Municipal Corporation, Gwalior vs Surendra Singh Yadav

The Writ Petition was directed against the award dated 07.03.2017 passed by Labour Court No.1. Gwalior in Case No.COC-22/A/I.D.Act/2016 (Ref). The reference before Labour Court was against the oral termination order dated 01.12.2012 which was questioned on the ground that having been engaged in March, 2010 and having continuously worked for over 240 days without any break, the termination of service without holding any enquiry and establishing misconduct and without adhering to the mandatory stipulations contained under Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity "1947 Act") is illegal, void ab initio.

The Labour Court after considering the rival contentions and the material evidence on record returned the findings that the termination of workman without subjecting him to an enquiry and without adhering to the stipulations contained in Section 25F(a) & (b) of 1947 Act, held the retrenchment illegal; accordingly, directed for reinstatement without backwages vide award dated 07.03.2017.

The appellant/management filed the writ petition on two counts; firstly, that the finding that workman continuously, without any break worked for 240 days by drawing adverse inference is bad, and secondly, the Labour Court ought to have directed for compensation instead of reinstatement.

Learned Single Judge vide impugned order negatived both these contentions.

As regard to working period of the workman, learned single Judge recorded the finding that it has been admitted by the Corporation that the pass book of the workman shows payment of salary on regular basis without any break.

"Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Petitioner. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the Corporation did not produce the documents pertaining to the service period of the respondent. Thus, under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement would not be sufficient.

It is further submitted by the Counsel for the petitioner, that mere failure on the part of the Corporation to produce the document would not be sufficient to draw an adverse inference against the employer. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation and others Vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha and another reported in (2014) 16 SCC 130. However, during arguments it was fairly conceded by the Counsel for the petitioner that in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation (Supra), no order was ever issued to produce the documents. Thus, the facts of the present case are distinguishable."

These findings as evident are in consonance with the findings recorded by Labour Court on the basis of material evidence on record.

The Labour Court found:

