Muthu vs State

Rengasamy, J.—The Appellant herein was the first accused before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, in S.C. No. 9 of 1987

having been convicted for the offence under Sections 302 and 324 Indian Penal Code to undergo life imprisonment and also rigorous imprisonment

for six months respectively, to run concurrently, for having caused the death of one Arumugam and simple injury to P.W.1 From the testimony of

13 witnesses examined on the prosecution side, the following facts would emerge:

The deceased Arumugam and P.W.3 Raman are the sons of P. W.2 Sakthivel residing in Vaigai North Bank in Madurai. About six years prior to

this occurrence, P.W.3 and this Appellant were doing paint works and they became friends. But this Appellant, subsequently, was affected by

paralysis and during that time, P.W.3 provided financial assistance to him through the Appellant''s wife Rajeswari, who was die second accused

before the Court below. As the said Rajeswari had close movement with P.W.3, they developed illicit intimacy and P.W.3 was providing funds to

Rajeswari whenever demanded by her and the total amount spent for her was about Rs. 4,000/- P.W.3 later on, got married and this Appellant

also recovered from the paralytic attack. As P.W.3 felt the pinch of financial strain, he demanded the amount from this Appellant, which he had

spent during his illness. But this Appellant was denying his liability to pay any amount. A week prior to this occurrence, in a milk boiling ceremony,

performed in the house of their close relation. P.W.3 again reminded to the Appellant as to the amount payable to him and the Appellant asked

P.W.3 to provide accounts for the amount spent by him. On 15.3.1986, P.W.3 had demanded the money from the Appellant when the Appellant

was in his house. In the quarrel between them, P.W.3 was beaten by this Appellant with an iron rod on his head. P.W.3 complained this matter to

his father P.W.2. On 17.3.1986 at about 11.45 a.m. P.W.1 was sitting in the tailoring shop of the deceased Arumugam and P.W.2 was standing

just outside the tailoring shop. At that time, this Appellant was coming crossing the Vaigai river, as his house is in the southern row of the Vaigai

Bank. When this Appellant was coming close to P.W.2 he asked the Appellant how he beat his son P.W.3 forgetting the help he rendered to him

during the time of his illness and that the differences between them could have been settled amicably in the presence of elders, but the Appellant,

without considering these matters, had attacked his son. Immediately, the Appellant drew out M.O.1 knife from his waist and shouted that he

would annihilate P.W.2''s entire family and also threatened to stab him. The deceased, who saw this from his tailoring shop, shouted not to cut the

old man, and approached the Appellant. At that time, three females Veerayee, Chellammal and Thangammal were sitting outside their houses

nearby. The Appellant attempted to stab the deceased Arumugam saying that he would not leave him (deceased Arumugam) also. P.W.1

intervened and separated them. However, this Appellant stabbed the deceased with M.O.1 Knife on the right flank behind the shoulder. P.W.1

saying that this Appellant had stabbed the deceased in spite of his intervention, held his waist. The Appellant scolding P.W.1 stabbed him also on

his right knee. When his holding loosened, the Appellant stabbed the deceased on his head. Instigated by the second accused, not to leave the

deceased, the Appellant again stabbed the deceased on his back, right side arm pit and also on the left thigh. The neighbours and others shouted

not to cut and this Appellant with his wife, the second accused, ran away from the scene. P.W.10 who is residing opposite to the place of

occurrence, heard the noise and when he came out, he was able to see the deceased Arumugam lying down with bleeding injuries and P.W.1 also

with injury on his knee. By a rickshaw, which came by that way, the deceased was taken to Rajaji Hospital, by P.W.2, P.W.1 went to B.9 Mad-

hichiyam Police station and lodged a complaint about this occurrence to the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W.12 by 1.00 P.M. under Ex.P.1. The

Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W.12 registered the same in Crime No. 304 of 1986 under Sections 324 and 307 Indian Penal Code and prepared

Ex.P.15 First Information Report, which was forwarded to the Court. P.W.1 after the complaint, went to the Hospital. In the meanwhile, the

deceased, who was taken in the rickshaw to the hospital, was seen by P.W.7, the Medical officer attached to the Rajaji Hospital, by 1.00 p.m.

and he found that the victim Arumugam had already breathed his last. So, informing this to P.W.2 he also sent the intimation Ex.P.7 to the police,

P.W.12, on receiving Ex.P.7 death intimation, altered the First Information Report to Section 302 I.P.C. and prepared the Express Report

Ex.P.16, which was sent to the Court and also to the higher police officials. P.W.7 the Medical officer by 1.30 p.m. examined P.W.1 and found

on him a lacerated would 10 cm x 3 cm in front of the right knee. Ex.P.8 is the wound certificate issued for the injury, P.W.13 the Inspector

Police, received the information about this occurrence by about 1.45 p.m. and he proceeded to the scene of occurrence by 2.00 p.m. He

prepared an observation mahazar Ex.P.2 in the presence of P.W.4 Thennarasu and another and also drew a sketch Ex.P.17 for the crime scene.

