower court was under an obligation to consider as per law to deal with and decide all the claims in accordance

with the law as objections were raised in the objection petition qua

all the claims and, therefore, the order is required to be set aside.

18.

As already noticed hereinbefore, from the order passed by

the trial court it appears that only rejection of 03 claims was

questioned/pressed by the appellant, therefore, now it is not open

for the appellant to question the validity of the judgment of trial

court on account of having allegedly pressed the grounds

pertaining to all the rejected claims. Law in this regard is very

clear. Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas

Shrinivas Nayak & anr. : (1982) 2 SCC 463 has laid down as

under:-

"Statement of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course, a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession as made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment."

19.

In view of the above, the plea sought to be raised by the

appellant cannot be countenanced.

20.

So far as the claims dealt with by the trial court are

concerned, it is not in dispute that the Letter of Intent dated

28/10/1989 was received by the appellant on 3/11/1989 and the

period of completion was to be reckoned from the date of Letter

of Intent i.e. 28/10/1989. In the claim petition, the appellant

inter alia indicated as under, which clearly reflects that the work

was commenced in November, 1989 itself and till March the

appellant had already completed the work exceeding Rs.50 Lakh

out of total contract for gross value of Rs.1,17,73,506/-:

"6. We displayed our diligence by mobilising our machines and men and actually commenced the work in Nov. 1989 without receiving promised Mobilisation advance from RSMML of Rs.11.77 Lakhs till 27 th Feb. 1990. We had thus started the work & continued for six months from funds drawn from our own resources. 7. Not a single Running Account Bill was paid to us till March 1990 by which time we had already carried out work exceeding Rs. 50 Lakhs. Thereafter every bill paid had to suffer enormous deduction based on whimsical & arbitrary interpretation of the contract provision by EIL/RSMML & we were pushed into acute financial straits. In short, our diligence Exploited by EIL/RSMML to cover their own weaknesses, inadequacies & lack of diligence."

21.

The above submissions in the Statement of Claim clearly

establishes that the appellant had undertaken a large part of

the work by the time the agreement dated 6/4/1990 was

executed between the parties. In the meanwhile, the meeting

dated 16/3/1990 was held between the appellant, RSMML and

Engineers India Limited, wherein, the issue regarding the

controlled blasting was discussed and concluded, the minutes

were drawn whereby, the ''controlled blasting'' was defined, it was

indicated that when blasting is done only with sand bags, it will

be considered as un-controlled blasting and the rates will be paid

as per S.O.R Item No.3.1 (d) and it was also agreed that the

said terms would form part of the contract and would be

incorporated in the contract documents.

22.

The appellant has not denied the existence of said minutes

and the fact that the said aspect was agreed to between the

parties. However, it was vehemently submitted that as the

detailed Letter of Intent dated 6/4/1990 did not make any

mention of the minutes dated 16/3/1990 and provided that "the

contract agreement supersedes all other correspondence

exchanged prior to issue of this detailed Letter of Intent" and

Clause ''C'' of the agreement dated 6/4/1990 duly executed

between the parties also did not make any mention of the

minutes dated 16/3/1990, though exhaustively indicated all

other documents executed between the parties, in terms of

Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872, unless the contract was

altered, the minutes dated 16/3/1990 could not have been relied

on by the respondent and the Arbitrator.

23.

As already noticed, the appellant had started working from

November, 1989 and had already undertaken large part of the

work and, thereafter, it agreed for defining the controlled

blasting and accepted that blasting done only with sand bags will

be considered as un-controlled blasting, therefore, only on

account of the fact that the formal agreement was entered into

between the parties on 16/4/1990, which did not make any

mention of the minutes dated 16/3/1990, by itself cannot be a

ground to come to a conclusion that the minutes dated

16/3/1990 were cautiously given a go-bye and/or the parties

agreed for treating the blasting done with sand bags also as

controlled blasting entitling the appellant to claim amount for

blasting done with sand bags as controlled blasting.

24.

