Munna Siddiqui vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

Rajendra Kumar, J

This appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the complainant assailing the judgment and order of acquittal dated 01.12.2020 passed in Sessions Trial No.67 of 2015 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, District Chhindwara (M.P.), whereby respondent No.2/accused Hakimuddin @ Hakku has been acquitted of the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution story, complainant Khursheeda Begum's younger daughter namely Rubina, a BCA student at Unique College, Parasia was subjected to harassment and sexual assault by respondent No.2/accused while commuting to college. Based on this report, a case was registered against respondent No.2/accused leading to his imprisonment. After his release from jail, respondent No.2/accused along with his brother Salimuddin and cousin Tanveer Ullah continued to intimidate and threaten Rubina. On 11.11.2014 Tanveer allegedly used obscene language against her through a microphone in a playground. Distressed by continuous harassment and threats extended by the accused persons towards her and her family, Rubina consumed poison on 19.11.2014 and subsequently died during treatment at Medical College, Nagpur. Upon receipt of the inquest from Nagpur, Chandameta Police Station registered FIR No.373/2014 and conducted the investigation. During investigation, various complaints, a notebook in Rubina's handwriting and other relevant documents were seized and the accused were arrested with seizure of their passports.

The accused/respondent No.2 abjured his guilt and pleaded complete innocence and he claimed to be tried. In his defence, he did not choose to examine any witness. Statements of the witnesses were recorded.

In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution has examined as many as 09 witnesses, namely, Dheeraj Kumar (PW-1), Tajammul Hasan (PW-2), Smt. Meena (PW-3), Munna Siddiqui (PW-4), Dr. Manjula Saha (PW-5), Smt. Khursheeda (PW-6), Jeba Siddiqui (PW-7), Shamim Siddiqui (PW-8), Shekh Qayum (PW-9), Naseem Siddiqui (PW-10), Mangleshwar Singh (PW-11) and M.L. Sharma (PW-12) and exhibited 29 documents (Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-29) in support of the prosecution case. On the defence side, respondent No.2/accused exhibited 7 documents (Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-7).

Learned trial Court after recording of evidence of both the parties acquitted the respondent No.2/accused hence, this appeal.

It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the the appellant/complainant that the father of the deceased namely Munna Siddiqui (PW-4) has categorically deposed in his statement that respondent No.2/accused had forcibly outraged the modesty of the deceased and the said incident occurred on 25.05.2014. Thereafter, when the deceased met the wife of the accused, the respondent No.2/accused along with other persons continuously subjected the deceased to harassment. It is further submitted that even after a compromise was arrived at between the parties on 11.11.2014, the respondent No.2/accused persisted in harassing and instigating the deceased, which ultimately drove her to commit suicide on 19.11.2014. It is further submitted that the statement of Munna Siddiqui (PW-4) when read in conjunction with the suicide note and other documentary evidence available on record, clearly establishes a cogent and credible case against the respondent No.2/accused. However, the learned trial Court without properly appreciating the evidence on record has erroneously acquitted the respondent No.2/accused. The said judgment is perverse, illegal, and unsustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of acquittal be set aside and the respondent No.2/accused be convicted and suitably punished for the offences alleged against him.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State as well as learned counsel representing respondent No.2/accused have submitted that the learned trial Court upon proper appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence available on record has rightly acquitted respondent No.2/accused of the charges levelled against him. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of 'abetment' as defined under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, which is punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. Learned counsel have further drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph-29 onwards of the impugned judgment, wherein the learned trial Court has observed that the writing on the alleged suicide note has not been found proved to be in the handwriting of the deceased. Moreover, the said suicide note does not bear the signature of the deceased. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the writing on the suicide note is that of the deceased, the contents thereof do not, in any manner, advance the case of the prosecution so as to attract the provisions of Section 107 of the IPC. It is further submitted that, as recorded in paragraph-35 of the impugned judgment, upon due appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court has rightly concluded that the ingredients of Section 107 IPC are not made out against the respondent No.2/accused. Therefore, the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court is based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not warrant any interference by this Court.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record meticulously.