He seized M.O.3 blood stained gravel and also M.O.4 sample gravel with tar from the scene of occurrence. He proceeded to the hospital where

P.W.1 was admitted and recovered M.O.2 shirt of P.W.1 under the mahazar Ex.P.4 in the presence of P.W.5 Muniyandi and another. He

conducted the inquest on the body of the deceased Arumugam between 3.30 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. and prepared the inquest report Ex.P.18. He

examined P.W.2 and P.W.3 at that time. He handed over the dead body to P.W.9 Constable attached to the police station, with a requisition

Ex.P.9 to the Medical Officer to conduct autopsy on the body of the deceased. On 18.3.1986, P.W.8 Dr. B. Thiagarajan, Assistant Professor in

Forensic Medicine, Madurai Medical College, commenced the post-mortem at 11.15 a.m. and he found the following injuries on the body of the

deceased.

A vertically oblique stab injury on the back of the right side close to the midline 3.5 c.m. x 1 c.m. on entering the thoracic cavity. On dissection,

the wound passed obliquely towards the front and cutting the 5th rib and adjoining intercostal muscles and passed through the lower lobe of right

lung through wound of entry and posterior aspect 3.5 c.m. x 1 c.m. wound of exit about and front 2.5 c.m. x 0.5 c.m. lower lobe of the lung

collapsed. Total depth of the wound about 8 cms. The wound margins were regular, upper end pointed and lower end blunt, right pleural cavity

contained 1200 cc. of blood with clots.

A stab injury postero anterior on posterior axillary fold 5 c.m. x 2.5 c.m. and through exit wound 6 cms. x 2 cms. Depth of the wound 7 cms.

margin were regular.

Incised wound entero posterior right side of the scalp curved with taoiling on the posterior aspect 2 cms. x 1 c.m. x bone deep

Oblique incised wound back of the right shoulder 2 cms. x 0.25 c.m. x skin deep tailing 1 c.m. on the lower end.

An oblique incised wound above downwards front and outer aspect of left thigh 6 cms. X 1 c.m. x muscle deep with tailing 1.5 c.m. in the lower

end.

The doctor was of the opinion that the deceased should have died of shock and haemorrhage due to the external injury No. 1 with corresponding

internal injuries, about 20 to 24 hours prior to the autopsy. Ex.P.10 is the post-mortem certificate issued by him. P.W.9 after the post-mortem,

recovered M.O.6 half-trouser and M.O.7 waist cord from the body of the deceased and handed over the same in the police station. The Inspector

of Police searched for the accused and he came to know that this Appellant had surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Paramakkudi, on

19.3.1986. He arrested the second accused on 22.3.1986. He applied before the Judicial Magistrate, Paramakkudi, for police custody of this

Appellant which also was ordered. On 27.3.1986 the Appellant was examined in Madhichiyam Police Station at about 2.00 p.m. and in the

presence of P.W.6 Subramanian and another Aanai, this Appellant said that he would point out the knife. Ex.P.15 is the admissible portion of the

confession made by the Appellant and he took the police party to the water tank and near the manure pit, M.O.1 knife was concealed. The

Appellant himself took out the concealed knife from the manure pit and the Inspector of Police recovered the same under a mahazar Ex.P.6 in the

presence of P.W.6 and Aanai. The Inspector of Police sent a requisition to the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Madurai, under the requisition Ex.P.11

for causing the articles seized by him to be produced before the Forensic Laboratory for chemical examination and the Judicial Magistrate under

his covering letter Ex.P.12 forwarded the materials to the Forensic Laboratory. After the examination of the articles, Ex.P.13 forensic report and

Ex.P.14 serologist report were sent to the Court. The Inspector of Police examined all the witnesses, who furnished information about this

occurrence, and filed the charge sheet on 4.7.1986.

After the committal of this case to the Court of Sessions, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, framed charges against this Appellant

and his wife, the second Appellant, for the offences u/s 302 read with Sections 109, 302 and 324 Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not

guilty of the charges and wanted trial of the case. Therefore, the prosecution produced 13 witnesses to prove their case. After die evidence of

these witnesses, the Appellant was questioned u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure to explain the incriminating circumstances found against him.

The Appellant denied the complicity in the crime and said that as the deceased and one Kalimuthu were functioning in two different factions, the

prosecution party, suspecting that he is closely associated with Kalimuthu, has implicated him in this case falsely and he has nothing to do with die

crime. He did not examine any witness on his side. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, after taking into consideration of the entire

evidence, had found that the charge against the second Appellant was not proved and therefore, acquitted her of the charges but has found that the

charge of murder u/s 302 Indian Penal Code and also the charge u/s 324 Indian Penal Code have been established against this Appellant and

therefore, finding him guilty of the said offence, inflicted the punishments, which are mentioned above. Hence, the Appellant has come forward with

this appeal.

The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant Mr. Alagarsamy took us through the evidence of the witnesses. He placed four aspects before

us to support his contention that the Appellant could not be the culprit in this offence. He also contended that the Court below, without taking into

consideration of the falsity of the evidence, which has been accepted in so far as the second accused is concerned, has failed to accept it as against

this Appellant and therefore, the findings have to be set aside. The points of controversy raised by him are, firstly, the material witnesses, viz.,

P.Ws.1 and 2, are the close friends of the deceased and the father of the deceased and as they are interested witnesses, they cannot be relied

upon when especially the independent witnesses, who were available there, have not been chosen to be examined in the Court, secondly the

improbability for the presence of P.W.2 thirdly, the improbability of the registration of the complaint Ex.P.15 at the time mentioned by the

prosecution and the possibility for creation of this complaint at a later point of time after the death of the deceased Arumugam and fourthly, the

inconsistency in the evidence as between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence.