"9- उक्त साक्ष्य से स्पष्ट है कि प्रथमपक्ष ने इस प्रकरण में उसकी सेवा समाप्ति को इस आधार पर विवादित किया है कि उसने द्वितीयपक्ष संस्थान में मार्च 2010 से दिनांक 01-12-12 तक कार्य किया है। सेवा समाप्ति के पूर्व 240 दिन से अधिक कार्य किया किन्तु द्वितीयपक्ष द्वारा बिना कोई वैधानिक प्रक्रिया अपनाए प्रथमपक्ष की अवैध सेवा समाप्ति की गई है तथा द्वितीयपक्ष का यह आधार है कि प्रथमपक्ष दै.वे.भो. कर्मचारी था उसे 89-89 दिवस के लिए कार्य पर रखा जाता था। ऐसे दै.वे.भो. कर्मचारी के लिए छटनी संबंधी प्रावधानों का पालन किया जाना आवश्यक नहीं था तथा कोई आरोप पत्र देना तथा विभागीय जांच किए जाने का भी कोई प्रावधान नहीं था किन्तु द्वितीयपक्ष साक्षी का कूट परीक्षण देखा जाए तो कूट परीक्षण में द्वितीयपक्ष साक्षी ने यह स्पष्ट रूप से स्वीकार किया है कि यह सही है कि प्रथमपक्ष को 89-89 दिन के लिए नौकरी में रखे जाने तथा अवधि समाप्त होने पर हटाए जाने का कोई आदेश मेरे द्वारा प्रकरण पत्रिका में पेश नहीं किया गया है। उक्तानुसार यह विचारणीय है कि निश्चित अवधि के लिए नियुक्ति किए जाने का आधार उसी दशा में मान्य किए जाने योग्य है जबकि निश्चित अवधि की नियुक्ति का लिखित आदेश रिकार्ड पर है जो द्वितीयपक्ष की ओर से प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है, अतः केवल मौखिक कथन के आधार पर यह प्रमाणित माने जाने योग्य नहीं है कि प्रथमपक्ष की नियुक्ति 89 दिवस के लिए की गई थी तथा प्रकरण में यह उल्लेखनीय है कि प्रथमपक्ष की ओर से जो दस्तावेजी प्रमाण प्रस्तुत किया गया है उन दस्तावेजों के संबंध में द्वितीयपक्ष साक्षी ने कूट परीक्षण में यह स्पष्ट रूप से स्वीकार किया है कि हमारे यहां मदाखलत विभाग भी होता है, यह बात सही है कि प्र.पी./1 हमारे मदाखलत अधिकारी का पत्र है, प्र.पी./2 हमारे निगम से प्रथमपक्ष के कर्मचारी भविष्य निधि की जानकारी है, प्र.पी./3 प्रथमपक्ष की कर्मचारी भविष्य निधि की पर्ची है। प्र.पी./1 के दस्तावेज को देखा जाए तो प्र.पी./1 का पत्र स्वयं द्वितीयपक्ष निगम के मदाखलत अधिकारी द्वारा सहायक श्रमायुक्त को लिखा गया है जिसमें यह स्पष्ट रूप से जानकारी दी गई कि श्री सुरेन्द्र यादव नगर निगम के ग्वालियर के मदाखलत विभाग में वर्ष 2010 से 2012 तक कार्यरत था। उक्त पत्र से ही यह स्पष्ट है कि प्रथमपक्ष ने जो उसकी सेवा अवधि बताई है उस सेवा अवधि में प्रथमपक्ष ने द्वितीयपक्ष निगम में काम किया है तथा मार्च 2010 से 01-12-12 तक की अवधि में प्रथमपक्ष की सेवा में कोई ब्रेक दिया गया हो ऐसा कोई स्पष्ट प्रमाण रिकार्ड पर नहीं है तथा प्रकरण में यह भी विचारणीय है कि प्रथमपक्ष ने उसकी सेवा से संबंधित रिकार्ड द्वितीयपक्ष से न्यायालय में प्रस्तुत कराए जाने हेतु विधिवत् आवेदन प्रस्तुत किया था जिस पर उभयपक्ष की सुनवाई पश्चात् द्वितीयपक्ष को न्यायालय में दस्तावेज प्रस्तुत करने का आदेश दिया गया था किन्तु प्रकरण में द्वितीयपक्ष की ओर से कोई दस्तावेज प्रस्तुत नहीं किए गए है जबकि द्वितीयपक्ष साक्षी ने ही अपने कूट परीक्षण में यह स्पष्ट रूप से स्वीकार किया है कि यह बात सही है कि प्रथमपक्ष की उपस्थिति एवं वेतन का रिकार्ड रख जाता है, यह बात सही है कि प्रथमपक्ष को वेतन उसकी उपस्थिति के आधार पर ही दिया जाता था, प्रथमपक्ष के वेतन पत्रक में ही उसकी उपस्थिति एवं अनुपस्थिति दर्ज की जाती है, यह बात सही है कि न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 20-10-16 के पालन में चाहे गए दस्तावेज निगम द्वारा प्रकरण पत्रिका में पेश नहीं किए गए हैं। द्वितीयपक्ष साक्षी के उक्त कथन से ही यह स्पष्ट है कि उनके द्वारा रिकार्ड उपलब्ध होते हुए भी न्यायालय द्वारा आदेश दिए जाने पर भी प्रकरण में प्रथमपक्ष की उपस्थिति व भुगतान का रिकार्ड प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है, ऐसी स्थिति में न्याय दृष्टांत 2010 (1) एम.पी.एल.जे.212 नवीन सिंह भदौरिया विरूद्ध स्टेट आॅफ एम.पी. में प्रतिपादित न्याय सिद्धांतो के प्रकाश में द्वितीयपक्ष के विरूद्ध विपरीत निष्कर्ष निकाले जाने योग्य हैं तथा प्र.पी./1 के अनुसार प्रथमपक्ष का वर्ष 2010 से 2012 तक कार्यरत होना द्वितीयपक्ष की ओर से भी स्वीकार किया गया है, अतः उपरोक्त साक्ष्य एवं विवेचन के अनुसार यह प्रमाणित है कि प्रथमपक्ष ने सेवा समाप्ति के पूर्व के वर्ष में 240 दिन से अधिक कार्य किया है।"