As per the prosecution story and the contents of FIR (Ex.P-11), the incident took place on 11.11.2014, when respondent No.2/accused allegedly extended threats to the deceased Rubina, compelling her to withdraw the case instituted at her instance. It is alleged that due to the continuous harassment meted out by respondent No.2/accused, the deceased committed suicide on 19.11.2014. However, the material available on record, particularly the Sulahnama (Ex.P-6) and the testimony of witness Sheikh Qayum (PW-9) reveals that on 11.11.2014 itself, the Anjuman Islahul Muslemeen, Eklehra had intervened in the matter and a compromise had been amicably settled between both the parties. The Sulahnama (Ex.P-6) has been duly proved by Sheikh Qayum (PW-9). The testimony of this witness has remained intact, which clearly establishes that the dispute between the family of the deceased and respondent No.2/accused, arising on 11.11.2014, was amicably settled before the Anjuman Committee. It is not specifically stated either in the FIR or in the evidence as to when, where and by what means subsequent to 11.11.2014, respondent No.2/accused allegedly extended any threat to the deceased to withdraw the complaint case filed at her instance. Furthermore, the deceased committed suicide on 19.11.2014, which indicates a considerable time gap between the alleged incident and the act of suicide.

In the case of Madhya alias Mahadev v. State, 2006 Cr.L.J. 1963 (M.P.) the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that the accused was alleged to have tried to outrage the modesty of the deceased, who had committed suicide two days after the happening of incident because she felt ashamed. Period of two days that elapsed between the two incidents showed that act of accused did not instigate her to commit suicide. It was held that accused could not be held guilty of the offence under Section 306, IPC. Here in the case in hand the period elapsed between the two incidents is almost eight days. Therefore, on this count the case of the prosecution found to be doubtful.

It is pertinent to note that although the report of the Fingerprint Expert has been placed on record and exhibited by the Investigating Officer as Ex.P-26, the concerned Fingerprint Expert, despite being available, was not examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to it. The Fingerprint Expert is a material witness to establish the authenticity and evidentiary value of the document Ex.P-26; however, his non-examination remains unexplained. In the absence of such examination, the said report cannot be read in evidence or relied upon against respondent No.2/accused.

In the present case, the parents of the deceased namely Munna Siddiqui (PW-4) and Smt. Khursheeda (PW-6) have made exaggerated statements in their depositions regarding the alleged incidents. Material contradictions, omissions, and variations have been revealed in their testimonies. It is further revealed from the evidence of these witnesses as well as other relatives examined before the learned trial Court that the earlier incident had allegedly occurred on 25.05.2014; however, no FIR was lodged in this regard until 05.10.2014. Likewise, concerning the incident dated 11.11.2014, the FIR was registered only on 20.11.2014 after the death of the deceased. The prosecution witnesses have failed to provide any satisfactory explanation as to why the FIR was not lodged promptly on the date of the alleged suicide. The delay of one day in lodging the FIR after the death of deceased, in the attending facts and circumstances of the case, assumes significance and renders the prosecution version doubtful. Moreover, the statements of the prosecution witnesses are also inconsistent with respect to the alleged incident of 05.10.2014.

A suicide note has also been produced in evidence on behalf of the prosecution; however, the said note contained in the copy seized through memorandum (Ex.P-12), casts serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case. It is noteworthy that the FIR pertaining to the incident was lodged on 20.11.2014 at 23:15 hours, whereas the incident itself occurred on 19.11.2014 at 19:30 hours. Despite this, the seizure memo (Ex.P-12) was allegedly prepared on 19.11.2014 at 22:30 hours i.e. prior to the registration of the FIR (Ex.P-11), which too creates a significant discrepancy and undermines the credibility of the prosecution version. It remains unexplained as to how the alleged seizure of the suicide note was effected by the police prior to the lodging of the FIR and registration of the crime. Furthermore, the Police Officer who purportedly prepared the seizure memo (Ex.P-12) has not been examined by the prosecution, which further weakens its case. It has also emerged from the evidence on record that respondent No.2/accused was approximately twice the age of the deceased, who was a 19-year-old student. The evidence further discloses that the deceased used to address respondent No.2/accused as "uncle," and that both resided in the same locality.

The learned trial Court, upon due consideration and appreciation of the evidence from paragraph 25 onwards of the impugned judgment, has observed that the handwriting on the alleged suicide note has not been proved to be that of the deceased. No document containing the natural or admitted handwriting of the deceased was seized to facilitate such comparison. Furthermore, Article A-1, being the copy/register purportedly used by the deceased, has also not been conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. The contents of the alleged suicide note are reproduced verbatim as under:-