Now, let us consider these aspects one by one. Before that, we feel that the occurrence can be narrated so that it would be easy for referring to

the circumstances pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. The plan Ex.P.17 shows that all these parties are residing in Vaigai North

Bank, Madurai and their houses are situated at short distances. P.W.3 the younger brother of the deceased Arumugam, would say that he had

spent about Rs. 4,000/- to the family of the Appellant when the Appellant had paralytic stroke about five years before the occurrence and his

version also is that as the second accused/wife of the Appellant was providing him sexual favours, he also provided funds at her request and when

he was in need of money, he demanded the same but the Appellant had refused to pay the same. He also had mentioned another incident on

15.3.1986 and he was attacked on that day by the Appellant with iron rod when he demanded money from the Appellant and this was complaint

to P.W.2 the father of P.W.3. Now, the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is that when the Appellant was going towards his house crossing the tailoring

shop of the deceased, where P.W.1 was inside and P.W.2 was outside the shop. P.W.2 had scolded the Appellant for his attack on his son

P.W.3 being ungrateful to him though P.W.3 had helped him a lot during the critical times of his illness due to the paralytic stroke, and all the

differences between them could have been settled through elders but the Appellant had attacked his son without considering all these aspects. It is

also the prosecution version that this Appellant, having heard this remark from P.W.2 threatened him that he would annihilate his family and when

the deceased, who was in the tailoring shop, shouting at this Appellant not to do anything to the oldman, approached him, he was stabbed by the

Appellant in spite of the intervention of P.W.1, who also had sustained one injury in his right knee for the reason that he interfered by holding the

Appellant by his waist. P.W.1, the injured witness who was present at the time of the occurrence, and P.W.2 the father of the deceased who

questioned the Appellant as to his conduct in attacking his son P.W.3 are the two eye-witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.10 is having a tea shop at

some distance on the western side. Though he had not witnessed the occurrence, his evidence is to the effect that after hearing the noise, he came

out and saw the deceased lying down with bleeding injuries while P.W.1 was standing with injury on his knee. From the evidence of P.W.10, who

is an independent witness and in no way connected with any of these parties, it is very clear that the deceased and P.W.1 had sustained injury in

the same occurrence. As mentioned above, P.Ws.1 and 2 are the eyewitnesses to the occurrence. P.W.1 would admit that he is a close friend of

the deceased Arumugam. This according to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, is a disqualification for relying upon the testimony of P.W.1 as

he is an interested witness in the deceased and P.W.2 being the father, would naturally support the prosecution case as this Appellant is implicated

in the occurrence and therefore, the interested testimony of these witnesses cannot be believed. The learned Counsel would further contend that

admittedly three other women were sitting close to the scene of occurrence in front of their houses and P.W.1 has mentioned the names of these

persons namely Veerayee Chellammal and Thangammal but the prosecution purposely avoided to examine those independent witnesses as they

wanted to suppress the truth but had chosen to examine only the interested witnesses and therefore, without the evidence of the independent

witnesses, the Court should not act upon the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 and the conviction on the strength of the evidence of these witnesses is

bad. The learned Counsel relied upon certain decisions in support of his argument on this aspect. The case law relied upon by him are Indradeo

Rai and Others etc. Vs. State of Bihar, State of Karnataka Vs. Bheemappa and Others, and Ram Ashrit Ram and Others Vs. State of Bihar, In

the first case cited by the learned Counsel, the view taken by the Patna High Court is that the interested witnesses cannot be reliable witnesses and

they cannot be relied upon to accept the prosecution case. But in that case, it was found that P.W.5 was the son of P.W.7 who was the brother of

the deceased. The Court found that they were tutored witnesses. When it was found that they were not speaking the truth and were merely tutored

witnesses, the Court had held that the evidence of these witnesses, without being corroborated by any evidence, could not be the basis for

conviction. In the next case. (State of Kamataka v. Bheemappa), even though some observation was made that the evidence of the interested

witnesses is not safe to rely upon without finding independent corroboration, in that case also, the Court had found after thorough consideration

that the evidence of those interested witnesses was nothing but embellishment. Therefore, it was held that without proper corroboration by the

independent testimony, it was not safe to act upon their evidence. In the third case Ram Ashrit Ram and Others Vs. State of Bihar, though caution

is given for relying upon the testimony of the interested witnesses, the Apex Court in that case has not laid down the principle that the testimony of

the interested persons shall not be relied upon. It proceeds to observe that when all the material witnesses in a murder case were either related or

otherwise interested in the prosecution, their testimony had to pass the test of close and severe scrutiny before their testimony could be safely acted

upon and in the absence of corroboration to a material extent in all particulars it would be hazardous to convict the accused persons on the basis of

the testimony of those highly interested, inimical and partisan witnesses when especially the testimony bristles with impropable versions and material

infirmities. Therefore, the view laid down by the Apex Court is that for the reason that one happened to be a relative of the deceased or friend of

the deceased, his testimony cannot be discarded outright without applying the mind whether the same is true or not. In the above cited cases, the

witnesses, were found to be unreliable for the reason of certain infirmities mentioned therein. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. S.

