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Judgment
13 paragraphs · 695 wordsT.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
The petitioner is seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the respondents cancelling his arms licence.
The petitioner was an armed licence holder. His licence was suspended on March 11, 1981, and he was served with a showcause notice as to why his licence be not cancelled. The petitioner submitted his explanation. Not satisfied with the explanation, the District Magistrate, Patiala, cancelled the licence under Section 17 of the Arms Act. An appeal field by the petitioner to the Commissioner, Patiala Division was also unsuccessful. Hence, the petitioner approached this Court by way of this writ petition.
In the impugned order dated August 28, 1981, the District Magistrate, Patiala, cancelled the licence on the following grounds :
"Although he has been acquitted in all the three cases yet his frequent involvement in such (cases) shows that he has some criminal tendency. He does not appear to be a fit person to hold an Arms Licence."
The Commissioner, Patiala Division only confirmed the order of the District Magistrate. He has not given any reasons for upholding the order of the District Magistrate. A perusal of the orders of the District Magistrate and the Commissioner clearly shows that both the authorities have not applied their mind to the provisions of subsection 3 of Section 17 of the Arms Act. Under the said section, a licencing authority may revoke the licence :
(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act, or
(b) if the licencing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under subsection (1) requiring him to deliver up the licence."
In the case in hand, none of the above requirements were present. It is not the case of the District Magistrate that the petitioner was prohibited from holding licence nor is it the case of the authorities that revocation of the licence is necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety. It is also not the case of the authorities that there was any suppression of material before obtaining the licence. There are also no allegations that there is any contravention of the conditions of licence or the petitioner failed to comply with any notice under subsection 1 to deliver the licence. The District Magistrate referred to only three cases which were registered against the petitioner under the Excise Act but not under the Arms Act. Even the District Magistrate admitted that all these three cases which were registered against the petitioner ended in acquittal. It is not known from where the District Magistrate got the impression that "the petitioner''s frequent involvement in such (cases) shows that he has some criminal tendency." Thus, it is clear that the order of the District Magistrate is based on no material at all. Normally, this Court will not interfere with the discretion of the authorities if it is based on some relevant material available with the authorities but here it is a case where no material is available for taking action under subsection 3 of Section 17 of the Arms Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned orders of the District Magistrate dated August 28, 1981, and the Appellate order dated May 4, 1982, are liable to be quashed.
The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
