Murari Lal s/o Shri Munshi Lal & Anr vs Smt. Dharmi Devi & Ors

The appellants-defendants have preferred the present appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, oppugning the judgment and

decree dated 07.08.1986 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Sirohi (hereinafter referred to as the ''Trial Court'') in Civil Original Suit

No. 47/1984 titled as ""Madan Lal through LRs Vs. Murari Lal & Anr."" whereby, a suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs had been

allowed.

The facts, in nutshell, needed for decision of the present appeal are that the original plaintiff-respondent Madan Lal instituted a suit for specific

performance against the present appellants, inter alia, stating that the defendants-appellants had executed an agreement to sell in relation to a house

situated in Abu Road on 03.10.1977, and according to the terms of the said agreement, the payment was to be made by 29.08.1979 and after

such payment, the possession of the suit premises was agreed to be delivered to the plaintiff (Madan Lal). The said suit property was agreed to be

transferred for a total consideration of Rs.20,000/- besides payment of the arrears of the rent.

As per the averments in the plaint, when the plaintiff requested the defendants for performance of the agreement, they adopted dilly-dallying

tactices and resisted the fulfillment of the terms. Later on, the plaintiff contacted Madan Lal Saini S/o Munshi Lal, elder brother and head of the

family of the defendants, who assured that he would persuade the defendants to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff''s wife Smt. Dharmi

Devi and his daughter Mewa Devi. While giving such assurance, said Madan Lal, settled the transaction for Rs. 20,324/-, Rs.20,000/- being the

sale consideration and Rs.324/-, being interest @ 1.25 rupee per month for the relevant period, besides Rs.3,244/-, being arrears of rent. In

furtherance of such understanding, the plaintiff gave Rs.3,244/- in cash to said Madan Lal and handed over a cheque of Rs.20,300/- bearing

Cheque No. 014000 dated 22.08.1979 drawn on Sirohi District Commercial Cooperative Bank, Abu Road issued in favour of M/s Jhunni Lal

Deena Lal duly endorsed in favour of Madan Lal Munshi Lal. In acknowledgment whereof, the defendants'' elder brother Madan Lal had handed

over a receipt to the plaintiff and promised that the requisite sale-deed would be executed, within a period of 2-4 days. It has also been averred in

the plaint that the plaintiff went to Abu Road and requested the defendants and his brother Madan Lal to accompany him to some document

writer, along with the original patta and documents of the title for facilitating drafting, execution and signatures on the sale-deed, but the defendants

did not turn-up to the document writer on 26.08.1979 and 27.08.1979.

Faced with such behaviour of the defendants, the plaintiff being wary of the defendants'' bona fide, when inquired from the said firm M/s Jhunni

Lal Deena Lal about the encashment of the cheque, they were informed that the said cheque has not even been presented for payment by the

defendants. In such situation, the plaintiff obtained another cheque bearing number 23051 dated 27.08.1979 of the Sirohi District Commercial

Cooperative Bank issued in his name and thereafter endorsed the same in favour of Murari Lal Munshi Lal and offered the same to the defendants

on 27.08.1979, which they refused to accept. As such, the plaintiff immediately sent a telegram on 28.08.1979 to the defendants, calling upon

them to perform the agreement, while sending the said cheque No. 23051 dated 27.08.1979, along with a notice. As per the averments made in

the plaint, the plaintiff had shown his readiness and willingness to bear the stamp duty and registration charges and apprised the defendants that he

would remain in Abu Road for execution and registration of the sale-deed. It has been stated in the plaint and deposed by the plaintiff that the

defendants refused to accept the said notice and the telegram and with a view to ensure non-compliance of the terms of the said agreement eloped

from Abu Road, for which, even the Postman could not find the whereabouts of the defendants from 29.08.1979 to 01.09.1979. With the

assertion of these facts, the plaintiff pleaded that he had performed his part of the contract and was always ready and willing to comply with the

terms of the agreement and prayed for a decree of specific performance of the contract and claimed possession of the suit premises, along with the

documents of the title.