Anbalagan would submit that the Apex Court has laid down the guidelines for relying upon the testimony of the close relatives and friends, who are

said to be the interested witnesses, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pattad

Amarappa v. State of Karnataka 1989 Cri. L.J. 2167 would submit that the relatives and friends are not disqualified from being examined

provided they had knowledge about the occurrence and they were present in the scene of crime. In the above decision, the Apex Court would

observe as follows:

..26.. It is true that P.Ws.1 to 5 are closely related to D1 to D3 and that no one residing near P.W.6''s house had been examined in the case. It

must, however, be noticed that P.Ws.1 to 5 are natural witnesses and not chance witnesses. They were all residing with P.W.6 and his brothers.

As the occurrence had taken place near the house of P.W.6 they must have necessarily witnessed the occurrence. It is not as if they were residing

elsewhere and had come upon the scene of occurrence by chance. Such being the case, their evidence cannot be stigmated as interested

testimony. As regards the non-examination of other residents of the locality, we have no evidence that any of them was present at the time of

occurrence and had witnessed the attack on the deceased...

In Hari Obula Reddy and Others Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, also the Apex Court would repeat the same observation, as follows:

It is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partnership by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or

rejecting sworn testimony. Nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless

corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses

should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or

inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. Although in the matter

of appreciation of evidence, no hard and fast rule can be laid down, yet, in most cases, in evaluating evidence of an interested or even a partisan

witness, it is useful as a first step to focus attention on the question, whether the presence of the witness at the scene of the crime at the material

time was probable. If so, whether the substratum of the story narrated by the witness, being consistent with the other evidence on record, the

natural course of human events, the surrounding circumstances and inherent probabilities of the case, is such which will carry conviction with a

prudent person. If the answer to these questions be in the affirmative, and the evidence of the witness appears to the Court to be almost flawless,

and free from suspicion, it may accept it, without seeking corroboration from any other source. Since perfection in this imperfect world is seldom

to be found, and the evidence of a witness, more so of an interested witness, is generally fringed with embellishment and exaggerations however

true in the main, the Court may look for some assurance, the nature and extent of which will vary according to the circumstances of the particular

case, from independent evidence, circumstantial or direct before finding the accused guilty on the basis of his interested testimony....

In the light of these observations no doubt, we have to take into consideration of the other circumstances also to find out whether the evidence of

P.Ws.1 and 2 is in conformity with the other circumstances brought out from the evidence. P.W.10 is an independent witness and nothing has been

suggested against him. He says in his evidence that at about 11.30 to 11.45 a.m. on that day, he happened to be inside his tea shop and only after

hearing the noise, he came out and saw the deceased Arumugam lying down with injuries in front of his tailoring shop and P.W.1 also had bleeding

injury on his right leg and thereafter, the deceased was taken in a rickshaw. This evidence of P.W.10 lends support to the time of the occurrence

and the place of the occurrence, i.e. in front of the tailoring shop of the deceased. The quarrel between P.W.3 and the Appellant has been

deposed by P.W.3. Even though it was suggested to P.W.3 that he was not beaten by the Appellant with iron rod, the evidence of P.W.3 that he

was repeatedly demanding money from this Appellant even on the day when his close relation had boiled milk in his new house and subsequently,

quarrel arose on a Saturday shows that P.W.3 was pestering the Appellant for return of the amounts due from him and therefore, it cannot be

stated that the Appellant had not retaliated in view of the conduct of P.W.3 insisting for the return of the money. There was no other enmity

between the Appellant and the deceased party except the one stated by P.W.3. Naturally, P.W.2 being the father of P.W.3 might have asked the

Appellant as to why his son was attacked for the reason that he demanded money and all the differences could have been settled between them.

Therefore, the evidence of P.W.3 confirms that P.W.2 should have been settled between them. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.2 should have

questioned the Appellant as to his behaviour in attacking his son. Even though P.Ws.1 and 2 would say that the Appellant was questioned by

P.W.2 with soft words without even provoking him, it appears that the Appellant had immediately used harsh words that he would annihilate the

entire family and only thereafter, the deceased had to intervene to save his father. Even going to the extent that there was wordy exchange between

the Appellant and P.W.2 abusing each other, no circumstance is brought out that the prosecution party were the aggressors compelling the

Appellant to avail private defence in attacking the deceased. Anyhow, the evidence of P.W.3 also supports the prosecution case that P.W.2 being

the father of P.W.3 had to question this Appellant as to his conduct in attacking his son and this is the origin of the occurrence. Therefore, the

evidence of P.W.1 and 2 with regard to the origin of the occurrence is fully corroborated from the testimony of P.W.3 whose evidence has not

been seriously disputed.

