High CourtsSingle Bench

Murtaj Ansari vs State of Jharkhand

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 22 May 2015 · Citation: (2015) 3 AJR 614 : (2015) 3 JLJR 485

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ravi Nath Verma, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 320 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 34, 498, 498A
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Cri. Revision No. 852 of 2014
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

7 paragraphs · 1,343 words

Ravi Nath Verma, J—The solitary question which falls for determination in the instant case is as to whether a matrimonial dispute resulting in filing of complaint by the wife under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code can be allowed to compound under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code''). The details of the fact is not required to reproduce herein rather a brief statement of facts would suffice the matter. At instance of the complainant - Amna Khatoon, the complaint case was instituted with the allegation that her marriage was solemnized with the present petitioner - Md. Murtaj Ansari and at the time of marriage on 13.05.2003 gold and silver ornaments along with other articles were given to the petitioner and in-laws. On the next day of marriage, she went her Sasural where the accused persons including the husband ill-treated her and even did not provide food and she was forced to pick burning pieces of coal resulting of which she sustained injuries and even she was forced to bring Rs. 20,000/-, T.V., Fridge and Motorcycle from her parents and in only after three days of marriage when her brother came to her Sasural she informed her about the demand and torture but as due to non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry and other articles, she was not allowed to remain in her matrimonial house. She came to her parent''s house, but again she went to her matrimonial home where she was assaulted by the accused persons including her husband and finally on 30.06.2007 she was ousted from her matrimonial house.

2.

As it appears from the record that the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad framed the charges against the four accused persons including the husband under Sections 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code but the other accused persons were acquitted of the charges but the present petitioner - Md. Murtaj Ansari was held guilty and convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- with default clause and on Appeal, the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sentences were affirmed whereafter this revision was preferred against the concurrent finding of the two courts. It also appear that during pendency of this revision, a compromise petition at the instance of the opposite party No. 2 (the complainant) was filed with a prayer that the petitioner and the opposite party No. 2 have settled their dispute outside the court and have compromised at the intervention of the common friends and well-wishers and hence in view of the compromise, the petitioner deserves to be acquitted in the instant case. One more petition was filed at the instance of this petitioner that in view of the compromise entered into between the petitioner and opposite party No. 2, the compromise petition may be allowed and the petitioner deserves to be acquitted of the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate court.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the case of B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 2003 SC 1386 : (2003) CriLJ 2028 : (2003) 3 CTC 54 : (2003) 1 DMC 524 : (2003) 3 JT 277 : (2003) 3 SCALE 214 : (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003) 2 SCR 1104 : (2003) 2 UJ 953 : (2003) AIRSCW 1824 : (2003) 3 Supreme 227 submitted that in a similar situated case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code after compromise the court held that there is no doubt the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing under S. 498 of the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Hypertechnical view would counterproductive and would act against interests of woman and against the object for this provision was added and the court also held that it becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes. It was also submitted that though Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code is not included in the schedule of Section 320 of the Code but in view of the above decision the parties may be allowed to compromise the case and the court in exercise of its inherent powers can acquit the petitioner from the charges and the conviction and sentences. Hence, the petitioner deserves to be acquitted in the light of the compromise.

4.

Learned counsel representing the State and the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2-Amna Khatoon (the complainant) fairly submitted that since the parties have settled their dispute outside the court and have filed an affidavit stating the dispute, a lenient view may be taken and the petitioner be acquitted. In B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 2003 SC 1386 : (2003) CriLJ 2028 : (2003) 3 CTC 54 : (2003) 1 DMC 524 : (2003) 3 JT 277 : (2003) 3 SCALE 214 : (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003) 2 SCR 1104 : (2003) 2 UJ 953 : (2003) AIRSCW 1824 : (2003) 3 Supreme 227 the Hon''ble Supreme Court while considering a similar situation arising out of a case instituted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code held in Paragraph-14 as follows:--

"There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code."

Section 320 of the Code sets out the details of offences in different tables, which are compoundable by the parties and those, which are compoundable with leave of the court. It is no doubt that Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code is not included in the above list of Section 320 of the Code but in view of the ratio decided in the above B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 2003 SC 1386 : (2003) CriLJ 2028 : (2003) 3 CTC 54 : (2003) 1 DMC 524 : (2003) 3 JT 277 : (2003) 3 SCALE 214 : (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (2003) 2 SCR 1104 : (2003) 2 UJ 953 : (2003) AIRSCW 1824 : (2003) 3 Supreme 227 it becomes the duty of the court to encourage the genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes. Admittedly, if the parties have settled their dispute and either revived relationship or decided to part their ways, in such eventuality there would be almost no chance of conviction. In the instant case, the parties have settled their dispute and have compromised their case after conviction of the petitioner and its affirmation by the Appellate court. Even then in the interest of justice when the opposite party No. 2 (the complainant) has herself prayed to acquit the petitioner (her husband) from the conviction and sentences, the continuation of proceedings, in the facts and circumstances stated above, would amount to abuse of the process of law. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above case has also held that it becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes. Relying upon the ratio decided in the above case, the conviction and sentence of the petitioner awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate court are, hereby, set aside.

Accordingly, the revision application is, hereby, allowed and the petitioner is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bond.