High Courts

Mukhtiar Singh vs Ajmer Kaur

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 18 January 1991 · Citation: (1991) PLJ 519 : (1991) 2 PLR 116 : (1991) 2 RRR 420

HON’BLE JUDGES
J.V.Gupta · CJ., J
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 2184 of 1978
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 720 words

J. V. Gupta, C.J.—This is defendants'' second appeal against whom the suit for declaration and redemption has been decreed by both the Courts below.

2.

Smt. Ajmer Kaur was the owner of the suit property, measuring 22 Kanals 1 Marla. She mortgaged the same with possession with the defendants for a sum of Rs.9,000/ on June 19, 1974. That very day, i.e., June 19, 1974 she executed a general power of attorney, Exhibit D.1) in favour of her brother Surjan Singh, defendant No. 7 authorising him to deal with her property in any manner he liked. It was duly registered. In pursuance of the said power of attorney, the said Surian Singh is said to have sold the land, in dispute, to the defendantsappellants for a sum of Rs. 18,000/ by registered sale deed, Exhibit D.2 dated February 10, 1976. The plaintiff filed the present suit for declaration that she was still the owner of the suit. property and the sale deed executed by her brother as her general attorney had no binding effect on her rights thereto, as the said power of attorney was cancelled by her on February 6, 1976. She further claimed that she was entitled to redeem the suit property from the defendants by paying them the mortgage money. The suit was resisted on the plea that the brother of the plaintiff was her lawful general attorney and had rightly sold the suit land for a sum of Rs. 18,000/ through registered sale deed, dated February 10, 1976. It was specifically pleaded that the general power of attorney in favour of Surian Singh defendant, was in force on the date of the execution of deed on February 6, 1976, and the same was never cancelled, as alleged by the plaintiff. The trial Court found that the sale deed executed by the plaintiff''s brother Surian Singh defendant, in favour of the defendantsappellants was not valid in view of the proper and legal cancellation of the general power of attorney given to, him by the plaintiff. In view of that finding, the plaintiff''s suit was decreed. In appeal, the learned District Judge, Sangrur, affirmed the said finding of the trial Court and, thus maintained the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff.

3.

The learned counsel for the defendantsappellants submitted that the sale deed was executed on February 6, 1976, though the same was got registered on February 10, 1976. According to the learned counsel, on February 6, 1976, Surian Singh, defendant, had the power of attorney on behalf of the plaintiff. Thus, argued the learned counsel, the registration of the sale deed on February 10, 1976, will relate back to February 6, 1976, and, therefore, the sale was valid in favour of the defendentsappellants. According to learned counsel the view taken by the Courts below in this behalf was wrong and illegal. In support of the contention, the learned counsel relied upon Milkha Singh v. Tara Singh, 1973 PLJ 124.

4.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondent submitted that the registration of the document on February 10, 1976, was invalid as on that day, Surian Singh, defendant had no authority to present the document executed by him on February 6, 1976, as the same was admittedly cancelled on February 6, 1976. According to learned counsel, if the registration was itself invalid, the question of relating back of the registration of the document to the date of its execution did not arise. In support of the contention, the learned counsel relied upon Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung, AIR 1922 Privy Council 359.

5.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I do not find any merit in this appeal.

6.

The principle that a document after registration relates back to the date of its execution has no applicability to the facts of the present case. The provisions of section 32 of the Registration Act, are imperative and unless a document presented for registration is presented by one of the persons described in the section, mere presentation does not give to the Registrar the indispensable foundation of his authority to register it and the registration if made, is invalid. Reference may in this behalf be made to Ma Shwe Mya''s case (supra).

7.

Consequently, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.