à¤...ब्बू भाई, मुझे माफ कर देना। आज मैं इतना बड़ा कदम उठा रही हूँ। मेरे पास à¤"र कोई वजह नहीं है। à¤...ब सिर्फ एक ही रास्ता है, इसलिए आज ये सब करने जा रही हूँ। मेरी वजह से मेरे भाई को à¤-तरा है। वो आज नाà¤-पुर में है, पर उसके साथ कुछ भी हो सकता है, इसलिए ये सब कर रही हूँ। मैं à¤...पने भाई को कुछ हो जाए, ये सब नहीं देà¤- सकती। आज मेरी वजह से मेरे भाई के साथ वो लोà¤- कुछ भी कर सकते हैं। मैंने ये सब सुना है कि वो लोà¤- मेरे भाई को मरवा देंà¤-े, इसलिए à¤...à¤-र मैं नहीं रहूँà¤-ी तो शायद मेरे भाई को या मेरे घरवालों को कुछ नहीं होà¤-ा। à¤...म्मी, वो सिसमा मेरे भाई को मरवाने के लिए बोल रहा था, उसे बचा लेना, उसे कुछ मत होने देना। मेरे किए की सजा मेरे भाई को मत होने देना। रही बात मेरी, मैं कुछ à¤-लत नहीं हूँ। आज भी मैं à¤...पने भाई, à¤...म्मी, à¤...ब्बू की कसम à¤-ाती हूँ-उन्होंने मेरे साथ à¤-लत किया था à¤"र मुझे धमकी दी थी कि वो मेरे भाई को मरवा देà¤-ा, इसलिए मैंने ये सब पहले नहीं बताया था। पहले उसने à¤...ब्बू के लिए बोला था, पर मैंने कुछ नहीं कहा। फिर बाद में जब उसने भाई की धमकी दी, तो मैं डर à¤-ई थी, इसलिए ये सब नहीं बताया। फिर बाद में वो मुझे हमेशा धमकी देता रहा à¤"र आँà¤- दिà¤-ाता रहा, इसलिए इन 5 महीनों में मैंने कुछ नहीं बोला। फिर बाद में मैं ये सब, जो मेरे साथ हुआ था, उसे भूलने लà¤-ी। पर 26 सितंबर को जब à¤...म्मी, वो तुमसे ये à¤-लत बात मेरे बारे में बताने आया था। उसके दो-तीन दिन पहले ही उसने मुझे आँà¤- दिà¤-ाई à¤"र कुछ बोलने की कोशिश किया था, पर मैंने उसकी बातों को à¤...नसुनी कर दी थी। पर à¤...ब भी जब वो मुझे दिà¤-ता है या मेरी तरफ देà¤-ता है, तो वो मुझे मेरे भाई का एहसास दिलाता है। आज भी वो मेरे भाई के पीछे लà¤-े हैं। मैं à¤...पने भाई के लिए à¤...पनी जान दे दूँà¤-ी, पर उसको कुछ हो जाए तो नहीं देà¤- सकती। आज भी मैं à¤...पने भाई के लिए डरती हूँ। पर भाई, तू कभी उन लोà¤-ों को माफ मत करना। उसने à¤...पनी हरकतों को छुपाने के लिए मुझे बदनाम कर दिया। पर भाई, आज भी मैं कहती हूँ मैं à¤-लत नहीं हूँ, वो à¤-लत है, à¤-लत था। उसने इन 5 महीनों में मुझे पल-पल ये एहसास दिलाया था कि तेरे भाई को ज़िंदा देà¤-ना है या नहीं देà¤-ना है। इसलिए मैंने ये बात कभी नहीं बताई किसी को, पर आज भी मेरा पूरा परिवार मेरे साथ है। फिर भी मुझे डर लà¤- रहा है। मैं क्या करूँ, ये आज इतनी परेशान हूँ कि मुझे नींद नहीं आती है। बस यही दिन-रात सोचती हूँ। मेरी वजह से क्या हो à¤-या। पर भाई, कभी मत छोड़ना। मैं दुà¤-ी हूँ कि उसने मेरी इतनी बदनामी की, मेरे घर वालों की इज़्ज़त के साथ à¤-ेला। ना तो à¤...ब मेरा किसी काम में मन लà¤-ता है, ना ही पढ़ाई में। à¤...ब पढ़ने का मन भी नहीं करता, ना ही कॉलेज जाने का। पर भाई, तू कभी वो हक्को को माफ मत करना उसको सजा दला के रहना।"

The suicide note reproduced hereinabove contained the name "Hakko" at two places; however, it does not clearly indicate that the said "Hakko" refers to respondent No.2/accused. The name of respondent No.2/accused is Hakimuddin @ Hakku, more so the expressions used in the alleged suicide note are insufficient to establish the essential ingredients constituting abetment as defined under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and others Vs State of Gujarat, (2025) 2 SCC 116 has held in paragraphs 21 to 23 and 26 to 29 as under:-

"21. Section 306 IPC provides for punishment for the offence of abetment of suicide. It has to be read with Section 107IPC which defines the act of "abetment". The provisions read as follows: "306. Abetment of suicide.-If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

"107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who-

First.-Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."

