M/s. Murarilal vs B.R. Vad

Vaidya, J.—This is an application for certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution of India filed by the applicants whose Miscellaneous Application No. 564 of 1965 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed by the judgment of this Court dated December 4, 5, 8, 1969; and the question which arises is whether the said judgment is a judgment in respect of which the High Court can issue a certificate under Article 133(1) (a) or (c).

Now, it is well established that the words "judgment, decree or final order" in Article 133 cannot apply to a judgment recording; an interlocutory finding or a finding which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. See Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand (1920) L R 47 I A 124 S C = 22 Bom. L R 606 Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons (1932) L R 60 I A 76 S C = 35 Bom. L R 331, Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, , Jethanand and Sons Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , AIR 1939 43 (Federal Court) AIR 1949 11 (Federal Court) , Mohd Amin Bros. v. Dominion of India AIR 1950 FC 77. Mr. Shah, the learned counsel for the applicant, relying on the decisions in Ramesh and Another Vs. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni and Others, and Bhagwan Singh and Another Vs. Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab, Jullundur, , contended that as Miscellaneous Application No 564 of 1965 was a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was an original proceeding raising the question of the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax authorities under the Bombay Sales Tax laws to levy, assess and reassess sales tax on a dissolved firm and the judgment dismissing it finally decides the question of jurisdiction so far as this Court is concerned and hence, it is a judgment or final order within the meaning of Article 133.

It is true that the writ proceedings are original proceedings under Article 226. But that does not mean that every order passed in a writ petition is a judgment or a final order within the meaning of Article 133. The nature and effect of the order passed must be considered in every case as laid down in Ramesh v. Gendalal Motital, Turning to the nature of Miscellaneous Application No. 564 of 1965, we find that it challenged the validity of the order by the Sales Tax authorities during the pendency of an appeal filed against the order under the Sales Tax legislation on several grounds. The judgment of the Court decided only the question of the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax authorities to proceed against a dissolved firm. This Court refused to deal with the other grounds raised in the petition as the applicant''s appeal is pending, for the reasons stated in the judgment. Although the petition is an original proceeding, it springs from and is founded on the proceedings still pending before the Sales Tax authorities. The judgment, no doubt, decides a preliminary point raised by the applicant in the proceedings. The effect of the judgment is that the applicants have to pursue their rights and remedies on merits before the Sales Tax appellate authorities. They are not finally barred by the judgment of the Court, though the judgment deals with the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax authorities, it is in substance an interlocutory judgment or finding regarding the powers of the said authorities to deal with the grievances of the applicants in the appeals filed by them. We do not think that the decisions in Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal and Bhagwan Singh v. Chief Settlement Commr. support the contention of Mr. Shah that the impugned judgment of this Court is a judgment within the meaning of Article 133, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case.

The above application is therefore, not maintainable and the rule is discharged with costs.