Mt. Siabati vs Sib Sahai Jha and Others

Meredith, J.—This matter has been referred to me as Taxing Judge u/s 5, Court-fees Act. The appellant sued in forma pauperis for maintenance at Rs. 60 per month and for a certain sum by way of arrears. The second prayer was rejected, and on the first prayer she was given a decree for the reduced amount of Rs. 30 per month. Moreover, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs.

The appeal has been preferred on two grounds: (1) that the maintenance claimed should have been decreed in full and (2) that the appellant should not have been ordered to pay costs, but on the contrary should have been allowed costs. There is no appeal with regard to the rejection of the claim for arrears. The first item of appeal has been valued by the appellant at Rs. 2,400, the second at Rs. 878-12-0, total Rs. 3,278-12-0 and the appellant is quite prepared to pay ad valorem court-fees on this sum; but the Stamp Reporter, in accordance with precedent in this Court has taken the view that court-fees should be paid separately on the valuation of each item u/s 17, Court-fees Act, which runs as follows:

Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act.

It will be seen that for the section to be applicable the suit must embrace two or more distinct subjects. It is well settled in this Court that distinct subjects should be interpreted as distinct causes of action: see Nauratan Lal v. Stephenson AIR 1922 Pat 359 , E.I. Railway Co. Vs. Ahmadi Khan, and Ram Narain Gir Vs. Gauri Shanker Lal and Others, . Now whatever may be said about the appeal, it is quite clear that the present suit did not embrace two or more distinct causes of action. Therefore, Section 17 in my view has no application. The-learned Taxing Officer has made an additional point, which seems to me unanswerable. The wording of the section is:

Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable, etc.

Therefore, in estimating the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal we have to see not whether the appeal embraces two or more distinct subjects, but whether the suit does. That is the only possible interpretation of the section. Had anything else been intended, the Legislature must have said:

Where a suit or memorandum of appeal embraces two or more distinct subjects the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable, etc.

The position in short is perfectly clear in my judgment and this reference would not, I think, have been made but for a decision of the Taxing Judge of this Court, Roe, J. in Rowlins v. Lachmi Narain Jha AIR 1918 Pat 210 in which the learned Judge said:

When the appeal against costs is distinct and separate from other parts of the appeal, court-fees must be paid ad valorem on the costs decreed.

No reasons at all are given for this opinion, and I am not sure to exactly what type of case the learned Judge meant his remark to apply. Whatever the learned Judge meant I cannot accept his remark as correctly stating the position in a case such as the present one.

My decision is that court-fees are payablef on the aggregate sum of Rs. 3278-12-0.