Municipal Committee, Jaitu vs Mathra Dass and Others

Dua, J.—This revision assails the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Bhatinda, holding the case to be covered by section 7(v)(b), Court-fees Act and not by section 7(v) (d), and in consequence holding the plaint to be properly valued for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction.

The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Ratnavaramaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla, , the petitioner cannot on revision assail the impugned order. It was observed in the reported case:

Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the court-fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again, the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court u/s 115 of the CPC is strictly conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusing to exercise jurisdiction vested in the subordinate Court or assumption of jurisdiction which the Court does not possess on the ground that the Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to. move the superior Courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudicating payment of court-fee payable on the plaint.

The counsel has also relied on Bhura Mal Dan Dyal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd. etc. AIR 1959 P&H. 629, where I too observed as follows:

It would not be out of place also to emphasise that payment of court-fee as a source of revenue is a matter primarily between the State and the subject. If the State has realised the court-fee it is hardly proper for the opposing litigant to raise objection on the score of court-fee for the purpose of shutting out or obstructing adjudication of disputes.

The learned counsel for the petitioner when faced with these decisions tried to take the case out of the ratio of the Supreme Court decision by submitting that the Supreme Court was only concerned with Madras Act 14 of 1955, but in my opinion, the learned counsel is not quite right in his submission. The observations quoted above were not made on the basis of the Madras Act. On the other hand the counsel for the defendant there attempted to spell out a legislative intent from the Madras Act which invested him with a right even to move the High Court in the event of the trial Court passing an order contrary to his submission. This contention was also repelled. I would, therefore, agreeing with the respondents'' submission, hold that the petitioner cannot canvass on revision the question of court-fee.

It has, however, been emphasised that the petitioner is assailing the order of the Court below on the basis of erroneous classification; meaning thereby that the Court below is wrong in holding the case to be covered by section 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act and not by section 7(v)(d). According to Dewan Atma Ram, had the Court below come to a correct conclusion on this point, the appeal of the" aggrieved party from the decision of the trial Court would lie to a higher Court in the hierarchy of Courts. He has further contended that the trial Court declined to determine the question whether or not the land in question is a revenue paying estate.

This contention has been met by Shri Kapur by relying on Tewari Singh and Others Vs. Gaya Prasad Sah and Others, a decision by a Division Bench in which a similar contention was repelled in the following words :

In my judgment, the fact that the first appeal would lie to the District Court and not to the High Court is of no importance at all. The right of appeal is not denied to the parties and it does not matter whether the appeal is heard by the High Court or by the District Court The other submission that, in case the defendants have got to go up in appeal to the Supreme Court, they will be put to disadvantage because of the valuation put in the plaint does not appeal to me in the least. The matter of valuation of the properties in suit has been decided for the purpose of court-fee and, in my opinion, no prejudice is likely to be caused to the parties in this regard at any future time.

In so far as the first point is concerned, undoubtedly the Supreme Court decision and the Punjab decision appear to conclude the matter against the present petitioner.

In so far as the second contention is concerned, the Patna decision appears to me to go against the petitioner. His counsel has, however, contended that the objection based on the deprivation of the right of appeal to a higher forum is legitimate and the Patna High Court did not adopt the correct view of law. I am, not inclined, as at present advised, to agree with the learned counsel. Whether or not the view of the Court below is right, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is circumscribed by the language of section 115, C.P.C. As laid down in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria etc. 4, "the words "illegally'' and ''material irregularity'' do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with." It is conceded that the only clause of section 115 or the Code, under which the present objection can possibly be brought, is clause (c), and, it has not been argued that there is any material defect of procedure from which the impugned order suffers. In this view of the matter, I am unable to sustain the objection raised by the petitioner. It is unnecessary, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, to deal with Urmilabala Biswas v. Binapani Biswas etc., on which the petitioner''s learned counsel tried to rely in support of the present revision. Asa Ram etc. v. Jagan Nath etc., is also of little avail in the present proceedings.

Section 12 of the Court Fees Act to which a passing reference was made by Dewan Atma Ram is equally unhelpful because that too can throw no light on the scope of the revisional power of this Court when it is asked to interfere with the decision of the trial Court on questions of Court Fee. Sub-section (1) of this section merely makes the decision of the Court regarding the valuation final between the parties to the suit and sub-section (2) enjoins the Court of appeal, reference or revision, before which the suit in question comes to require the party to pay additional Court Fee if the question relating to it has been wrongly decided to the detriment of revenue. This section does not entitle a party to invoke this Court''s revisional power against interlocutory order determining the question of Court Fee even though it be based on a wrong plea of valuation.

I may, however, make it clear that if under the law the petitioner is entitled to raise the question of valuation on appeal from the decree then this order would not stand in his way because I am disallowing this revision on the ground that this Court should not go into the controversy in the present revision.

For the foregoing reasons this petition fails and is hereby dismissed but without costs. Parties are directed through their counsel to appear in the trial Court on 2nd December, 1963 for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.