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Judgment
S.S. Subramani, J.—All these Writ Petitions are filed by applicants who were not admitted to First Year M.B.B.S. Course. In W.P. Nos. 11962 and 12241 of 1998, Petitioners claim admission to First Year M.B.B.S. Course on the basis that they are eligible for admission under special category, viz. children born of parents of intercaste marriage. In the other two writ Petitions, Petitioners claim admission under special category on the ground that they are children of ex-servicemen.
In both these categories of admission, a specified number of seats are reserved, and if there are more applicants than one, it will have to go according to merits only. This position is not disputed.
In all these cases, the Selection Committee issued telegram to all these candidates that they have been provisionally selected. On the very next day, another telegram was issued intimating them that the provisional selection is withheld. Subsequently telegrams were sent to them informing that the selection is cancelled. Petitioners contend that once they have been provisionally selected, their admission cannot be withdrawn unilaterally and without notice to them. According to them, the Principle of Natural Justice is violated. A further contention was taken that on the basis of the selection, some of the candidates have acted on the promise, and the admission which they secured in some other institution was surrendered. According to them, once they have acted on the promise, even if there is a mistake on the part of the Government, on the principle of estoppel, the provisional admission cannot be cancelled.
As against these contentions, common counter-affidavit has been filed by Respondents admitting that there was a mistake and some of the applications were not considered by inadvertence, while issuing the first telegram, to various Petitioners. There were many complaints from qualified candidates and only then they found out that some of the applications were not considered and even before these Petitioners were admitted, the provisional selections were cancelled. According to Respondents, a provisional selection is liable to be cancelled at any time and the prospectus provides a right to thee Respondent to cancel the same. Apart from the same, it is contended that if the candidates who were selected are better qualified, merely on the basis of principle of promissory estoppel, they (Petitioners) cannot get a legal right. It is further said that admission to various professional courses must be only on merits as declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc., and that is the law of the land. Reliance on the principle of promissory estoppel cannot go against law. Respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of all the Writ Petitions.
I will first consider the factual basis.
Learned Special Government Pleader placed before me the entire selection list regarding special categories with marks obtained by each and every candidate.
There are 51 eligible candidates who are children born of intercaste marriage. Only 14 seats are allotted for that special category. Ranking of Petitioner in W.P.11962 of 1998 is 16 and that of the Petitioner in W.P.12241 of 1998 is 17. It could be seen from the selection list that all the candidates of Serial Nos. 1 to 15 are having higher marks than these Petitioners. In paragraph 5 of the counter in W.P.11962 of 1998, it is said that the eligibility of some of the candidates was, by mistake, omitted to be considered, and when complaints were received, it was found out that there was non-selection of certain candidates who had secured higher marks and who were eligible for selection. It is said that Serial Nos. 4 and 11 in the Selection List, namely, one Jeysree, A.M. and Sreemagai, M. had to be selected in then-place. It is not disputed that they have obtained 266.42 and 251-75 marks respectively, whereas Petitioners have obtained far less percentage of marks, namely, 232.67 and 231.91 respectively.
In regard to children born to Ex-servicemen, i.e., category No. 0.5, there were 283 eligible candidates. Out of them, two candidates were selected. According to the merit list, the ranking of the Petitioners are, respectively 13 and 15 in that category. After the mistake was rectified, candidates whose ranks were 5 and 8 were selected, whose marks are 289.25 and 287 respectively. Petitioners have obtained only 284 and 283.75 respectively. So, on going by the marks, it cannot be doubted that the Respondents have taken into consideration only the merit.
How far the principle of promissory estoppel will apply in such cases has to be considered. Clause 8.1(h) of the Prospectus reads thus:
All selections for MBBS/BDS/Para Medical Courses are only provisional. The selection and admission is liable to be cancelled any time as and when the eligibility conditions are found to be defective in addition to revelation of suppressed and overlooked facts.
(Emphasis)
Learned Senior Counsel for Petitioners argued that on the promise made, they had arranged to pay the admission fees, etc. and they also did not participate in the selection in other Colleges in which they obtained admission. Their further argument is that when once selection has been made, it cannot be withdrawn unilaterally, for, it violates the Principles of Natural Justice.
It is not disputed by any of the learned Counsel for Petitioners that selection to professional courses must be on merits only, subject to the rule of reservation. Even in regard to admission to special categories, it is only a source of admission where merit alone will have to be considered. Even though that was the law all along, the same was still emphasised in Unnikrishna''s case (supra). When the Honourable Supreme Court itself has declared the law that admission to professional courses must be on merits, the same is the law of the land.
In Home Secretary, U.T. of Chandigarh and Another Vs. Darshjit Singh Grewal and Others, , a Principal of a College passed an Order that he has no objection for transferring a student, but, in fact, that was against the University Rules. The contention put forward before the Honourable Supreme Court was that in view of the Order of the Principal, the University is estopped from denying the transfer. In paragraph 21, it was held thus:
...The subject of migration of students is a matter governed by law. The Principal could only act within the said provisions - nor outside them. Respondents had applied for transfer/migration in accordance with the said Rules. They knew what the rules were. In any event, the Principal could accord his consent to the transfer only in terms of the said Rules. The Rules are emphatic. They left no choice to him. He had no option but to refuse his consent. The consent given by him was thus contrary to law. It was beyond his power, i.e., ultra vires his powers. It should be noted that the violation was not a technical one. It was not a procedural or peripheral one. It touched the core, the substance of the Rules. It is worse that it was a conscious violation. Can it be said in these circumstances that he is bound in law by such consent or that he is estopped from reiterating his objections based upon the Rules before the actual admission of the Respondents? We think not....