The learned Counsel Mr. Alagarsamy contended that P.W.1 was not only a close friend of the deceased but he was also an accused along with

the deceased and P.W.3 in several cases, that he was also prosecuted by Madhichiyam police in S.T.C. No. 24 of 1984 for breaking the glasses

in the tea shop of Kalimuthu, that he was also an accused in C.C. No. 24 of 1984 for damaging the toddy shop by setting fire, that P.W.1 though

had denied his participation in demolishing the toddy shop. P.W.3 would admit that they were prosecuted, that the admission made by P.W.3

would falsify the evidence of P.W.1 who is a perjurer and therefore, his evidence cannot be looked into for any purpose. Except the admission

made by P.W.3 with regard to one case namely, die demolition of a toddy shop in which P.W.1 deceased Arumugam and P.W.3 were

prosecuted, there is nothing in the evidence to show that P.W.1 is an accused in any other case. It is also elicited from P.W.3 that Dinakaran,

Arumugam, Kumar Pasupathi and Mina Thiagarajan and others were prosecuted in Crime No. 530 of 1986 u/s 307 Indian Penal Code for having

attacked P.W.3 by these persons. Probably, in retaliation of that event, these persons might have attacked the toddy shop. Anyhow, from the

evidence of P.W.3 the involvement of P.W.1 in the demolition of toddy shop is brought out though it was suggested to P.W.1 that it was a case of

arson for which there is no evidence. But when P.W.12, the Sub-Inspector of Police, was in the box, these particulars were not elicited, with

regard to the involvement of P.W.1. The Appellant could have obtained the copies of the documents relating to the proceedings against P.W.1 to

show diat he is involved in several cases. So, without such evidence, for the reason that he was involved in one case along with P.W.3 and his

brother, it is not proper to totally reject his testimony. Probably, P.W.1 thinking that his involvement in the criminal proceedings if admitted by him

in the Court, might be a ground to be looked down upon him, he might have denied the proceedings against him. There is no evidence to show that

this witness was convicted in that case. Therefore, we cannot presume that he is a man of bad character totally unreliable. As a matter of fact, the

Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Wassan Singh and Others, would observe that the antecedents of the witnesses or their interestedness is not a

valid ground to reject their evidence because persons with such antecedents are not necessarily untruthful witnesses nor mere relationship with the

deceased was a good ground for discarding their testimony when their presence at the scene of occurrence was probable. The Apex Court would

add that all that was necessary is to scrutinise their evidence with more than ordinary care and circumspection with reference to the part or role

assigned to each of the accused. In another case in State of U. P. Vs. Shanker, when the relationship was denied by a witness, it was argued that

he is untruthful witness as he denied the relationship itself. However, the Apex Court would observe:

32... But the mere fact that the witness had not told the truth in regard to a peripheral matter would not justify a wholesale rejection of his evidence.

Time and again, this Court has pointed out that in this country it is rare to come across the testimony of a witness which does not have a fringe or

an embroidery of untruth although his evidence may be true in the main. It is the function of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff and

accept what appears to be true and reject the rest. It is only where the testimony of a witness is tainted to the care, the falsehood and the truth

being inextricably intertwined, that the Court should discard his evidence in toto.

In the light of these dicta of the Apex Court, the interestedness of P.Ws.1 and 2 or the denial of P.W.1 being involved in a criminal case will not

falsify their testimony in toto when especially the evidence of P.W.10 establishes the truth that P.W.1 also was present in the scene of occurrence

and he also had sustained injuries in the same transaction. P.W.2 being the father of the deceased and his residence also is close to the scene of

occurrence, was a natural witness to the scene of occurrence.

It was argued before us that P.W.2 though is the father of the deceased, did not even attempt to intervene when his son, the deceased was

attacked by the Appellant, that the normal conduct of a father would be to intervene when his kith and kin were attacked as he may not mind his

safety and as the conduct of P.W.2 was quite strange, he could not have been present in the scene. This argument is devoid of any merit or

support. The evidence of P.W.1 discloses that though he intervened and separated the Appellant, the Appellant had stabbed him on his knee. So,

when the conduct of the Appellant is such, injuring even the person against whom he had no ill-will, naturally, P.W.2 being a man of 70 years old,

would have hesitated to intervene in the scuffle or attack, as his physical strength might not be sufficient to withstand the onslaught of the Appellant.

Therefore, for the reason that he did not intervene or sustain the injury at the hands of the Appellant, it cannot be a reason to disbelieve his

presence in the scene of occurrence. As a matter of fact, soon after the occurrence, the deceased was taken in a rickshaw only by P.W.2 to the

hospital and the doctor P.W.7 also would say that the deceased was brought by his father. Therefore, it is beyond the shadow of doubt for the

presence of P.W.2 in the scene of occurrence when especially the evidence is that he was the person, who questioned the Appellant which led to

this unfortunate incident of gory violence leading to the death of Arumugam. P.W.1 also is a resident of the same area and as mentioned above, he

was also present in the scene of occurrence as stated by P.W.10 and therefore, these two witnesses are the natural witnesses for the crime.

