Munney Khan vs State of U.P.

Rajes Kumar, J.—The petitioner was a Constable, while he was posted at Police Station, Tanda, District Rampur in the year 2005-06, disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner and a charge-sheet has been given on 5.6.2006. In the charge-sheet, following charges have been framed:

In the charge-sheet, various documents relied upon have also been referred. The petitioner filed reply. The inquiry officer submitted the inquiry report on 30.9.2006 wherein he found all the charges proved against the petitioner and recommended major punishment under Rule 4 (1) (k) (iii) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the ("Rules, 1991") for placing the petitioner at the lowest pay-scale for a period of three years. On receipt of the inquiry report, disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice. The petitioner filed reply and on consideration of the inquiry report and reply of the petitioner, the disciplinary authority passed the punishment order dated 27.12.2006 and awarded major penalty to the extent putting the petitioner at the lowest pay-scale for a period of three years. Against the punishment order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad. While considering the appeal of the petitioner, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad found that there is no substance in the appeal. He further found that charges against the petitioner are so serious and he is not liable to be kept in service. He recorded the following findings:

The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region. Moradabad vide order dated 15.2.2007 has directed to issue show cause notice as required under Rule 24 (k) of the Rules, 1991. In pursuance thereof, show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner on 15.2.2007 asking him to file reply within fifteen days. The petitioner sought further time and has been granted eight days further time to file reply. However, the reply has not been filed by the petitioner. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad passed the order dated 30.4.2007 and terminated the services of the petitioner. The following observations have been made:

Against the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad dated 30.4.2007, the petitioner filed revision before the Director General of Police, U.P., Lucknow, which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 16.9.2008. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner has not challenged the order dated 15.2.2007.

Heard Sri V.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for the respondents.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad is vitiated for the reason that even if the reply to the show cause notice has not been filed by the petitioner still the reason for enhancement of penalty terminating the service of the petitioner should be given. The show cause notice was in the form of the charge-sheet, while no reason has been given terminating the service of the petitioner. He further submitted that the revisional authority has also erred in confirming the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Moradabad Region, Moradabad.

Learned standing counsel submitted that it is not correct that the reason for dismissal has not been given. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad while passing the order dated 15.2.2007 rejecting the appeal of the petitioner and coming to the conclusion has recorded a categorical finding that the charges against the petitioner are serious and on such charges, the petitioner is not entitled to continue in service. For such reason, which has been recorded in the order dated 15.2.2007, the petitioner has been given show cause notice in the form of opportunity, which the petitioner did not avail, which amounts to that the petitioner had nothing to say about such view of the appellate authority. He further submitted that it is not correct that while passing the termination order, the reason has not been given. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad has given the reason. He further submitted that all the charges against the petitioner stood proved in the inquiry. The charges are so serious that if the petitioner would have been allowed to continue in service that may cause the bad name to the police force and the petitioner would have been given licence to act in a similar manner in future.

I have considered rival submissions and perused the record.

I do not find substance in the argument of leaned counsel for the petitioner. The charges, referred to hereinabove, mentioned in the charge-sheet, were found proved in the inquiry. Having regard to the charges, the appellate authority found that the nature of the charges are so serious and the petitioner could not be entitled to continue in service and the finding in this regard has been recorded in the order dated 15.2.2007, referred to hereinabove. This order has not been challenged by the petitioner. To provide, opportunity, a show cause notice has been given under Rule 24 (k) of the Rules. 1991. The petitioner had not chosen to fife reply despite further time being granted. It amounts that the petitioner had nothing to say in respect of the charges. It is not correct that the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad in his order dated 30.4.2007 terminating the service of the petitioner had not given any reason. He has given the ultimate inference arrived on the basis of the material on record. The charges are mentioned in the charge-sheet and the same were found proved by the inquiry officer. On the said proven charges, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad arrived to the conclusion that the charges were very serious in nature, it may affect the discipline of the police force in case if the petitioner may be allowed to continue in service.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that while awarding the punishment of termination from service, the reasons have been given by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Moradabad Region, Moradabad, which has been confirmed by the revisional authority. For the reasons stated above. I do not find that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is unreasonable or disproportionate, which requires interference by this Court.

It is settled principle of law that scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the punishment is very limited. In writ jurisdiction, the Court can only interfere with the punishment order, if it is found to be arbitrary, based on surmises and conjectures and on irrelevant consideration. Such situation is not available in the present case. Further, punishment order cannot be interfered, unless the punishment is found to be shocking and hit the conscience of the Court. Such situation is also not available in the present case.

The Apex Court in the case of Director General R.P.F. and Others Vs. Ch. Sai Babu, , has observed as follows:

As is evident from the order of the learned single Judge, there has been no consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case including as to the nature of charges held proved against the respondent to say that penalty of removal from service imposed on the respondent was extreme. Merely because it was felt that the punishment imposed was extreme was not enough to disturb or modify the punishment imposed on a delinquent officer. The learned single Judge has not recorded reasons to say as to how the punishment imposed on the respondent was shockingly or grossly disproportionate to the gravity of charges held proved against the respondent. It is not that in every case of imposing a punishment of removal or dismissal from service a High Court can modify such punishment merely by saying that is shockingly disproportionate. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a Tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works.

The Apex Court in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Others Vs. P.C. Kakkar, , has observed as follows:

The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator''s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

In view of the facts and circumstances and foregoing discussions, I do not find any error in the impugned orders, which require interference by this Court. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.