Mukund Limited vs Shri Gajanan Shantaram Sakre and Others

B.N. Srikrishna, J.—This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the order dated 20th November 1992 made in Revision Application (ULP) No. 63 of 1987 by the Member, Industrial Court, Thane allowing the Revision Application and setting aside the order dated 29th May, 1987 made by the Labour Court, Thane in Complaint (ULP) No. 62 of 1987, & W.P. 5243 of 1992 both under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

The first Respondent was employed as a Stores Clerk in the service of the Petitioner for about 14 years. On 25th November, 1979 at about 5.15 p.m. one lorry was carrying material from the Petitioner''s Kalwe Plant to its Kurla Plant. Just outside the main gale, the lorry was checked by one Goradia, Materials Manager, and Jamadar Kadam of Security Department and a bag containing approximately 50kgs. of Ferro Molybdenum, a costly chemical also known as Ferro-moly, valued at Rs. 22,000/- was seen being carried away in the lorry unauthorisedly. The material belonged to the Petitioner company. The lorry was allowed to proceed. As soon as the lorry reached near Shangrilla Biscuits Company, Agra Road, Bhandup, enroute to the Kurla Works, it was stopped by the driver and he handed over the properly to Natwarlal Shah and Vilhal Parab, who were waiting on road to receive it. As soon as they took possession of the stolen property, they were caught with the aid of the police. A police complaint was also filed by the Petitioner as a result of which the two persons, who hail received the stolen property, were arrested and their interrogation revealed the modus- operand namely, that the material had been surreptitiously removed from the factory premises and handed over to the driver of the lorry for being delivered to Natwarlal Shah and Vilhal Parab on the way. The first Respondent was also arrested by the police and all three persons were prosecuted be fore the J.M.F.C., Court No. 1 at Thane for charges under Sections 408, 381 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Before the Criminal Court, all the accused, including the first Respondent, pleaded guilty and prayed for leniency on the ground that they were not habitual offenders and expressed repentance for their acts. Consequently, by an order made on 24th March 1983, the J.M.F.C., Court No. I. Thane, convicted the first Respondent and other accused under Sections 408, 351 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, but released them on execution of bond of Rs. 11.000/-.

Independently of the criminal proceedings, first Respondent was also served with a charge-sheet dated 30th November, 1979 alleging against him the misconduct of theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer''s business or properly and commission of any act subversive of good be heavier with in the establishment or of the discipline of the establishment. By his reply dated 6th January, 1979, the first Respondent denied the charges level led against him and stated that he had nothing lo say in the matter for the present, A lengthy enquiry ensued and resulted in the first Respondent being found guilty of the charges alleged against him. A Her considering their past service records and other attendant circumstances, the first Respondent and his two associates were dismissed from service by an order made on 12th April, 1980.

The, first Respondent moved the Labour Court at Thane by his Complaint (ULP) No. 62 of 1980 seeking reliefs of reinstatement with back wages and continuity. The Labour Court tried the Complaint and, by its order dated 29th May, 1987, dismissed the Complaint and declined relief to the first Respondent. The first Respondent moved the Industrial Court, Thane by his Revision Application (ULP) No. 63 of 1987 which was allowed by the Industrial Court by the impugned order dated 20th November, 1992. The Industrial Court set aside the order of the Labour Court and directed reinstatement of the first Respondent with continuity of service and full back wages together with all consequential benefits. Being aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner is before this Court by way of present Writ Petition.

It may be mentioned here that the Labour Court had raised the following issues and answered them as under:-

(1) Docs the Respondent prove that the domestic enquiry conducted against the workman was fair and proper and in accordance with die principles of natural justice (including findings)-Yes.

(2) Is the misconduct proved on the strength of the domestic enquiry or die evidence adduced by the Respondent to that effect? - Misconduct is proved on the strength of the domestic enquiry.

(3) Does the Complainant prove any of the alleged unfair labour practices against the Respondents? - No.

(4) Is the dismissal order against the Complainant valid and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case? - Yes.

(5) What reliefs and order? - As per order below.