The learned Counsel Mr. Alagarsamy submitted that these two eye-witnesses had implicated the second accused, wife of the Appellant, as

though she incited the Appellant to cut the deceased and she also pulled the leg of the deceased, making him to fall down, but the learned trial

Judge has disbelieved the role of the second accused in this occurrence and disbelieved the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 on this aspect and it goes

without saying that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is untruthful and therefore their evidence has to be totally rejected. As a matter of fact, the very

same argument had been raised before the learned trial judge and after considering the maxim, ''falsus in uno falsus in omnibus'', the learned trial

Judge has held that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 cannot be totally rejected though he disbelieved the evidence of those witnesses relating to the

participation of second accused. Now, the learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit that the maxim, ''falsus in uno falsus in omnibus'' is not

a rule but is only a rule of caution, that when part of the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 is found to be false, there is no reason to believe the rest of the

portion and therefore, the Court below is not right in accepting the testimony in respect of the overt act against the Appellant. The learned Counsel

refers to the decisions in Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 S.C. 386 and Prem Singh Vs. State of Punjab, to support his argument that the

above said maxim is only a rule of caution. In the first decision relied upon by him, the Apex Court would observe that the maxim ''falsus in uno

falsus in omnibus'' is merely a rule of caution and all that it amounts to is that in such cases, the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must

be disregarded, it would further state that the doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of

circumstances but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence. In the second case, two eye-witnesses were examined and four

accused were acquitted by the Sessions Court without accepting their participation in the occurrence and in the High Court, the evidence of the

two eye-witnesses was totally disbelieved and therefore, the remaining two accused also were acquitted. But in that case, the trustworthiness of

those two eye-witnesses was thoroughly considered and the Sessions Court as well as the High Court had observed that they were unreliable

witnesses and the reason also was given that their evidence was falsified by the medical evidence. So, when the evidence of those two eye-

witnesses was discarded from the medical evidence, the Apex Court has held that when such evidence was disbelieved for acquitting four of the

accused, there cannot be a conviction in respect of the other two accused and therefore, all of them were entitled for acquittal. But in this case, as

discussed above, it cannot be stated that the testimony of these two witnesses is totally false though the Court below has disbelieved their evidence

in part with regard to the participation of the second accused. The reason assigned by the Court below is that though the witnesses would say that

this Appellant was coming to the residential area crossing the river Vaigai and was confronted by P.W.2, no evidence was let in as to how the

second accused came and joined with the Appellant and therefore, her presence cannot be true. Further, there was no evidence for the common

intention for the charges u/s 302 read with Section 109 Indian Penal Code. These aspects for acquitting the second accused will not in any way

come into the reliability of the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 in respect of the overt act against the Appellant. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge

has rightly held that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not applicable to India. The Apex Court has laid down in Chandkhan v. State of

U.P. 1995 S.C.C. (Cri.) 915 that it is imperative for the trial Court to consider the case of the individual accused on their respective merits in the

light of other evidence on record and not to reject outright the evidence of the two witnesses in its entirety for it is trite that the principal ''falsus in

uno, falsus in omnibus'' does not apply to criminal trials and it is the duty of the Court to disengage the truth from falsehood. Therefore, in the well

considered view of the Apex Court in the above decision, we cannot totally disregard the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2 for the reason that the

second accused was acquitted by the trial Court disbelieving her participation.

The next contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that Ex.P. 1 could not have come into existence at 1.00 p.m. as stated by the

witnesses P.Ws.1 and 2 and the same should have been created after the death of the deceased Arumugam, in consultation, and therefore, no

importance can be given to Ex.P.1 for the version given in the earliest point of time and the occurrence should have happened in some other

manner. The learned Counsel would argue that as P.W.1 had a cut injury on his knee, he also would have gone to the hospital along with the

deceased and he would not have gone to the police station to give the complaint. He would refer another circumstances namely, the admission of

P.W.1 in the hospital by 1.35 p.m. even without a police memo though P.W.1 was returning from the police station after giving the complaint

Ex.P.1 to P.W.12. But the wound certificate Ex.P.8 would show that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 was only simple in nature and therefore,

P.W.1 might have thought that he should send the deceased, who was seriously injured, immediately to the hospital for treatment and he could go

to the police station to lodge the complaint without delay. For the reason that he did not go to the hospital straight-away but went to the police

station, it cannot be said that the complaint lodged by him could not have been given at the time mentioned by him. It all depends upon the nature

of the wound and the tolerance of the witness. It is true that when P.W.1 returned from the police station after giving the complaint, the doctor

P.W.7 would say that P.W.1 himself came to the hospital and no reference with regard to the police memo is mentioned by him in his wound

certificate Ex.P.8 and also in his evidence, making it clear that no police memo was issued by the Sub Inspector of Police P.W.12 for sending

P.W.1 to the hospital. But one thing is clear and that is Ex.P.7, the complaint lodged by P.W.1, was registered only for the offences under

Sections 324 and 307 Indian Penal Code. The evidence of P.W.7, is that even when the deceased was brought by his father to the hospital, it was

only a dead body and therefore, death intimation also was sent immediately to die police station. If P.W.1 was aware that the deceased was dead

already, he would not have lodged the complaint for the offence u/s 307 Indian Penal Code but on the other hand, the police after receiving the

intimation Ex.P.7 from the hospital, would have straightaway registered the case for the offence u/s 302 Indian Penal Code itself. Therefore, it

makes clear that even before the body of Animugam had reached the hospital by 1.00 p.m. the complaint Ex.P.1 should have been lodged by