In response to the plaint so filed by the plaintiff, the defendants - Murai Lal and Manohar Lal, filed a joint written statement and contended that

the agreement dated 03.10.1977 had been got signed, while keeping them in dark, and maintained that Madan Lal did not have any right to accept

the amount/cheque on their behalf. The factum of Madan Lal s/o Munshi Lal, being the head of their family, had also been refuted. As such, if

Madan Lal has acted, accepted any cheque or issued any receipt, the defendants cannot be bound-down by such act. It was, however, contended

that the averments made in the plaint regarding absence of defendants No. 1 and 2 from Abu Road was not intentional, as the defendant No.1

Murari Lal engaged in business of taxi, was out of Abu Road in the course of his business; whereas, the defendant No.2 Manohar Lal, being

student, was busy with his studies.

In sum and substance, the defendants, though accepted execution of the agreement dated 03.10.1977, but had maintained that the same was

got signed under misapprehension/ misunderstanding. It had also been contended that the plaintiff is not entitled for enforcement of the agreement in

question, as the time for payment had since expired and the plaintiff has failed to offer the cash amount within the stipulated period.

Based on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues came to be framed by the Trial Court:- ""VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED

On behalf of the plaintiff, PW-1 Bhanwar Lal; PW-2 Amar Chand; PW-3 Deva Ram; PW-4 Matadeen; and PW-5 Rajendra Prasad appeared

in the witness-box, whose statements were recorded and as the documentary evidence, Ex.1 agreement dated 03.10.1977; Ex.2 receipt of the

rent; Ex.3 agreement; Ex.4 telegram dated 28.08.1979; Ex.5; Ex.6 copy of the telegram and telegram receipt; Ex.7 the certificate of delivery of

telegram, Ex.8 being copy of the notice; Ex.9 & 10 postal receipts of the notice; Ex.11 & 12 envelope of the notice; Ex.13 cheque; Ex.14 letter of

Madan Lal; Ex.15 counter-foil of cheque; Ex.16 entries in the register; and Ex.17 agreement dated 14.06.1976 were produced and got exhibited.

On behalf of the defendants, DW-1 Murari Lal and DW-2 Madan Lal appeared in the witness-box.

After appreciation of the evidence, both documentary and oral, the Trial Court decided issues No. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff.

Whereas issue No.4 framed at the instance of the defendants; as to whether, the suit in question is not within time, has been decided against the

defendants; so also had been the fate of issue No.5. Resultantly, the issue No. 6, relating to the relief, came to be decided in the manner that the

suit filed by the plaintiff has been decreed, vide judgment and decree dated 07.08.1986, as infra:- ""VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED

Mr. Manish Shishodia, learned counsel for the appellants, calling the judgment and decree dated 07.08.1986 in question, submitted that the

learned Court below has committed an error of facts as well as of law in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff. While critically analyzing the oral

evidence, Mr. Shishodia submitted that the learned Court below, while deciding issues No. 1 to 5, has wrongly held that the plaintiffs were always

ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and it was the defendants, who evaded performance of the agreement. He added that the

Court below has failed to consider that there was no valid consideration or offer for payment of the sale price to the defendants. It was argued that

the plaintiff had earlier come out with the case that they had paid a sum of Rs.3,244/- in cash, while also giving a cheque of Rs.20,300/-, without

bringing on record anything evincing that the said Madan Lal had any authority to accept anything under the contentious contract. It was also

argued that the acceptance of the amount in cash or cheque by Madan Lal cannot bind the defendants. Mr. Manish Shishodia contended that the

pleadings of the plaintiff are curious and unreliable, while pointing out that it has been pleaded that Madan Lal had issued the receipt in presence of

the defendants. He posed a question with amazement that why would the plaintiff accept receipt given by Madan Lal, when the defendant(s)

himself was present ? Learned counsel for the appellants, reading pleadings of the plaint, argued that the pleadings of the plaintiff and so also their

statements are clearly suggestive of the fact that the plaintiffs had projected a false case to portray Madan Lal, as their agent/authorised person. In

view of this factual backdrop, contended learned counsel for the appellants that firstly, said Madan Lal cannot be said to be a person authorised by

the defendants to accept such consideration and secondly, the acceptance of amount and cheque by Madan Lal cannot be treated to be a due

payment to the defendants and reckoned as performance of the plaintiffs'' part of the agreement. The Court below has erred in holding that the

plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; contended learned counsel for the appellants. It was also argued on behalf of the

appellants that Madan Lal has been introduced as a ploy of the plaintiffs and the plaintiff''s evidence in this regard is contradictory and is an attempt

to come out of the fix, as the plaintiff had failed to offer the consideration to the defendants, within the stipulated time.

