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Judgment
P.K. Misra, J.—Heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties.
In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings initiated under G.O.Ms. No. 301, H & UD
Dept. dated 4.3.91 has lapsed as the award was not passed in time in respect of the lands belonging to the petitioner in S. No. 36/1 in
Palayamkottai in Tirunelveli District.
The main contention of the petitioner is that the award has not been passed within a period of two years as contemplated u/s 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act). In making the aforesaid submission, the petitioner has referred to notice dated 13.5.1996,
which is to the following effect :
An extent of 1.73.0 Hectares of land in S. No. 36/1 in V.M. Chatram Village, Block IV, was acquired and award was already passed in this
office award No. 3/92-93 dt. 12.3.93 (Roc. No. A.34/88 dt. 12.3.93). You have filed W.P. No. 2977/93 in the High Court, Madras and the
High Court, Madras in their order dated 10.1.96 has dismissed the W.P. filed by you. Now the W.P. has been dismissed, and stay vacated, the
amount of compensation has to be finalised. You are therefore requested to produce the documentary evidence to prove the entire land in S. No.
36/1 of V.M. Chatram Village is only belongs to you. You are requested to appear in this office on 20.5.96 at 11,00 A.M. before me without fail
with all the documents available with you. . . .
By referring to the expression "" Now the W.P. has been dismissed, and stay vacated, the amount of compensation has to be finalised. . . ."" learned
counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the above portion indicates that by the date of such notice, the award had not been passed. To verify
this aspect, the learned counsel representing the State was called upon to produce records. The records show that award had been passed on
12.3.1993. As a matter of fact, even in the notice dated 13.5.1996, there is a reference to the award dated 12.3.1993.
The expression contained in the very same notice to the effect "" . . . the amount of compensation has to be finalised."" is an inartistic expression,
which has given rise to the present submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. On perusal of the records, I am not able to accept this
submission that the award was not passed within 2 years. Therefore, the prayer of the petitioner that the land acquisition proceedings should be
quashed on account of non-compliance of Section 11-A cannot be sustained.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the petitioner has been repeatedly writing to the authorities to furnish a copy of the
award to make a formal application u/s 18 of the Act. As a matter of fact such representation was considered as an application for making
reference and was rejected by the authorities on the ground that such application was not filed within the stipulated period. This aspect is being
challenged by the counsel for the petitioner.
The provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act are as follows :-
Reference to Court.- (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the
compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken :
Provided that every such application shall be made, -
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of
the Collector''s award;
(b) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the
Collector''s award, whichever period shall first expire.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the present case award had not been made in the presence of the petitioner nor notice
had been issued prior to making of the award. He has therefore submitted that Section 18(2) proviso (a) would not be applicable and Section
18(2) proviso (b) would be applicable. In this context, he has further submitted that mere knowledge of the petitioner that some award has been
passed is not sufficient and the respondent was required to furnish particulars of the award or serve a copy of the award.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision reported in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition
Officer and Another, and State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, . In the decision reported in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh
Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, , the award was actually made, signed and filed in the office of the concerned Land
Acquisition Officer on 25.3.1951. No notice of this award had been given to the appellant as required u/s 12(2). The appellant received
information about making of the award on or before 13.1.1953. The appellant then filed application on 24.2.1953 u/s 18 requiring that the matter
should be referred for determination of the Court as compensation determined in the proceedings was inadequate. Such application was rejected
on the ground that it had not been filed within the stipulated period. Ultimately in the Division Bench of the High Court it was held that the
application was not filed within time. In appeal before the Supreme Court, it was observed :
. . . The proviso to Section 18 deals with the question of limitation. It prescribes that every such application shall be made (a) if the person
making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collector''s
award; (b) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s 12(2), or within six months from the date of the
Collector''s award which ever shall first expire. The appellant''s case falls under the latter part of clause(b) of the proviso. It has been held by the
Allahabad High Court that since the application made by the appellant before respondent 1 was made beyond six months from the date of the
award in question it was beyond time. The view taken by the High Court proceeds on the literal construction of the relevant clause. As we have
already seen the award was signed and delivered in his office by respondent 1 on March 25, 1951, and the application by the appellant was made
u/s 18 on February 24, 1953. It has been held that the effect of the relevant clause is that the application made by the appellant is plainly beyond
the six months permitted by the said clause an so respondent No. 1 was right in rejecting it as barred by time. The question which arises for our
decision is whether this literal and mechanical way of construing the relevant clause is justified in law. It is obvious that the effect of this construction
is that if a person does not know about the making of the award and is himself not to blame for not knowing about the award his right to make an
application u/s 18 may in many cases be rendered ineffective. If the effect of the relevant provision unambiguously is as held by the High Court the
unfortunate consequence which may flow from it may not have a material or a decisive bearing. If, on the other hand, it is possible reasonably to
construe the said provision so as to avoid such a consequence it would be legitimate for the Court to do so. We must therefore enquire whether
the relevant provision is capable of the construction for which the appellant contends, and that naturally raises the question as to what is the
meaning of the expression the day of the Collector''s award.
