Murari Singh vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Another

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

The application seeking condonation of the delay of 14 days' is not opposed by Ms. Bina Pande, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of U.P. and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay Condonation Application stands disposed of.

This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No.3041 of 2016 dated 21.09.2019.

The appellant herein filed Writ Petition (M/S) No.3041 of 2016 questioning the action of the respondents in charging him penal rent for the period 01.10.2014 to 01.12.2015.

Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the appellant-writ petitioner was occupying Class II quarters for which rent is liable to be paid by the employee concerned, unlike Class I quarters which are said to have been made available to employees free of cost. This Class II quarter, which the appellant-writ petitioner hitherto occupied, was originally allotted to Mr. P.K. Mittal in the year 2003; and since he did not choose to occupy this quarter, it was allotted to the appellant-writ petitioner in the very same year. When the appellant-writ petitioner was residing in this quarter, his son was appointed in February, 2009 as a Class IV employee. It is the appellant-writ petitioner's case that his son continued to reside with him ever since his appointment in February, 2009.

While matters stood thus, the appellant-writ petitioner retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.08.2014. In terms of the extant policy, a retired employee is entitled to occupy the quarter for a period of one month, after his retirement, on payment of normal rent; and if he overstays beyond a period of one month, then penal rent is liable to be charged. The appellant-writ petitioner's son submitted an application on 05.08.2014 for allotment of the very same quarters. However, the quarters which was occupied by the appellant-writ petitioner was allotted to Mr. P.K. Mittal on 19.08.2014 and, after the appellant-writ petitioner retired from service, the quarters occupied by Mr. P.K. Mittal was allotted to the appellant-writ petitioner's son on 15.09.2014. On the ground that Mr. P.K. Mittal did not vacate the quarter occupied by him, the appellant-writ petitioner claims that his son continued to remain in the quarter under the appellant-writ petitioner's occupation; and, since his son was entitled to be allotted quarters, he cannot be charged penal rent; and, at best, only normal rent can be charged.

On the ground that the penal rent was charged, for the period 01.10.2014 to 01.12.2015, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge found the ground urged on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner was flimsy. He held that an employee must vacate the official accommodation as per Rules after he reaches the age of superannuation and retires from service, otherwise the Rules provided for penal rent to be recovered from him; and, since the appellant-writ petitioner failed to vacate the official accommodation after his retirement from service, the penal rent was being recovered from him as per rules, which required no interference by this Court. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.

Mr. Tapan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that an obligation is cast on the employer to provide accommodation to its employees; the appellant-writ petitioner's son was also a Class IV employee with the Irrigation Department; while he was allotted the quarters occupied by Mr. P.K. Mittal on 15.09.2014, the fact remains that Mr. P.K. Mittal did not vacate the said quarters; it was obligatory for the employer to ensure that Mr. P.K. Mittal vacated the quarters to enable the appellant-writ petitioner's son to move into the said quarters; and having failed to get Mr. P.K. Mittal vacated, the respondents officials cannot place the blame on the appellant-writ petitioner and seek to recover penal rent from him.

We must express our inability to agree. No employee has a right to claim that he should be allotted a particular quarter or that he should be allotted a quarter at all. In case, he is not allotted the quarter, he is entitled for the applicable house rent allowance.

The appellant-writ petitioner's son was, admittedly, allotted the quarter occupied by Mr. P.K. Mittal on 15.09.2014, and not the quarter occupied by his father i.e. the appellant-writ petitioner herein. In terms of the extant Rules, the appellant-writ petitioner could stay in the quarter only for a period of one month after his retirement i.e. 30.09.2014. Thereafter, he was obligated to vacate the quarter or to pay penal rent. Since the appellant-writ petitioner continued to occupy the quarter from 01.10.2014 to 01.12.2015, the respondent-authorities were justified in levying penal rent on him for the said period.

The submission of Mr. Tapan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, that it is not the appellant-writ petitioner but his son who occupied the quarter from 15.09.2014, is only to be noted to be rejected. The quarter was allotted to the appellant-writ petitioner and not to his son; and the appellant-writ petitioner's son could not have occupied the said quarter by force. Accepting the contention of the learned counsel would mean that the disciplinary action can be taken against the appellant-writ petitioner's son for forcibly occupying the said quarter even without an order of allotment. His right to occupy the said quarter arose on his being allotment the same on 02.12.2015. For the period 01.10.2014 to 01.12.2015, whether the quarter was occupied by the appellant-writ petitioner or was forcibly occupied by the appellant-writ petitioner's son even without an allotment order, the respondent-authorities were justified in charging penal rent from appellant-writ petitioner.

Interference in an intra-court appeal would be justified only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality. We find no such infirmity in the order under appeal.

The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.