Mugneeram Bangur and Co. vs Kalidas Ghosh

Chakravartti, C. J.

This is an application under Article 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, dated the 15th April, 1954, whereby the respondent''s suit dismissed by the trial Court was decreed. The suit was for a declaration that a certain contract for sale by the appellant to the respondent of a certain plot of land was still subsisting and for an order directing the appellants to execute the necessary conveyance. The learned Judges of this Court, in decreeing that suit, adjusted the form of the relief in manner that instead of making the declaration and the order asked for they directed specific performance of the contract on payment of the necessary additional court-fees. The court-fees having been paid, a final order was passed. When the application first came up for hearing on the 27th August, 1954, we found that the parties were not in agreement as respects the value of the subject-matter in dispute. Accordingly we sent the case down to the trial court, in order that the value of the property as on the 23rd of September, 1946, the date of the institution of the suit and on the 9th of June, 1954, the date of the presentation of the present application, might be ascertained. The learned subordinate Judge held the enquiry in due course and he has reported to us that the value of the land in dispute on the 23rd of September, 1946, was Rs. 28,800 and its value on the 9th June, 1954, was Rs. 30,400.

Mr. Sen Gupta, who appears on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent contends that on the values reported by the learned Subordinate Judge, the subject-matter of the dispute both in the court of first instance and in the proposed appeal must be held to be below the statutory amount of Rs. 20,000. His contention is that the plaintiff''s claim was to get the land on payment of the price agreed on in the contract for sale. The only defence of the petitioners was that time was of the essence of the contract and inasmuch as the contract had not been completed in time, it had lapsed. They therefore wanted to keep the land and did not want any money for it. This court held against the petitioners and took the view that the respondent was entitled to get the land on payment of the contract price. Mr. Sen Gupta''s contention is that the dispute in the present case is clearly of the nature that the plaintiff-respondent was saying that he was entitled to get the land on payment of Rs. 14,400, while the petitioners were saying that they were not bound to sell the land at all. In view of that nature of the dispute, the value of the subject-matter, Mr. Sen Gupta contended, would be the difference between the actual value of the land and the contract price for which the appellants would be bound to convey the land, if the plaintiff''s suit succeeded.

In my view, Mr. Sen Gupta''s contention is correct. It was resisted by Mr. Chakravartti, who submitted that when the Constitution used the expression "subject-matter of the dispute", it meant the subject-matter to which the dispute related and not the content of the dispute. In that view, the subject-matter of the dispute in the present case would be the land itself and, according to Mr. Chakravartti, the value of that subject-matter would be the value of the land, as reported by the learned Subordinate Judge without any deductions of any kind. If the actual value of the land was the value of the subject-matter of the dispute within the meaning of Article 133 (1)(a), then the valuation test was clearly satisfied, inasmuch as the value on both the relevant dates was above Rs. 20,000.

It seems to me, however, that the expression "subject-matter of the dispute" does not mean the property or the matter to which the dispute relates. There may be a small dispute with respect to a vast property, affecting only an infinitesimal portion of it or a microscopic interest in it. It would be irrational to hold that the framers of the Constitution intended that even in such cases the value of the dispute should be regarded as the value of the property itself, however small might be the proportion it bore to the actual dispute between the parties, I am free to confess that as a matter of language, the expression "subject-matter of the dispute" is capable of two meanings, but the meaning, I would prefer is the meaning which appears to me to be in accord with the true intent of Article 133(1)(a). That clause of the article and the next are concerned with limiting the right of appeal in civil proceeding to cases of and over a stated value on the obvious principle that in order that a dispute may be allowed to go further than the High Court, the stake must be sufficiently large. So when the clauses speak of or refer to "the subject matter of the dispute" what they have clearly in view is the matter over which the parties are in disagreement and when they speak of the value of such subject-matter, they mean the monetary measure of the gain or loss to the parties according as their respective contentions succeed or fail. I would add that the true meaning of the expression is made clearer by the other phrase used in the Article to describe the required valuation in respect of the proposed appeal. That phrase is "subject-matter * * * still in dispute on appeal". To my mind that phrase means and can only mean the content of the dispute and therefore as to magnitude of monetary value, the subject-matter is limited by the dimensions of the dispute and is not necessarily co-extensive with the property to which the dispute appertains. If that be so, the value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the present case, whether in the court of first instance or in the proposed appeal, is below the statutory limit

Mr. Chakravartti, then contended that if he could not claim leave under Article 133(1) (a), he would pray for leave under sub-clause (c) of the Article, because the case was otherwise a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. He submitted that the prayers in the plaint were only for a declaration that the contract entered into in 1946, was still subsisting and for a direction on the petitioners to execute the necessary conveyance. The suit brought on that plaint had been converted by the learned Judges of this court into a suit for specific performance and whether such adjustment of the relief awarded to the plaintiff was at all permissible in law, was a question of sufficient importance which made the case a fit case for further appeal. It appears to me that this submission of Mr. Chakravartti must also be overruled. It is elementary that the Court is not limited to the forms of relief actually prayed for in the plaint. It can always adjust or refashion them in the interest of justice. If however in doing so, the Court alters the whole constitution of the suit at the last moment and thus places the other party at a disadvantage, it must be held that the court goes beyond the permissible limits. In the present case, however, it is perfectly clear that the parties well understood what the true issues between them were and there is also a finding that the plaintiff-respondent on his part had always been ready and willing to perform the contract, whereas the petitioners had been resisting its performance. I do not think that the form in which this court awarded relief to the respondent raises any substantial question of law which would justify us in granting the leave prayed for and adding another chapter to this protracted litigation

After all, the dispute between the parties is and always was whether or not the petitioners were bound to convey the land to the respondent under the contract entered into in 1946, and at the price stipulated by that contract. That is the straight and plain issue between the parties and that issue and no other has in substance been tried. I do not see how it will be proper to introduce refinements and technicalities in order to convert that simple dispute into something intricate and make such refinements the basis for a further appeal to the Supreme Court. For the reasons given above, this application is dismissed with costs the hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs.

Lahiri, J.

I agree.