Learned counsel for the appellants thereafter argued that the Trial Court has seriously erred in not noticing that the plaintiff had taken conflicting

stand, if not contrary. He submitted that even as per the plaintiffs, the amount due under the contract was Rs.23,564/-, out of which, the plaintiff

had paid a sum of Rs.3,244/- in cash to the defendants, while issuing a cheque of Rs. 20,300/-. If that be so, Mr. Shishodia argued that why the

plaintiff had subsequently sent another cheque of Rs.20,000/- only, amount lesser by Rs.300/-? In view of this anomaly in the version of the

plaintiff, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the plaintiff was not at all ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and as such,

even if the version of the plaintiff is believed, then also the offer of Rs.20,000/- vide subsequent cheque cannot be said to be a proper performance

of the agreement, as the amount of cheque, in pursuance of the agreement, was admittedly of lesser amount. Though not relevant, Mr. Shishodia

pointed out that as per the plaintiff himself, earlier there was another agreement (Ex.17) executed between the parties on 14.06.1976, in relation to

the very same property, according to which, the plaintiff was required to make payment by 29.08.1977. On failure to make requisite payment,

another agreement dated 03.10.1977 (Ex.1) purportedly came to be executed, vide which, the plaintiff was required to make payment of

Rs.20,000/- and the due rent by 29.08.1979.

According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the language of both the agreements made the ''time'' an essence of the contract and on

failure of the plaintiff to make payment within the stipulated period, the plaintiff could not seek decree of the specific performance. The Court

below has failed to consider the facts of the case in true perspective, contended Mr. Shishodia.

Per contra, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents-decree-holder submitted that the learned Court below has

committed no error of law, in passing the decree of specific performance and in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff. He submitted that existence

and execution of the agreement in question has not been disputed by the defendants and the amount of consideration had been received by Madan

Lal, none other than defendants'' elder brother. Such assertion and corresponding oral and documentary evidence is sufficient to prove that the

amount in pursuance of the agreement to sell has been tendered, rather paid by the plaintiff and equally accepted by the defendants. He submitted

that it was a normal phenomenon in yester-years'' social structure that the amount used to be offered to the head of the family; in the present case,

being elder brother of the defendants, who were less than 25 years of age, and young enough to accept the amount in presence of their elder

brother. As such, according to Mr. Thanvi, there was nothing unnatural, if all the decisions including acceptance of the money was done by the

elder brother Madan Lal. He submitted that Madan Lal, their (defendants) elder brother used to live in the same house, along with the defendants

and he having accepted the amount and issued a receipt, is sufficient performance of the contract at their end and the receipt by Madan Lal would

bind the defendants. In the alternative he contended that it is enough to show that the plaintiff had made the requisite payment, pursuant to the

contentious agreement and such assertion and proof does away with the requirement of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness. Mr.

Thanvi further contended that in the present factual backdrop and in light of the stand of the parties, the plaintiff was not required to show his

readiness and willingness, particularly when he has made payment of the amount in question; firstly, vide cheque handed over to Madan Lal and

thereafter sending another cheque in the name of Murari Lal Munshi Lal, the vendor. Mr. Thanvi, however, submitted that DW-1 Murari Lal,

during the course of his cross-examination, has accepted the receipt of the amount, vide receipt dated 06.06.1979 (Ex.2). He further submitted

that the defendants have failed to prove that the agreement in question has been got signed under disguise or apprehension and urged that as long

as the execution of the agreement and signatures thereupon have been admitted, the mere allegation that the same was got signed under

misconception, is of little avail to the defendants. Until and unless, the defendant pleads and proves that the agreement is vitiated having been got

signed under duress, coercion or fraud, merely because the agreement is alleged to have been signed, while keeping the vendor under dark, does

not absolve the defendants of their contractual obligation.

I have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record, including the oral and documentary evidence, apart

from the judgment of the Court below, which has aptly dealt with each and every aspect and the evidence, both documentary and oral.

