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Judgment
9 paragraphs · 917 wordsMullick, J.—These two applications in revision arise oat of suit Nos. 20 and 21 of 1922 before the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur. The plaintiff, a mutwalli asks for a declaration that the properties in suit are increments to a wakf created by Mt. Nurjahan Begum and for recovery of possession from the defendants who in one case claim title under a Court sale of the 16th February. 1914, and in the other under a kobala executed by Mt. Nurjahan on the 9th August, 1914. One of the issue raised at the trial was whether the Court-fee paid was sufficient. The issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff, but the suits were dismissed on the merits. An appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the District Judge who found that the value of the properties was not Rs. 2,100 as held by the trial Court but not less than Rs. 15,000 or 20,000 and he accordingly returned the memoranda of appeal to be presented to the proper Court.
Against this order an appeal was preferred to this Court under Order 43, Rule 1(a) of Civil Procedure Code; but we held following Raghunath Charan Singh v. Shamo Koeri (1903) 31 Cal. 344 that no appeal lay and we directed the applications to be registered as revision cases.
It is now urged before us by the learned Vakil for the plaintiff that the learned Judge''s order returning the memoranda of appeal was without jurisdiction. I think this contention must fail. Clearly Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1837 does not apply. The Subordinate Judge had unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction and no objection was or could have been taken before him on the ground of his jurisdiction to try the suit. If the suit had been tried by a Munsif it may be that an objection as to valuation for the purpose of determining the Court-fee might, in certain circumstances, have also been regarded as an objection as to jurisdiction and in that case the appeal Court, if satisfied, that, inspite of the under-valuation, the disposal of the suit on the merits had not been prejudiced, would have been entitled to hear the appeal as if there has been no defect of jurisdiction.
But here the question is not whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to try the suit but whether the appeal Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, Ordinarily the appeal Court does not interfere with a valuation made by a trial Court for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, but; it is always open to a party to take this as a ground of appeal. The Court may also investigate the matter in exercise of its inherent powers Part 1 of the Suits Valuation Act empowers the Local Government to make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in certain classes of suits, and Part II declares that in suits not coming within paras. V, VI and IX and para. X, Clause (d) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, the value as determinate for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. Under the first part of Section 12 of the Court Fees Act the valuation made by the trial Court for the purpose of computing the Court-fee is final as between the parties, but the finality so conferred in confined within very narrow limits and it is even open to a party to appeal on a question of category, that is to say, the class within which the suit falls. On a question of valuation pure and simple, a party cannot appeal, but the Court may set under the 2nd part of Section 12 of the Court Fees Act for the purpose of protecting the revenue.
Here the suits before us fall within the Section 7, para 4(c) of the Court Fees Act and the valuation for the purpose of computing the Court-fee must determine the jurisdiction. But there was nothing to prevent the defendants from objecting before the District Judge that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The District Judge had jurisdiction, and indeed it was his duty, to determine the point, and as there was material before him for coming to the finding that the value of the subject-matter was at least Rs. 15,000 and that therefore he was not competent to hear the appeal, no revision lies against his order.
It follows from this view that an appeal on the ground of defect of jurisdiction may, if successful, disturb the finality of the valuation for the purpose of computation of Court-fees in suits coming u/s 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, but there can be no doubt that the first clause of Section 12 of the Court Fees Act is subject to the provisions of the Suits Valuation Act; and so it has been held in Peary Shah v. Surajmal Marwari (1912) 16 C.L.J. 371. In the present case the Court vested with jurisdiction to hear the appeals will, in deciding the question of jurisdiction, be competent to levy deficit Court-fee on the plaint if satisfied that the District Judge''s valuation was correct.
The immediate question however before us is whether the District Judge acted without jurisdiction in returning the memoranda of appeal. The answer is in the negative and these applications in revision are dismissed with costs: hearing fee two gold mohurs in each case.
Ross, J.
I agree.
