Mutyala Jaggamma vs Mutya Satyanarayanamurthi

Chandra Reddy, J.—The plaintiff in O. S. 142/50 and defendant in O. S. 22 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judges Court, Kakinada, is the appellant in both the appeals. The plaintiff in O. S. 142/1950 laid an action against her husband for recovery of maintenance, future at the rate of Rs. 4000/- per year and past at Rs. 2000/- per year for nine years, jewels weighing 50 tolas of gold and valued at Rs. 5000/- and for an account of her "Pasupu kumkuma" (pin-money) entrusted to her husband by her father after the marriage and for other incidental reliefs.

It was alleged in the plaint that the defendant induced the plaintiff''s parents in December 1927 to give her in marriage to him on the representation that he had left off his first wife who was unfit for marital life, being sick, that they lived happily for some years and later on he brought back his first wife in breach of this assurance and began to neglect and illtreat the plaintiff and ultimately drove her out of the house in the year 1940 after forcibly removing a gold chain and bangles from her which were presented to her by her parents at the time of her marriage.

The next day after the marriage, her father paid into the hands of the 1st defendant Rs. 8000/-by way of ''Pasupu Kumkum'' (Pin-money) for her with instructions to improve it and hand it over to her whenever so desired by her. The defendant failed to pay her this amount also with interest accruing thereon. The defendant in his written statement denied all these averments and his liability in regard to any of the heads and stated that the plaintiff left his house in his absence as he did not agree to take in adoption her sister''s son whom she was bringing up for some time.

The defence prevailed with the trial court and all the issues were decided against the plaintiff. It preferred to believe the defence witnesses to those of the plaintiff, the oral evidence for the plaintiff being characterised as unsatisfactory and unreliable. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff''s suit and decreed the suit brought by the husband, the present defendant, for restitution of conjugal rights which has given rise to No. 855 of 1953.

(3-10) Aggrieved by these decrees, the wife has filed these appeals. In these appeals, all the conclusions of the Subordinate Judge are challenged. (After discussing the evidence, his Lordship, agreeing with the trial court, held that the story regarding the agreement to abandon the first wife and of ill-treatment and desertion was false, that both the wives lived amicably with the defendant till plaintiff left him for the reasons mentioned by him, that the plaintiff had not laid any foundation for her claim for the jewels and the Pin-money, His Lordship then proceeded:). It follows that the suit was rightly dismissed. In the premises this appeal would have been dismissed but for a supervening event.

Pending the appeals, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 was passed by the Indian Parliament. Under S. 18(2) of that statute a wife is entitled to live separately from her husband and claim maintenance on any of the grounds enumerated therein, such as if the husband has any other wife living.

The appellant invokes this provision for claiming maintenance on the ground that the respondent''s first wife is living. Though the Act was passed subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and this right was not available to the plaintiff at the time of the institution of the suit there can be little doubt that it can be applied to pending proceedings as the court should take into consideration the subsequent legislation which has altered the rights of the parties. Sub-section (1) of S. 18 governs a wife married before the commencement of this Act. Consequently the plaintiff could take advantage of this enactment notwithstanding that her marriage took place in 1927.

Mr. Kuppuswamy contends that sub-section (2), clause (d) could confer a right only on the first wife to claim maintenance and that that section could not be availed of by the 2nd wife. His submission is that the words "if he has any other wife living" in clause (d) should be given restricted meaning. It should be confined to wives other than the last married one as otherwise it will lead to inconvenient results such as every one of the wives living separately would have to be awarded maintenance, while the husband is deprived of the company of each of the wives, he is compelled to maintain all of them.

This result is not in consonance with the accepted notions of Hindu Law and as such this could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature, continues the learned counsel. It is urged that giving ordinary meaning to the language of a statute leads to manifest in justice, and hardship and a construction should be put upon it which avoids such results. Such words should be so construed as to bring them in line with the intendment of the enactment.

To bear out this proposition, Mr. Kuppuswamy relies on a passage in Maxwell''s In terpretation of Statutes (10th edition) at page 229:

Where the language of a statute, in it ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.

This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their c(sic) location or by rejecting them altogether or (sic) interpolating other words, Under the influent no doubt of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intend what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made arc mere corrections of case less language and really give the true meaning.

For the same purpose are cited Rex v. Ettrid 1909 2 KB 24 (A) and Norman v. Norman 195 All ER 1082 (B). The question that posed its in the first of the two cases was whether court of appeal could pass a different sente(sic) when the conviction was based on the accused plea of guilty. Section 4(3) of Criminal App(sic) Act, 1907, enabled a court to quash the sente(sic) passed at the trial and pass such other sente(sic) in law by the verdict.

The point was that if a prisoner was (sic)victed on his plea of guilty and not in consequence of being found guilty by the verdic(sic) the jury whether it would fall within the an of sub-section. Darling J. who spoke for Court repelled the contention that it should confined only to cases of conviction by the diet of the Jury as in his opinion the Parlia(sic) could not have intended that only those could have been found guilty by the Jury sh(sic) be allowed to appeal against the sentence.

The learned Judge thought that to co(sic) the operation of that sub-section to case verdict, by Jury would not give full effect to(sic) intendment of the section, for passing of sentence was not the act of the Jury as sentence is fixed and awarded by the Judge not the act of the Jury. It was in that co(sic) that he said:

We are of opinion that we may in re(sic) this statute reject words, transpose ther(sic) even imply words, if this be necessary to effect to the intention and meaning of the I(sic)lature.