Having gone through the entire record, the fundamental fact which has surfaced is, that the basic agreement to sell dated 03.10.1977 and its

execution has remained undisputed. The defendants have unequivocally accepted the execution and signatures on the subject agreement. The

plaintiff has also pleaded and proved that he had made the payment of the consideration, out of which, a sum of Rs. 3,400/- has been paid in cash

to Madan Lal, the elder brother of the defendants, who has issued a receipt in this regard, being receipt dated 06.06.1979 (Ex.2). The plaintiff has

also proved beyond any pale of doubt, by oral as well as documentary evidence that he had handed over a cheque of Rs.20,300/-, along with

cash of Rs.3,244/- to Madan Lal (elder brother of the defendants) and as the said cheque, despite being accepted by Madan Lal was not

presented for payment, the plaintiff had sent another cheque of Rs.20,000/-, being cheque No. 23051, got issued in his favour and duly endorsed

to Murari Lal Munshi Lal. Not only this, the remittance of cheque was followed by a registered notice dated 27.08.1979 and a Telegram dated

28.08.1979. These facts are sufficient to prove that the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract, firstly, by paying cash in the sum of

Rs.3,244/-, which had been duly accepted by none other than vendors'' elder brother Madan Lal and a cheque in the sum of Rs.20,300/-

endorsed in favour of Madan Lal Munshi Lal. Apart from this, when the said cheque was not presented, the plaintiff got another cheque issued in

his favour and then, endorsing the same in favour of Murari Lal Munshi Lal, being defendant No.1. Offered and sent to the defendant.

It is to be noticed here that the cheque endorsed in the name of Murari Lal Munshi Lal is nothing but an endorsement in favour of defendant

No.1 Murari Lal, who is son of Munshi Lal, which is a normal practice in the area nearby Gujarat, where father''s name is also given along with the

name of the payee. The first cheque had not been presented for payment and even the second cheque which had been sent, had not been

presented for payment, for which, the defendants have taken a defense rather a recluse, that the said cheque was received after the expiry of the

period viz. 29.08.1977.

In considered opinion of this Court, in the transactions of specific performance, as in the present case, it may so happen that the vendor, as a

ploy to avoid the performance, may refuse or elope to deter receipt of the consideration. In such circumstances, it is not the actual payment, but

the sincerity and intention of the purchaser - vendee, which is required to be looked into. The Court should probe, as to whether, the vendee or the

plaintiff has made all sincere efforts to make payment pursuant to the agreement in question. In the cases like the one at hands, if the vendor or the

seller escapes to obviate the receipt of consideration, despite the vendee being ready with the amount, the non-payment or nonpresentation of the

cheque cannot be taken as a failure on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. Needless to say that a vendee or purchaser

cannot force the vendor/seller to accept the amount, he can only keep the money ready for the payment.

In the cases of specific performance, the Courts are required to ascertain and record a finding about readiness and willingness of the purchaser

- vendee and if the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that he was ready and willing to make payment, but the defendants has adopted dilatory tactics

or protracted the receipt of the payment, with a view to let the prescribed time pass, the Court should unhesitantly pass a decree of specific

performance of the contract in favour of the plaintiff.

On the touchstone of these principles, if the facts of the present case are tested, it is clear that the plaintiff was not only ready and willing to

make payment, but as a matter of fact had made payment to the defendants'' brother Madan Lal, who has willingly accepted the same and issued

the receipt in this regard. Even the defendants have admitted to have received the amount of Rs.3,244/- in cash by Madan Lal, along with the

cheque of Rs.20,300/-, of course by their elder brother Madan Lal. Besides this, even before the outer limit prescribed in the contract could pass,

the plaintiff had issued another cheque and offered it to the defendants and his brother, who refused to accept the same for which, the plaintiff had

sent the same to the defendants vide registered notice.

