M/s. Laxmi Dyechem vs State of Gujarat and Others

Gyan Sudha Misra, J.—I endorse and substantially agree with the views expressed in the judgment and order of learned Brother Justice Thakur. However, I propose to highlight a specific aspect relating to dishonour of cheques which constitute an offence u/s 138 as introduced by the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 by adding that in so far as the category of ''stop payment of cheques'' is concerned as to whether they constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the ''NI Act'', due to the return of a cheque by the bank to the drawee/holder of the cheque on the ground of ''stop payment'' although has been held to constitute an offence within the meaning of Sections 118 and 138 of the NI Act, and the same is now no longer res Integra, the said presumption is a ''rebuttable presumption'' u/s 139 of the NI Act itself since the accused issuing the cheque is at liberty to prove to the contrary. This is already reflected u/s 139 of the NI Act when it lays down as follows:

Presumption in favour of holder.-- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.

We have to bear in mind that the Legislature while incorporating the provisions of Chapter XVII, Sections 138 to 142 inserted in the NI Act (Amendment Act 1988) intends to punish only those who know fully well that they have no amount in the bank and yet issue a cheque in discharge of debt or liability already borrowed/incurred-which amounts to cheating, and not to punish those who refused to discharge the debt for bona fide and sustainable reason. It is in this context that this Hon''ble Court in the matter of M.M.T.C. Ltd. And Anr vs. Medchl Chemical and Pharma (P) Ltd. And Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 234 was pleased to hold that cheque dishonour on account of drawer''s stop payment instruction constitutes an offence u/s 138 of the NI Act but it is subject to the rebuttable presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act as the same can be rebutted by the drawer even at the first instance. It was held therein that in order to escape liability u/s 139, the accused has to show that dishonour was not due to insufficiency of funds but there was valid cause, including absence of any debt or liability for the stop payment instruction to the bank. The specific observations of the Court in this regard may be quoted for ready reference which are as follows:

The authority shows that even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of stop-payment instructions by virtue of Section 139 the court has to presume that the cheque was received by the holder for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show that the "stop-payment" instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his account there were sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of other valid causes including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment, then offence u/s 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus a court cannot quash a complaint on this ground.

Therefore, complaint filed in such a case although might not be quashed at the threshold before trial, heavy onus lies on the court issuing summons in such cases as the trial is summary in nature.

In the matter of Goaplast (P) Ltd. vs. Chico Ursula D’Souza And Anr. (2003) 3 SCC 232 = (2004) Crl.L.J. 664 also this Court had held that ordinarily the stop payment instruction is issued to the bank by the account holder when there is no sufficient amount in the account. But, it was also observed therein that the reasons for stopping the payment can be manifold which cannot be overlooked. Hence, in view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. But the presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. However, this presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, in order to hold that the stop payment instruction to the bank would not constitute an offence, it is essential that there must have been sufficient funds in the accounts in the first place on the date of signing of the cheque, the date of presentation of the cheque, the date on which stop payment instructions were issued to the bank. Hence, in Goaplast matter (supra), when the magistrate had disallowed the application in a case of ''stop payment'' to the bank without hearing the matter merely on the ground that there was no dispute about the dishonour of the cheque issued by the accused, since the signature was admitted and therefore held that no purpose would be served in examining the bank manager since the dishonour was not in issue, this Court held that examination of the bank manager would have enabled the Court to know on what date stop payment order was sent by the drawer to the bank clearly leading to the obvious inference that stop payment although by itself would be an offence, the same is subject to rebuttal provided there was sufficient funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque.

Further, a three judge Bench of this Court Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption u/s 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the Defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption u/s 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.

Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes Into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant.

It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution u/s 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.

As already noted, the Legislature intends to punish only those who are well aware that they have no amount in the bank and yet issue a cheque in discharge of debt or liability which amounts to cheating and not to punish those who bona fide issues the cheque and in return gets cheated giving rise to disputes emerging from breach of agreement and hence contractual violation. To illustrate this, there may be a situation where the cheque is issued in favour of a supplier who delivers the goods which is found defective by the consignee before the cheque is encashed or a post-dated cheque towards full and final payment to a builder after which the apartment owner might notice breach of agreement for several reasons. It is not uncommon that in that event the payment might be stopped bona fide by the drawer of the cheque which becomes the contentious issue relating to breach of contract and hence the question whether that would constitute an offence under the NI Act. There may be yet another example where a cheque is issued in favour of a hospital which undertakes to treat the patient by operating the patient or any other method of treatment and the doctor fails to turn up and operate and in the process the patient expires even before the treatment is administered. Thereafter, if the payment is stopped by the drawer of the cheque, the obvious question would arise as to whether that would amount to an offence u/s 138 of the NI Act by stopping the payment ignoring Section 139 which makes it mandatory by incorporating that the offence u/s 138 of the NI Act is rebuttable. Similarly, there may be innumerable situations where the drawer of the cheque for bonafide reasons might issue instruction of ''stop payment'' to the bank in spite of sufficiency of funds in his account.