The Industrial Court in the impugned order has held the enquiry to be bad on the ground that the charge-sheet was vague. Mr. R.J. Kochar has drawn my attention to he charge-sheet issued to the first Respondent which is at Exhibit "A" to the Writ Petition and reiterated the contention that the charge-sheet is vague. It is difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel. The charge-sheet clearly narrates all particulars like the date, time and place of the misconduct and the nature of the misconduct. At the time the charge-sheet was issued, the Petitioner did not know fully the modus operandi and was yet to have the explanation of the first Respondent. Perhaps, for this reason, the charge-sheet described that the first Respondent had "caused to be removed" surreptitiously from the Company''s premises the property in question with a view to its being handed over to accomplices outside the premises who were also named in the charge-sheet. It is difficult to agree with the Industrial Court that this charge-sheet was in any manner vague so as to prejudice the employee in giving a proper explanation thereto. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in holding that the first Respondent''s case fell within the ratio of the judgment in Miraj Taluka Girni Kamgar Sangh v. The Manager, Shree Gajanan Weaving Mills, Sangli, and Ors. 1991 2 CLR 714 : 1992 (2) LLJ 686 to which I was a party. There is also a second infirmity in the reasoning of the Industrial Court. The reply to the charge-sheet given by the first Respondent is at Exhibit "B" to the Writ Petition. In the reply dated 6th December, 1979, the first Respondent does not plead that he is unable to comprehend the charges on account of vagueness in the charge-sheet, but emphatically says "I do not accept the charges imposed by you vide your letter. However, I have taken up this matter with my lawyer. 1 do not have anything to say in this matter at present". In my view, this reply does not indicate that the first Respondent was in any way misled or prejudiced in giving his explanation to the charge-sheet. There is not even the ghost of a suggestion herein that the charge-sheet was vague or misleading. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in interfering on the ground of the alleged vagueness of the charge-sheet.

The Industrial Court further erred in reassessing the evidence of the different witnesses which was recorded during the domestic enquiry. It is the function of the trial Court assess if the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were reasonably possible on the material on record at the domestic enquiry, but it is no function of the trial Court to reassess them and arrive at different conclusions. May be, different persons instructed in law may arrive at different conclusions on the same evidence, but that is no ground for taking the view that the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer were perverse. The Industrial Court erred in framing the issue "whether the misconduct has been proved on the strength of the evidence recorded at the domestic enquiry". This was none of its function. While exercising jurisdiction u/s 44 of the Act, which grants only a limited jurisdiction of judicial superintendence over the Labour Court, the Industrial Court is only required to ensure that the Labour Court has acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction. The framing of the above issue indicates that the Industrial Court was arrogating to itself appellate powers, not only against the Labour Court, but also against the domestic enquiry, which it certainly did not possess.

Another infirmity in the impugned order of the Industrial Court is that, having held that the Complainant had failed to prove any of the alleged unfair labour practices against the Respondent employer, the Industrial Court ought to have realised that no relief could have been granted in the Complaint, much less, in the Revision Application. The whole exercise was an exercise without jurisdiction on its own findings.

Finally, the Industrial Court grossly erred in taking the view that the fact that the first Respondent had admitted his guilt before the Criminal Court was an irrelevant fact and did not mean that the offence with which he was charged was automatically proved. The Industrial Court failed to notice that, even in a criminal trial, Section 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permits the Judge, when the accused pleads guilty, to record the plea and in his discretion to convict the accused. Such a conviction is very much a conviction even if it proceeds on a plea of guilty made by the accused. In my judgment, the fact that the first Respondent pleaded guilty to charges under Sections 408, 381 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and, upon his plea of guilt was convicted by the Criminal Court, clearly establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of the offence with which he was charged. In these circumstances, there was no warrant whatsoever for the Industrial Court to interfere with the findings recorded by the Labour Court or its order that the first Respondent was not entitled to any relief.

In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Industrial Court, Thane dated 20th November, 1992 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

I am informed by learned Counsel on both sides that the first Respondent has already retired from service having reached the age of superannuation. The Petitioner company shall ensure that all his legal dues, if not already paid to him, shall forthwith be paid to him.

Issuance of certified copy of this judgment expedited.