Section 306 IPC penalises those who abet the act of suicide by another. For a person to be charged under this section, the prosecution must establish that the accused contributed to the act of suicide by the deceased. This involvement must satisfy one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107IPC. These conditions include the accused instigated or encouraged the individual to commit suicide, conspiring with others to ensure that the act was carried out, or engaging in conduct (or neglecting to act) that directly led to the person taking his/her own life.

For a conviction under Section 306IPC, it is a well-established legal principle that the presence of clear mens rea-the intention to abet the act-is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide.

The essential ingredients to be fulfilled in order to bring a case under Section 306IPC are:

(i) the abetment;

(ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

Thus, to bring a case under this provision, it is imperative that the accused intended by their act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Thus, in cases of death of a wife, the court must meticulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as assess the evidence presented. It is necessary to determine whether the cruelty or harassment inflicted on the victim left them with no other option but to end their life. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be concrete proof of either direct or indirect acts of incitement that led to the suicide. Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient to establish guilt. For a conviction, there must be evidence of a positive act by the accused, closely linked to the time of the incident, that compelled or drove the victim to commit suicide.

It is essential to establish that the death was a result of suicide and that the accused actively abetted its commission. This can involve instigating the victim or engaging in specific actions that facilitated the act. The prosecution must prove beyond doubt that the accused played a definitive role in the abetment. Without clear evidence of an active role in provoking or assisting the suicide, a conviction under Section 306IPC cannot be sustained.

The act of abetment must be explicitly demonstrated through actions or behaviours of the accused that directly contributed to the victim's decision to take their own life. Harassment, in itself, does not suffice unless it is accompanied by deliberate acts of incitement or facilitation. Furthermore, these actions must be proximate to the time of the suicide, showcasing a clear connection between the accused's behaviour and the tragic outcome. It is only through the establishment of this direct link that a conviction under Section 306 IPC can be justified. The prosecution bears the burden of proving this active involvement to hold the accused accountable for the alleged abetment of suicide. The same position has been laid down by this Court in several judgments, such as:

(i) M. Mohan v. State;

(ii) Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B.;

(iii) Kamalakar v. State of Karnataka."

On evaluating the evidence on record vis-a-vis the definition of abetment as prescribed under Section 107 of IPC and also having considered the law laid down in the case cited above, it cannot be said that any instigation or abetment has been caused by accused/respondent No.2 for commission of suicide by the deceased. The prosecution has failed to establish, by cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence the essential ingredients of the offence of abetment as defined under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 306 of the IPC. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court warrant no interference.

In case of State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, (2016) 14 SCC 151 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt. Unless finding of the trial Court is found to be perverse or illegal/impossible, it is not permissible for the appellate Court to interfere with the same.

In case of Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again summarized the principles while deciding the appeal against acquittal, which are as follows :-

"42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarised as :

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive - inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court."...

Recently, in the case of Abhinav Mohan Delkar Vs. The State of Maharasthra and others, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 812, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 21 to 23 as under:-

"21. It was held that abetment involves the mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without a positive act on the part of the accused, in aiding or instigating or abetting the deceased to commit suicide, a conviction cannot be sustained.

What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein before cited is that, even if there is allegation of constant harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the direct consequence of such continuous harassment, the last proximate incident having finally driven the subject to the extreme act of taking one's life. Figuratively, 'the straw that broke the camel's back'; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on individual predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find mens rea. Merely because the victim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim.

The victim may have felt that there was no alternative or option, but to take his life, because of what another person did or said; which cannot lead to a finding of mens rea and resultant abetment on that other person. What constitutes mens rea is the intention and purpose of the alleged perpetrator as discernible from the conscious acts or words and the attendant circumstances, which in all probability could lead to such an end. The real intention of the accused and whether he intended by his action to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide, is the sure test. Did the thought of goading the victim to suicide occur in the mind of the accused or whether it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances arising in the case, as the true test of mens rea would depend on the facts of each case. The social status, the community setting, the relationship between the parties and other myriad factors would distinguish one case from another. However harsh or severe the harassment, unless there is a conscious deliberate intention, mens rea, to drive another person to suicidal death, there cannot be a finding of abetment under Section 306."

Ex consequenti, in the light of aforesaid discussions and the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in aforesaid cases coupled with careful analysis of the evidence, the observations made by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment are not found to be perverse, illegal or faulty. The learned trial Court on proper appreciation of evidence available on record has rightly acquitted the accused/respondent No.2. There is no ground for interference with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, while affirming the findings of acquittal of respondent No.2 by the learned trial court, the appeal being bereft of merit is hereby dismissed.

The order of the trial Court with regard to disposal of property is affirmed.