What is wished to be emphasized is that matters arising out of ''stop payment'' instruction to the bank although would constitute an offence u/s 138 of the NI Act since this is no longer res-integra, the same is an offence subject to the provision of Section 139 of the Act and hence, where the accused fails to discharge his burden of rebuttal by proving that the cheque could be held to be a cheque only for discharge of a lawful debt, the offence would be made out. Therefore, the cases arising out of stop payment situation where the drawer of cheques has sufficient funds in his account and yet stops payment for bona fide reasons, the same cannot be put on par with other variety of cases where the cheque has bounced on account of insufficiency of funds or where it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account, since Section 138 cannot be applied in isolation ignoring Section 139 which envisages a right of rebuttal before an offence could be made out u/s 138 of the Act as the Legislature already incorporates the expression "unless the contrary is proved" which means that the presumption of law shall stand and unless it is rebutted or disproved, the holder of a cheque shall be presumed to have received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 of the NI Act, for the discharge of a debt or other liability. Hence, unless the contrary is proved, the presumption shall be made that the holder of a negotiable instrument is holder in due course.

Thus although a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. may not be entertained by the High Court for quashing such proceedings, yet the judicious use of discretion by the trial judge whether to proceed in the matter or not would be enormous in view of Section 139 of the NI Act and if the drawer of the cheque discharges the burden even at the stage of enquiry that he had bona fide reasons to stop the payment and not make the said payment even within the statutory time of 15 days provided under the NI Act, the trial court might be justified in refusing to issue summons to the drawer of the cheque by holding that ingredients to constitute offence u/s 138 of the NI Act is missing where the account holder has sufficient funds to discharge the debt. Thus the category of ''stop payment cheques'' would be a category which is subject to rebuttal and hence would be an offence only if the drawer of the cheque fails to discharge the burden of rebuttal.

Thus, dishonour of cheques simpliciter for the reasons stated in Section 138 of the NI Act although is sufficient for commission of offence since the presumption of law on this point is no longer res Integra, the category of ''stop payment'' instruction to the bank where the account holder has sufficient funds in his account to discharge the debt for which the cheque was issued, the said category of cases would be subject to rebuttal as this question being rebuttable, the accused can show that the stop payment instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds, but stop payment instruction had been issued to the bank for other valid causes including the reason that there was no existing debt or liability in view of bonafide dispute between the drawer and drawee of the cheque. If that be so, then offence u/s 138 although would be made out, the same will attract Section 139 leaving the burden of proof of rebuttal by the drawer of the cheque. Thus, in cases arising out of ''stop payment'' situation, Sections 138 and 139 will have to be given a harmonious construction as in that event Section 139 would be rendered nugatory. The instant matter however do not relate to a case of ''stop payment'' instruction to the bank as the cheque in question had been returned due to mismatching of the signatures but more than that the Petitioner having neither raised nor proved to the contrary as envisaged u/s 139 of the NI Act that the cheques were not for the discharge of a lawful debt nor making the payment within fifteen days of the notice assigning any reason as to why the cheques had at all been issued if the amount had not been settled, obviously the plea of rebuttal envisaged u/s 139 does not come to his rescue so as to hold that the same would fall within the realm of rebuttable presumption envisaged u/s 139 of the Act. I, therefore, concur with the judgment and order of learned Brother Justice Thakur subject to my views on the dishonour of cheques arising out of cases of ''stop payment'' instruction to the bank in spite of sufficiency of funds on account of bonafide dispute between the drawer and drawee of the cheque. This is in view of the legal position that presumption in favour of the holder of a cheque u/s 139 of the NI Act has been held by the NI Act as also by this Court to be a rebuttable presumption to be discharged by the accused/drawee of the cheque which may be discharged even at the threshold where the magistrate examines a case at the stage of taking cognizance as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or not against the drawer of the cheque.