The Arbitrator while dealing with the said aspect of the

matter, though came to the conclusion that blasting carried out

even with the aid of sand bags was controlled in nature, in view

of the minutes dated 16/3/1990 rejected the claim.

25.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanchan Udyog

(supra) while dealing with the aspect of novation of a contract

relying on its earlier judgment held that the same could take

place sub silentio and that waiver could also be deduced from

acquiescence.

26.

Further in the case of Cauvery Coffee Traders (supra), it

was laid down that unless the allegation of misrepresentation,

fraud or coercion are made, it is not open to either of the parties

to raise the claim.

27.

So far as the reliance placed by counsel for the appellant

on the judgment in case of Young Achievers (supra) is

concerned, the said judgment pertain to the survival of

arbitration clause once the contract containing the arbitration

clause is superseded by fresh contract, which aspect has no

application to the facts of the present case as the issue raised in

the present case pertains to conduct of the appellant in

accepting a particular interpretation/condition and having

worked under it without raising any objection.

28.

In view of the above discussion, the plea sought to be

raised by the appellant relying on the fact that final Letter of

Intent and agreement dated 6/4/1990, which was executed

almost after six months from the date of commencement of

work, did not include the minutes dated 16/3/1990, which were

drawn during the progress of the work settling the terms

pertaining to controlled/un-controlled blasting, has no substance

and the same is, therefore, rejected.

29.

So far as the ground pertaining to claim ''B'' for the land

filling work done by the appellant beyond the contract

requirement is concerned, the Arbitrator relying on the contract

document of M/s. R.K.Singhvi awarded a sum of Rs.1,48,000/-

to the appellant. The appellant in his claim had claimed a sum of

Rs.31,29,875/- towards the said claim, however, no basis

whatsoever was disclosed in the said claim by the appellant.

Learned counsel for the appellant also fairly conceded that there

was no material available on record to substantiate the said

claim of Rs.31,29,875/-.

30.

So far as the contract of M/s. R.K.Singhvi is concerned,

which has been relied on by the Arbitrator, though the source of

the said contract is not available on record, the same factually

forms part of the record of Arbitrator which he had submitted to

the District Court and has been perused by this Court.

31.

In these circumstances and on account of the fact that

respondents have not questioned the award of sum of

Rs.1,48,000/- to the appellant, the claim sought to be raised by

the appellant without any substantiation available on record also

cannot be countenanced and the objections in this regard have

no substance.

32.

Insofar as the claim ''C'' pertaining to construction of

approach roads is concerned, the Arbitrator relying on clause

17.4 of General Conditions of Contract came to the conclusion that the construction of approach road being part of the contract

rejected the claim. Clause 17.4 of the General Conditions of

Contract provides as under:-

"17.4 Wherever it is mentioned in the specifications that the Contractor shall perform certain work provide certain facilities, it is understood that the contract shall do so at his cost."

33.

Further, it was indicated in Clause 3.2 and 3.3 of the

Special Conditions of Contract as under:-

"3.2 The present scope for mine haulage road includes only construction of embankment/formation width, construction of the drainage system and stability of the cut and fill slopes with toe wall and retaining wall and benching etc. 3.3 The contractor shall acquaint himself with the access to the site, availability of local facilities such as transport facilities, material and labour and shall provide suitable allowance in his quotation."

34.

Once the General Conditions require the appellant to

acquaint himself with the access to the site, availability of local

facilities and it was required of the appellant to provide for

suitable allowance in his quotation in this regard, the claim

sought to be made pertaining to construction of approach road,

cannot form part of the excess work and the same shall be

deemed to be part of the contract as the appellant was required

to visit the site before participating in the tender process and if

the requirement was that of construction of approach road for

reaching the site, the said work cannot be said to be outside the

scope of work and was bound to be included by the appellant in

the tender quotation and, therefore, the claim made in this

regard cannot be sustained.

35.

So far as the judgments cited by the learned counsel for

the appellant in the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals

(supra) and V.G.George (supra) are concerned, none of the

principles laid down therein have any application to the facts of

the present case, the judgments as such have no application.

36.

In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in

the appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed.

37 No order as to costs.