P.W.1 to the Sub Inspector of Police. That is why the crime was registered initially for the offence u/s 307 Indian Penal Code only. This

circumstance makes it well that P.W.1 should have gone to the police station straightaway without going to the hospital and only after lodging the

complaint, he came to the hospital for treatment. No doubt, in such a circumstance, P.W.12, the Sub-Inspector of Police, should have issued a

police memo directing P.W.1 to go to the hospital for treatment. Probably, P.W.1 in anxiety as to the fate of his friend, who was sent to the

hospital, might have left the police station even without informing the police officer and therefore, he came straight to the hospital without a police

memo and his injury was attended by the doctor. For this reason, namely for the non-issuance of a police memo for the treatment of P.W.1,

Ex.P.1 cannot be a document created subsequent to the death of Arumugam. Further, the prosecution was in no way better placed by registering

the case by 1.00 p.m. for the offence u/s 307 Indian Penal Code, even after knowing that the deceased was dead. Therefore, taking into

consideration of all the circumstances, it is true that P.W.1 had straight away went to the police station and lodged the complaint with P.W.12 for

which Ex.P.15 First Information Report was also issued, which reached the Court by 4.00 p.m. Only after the death of Arumugham for which

Ex.P.7 intimation was sent to the Police Station, the Crime was altered to Section 302 Indian Penal Code for which Ex.P.16 First Information

Report was issued. Within an hour after the occurrence, P.W.1 had narrated the whole incident in his complaint and the particulars furnished in

Ex.P.1 are fully in tune with the prosecution case and this circumstance also strengthens the case of the prosecution for the occurrence in the

manner alleged by the prosecution.

Another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that in Ex.P. 10, it is mentioned that the deceased would have died 20 to

24 hours prior to the post mortem and as the post mortem was done on 18.3.1986 at 11.15 p.m. the death should have occurred on 17.3.1986

night at about 11.15 p.m. and therefore, the evidence of the doctor P.W.7 that he found the deceased dead even by 1.00 p.m. on 17.3.1986

cannot be correct and there is mystery as to the time of the death of the deceased. Absolutely there is no mystery because, a mistake seems to

have been committed by P.W.8 when he prepared the post mortem certificate Ex.P.10. In the post mortem certificate, the column gives a.m. and

p.m. as to the time of the requisition and also the time of commencement of the post mortem. The doctor had struck off the column ''a.m.'' in both

places instead of the column ''p.m.''. This is patent from the evidence that the body of the deceased was kept in the hospital itself even on 1.00

p.m. On 17.3.1986. The requisition of the Inspector of Police was sent to the doctor soon after the inquest on 17.3.1986 itself. As the doctor

should have received the requisition of the Sub Inspector of Police atleast on the next day, that is on 18.3.1986 morning, he should have

commenced the post mortem only on the forenoon of 18.3.1986. There is a prohibition for doing the post-mortem during night time and this

prohibition has been relaxed recently by a G.O. Further the doctor P.W.8 would say in his evidence that he received the requisition at 11.05 a.m.

on 18.3.1986 and commenced the post mortem at 11.15 a.m. on the same day. But somehow in the post mortem certificate, a mistake has crept

in by striking the column ''a.m.'' instead of ''p.m.''. If really, deceased was alive till 11.05 p.m. on 17.3.1986, the inquest could not have been

conducted by P.W.13, Inspector of Police, on the evening of 17.3.1986. Therefore, the learned Counsel cannot take advantage of a mistake in the

certificate with regard to the time of the post mortem.

The next contention taken by the learned Counsel is that the deceased should have been attacked by more than one person for the reason that

injuries found on the deceased were having the symptoms of different weapons and the doctor P.W.8 also would admit that injury No. 1 on the

deceased might have been caused by a single edged weapon whereas the injury No. 2 was having sharp edges on both ends indicating the injury

by a double-edged weapon and injury No. 3 had a curve, making it probable that it could have been caused by an aruval and therefore, these

circumstances would establish the truth that the occurrence should have happened elsewhere in a different manner with the participation of more

than three persons. He would further contend that P.W.1 had sustained only a laceration in the knee, that M.O.1 being a sharp edged weapon,

could not have caused this laceration and therefore, the entire prosecution case should be thrown out. He also would rely upon the decision of this

Court in Soundarapandi Vs. State, in which it is held that when the medical evidence is in conflict with the oral testimony of the eye-witnesses, the

evidence of the eye witnesses cannot be relied upon and the accused should be given the benefit of doubt, this point was urged before the learned