Evidently, the workman discharged his burden in establishing of having continuously worked for 240 days preceding his termination. The onus was, therefore, on the appellants/Management to have discharged the burden by producing cogent material evidence that the workman had not completed 240 days preceding the date of termination. In view whereof, the decision in "Municipal Corporation, Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195]" and in "Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore Vs. S. Mani and others [(2005) 5 SCC 100]" is of no assistance to the appellants. This will be evident from the observation by their Lordships in paragraph 19 of the judgment in S. Mani and others (supra) that the workman had not discharged his initial burden that he completed 240 days. In the case at hand as noted supra the workman discharged his burden that he worked for 240 days. The first contention, therefore, fails.

The next contention is that the Labour Court ought to have granted compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Appellant has relied on the decisions in "Municipal Corporation, Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas [(2004) 8 SCC 195]", "Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation and others Vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha and another [(2014) 16 SCC 130]" "Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and another Vs. Gitam Singh [(2013) 5 SCC 136]", "Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Man Singh [(2012) 1 SCC 558]", "Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal [(2014) 7 SCC 177]", "Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited And others Vs. Kailash Narayan Sharma [(2014) 16 SCC 440]" to bring home submission that the compensation is a rule and the reinstatement is an exception.

Section 25F of the Act of 1947 envisages:-

"25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. "

Dwelling on the aspect of clauses (a) and (b) being mandatory in nature, it is observed by learned Author in Principles of Statutory Interpretation:-

"Considerations of general inconvenience, which would have resulted in holding these enactments mandatory, appear to have out-weighed the effect of the negative words in reaching the conclusion that they were in their true meaning merely directory. An interesting example, where negative words have been held to be directory, is furnished in the construction of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where compliance of clauses (c) has been held to be directory; although compliance of clauses (a) and (b) which are connected by the same negative words is understood as mandatory".

[Chapter V Synopsis 6 at page 448 14th Edition]

Learned Author relied on the decisions in Bombay Union of Journalists Vs. State of Bombay [AIR 1964 SC 1617] and Krishna Bahadur Vs. Purna Theatre [(2004) 8 SCC 229].

In Bombay Union of Journalists (supra), it is held:-

"12. In this connection, there is one more consideration which is relevant. We have already seen the requirement of S. 25F(a). There is a proviso to S: 25F(a) which lays down that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of services. Clause (a) of S. 25F, therefore, affords a safeguard in the interests of the retrenched employee; it requires the employer either to give him one month's notice or to pay him wages in lieu thereof before he is retrenched. Similarly, clause (b) provides that the workman has to be paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year of service, or any part thereof in excess of six months. It would be noticed that this payment has to be made at the time of retrenchment, and this requirement again provides a safeguard in the interests of the workman; he must be given one month's notice or wages in lieu thereof and he must get retrenchment compensation as prescribed by clause (b). The object which the Legislature had in mind in making these two conditions obligatory and in constituting them into conditions precedent is obvious. These provisions have to be satisfied before a workman can be retrenched. The hardship resulting from retrenchment has been partially redressed by these two clauses, and so, there is every justification for making them conditions precedent. ...."

Similarly, in Krishna Bahadur (supra), it is held:-

"12. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the provision of Section 25-F(b) is imperative in character. The provision postulates the fulfillment of the following three conditions :

(i) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu of such notice;

(ii) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(iii) notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner.

The requirement to comply with the provision of Section 25-F(b) has been held to be mandatory before retrenchment of a workman is given effect to. In the event of any contravention of the said mandatory requirement, the retrenchment would be rendered void ab initio."

In view whereof, in case where there is a breach of provisions of Section 25-F(a) and Section 25-F(b) of 1947 Act, the reinstatement is a rule rather than an exception and a compensation in lieu of reinstatement can only be awarded in exceptional circumstances.

When the impugned order is tested on the anvil of above analysis, we do not perceive any illegality, as would warrant any indulgence.

Consequently, appeal fails and is dismissed. No cost.