After scanning and considering the evidence and material available on record, this Court has reached to a conclusion that the performance of

the contract on the part of the plaintiff - vendee has been made, but the same was averted by the defendants for the obvious motive of frustrating

the agreement; firstly, by not presenting the cheque of Rs.20,300/- in bank, despite accepting the cash payment and thereafter, by not presenting

or keeping themselves ready for execution of the saledeed despite plaintiff''s requiest. Even from the defendants'' own pleadings, it is apparent that

during the relevant period, the defendants No. 1 and 2 were not in Abu Road. It transpires from the pleadings of the defendants that even they did

not want fructification of the contract, for which, they planned and ensured their absence from Abu Road for forestalling the execution of the sale-

deed in plaintiff''s favour.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants are nothing but an attempt to somehow resile from the contractual obligation. The

appellants'' stance that receiving money and acceptance of cheque by Madan Lal is not a performance by the plaintiff, cannot be countenanced in

the present factual and social background. It is for Madan Lal, the elder brother of the defendants, to have refused to accept the cash and cheque,

if he was not competent or authorised to accept the same on behalf of the defendants. The defendants - vendors, being 22 years and 20 years of

age, cannot take subterfuge of Madan Lal not being authorised to get the same on their behalf; particularly when they were young enough to take

decisions at the relevant time.

As far as, execution of the agreement is concerned, the same had admittedly been executed and signed by the defendants. In a suit for specific

performance, if the agreement of sale has been admitted to have been signed or executed by the title-holder, the mere fact that the cheque in

furtherance of the contract has been tendered or handed over to a person other than vendor, becomes inconsequential, if not irrelevant.

This Court does not find any substance in the argument of the appellants that the amount has not been accepted by the defendants or the

consideration has not been received by the defendants. In the present factual backdrop, the cheque having been tendered to Madan Lal and sent

to the defendants is sufficient compliance of the agreement.

Equally fallacious is the argument of the appellants that the plaintiffs were required to make payment of consideration in cash and not vide

cheque, if they were to comply with the terms of the agreement. The payment by way of cheque is equally valid and legal tender and it cannot be

said that such payment cannot be termed as sufficient compliance of the agreement.

Mr. R.K. Thanvi has relied upon the following Judgments in support of his cause:-

(1) AIR 1970 Supreme Court 546 (Nathulal Vs. Phoolchand)

Head Note-(B) Contract Act (1872), Section 55 - Readiness and willingness - Purchaser need not produce money or vouch a

concluded scheme for financing the transaction. AIR 1950 PC 90, Rel. on.

(2) AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1238 [Ramesh Chandra Chandiok & Anr. Vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his legal

representatives & Ors.]

Second Sub Para

Held that on the facts and circumstances of the case A must be held to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract till

date of suit and was therefore entitled to a decree for specific performance. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-

jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the

parties concerned. There was no material on record to show that A at any stage was not ready and willing to perform his part of

contract or that he did not have the necessary funds for payment when the sale deed would be executed after the sanction was

obtained. (1965 Pun LR (Supp) 251. Reversed.

(3) 2012(4) Civil Court Cases 239 (P&H)

(Lal Chand Vs. Tek Chand) Para 9

Now the second question that is required to be determined by this Court is as to whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract or not. In the present case, the stand of the defendant was of clear cut denial of the execution of the

document in question. However, the defendant, as stated earlier, has miserably failed to prove this plea. In such a scenario, the only

question that required to be seen is that the Specific Relief Act or not. It has been held in Santa Singh v. Binder Singh & Ors., 2006

(4) Civil Court Cases 608 (P&H) : 2006 (4) CCC 608 (P&H) that in case the defendant has denied the execution of the agreement,

the statement of the plaintiff is sufficient to infer that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the case in hand,

the plaintiff has not only mentioned regarding his readiness and willingness in the plaint he has in fact mentioned the same by examining

his power of attorney holder as PW7 who in no ambiguous terms has stated that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform

his part of the contract. Further more, the extension of dates which had taken place and was also reduced into writing on the back

side of the agreement to sell coupled with the legal notice sent by him to the defendant, further proves and satisfies this Court that the

plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. A coordinate bench of this Court in Jora Singh v.