Principal Sessions Judge also and he has also considered the merit of this contention. Unfortunately, the learned Counsel has failed to give weight

for the rest of the evidence of the Doctor P.W.8, who has stated that all the injuries found on the deceased were possible by M.O.1 which is a

double edged weapon. P.W.7 also would say that a lacerated injury can be caused by a sharp edged weapon and the injury on P.W.1 was

possible by M.O.1 also. When the experts P.Ws.7 and 8 have asserted in their testimony that the weapon shown in the Court, viz., M.O.1 is

capable of causing the injuries found on the deceased and also on P.W.1, now the learned Counsel cannot contend that there is discrepancy

between the evidence of the eye witnesses and the medical evidence. Even though the doctor P.W.8 was of the opinion that the injury No. 1 is

also possible to be caused by a single edged weapon and that as injury No. 2 had sharp edges on both the ends, it was possible for such an injury

by a double edged weapon, the doctor has not ruled out the possibility for those injuries only by such weapons, namely single weapon or double

edged weapon. It all depends upon the way in which the weapon was handled and now the victim was able to ward off the assault on him. If a

double edged weapon is not thrust in full but scratched on the body of a person, the injury will be only from one edge and it may appear to be an

injury caused by a single edged weapon. M.O.1 is a double edged weapon and therefore, injury No. 2 on the deceased is possible by M.O.1 has

got a curve as it is a pichuva, and therefore, injury No. 3, which is a curved injury, is also possible by M.O.1. Therefore, there is no possibility to

hold that the weapon M.O.1 in the Court would not have caused the injury on the deceased. So far as P.W.1 is concerned, the seat of injury is the

knee which is a bony part of the body and therefore, when the weapon like M.O.1 was used in this particular part, because of the bony part

underneath the seat, diere is likelihood for laceration and this has been spoken by P.W.7 also. Under the above circumstances, the learned

Counsel is not right in arguing that there is discrepancy between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence.

We went through the findings of the learned Principal Sessions Judge. He has disbelieved the recovery portion of M.O.1 at the instance of the

Appellant. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, would give a reason that as P.W.13, the Inspector, of Police, would admit in his evidence that he

would not allow third parties to be present at the time when an accused in a murder case was being interrogated, there was no chance for P.W.6,

to be present when the confession statement was given by the Appellant and therefore, the recovery as spoken by P.W.6 cannot be true. Now,

the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that even though P.W.13 would say that he would not allow the strangers to be present for

interrogation of a murder case accused, he has stated that he would retain the witnesses if required and according to the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor, as P.W.6 and Aanai were retained in the place as their attestation was required for the confession statement Ex.P.5, the reasoning

given by the learned Sessions Judge, for rejecting the recovery of M.O.1 is not well founded. In the cross examination of P.W.13 itself, it is

brought out that though normally they will not allow strangers to be present when a person is interrogated, P.W.13, is very specific that the

witnesses would be retained and in this case, P.W.6 and Aanai have attested the confession statement Ex.P.5 and also for the recovery of M.O.1

under Ex.P.6. Therefore, as they were witnesses, we cannot take it that P.W.13 would not have allowed these persons to be present when the

confession statement was made by the Appellant. P.W.6 would say in his evidence that as he and Aanai heard that the Appellant was brought to

the Police Station, they went there in curiosity to see him and at that time, they were asked to be present for attestation of the confession statement.

When the evidence of P.W.13 is consistent for the presence of P.W.6, we are unable to agree with the reasoning given by the learned Principal

Sessions Judge, for rejecting the recovery portion of the testimony of P.W.6. The learned Principal Judge has not given any reason for disbelieving

the evidence of P.W.13, the Inspector of Police, who would say that at the instance of the Appellant, he recovered M.O.1 from a manure pit

where this weapon was kept buried. We find that the evidence of P.Ws.6 and 13 is believable and acceptable and therefore, the recovery part

also can be believed.

The Serologist''s report Ex.P.14 shows that the weapon M.O.1 contained human blood group ''A'' and the same group was found in the

drawer of the deceased M.0.6 and also in the shirt of P.W.1 M.O.2. Anyhow, it is made clear from this that this weapon was used either for the

attack of the deceased or P.W.1 as it contained blood group found in the clothes of these persons. Therefore, this is another circumstance to

corroborate the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that the Appellant alone had caused the injuries on the body of the deceased.

The medical evidence, as mentioned above, is fully in tune with the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 for the injuries on the deceased and P.W.1.

Therefore, we find no infirmity in any aspect in the prosecution case.

The only defence taken by the Appellant is that as die prosecution party mistook that he is an hireling of Kalimuthu against whom there were

criminal cases between the deceased and Kalimuthu, he was implicated in this case without knowing the identity of the real culprit. The occurrence

took place in the broad day light at 11.15 a.m. and it is hard to accept that the identity of the real assailant was not known either to P.W.1 or to

P.W.2. If more than one accused is involved in this case, there is no possibility for implicating an innocent person. But the Appellant is the only

accused and there is no reason for P.W.1, the injured witness or the father of the deceased P.W.2, to falsely implicate this Appellant against whom

there is no other motive or enmity and allow the real culprit, who was responsible for the death of the deceased, to escape without any punishment.

At no stretch of imagination, such a situation can be perceived in this case for the implication of the innocent person when especially, the

occurrence was in the broad day light. Therefore, taking into consideration of the entire spectrum, the eye-witnesses'' account, the medical

evidence and also the surrounding circumstances, all go a long way to establish that the Appellant himself was responsible for the injuries found on

the deceased and also on P.W.1 and therefore, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, has rightly held this Appellant to be guilty of the offences

under Sections 302 and 324 Indian Penal Code. We find no infirmity of any type in this case and therefore, the findings of the learned Principal

Sessions Judge, deserves to be confirmed and accordingly, the conviction and sentence is confirmed.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The bail bond is cancelled. The Appellant is directed to surrender to undergo the sentence.