It was further observed :
Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property
then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal
requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the
date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office;
it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true
position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words ""the date of the award"" occurring in the relevant section would not be
appropriate.
(6) There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the
matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the right of the owner of the property
and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said
party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before
the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award of
signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced.
If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced
the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if
without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of
fair-play and natural justice the expression ""the date of the award"" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated
to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words ""from
the date of the Collector''s award"" used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.
(7) In this connection it is material to recall the fact that u/s 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the
persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity
of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award u/s 11 followed by its filing u/s
12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party
concerned was also necessary and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award
immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it.
This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression ""from the date of the Collector''s award"" in
the proviso to Section 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an
obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show the literal and
mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector
to discharge his obligation u/s 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application u/s 18, and this result
could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature.
Ultimately after referring to several decisions of various High Courts and different statutes, it was further observed :-
. . . These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the
remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either
actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in
error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to Section 18
of the Act.
The question again cropped up in the late decision reported in State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, , wherein it was
observed :-
. . . (5) As to the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj
Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, . It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words ""six
months from the date of the Collector''s award"" occurring in the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and ""the knowledge
of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression . . .
used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively.
. . . Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the
essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party u/s 12(2)
of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is
present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the
contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential
contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that
the respondents had knowledge of the award. ...
In view of the aforesaid two clear decisions directly on the point, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the interest of
justice, the respondents should be given a direction to furnish a copy of the award to the petitioner to enable him to file an application u/s 18 for
making a reference.
As against this submission, the learned counsel appearing for the State has relied upon a decision reported in State of Punjab and Another Vs.
Satinder Bir Singh, which has been followed in 1996 (II) SCC 213 and contended that it is not necessary to furnish a copy of the award and since
the petitioner had knowledge that award had been passed, he cannot be permitted to file application u/s 18 after lapse of the period as
contemplated u/s 18 of the Act. It is no doubt true that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the State support his contention. However, on
perusal of the aforesaid two decisions, it is found that there is no reference to any of the earlier decisions already discussed. It is noticed that 1961
SC 1500 was rendered by a Bench consisting of two judges and the decision reported in 1963 SC 1604 by a Bench consisting of three judges.
The two subsequent decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent were rendered by Benches consisting of two judges. In other words,
the decision reported in 1963 SC 1604 is of a larger Bench.
Law is well-settled that earlier decision of the Supreme Court of the same strength or of higher strength is binding even on the Supreme Court.
The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which have been rendered without referring to the earlier two decisions, one of which is by a
larger bench, cannot be preferred. In such view of the mater, I am of the opinion that the contention raised by the counsel for the State
Government cannot be accepted.
Even though the petitioner had made application to furnish copy of award to make a formal application u/s 18 of the Act and the respondent
No. 3 has purported to reject such application treating it as an application for reference, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the
interest of justice, I direct that the respondents should furnish a copy of the award within a period of three weeks from the date of communication
of the order and it would be open to the petitioner to file a formal application u/s 18 for making a reference claiming higher compensation. If any
such application is filed within six weeks from the date of receipt of such award, such application should be referred as contemplated u/s 18 of the
Act.
Learned counsel for the respondents has also raised a technical question that since there is no prayer for making a reference, no such direction
should be given. It is well known that the Rules of procedure are hand maids of justice. The High Court while deciding a matter under Article 226
acts as a Court of equity and and good conscience it has got inherent power to pass necessary orders in the interest of justice without being
bogged down by the technicalities of procedural law.
With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. NO. 18102 is closed.