1950 1 All ER 1082 (B) does not the matter very farther. What was laid there was that an application for continu(sic) of payments within the meaning of S. 2((sic) the Married Women''s Maintenance Act, was not confined to cases where the or order had not expired. It would make no (sic)ing if the order to be continued under S(sic) was one which was actually in force and (sic) the statute must be read so as to make and to remedy the mischief or fill the g(sic) the scheme of things in connection wit (sic) aintenance and education of children which already existed, observed Justice Hodson.

These various rules enunciated above (sic)e only aids in construing a statute properly (sic)d come into play when it appeared that the (sic)guage employed does not bring out sufficient (sic) the intentions of the Legislature. If the words are susceptible of two interpretations, (sic)ey should be construed in a sense which is (sic)re in harmony with the intention of the Legislature, though it might be less correct dramatically.

The cardinal principle of interpretation of (sic)tutes is that, when enacted words are plain (sic)d capable of only one meaning effect should given to them irrespective of the consequen(sic) that might flow from it. The court is not (sic)cerned with the Legislative policy, its only (sic)ction being to construe the statute that is (sic)ced before it and not to legislate.

It has to look primarily to the language and the effect to it. If it is felt that a particular (sic)ctment causes hardship or inconvenience the (sic)islature must be approached for redress. AIR 1945 48 (Privy Council) Krishna v. Delhi State, (S) AIR 1956 SC (sic) (D). In this context, a passage from the Rananjaya Singh Vs. Baijnath Singh and Others, is (sic)inent.

The spirit of law may well be an elusive unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can (sic)ainly not be given effect to in opposition to plain language of the sections of the Act and (sic) rules made thereunder. If all that can be (sic) of these statutory provisions is that con(sic)ed according to the ordinary, grammatical (sic) natural meaning of their language they (sic)k injustice by placing the poorer candidates (sic) disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this Court.

(sic)t is our duty to construe the words in the (sic)nary sense when the language is clear and (sic)icit and we cannot seek to limit their scope (sic)he ground that they are not in conformity (sic)the supposed intentions of the Legislature.

The words "any other wife living" in clause of S. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act must be given their ordinary mean. They are words of wide connotation and (sic)de wives except the one claiming relief cannot be limited to any particular wife, (sic)do not contemplate any preference to the (sic) wife. The only condition for any of the (sic)s calling in aid of that section is that there (sic)d be another living wife.

Nor is there any force in the conten(sic) that a literal or grammatical construction (sic)pugnant to the accepted notions of Hindu (sic). The concepts regarding the rights and liabi(sic) of the husband in relation to his wife are (sic)fixed and immutable. These notions are (sic)ging with the change in social conditions.

Society is not static and it keeps abreast of (sic) Indisputably, the Hindu Adoptions and (sic)tenance Act was passed to alter the law in (sic)ct of the rights of wives in a particular field. The Parliament has deliberately made a departure from existing law in that regard with a view to remedy what in its opinion are defects pertaining to that subject.

It is considerations of social conditions that have given rise to this change. It is therefore no use harping upon old notions and theories. Consequently, the submission on this topic is unacceptable and has for be rejected. It follows that the plaintiff could claim relief under the Act as the first wife is shown to be still alive.

It was next contended that the plaintiff having abandoned her husband could not with any justification ask to be maintained by her husband. She had forfeited that right before the Act came into force and the Act could not revive a right that had already been extinguished, argues the counsel for the respondent.

The answer to that is that when a wife quits her husband for no justifiable reasons but not for immoral purposes her right to be maintained is only suspended but not forfeited. It is always open to her to come back and claim to be maintained as her home is in her husband''s house.

So long as she chooses to live apart from her husband without sufficient cause the right to be maintained is kept in abeyance. A separate living without justifiable cause but with no corrupt motives would not operate to extinguish that right of maintenance. Therefore, there is no question of the new enactment reviving the right. It was open to the wife to return to her husband before this enactment was passed though till then her separate maintenance was suspended but without incurring any forfeiture.

This is a circumstance to be taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance. A less liberal rate will be awarded where the wife leaves her husband without due cause. For these reasons, we hold that the plaintiff-is entitled to live separately without forfeiting her right within the meaning of S. 18(2) of the Act. This view of ours gains support from Surampalli v. Surampalli ILR 31 Mad 338 (F), Vasuntharadevi v. Ramakrishna 1947 2 Mad LJ 544 : (AIR 1949 Mad 100) (G) and Dharmarao v. Venkatamahalakshmamma ILR 1947 Mad 387: (AIR 194T Mad 96) (H).

There remains the point whether the plaintiff could claim maintenance from the date she left her husband or from the date the Act came into force. This problem does not present any difficulty if it is remembered that prior to the Act a wife who had left the husband without sufficient excuse could not claim to be maintained separately and such a right is conferred by the new Act. Since that right accrues by virtue of the provisions of that Act, a suit for maintenance could be laid only after it came into force.

Its operation, is only prospective though it brings within its scope marriages that took place prior to the Act. Therefore, the maintenance can be claimed only from the date the Act takes effect and not from the date the wife chooses to live separately from the husband. The Subordinate Judge had not decided the question of quantum of maintenance in the view he took of the right of the plaintiff to get maintenance.

This matter has to be gone into by him. We think the proper course is to allow the appeal and remit it to the trial court for disposal on the quantum of maintenance. The appellant will have to pay the costs of the respondent in A. S. 900/52 as she has failed on the case she had laid before the trial court but partially succeeded here by reason of a supervening event, namely, the passing of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

A. S.855/53 has to be allowed as the appellant can no longer be compelled to live with the husband in view of the provisions of the aforesaid Act which, we have held, applies to the appellant. No order as to costs in this appeal.