Municipal Committee Bhatinda vs Director, Local Government, Punjab and ors.

I.S. Tiwana, J. (Oral)

Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that these 24 petition Nos. 1362, 2095 to 2103, 2133 to 2137, 2660 to 2663 and 2665 to 2669 of 1985 filed by Municipal Committee, Bhantida against different house tax assessees but on similar grounds can conveniently be disposed of through a common order. They are also agreed that for purposes of this judgment, only the facts stated in C.W.P. No 1362 to 1985 need to noticed.

Property No. 379/44 of respondent No. 3 Shri Jogan Nath Goyal has been subjected to house tax for the first time by the order of the petitionerCommittee dated 29.3.1982. Concededly, it is situated within the area of Urban Estate, Bhatinda. Its annual rental value has been assessed at Rs. 18000/ and a tax of Rs. 2430/ has been imposed thereupon under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Shri Goyal preferred an appeal against this assessment of the rental value and house tax before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda who vide order dated 23.6.1983 (Annexure P.1) set aside the assessment made by the Committee on two grounds: (i) since the property fell within the area of Urban Estate, Bhatinda, the Municipal Committee, i.e. the petitioner had no jurisdiction to impose any house tax, and (ii) the assessment could not be made by the Committee in view of the provisions of section 4 of the Punjab Executive Officers Act, 1931. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner approached the Joint Secretary to Government Punjab, who also happens to be the Director Local Government Punjab under section 237 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The later authority upheld the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner on the very first ground that the property in question being a part of the Urban Estate, Bhatinda, could not be subjected to any house tax under the Municipal Act. It is this later mentioned order which is now being impugned by the petitioner with the prayer that the order of the Director i.e., respondent No. 1 confirming the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, i.e. respondent No. 2. be set aside. It deserves to be mentioned here that no prayer for the setting aside of order of respondent No. 2 has been made in any of these petitions.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the order of the Director (Annexure P.3) cannot possibly be sustained. None of the learned counsel for the parties has been able to bring to my notice any provision in the Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964 which excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act to the area of operation of the former Act. However, the impugned order Annexure P.3 is sought to be sustained by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 in the light of subsection (2A) of section 8 of the Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964, which reads as follows :

"(2A) If the area or any part thereof with respect to which a notification under subsection (1) is issued is situate within the limits of a local authority, the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, or Punjab Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishads as Act, 1961, as the case may be, shall cease to apply with respect to such area or part thereof:

Provided that the arrears of tax, if any, due to the local authority concerned till the date of issue of a notification under subsection (1) may be recovered in the same manner as if such notification had not been issued."

A bare reading of this provision clearly indicates that the Act mentioned therein including the Punjab Municipal Act cease to apply to an area which forms part of an Urban Estate only if a notification under subsection (1) of section 8A has been issued by the State Government. Concededly, no such notification has been issued n the instant case.

As a last resort, it is maintained by the learned counsel for the privaterespondent that with the addition of subsection (2A) to section 8 vide Punjab Act No. 12 of 1975 an anomaly has come into existence; according to the learned counsel, this subsection should have been made to form a part of section 3 of the Act. Even if, that be so, it is not for this Court to relegislate or reenact the statute as the learned counsel seeks to urge.

For the reasons recorded above, I allow these petitions and while setting aside the impugned order passed by respondents No. 1 i.e. the Director, send the case back to him for decision afresh in accordance with the law. No costs.