Lakhwinder Kumar & Ors., 2011 (1) Civil Court Cases 113 (P&H), has held that when the defendant has denied the execution of

the agreement to sell, it means that the defendant was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and it does not lie in

his mouth to contend that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In view of the law laid down

above and also in the opinion of this Court, that in a case where the defendant has denied the execution of the agreement to sell, he

cannot raise the plea of the plaintiff being ready and willing and it only remains between the court and the plaintiff to determine the

question of readiness and willingness, I have no hesitation in dismissing this appeal as the same is without any merit. The judgments

that have been relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant are peculiar in their own facts and circumstances and the same are

not applicable to the present case for the reason that in the present case, the power of attorney holder has been able to prove the

readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff and also no evidence whatsoever is coming forth on behalf of the defendant to

negate the same. Hence, Janki Vashdeo''s case (supra) is not applicable to the present case. K. Narindra''s case (supra) is also

distinguishable on facts, as in the present case I am inclined in not interfering in the relief granted by the learned lower Appellate Court

of specific performance in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

(4) AIR 1966 Madras 435

(Mohideen Bi & Ors. Vs. Khatoon Bi & Ors.) Para-7

(7) That issuing a cheque is as good as payment in cash appears from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Colurt

in Kirlosker Bros. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1952-21 ITR 82: (AIR 1952 Bom 306), Changla C.J. who spoke for the

court, observed (at p. 91 (of ITR): (at p. 308 of AIR):

It is also well settled in commercial practice, as I shall presently point out, that a cheque is look upon as a payment if a creditor

accepts a cheque in place of the country''s currency.

The learned Judge in support of this conclusion of his referred to a passage in Benjamin on ""Sale of Personal Property"" at page 189

of the 8th Edn., which runs as follows:-

......... a man who prefers a cheque on a banker to payment in money is not considered as electing to take a security instead of cash,

for a cheque is accepted as a particular form of cash payment, and if dishonoured, the seller may resort to this original claim of the

condition on which it was taken.

He has also referred to Byles on ""bills of Exchange"" at page 23 of the 20th Edn., which enunciated the position in law that ""a cheque,

unless dishonoured, is payment"".

(5) AIR 1980 Punjab and Haryana 270

(Sher Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar & Anr.)

All the Judgments are on general principles, which principles are fundamental and do not need any discussion and discourse, and hence this

Court does not deem it necessary to dilate upon them.

In light of the discussion foregoing and law aforesaid, this Court neither finds any substance in the appeal, nor does it find any fault in the

judgment and decree dated 07.08.1986 passed by the Trial Court.

It is to be noticed that at the time of admission of the present appeal, this Court had stayed the execution of the decree on the condition that the

Respondents would withdraw the amount which has already been deposited by them, pursuant to the judgment and decree dated 07.08.1986. It

would not be out of place to reproduce the said interim order dated 22.09.1987 passed by this Court:-

Mr. R. Mehta has already deposited the amount, as due in pursuance of the judgment and decree of the learned Distt. Judge dated

7.8.86.

Mr. Shishodia has prayed for a stay order and submitted that the operation of the judgment of the learned Distt. Judge relating to the

specific performance of the agreement be stayed.

Mr. Mehta submits that this part of the decree may be stayed only when he is permitted to withdraw the amount that has already

been deposited, with this condition that it will not prejudice the rights of the respondents in any manner.

Mr. Shishodia has no objection to this. In view of this submission, the judgment and decree of the learned Distt. Judge, so far as it

relates to the specific performance of the agreement dated 3.10.77, is hereby stayed, with this condition that the respondents be

allowed to withdraw the amount that has been deposited by them, without prejudice to their rights in any manner.. If the appeal fails,

the respondents shall re-deposit the amount as and when ordered or in the manner ordered by the Court.

While rejecting the appeal and affirming the Judgment and Decree under challenge, it is deemed appropriate and hence ordered that in case,

the plaintiff-Respondents deposit the consideration amount of Rs.20,000/- along with simple interest @ 12% per annum payable from 29.07.1979

to the date of payment/deposit on or before 31st May, 2018 in the Trial Court, the defendants shall hand over the possession of the subject

property and execute a sale-deed in favour of the Respondents or any one of them, as jointly requested.

On defendants'' failure to do the same, the plaintiffs/Respondents would be entitled to get the same done through the Trial Court in accordance

with law. Needless to observe that cost of registration and stamp duty shall be borne by the plaintiff(s)/Respondents.

Appeal fails. Parties to bear their own cost.