(Italics in the Report)
In AIR 1995 SCW 3847 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products), Their Lordships have held thus:
The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. If it is more just from the point of view of both promisor and promisee that the latter is compensated appropriately and allow the promisor to go back on his promise, that should be done; but if the Court is of the opinion that the interests of justice and equity demand that the promisor should not be allowed to resile from his representation in the facts and circumstances of that case, it will do so. This is the proper way of understanding the words "promisee altering his position". Altering his position should mean such alteration in the position of the promisee as it makes it appear to the Court that holding the promisor to his representation is necessary to do justice'' between the parties. The doctrine should not be reduced to a rule of thumb. Being an equitable doctrine it should be kept elastic enough in the hands of the Court to do complete justice between the parties.
Anything and everything done by the promise on the faith of the representation does not necessarily amount to altering his position so as to preclude the promisor from resiling from his representation....
(Emphasis supplied)
Sales Tax Officer and Another Vs. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Another, was a case where the State Government granted exemption to certain oil mills from sales-tax. u/s 6 of that Act, the same could be withdrawn at any time. In that context, the Honourable Supreme Court, in paragraph 16 of that judgment, has held thus:
When the Respondent set up its oil mill and was granted exemption from sales tax, it should have known that the notification granting exemption of tax u/s 6 could be withdrawn at any point of time. Therefore, the case of promissory estoppel is without any basis. There cannot be any estoppel against statute.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari Vs. State of U.P. and Another, , in paragraphs 22 and 23, Their Lordships held that rule of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for the enforcement of a promise or a declaration which is contrary to law. Para 22 and relevant portion of Para 23 read thus:
Whether a promissory estoppel, which is based on a "promise" contrary to law can be invoked has already been considered by this Court in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India as also in Shabi Construction Co. v. City & Industrial Dev. Corporation wherein it is laid clown that the rule of "promissory estoppel" cannot be invoked for the enforcement of a "promise" or a "declaration" which is contrary to law or outside the authority or power of the Government of the person making that promise. Applying the above principles to the instant case, even if it is accepted that the State Government or the Director, Medical Education and Training, assured the Appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted to the posts of Lecturer, such a "promise" cannot be enforced against the Respondents as the avenue of promotion for Demonstrators to the post of Lecturers was not provided either under the Statute or any executive instruction. Moreover, if the post of Lecturer was filled up by promotion of Demonstrator, it would defeat the existing mode of recruitment, namely, that it can be filled up by direct recruitment only and not by promotion....
Again, it may also be stated that the pleading regarding promissory estoppel is not clear. It is vague. In Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheswari''s case (supra), Their Lordships have said that vagueness cannot be the doctrine of principle of promissory estoppel. The same principle was reiterated in the decision reported in Shabi Construction Company Vs. City and Industrial Development Corporation and Another,
In these cases also, Petitioner were put on notice that the Respondents are entitled to cancel the admission, if they have overlooked certain facts. It is not disputed by any of these Petitioners, that the Respondent-Selection Committee informed them that they have committed certain mistakes and more meritorious candidates have been overlooked. When the Selection Committee found out that mistake and immediately corrected it even before counselling, I do not think that the Petitioners herein can get admission on the principle of estoppel, muchless promissory estoppel. What is the further step that the Petitioners had taken, is not evident. Only in W.P. No. 12754 of 1998, an argument was taken that the Petitioner therein relinquished a seat in Engineering College in view of the telegram received from the Respondent. According to me, that contention also cannot be accepted. On 1.8.1998, the Regional Engineering College published the selection list, and the candidates were asked to appear for Counselling on 8.8.1998. So far as the Medical College admission is concerned, Petitioner was informed regarding provisional selection on 5.8.1998, and the provisional selection was with held on 7.8.1998, and he received a telegram to that effect on 7.8.1998. Therefore, nothing prevented the Petitioner from attending the Counselling on 8.8.1998. The candidate has taken the risk by not attending the Counselling on 8.8.1998. That apart, as I have already said, even if the relinquishment of the seat in engineering college was based on the representation of the Respondent-Selection Committee, I cannot accept that argument, for, if such an argument is accepted, that will amount to preferring a lesser meritorious candidate to a better meritorious candidate and that will be against the law of the land.
The question of violation of Principle of Natural Justice also will not arise in such cases. There is no civil consequence. Even before the candidates were admitted to the College and before getting a right, they were informed about the mistake committed by Respondents and also about the cancellation of the provisional selection. It is a mistake on the part of the Department itself, for which no explanation is required from the Petitioners. Therefore, there cannot be any question of violation of the Principle of Natural Justice, nor can there be any question of promissory estoppel in such cases.
All these Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Naturally before getting a relief, they must establish that they have got a right of admission to the Course, and that they were denied admission arbitrarily or without taking into consideration relevant materials, or that their case has been overlooked by selecting some other candidates who have secured lesser marks. None of these Petitioners has such a complaint. While invoking the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even though extraordinary, it must also be equitable. Public interest also will have to be considered. Law of land must be applied. If all these are taken into consideration, none of the Petitioners will be entitled to any relief, and consequently all the Writ Petitions will have to be dismissed, and I do so. No costs. Connected W.M. Ps. are also dismissed.