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Judgment
8 paragraphs · 543 wordsRamesh Ranganathan, CJ
The appellant-writ petitioner was awarded Stage-I contract for construction of Balmara (Bhakura) to Talli Chanoli (Elukhet) Motor Road on 17.12.2016. While the initial period, stipulated for completion of the said work, expired, the appellant-writ petitioner claims that they have been granted extension, to complete the Stage-I work, till 04.10.2019. They invoked the jurisdiction of this Court contending that, since the Stage-II work can only be undertaken after they complete the Stage-I work, awarding the Stage-II work, even before the appellant-writ petitioner completes the Stage-I work, is arbitrary and illegal.
The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition as totally misconceived, held that merely because the appellant-writ petitioner was engaged in completing the Stage-I work, the respondents could not be restrained from initiating the process of grant of work to the eligible candidates for the Stage-II work. Holding that no interference was called for, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
Mrs. Prabha Naithani, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the Stage-I work, entrusted to the appellant-writ petitioner, is for cutting of the road and laying parapet walls; the appellant-writ petitioner has completed 80% of the work, and has been granted time till 04.10.2019 to finish the remaining 20%; the Stage-II work consists of laying a bitumen road over the very same area; permitting the Stage-II work to commence, would hamper the work now being executed by the appellant-writ petitioner; and the learned Single Judge had, therefore, erred in dismissing the writ petition.
On the other hand Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, would submit that the Stage-II work has not yet been entrusted to anyone; the respondents have merely invited tenders; the process of tenders will take some time to complete; after its finalization, the work is required to be awarded and an agreement entered into; only thereafter can the Stage-II work be entrusted to the successful bidder; on the appellant-writ petitioner's own admission they have completed 80% of the work; and there can, therefore, be no impediment to the Stage-II contractor to execute the work in the said 80% area where the appellant-writ petitioner has already completed the Stage-I work so far.
While we see no reason to interfere with the order under appeal since it is not even the appellant-writ petitioner's case that they have submitted a bid for the Stage-II work, suffice it to observe that, since the respondents have themselves extended the time for the appellant-writ petitioner to complete the Stage-I work till 04.10.2019, it shall be ensured that the award of Stage-II work, and its commencement and execution, shall be undertaken without causing hindrance to the appellant-writ petitioner to complete the remaining 20% of the work on or before 04.10.2019.
We make it clear that the order now passed by us shall not be understood to mean that the appellant-writ petitioner can complete the work at their leisure. In case the work is not completed within the extended period upto 04.10.2019, the order now passed by us shall not disable the respondents from taking action against the appellant-writ petitioner in accordance with law.
Subject to the aforesaid observations, the Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
