Munsha Singh vs Gram Panchayat, Subhanpur, and another

Dua, J.—This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution impugning the order of the District Magistrate, Kapurthala, declining to decide on merits the revision filed before him by the Petitioner under Sections 51 and 97 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act No. IV of 1953 (hereinafter called the Act), from the order of the Gram Panchayat, Subhanpur, District Kapurthala (sic) 11th April 1962 imposing on the Petitioner u/s 23 (sic) a fine of Rs. 25/- and also a recurring fine of Re. 1/- till the construction of the water-channel in question.

I need not go into and discuss the merits (sic)out case because, in my opinion, the learned District Magistrate has on (sic) erroneous and illegal grounds declined to discharge his duty u/s 51 of the Act. It may here be mentioned that according to the District Magistrate''s order, the Gram Panchayat having acted judicially while passing the impugned order, a challenge to such an order can be made in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution with the result that it was unnecessary for the District Magistrate himself to dispose of the revision petition on the merits. This in my opinion, betrays a complete misunderstanding of the correct legal position. Narain Singh Hira Singh and Another Vs. The State, , a Full Bench decision, on which the learned District Magistrate has relied for his view, merely lays down that the Gram Panchayat while proceeding under Sections 21 and 23 of the Act acts judicially and, therefore, a petition challenging its orders under either of those sections would lie to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. These observations were, however, made as a result of the challenge to the power of the High Court to interfere with such orders on the ground that they were of an administrative or executive nature and that, therefore, neither Article 227 of the Constitution nor Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure conferred on the High Court a power to interfere with those orders. That decision is no authority for the proposition that the District Magistrate should because of the existence of Article 227 of the Constitution decline to exercise the power of supervision conferred on him by the Act. It appears to me that the learned District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the facts in Narain Singh Hira Singh''s case1 and to the discussion contained in the judgment with the result that he did not grasp the true ratio of the decision of the Full Bench, otherwise I do not think he would have so unceremoniously declined to dispose of the petition on the merits.

Article 227 undoubtedly vesis this Court with wide powers as custodian of all justice within its territorial limits so as to ensure that even handed justice is meted out equitably, fairly and properly but then this can never be construed to be the normal remedy excluding the statutory remedy created by the various statutes dealing with the specified subjects and the problems arising thereform. Under this Article, the High Court possesses, as provided by the Constitution, power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout its jurisdiction, but this power though imposes a duty on the High Court to keep all subordinate tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority does not involve responsibility for the correctness of the decisions of the subordinate tribunals either in fact or in law. The power is extraordinary and intended to be used only in exceptional cases and not as a substitute for original, revisional or appellate powers. It is this fundamental character of the power conferred by Article 227 which has been lost sight of by the learned District Magistrate. Besides, even where this Court and a subordinate Court have concurrent powers to scrutinise the order of a more subordinate tribunal, according to the well-known rules of practice, the subordinate revisional authority should not decline to go into the merits on the ground that the High Court should be approached for the necessary redress. To approach the High Court would undoubtedly involve more expense and also comparatively speaking greater delay in the disposal of controversy; on this ground also, it would be more suitable for the subordinate revisional authorities to deal with the suitor''s grievance on the merits ; besides, this would also be helpful to the High Court if later the matter comes up before it under Article 227 of the Constitution. From every point of view, therefore, the interests of justice required the District Magistrate in the instant case to deal with the Petitioner''s grievance on the merits and not to decline decision on the merits on the ground of the existance of Article 227.

For the foregoing reasons, I have no option except to allow this petition and setting aside the order of the District Magistrate dated 13-3-1962 to send the case back to him for decision on the merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.

5 Before parting with the case, I must observe that it is a duty of all judicial and quasi judicial tribunals to see that justice is not only done but it must also seem to be done. The provision of supervision of criminal proceedings before the Panchayats by the District Magistrate imposes an important and a responsible duty on this officer to see that the Panchayats who have recently been conferred very wide powers and the members of which are not always trained in the administration of justice act in consonance with law and the rules of natural justice which form the core of our judicial administration. The District Magistrate will, I hope, also consider the legality or otherwise of the recurring fine imposed without any limit u/s 23 of the Gram Panchayat Act.

With these observations, I set aside the order of the District Magistrate and send the case back to him. The parties are directed through their counsel to appear before the District Magistrate on 12-11-1962 when another short date would be given to them for further proceedings.