High CourtsSingle Bench

M/S Vanasthali Investments Private Limited vs State & Ors

Delhi High Court · Decided on 7 August 2018 · Citation: (2018) 08 DEL CK 0362

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.K.GAUBA, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 · Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 506
RESULT
Diposed Off
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3529, 3530 Of 2015 & Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 12562 Of 2015
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Judgment

56 paragraphs · 1,224 words

R.K.GAUBA, J

1.

Both these petitions have been filed invoking the inherent power of this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)

read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India to raise questions as to the correctness, legality and propriety of similar orders passed by the

Metropolitan Magistrate on 21.07.2015 in the context of two different complaint cases (CC Nos. 50/10/12 and 51/10/12) which were instituted by the

petitioner (hereinafter the complainant) against the private party respondents herein, each alleging offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881. By the impugned orders, the application of the private party respondents (the accused) for refund of the amount of Rs. 38

lakhs that had been earlier paid by them to the complainant were granted and the Metropolitan Magistrate called upon the petitioner (the complainant)

to submit the same in the form of fixed deposit receipt.

2.

Though the private party respondents (the accused persons) were duly served and had even appeared through counsel, seeking to resist these

petitions by way of replies earlier submitted, at the hearing, there is no appearance on their behalf.

3.

The background facts leading to the petitions at hand being filed, simply put, are that aside from the two criminal cases involving offences under

Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the parties were involved in other litigation, this including the criminal cases arising out of FIR No.

1278/2010 that had been registered at the instance of the petitioner by police station Sector 20, Noida (U.P.) involving offences punishable under

Sections 467/468/471/420/506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The parties were referred to mediation by orders dated 18.10.2012 and 24.10.2013 in

the proceedings in the complaint cases from which the present petitions arise. They entered into a settlement agreement dated 22.01.2014, copy

whereof has been submitted with these petitions. Going by the terms of settlement, arrived at through mediation, the accused persons were to pay to

the complainant, a total amount of Rs. 62,50,000/- and out of the said amount Rs. 38 lakhs was to be paid as the first instalment, this inclusive of Rs.

33 lakhs which was passed on in the form of demand draft at the time of signing of the settlement agreement and the balance of Rs. 5 lakhs which

had already been deposited in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate and was agreed to be released to the complainant with no objection from the

accused persons. It was agreed that the complainant would cooperate and the accused persons would move Allahabad High Court with the prayer for

quashing of the FIR that had been registered in Noida (U.P.). It was further agreed that the balance amount of Rs. 24.50 lakhs would be paid “the

momentâ€​, the quashing of the FIR “was done by the competent court of jurisdictionâ€​.

4.

In the wake of the above-mentioned settlement agreement dated 22.01.2014, certain submissions were made before the court of Metropolitan

Magistrate that were recorded in the proceedings, similar in both the complaint cases on 22.02.2014. The criminal complaints were not withdrawn.

Rather, the matter was deferred for recording of statement for withdrawal of the cases for 29.05.2014. It appears, no steps were taken immediately

for filing of the petition before the High Court of Allahbad for quashing of the afore-mentioned FIR. Yet, on 04.08.2014, while the counsel for the

complainant informed the Magistrate that the accused had “failed to honour his commitments†and consequently the settlement had not

materialized, the accused persons submitted that substantial payment had been made and the petition for quashing of the FIR had “already been

filed†before the High Court of Allahabad. The Magistrate kept the matters alive and adjourned them for 25.08.2014. Eventually, on 07.10.2014, the

submissions to above effect were reiterated and re-recorded in the proceedings common to both the cases, the accused persons through counsel,

submitting that they were still willing to honour the settlement and make further payment adding that “matter has already been filed before the High

Court of Allahabadâ€​.

5.

A copy of the petition whereby the prayer for quashing of the FIR of Noida was submitted before the High Court of Allahabad, has been submitted

by the petitioner. It would show the petition to be dated 16.11.2014. From this, it naturally follows that the submissions made before the Metropolitan

Magistrate on 04.08.2014 and 07.10.2014 about such petition having already been filed were not truthful.

6.

Be that as it may, it is clear from the averments on both sides that the settlement agreement dated 22.01.2014 could not be taken to logical end. It is

submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid petition for quashing is still pending before the High Court of Allahabad, it having been

once dismissed in default though later restored, the petitioner (the complainant) continuing to be willing to cooperate with such process. But, the fact

remains that the balance amount payable in terms of the settlement agreement has also not reached the hands of the petitioner till date.

7.

Against the above backdrop, the accused persons (the private party respondents) moved the application seeking restoration of the position as it

existed prior to entering into the settlement, which, in simple terms, would mean direction to the complainant to refund the amount of Rs. 38 lakhs

which has been received by it under the said settlement agreement. The application made by the accused persons, it appears, was silent and non-

specific as to the reasons why the settlement agreement could not fructify. It seems to be scrupulously silent as to the reasons why wrong statements

were made before the trial court about the petition for quashing having been filed. In reply to these petitions, an endeavour was made by the accused

persons to justify inaction with reference to some title documents not having been handed over though the settlement agreement seems to be silent in

such regard.

8.

The petitioners are aggrieved by the directions of the Metropolitan Magistrate to refund the amount of Rs. 38 lakhs and in the opinion of this Court,

justifiably so. The settlement agreement though entered upon through the process of mediation where the parties had been referred by the criminal

court had been arrived at by the parties on their own free will and volition. There was no direction from the Metropolitan Magistrate for payment to be

made. The amount of Rs. 38 lakhs was, thus, paid to the complainant by the accused persons on their own initiation. The question as to whether this

amount (assuming it represents the value of the cheques) was due as liability or not will have to be addressed at the trial of the criminal cases which

continue to remain pending. The court of Metropolitan Magistrate not having brought about the said payment cannot be converted, midway the

process, into a forum for its restitution, refund or recovery. Undoubtedly, at the stage of final adjudication, the criminal court will render findings as to

whether any amount was due for payment of which the cheques were issued and, if due, what was the extent of such liability. Suitable directions for

restitution, if that were required, can always be passed at such stage.

9.

In view of the above, the impugned orders are set aside. The petitions and the applications filed therewith stand disposed of.