M.V. Joga Rao vs State of Madras

Subba Rao, C.J.—This is an appeal against the order of our learned brother Satyanarayana . Raju, dismissing the application filed by the Appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the Government dismissing him from service.

The Appellant was a permanent Tahsildar of Visakhapatnam District. It was brought to the notice of the Government by appropriate departments that a prima facie case of corruption was made out against him. The matter was in due course entrusted to the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings for enquiry. The allegations against the Appellant were that when he was working as Special Tahsildar for Loans, he took illegal gratifications in 9 instances from the applicants for loans of the Village of Narava and its hamlets and in four instances from the applicants of the village of Kanithi.

The tribunal framed charges and held an elaborate enquiry. The enquiry was held along with that of another Government servant one Thakoorjee who was during the crucial period the Special Revenue Inspector for loans in the same place. The tribunal held that Ave acts of conniption had been made out against the Appellant and it recommended to the Government that the Appellant should be dismissed from Service. On the receipt of the report, on 7th January 1953, the Government of Madras issued the following notice to the Appellant. We shall read the entire notice as the main argument was based on its terms. It runs:

Government of Madras.

(Revenue Department. Memorandum No. 53596 G/52-7 dated 7th January 1953.

Sub: Public servants-(Visakhapatnam) Sri M. V. Jogarao - Departmental enquiry No. 3 of 1952.

Ref: From the Chairman, Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Letter No. 2834/52 dated 29-7-1952.

A copy of the report of the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings on the subject mentioned above is communicated to Sri M. V. Jogarao, for merly special Tahsildar for loans, Visakhapatnam. The Government agree with the findings of the Tribunal in respect of the charges as well as its recommendation regarding the punishment and have arrived at a provisional conclusion that the accused officer should be dismissed from service. Sri M. V. Jogarao is accordingly directed to show cause within one month from the date of receipt of this memo why he should not be dismissed from service.

The available records relating to the case have been sent to the office of the Tribunal for T)isciplinary proceedings. Sri M. V. Jogarao is informed that he may peruse the records and take copies of notes thereof if required, at that office. No extension of time beyond the limit specified in para 1 above will, however be granted under any circumstances."

Pursuant to the notice, the Appellant submitted written explanation challenging the validity of the Tribunal''s findings and also on the quantum of punishment proposed to be inflicted. He pointed out in his explanation that the finding of the tribunal was based on no evidence and that the Tribunal "had violated statutory rules. The Government thereafter made a final order on the 26th June 1953 dismissing him from service. In that order, after giving a brief history of the case and the stages of inquiry, the Government stated thus:

The Government have further examined the records of enquiry in the light of the final written representations of the accused officer. They see no reason to revise their provisional conclusion referred to in para 3 above. They accordingly confirm that conclusion in respect of punishment to be imposed on the delinquents and direct that Sri M. V. Jogarao, Sri M. A. Rahim and Sri Thakoorjee be dismissed from service with effect from the dates on which they were "placed under suspension.

The Appellant filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash that order. Satyanarayana Raju J. dismissed it by his order dated 4th February 1955.

Mr. Venkatesam, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, raised before us various contentions which his client had unsuccessfully pressed before the learned Judge. We shall proceed to consider them in seriatim.

The first objection to the order is that the Government did not give to the Appellant the notice prescribed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the order is invalid. Under Article 311, no person who is a member of a civil service of a State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The crucial words of the Article are that a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken should be given to him.

The scope of the notice was the subject of Judicial scrutiny both under the corresponding section 240 of the Government of India Act and also under Article 311 of the Constitution. The earliest decision on the subject is that of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1948 121 (Privy Council) . There the Judicial committee was construing the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 240 of the Government of India Act, which is in parimateria with article .311 of the Constitution, so far as it is relevant to the present enquiry. u/s 240;

no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. One Lall, A District and Sessions Judge belonging to the Indian Civil Service Vas held to be guilty oft nepotism and victimisation and was removed from. service. The learned Chief Justice has summarised the nature of the enquiry held against him in the following terms:

Whatever representations were made it is clear that at no time before his removal from the service was Mr. Lall allowed to see the reports of| either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Brayne, (Officers who made the preliminary enquiry) nor was he informed that either the Punjab Government or the Federal Public Service Commission or the Government of India or the Secretary of State were definitely proposing on the basis of these reports to remove him from the service. He had received a general invitation to show cause against possible dismissal (amongst other possible punishments) included at the end of the charges originally served on him. But no opportunity to show cause against dismissal was given to him, after dismissal had passed from being a possible punishment to the punishment proposed and recommended. At no time was he given an opportunity before dismissal of making representations against the accuracy of facts found by Mr. Anderson or Mr. Brayne in their reports or against the adverse deduction drawn against him, particularly by Mr. Brayne.

On those facts, the Judicial. Committee, after scrutinising the provisions of the Government of India Act and the rules made there under, made the following observation at page 61 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 126 of AIR):

In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the Sub-section, until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. It is on that stage being reached that the statute gives the civil servant the opportunity for which Sub-section (3) makes provision. Their Lordships would only add that they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more than one stage. If the civil servant has been through an enquiry under Rule 55 it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, but that would not exhaust his statutory right and he would still be entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry.

The interpretation of the aforesaid passage was the basis of attack against the Government''s orders taking action against the misfits in the civil service. Rajamannar C. J. and Venkatrama Ayyar J. in C. Sambandam Vs. The General Manager, South Indian Railway, Tiruchirapalli, , after noticing the aforesaid observation in the Lall''s case (A), summarised them at page 542 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 56 of AIR) thus:

In other words in a case governed by section 240 (3) there will be two stages: firstly an enquiry after notice into the charges against the civil servant and this is the rule of natural justice that no person should be condemned without) a hearing and secondly after the enquiry is over and a, punishment decided on a further notice in terms of. Sub-section (3) informing the. civil servant of the action proposed to be taken and giving him an opportunity to show cause against that action and this is a statutory requirement.

The observations were further elucidated by the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay Vs. Gajanan Mahadev Badley, Chagla, C. J. expressed his view of the scope of section 240 (3) at page 920 (or JIM Bom): (at pp. 354-355 of AIR) in the following terms :

It is well settled law that it is not sufficient under this sub-section for the Government merely to inform the servant that it proposes to pass a particular punishment and to ask him to show cause against the punishment. The opportunity which the State has to furnish has to be a reaso�nable opportunity and the courts have held that a reasonable opportunity is only afforded to the servant when he can show cause not only against the punishment but also against the grounds on which the state proposes to punish him. There�fore, it is not sufficient that the state should call upon the servant to show cause against the quan�tum of punishment intended to be inflicted upon him; the State must call upon the servant to show cause against the decision arrived at by'' a departmental inquiry view decision constitutes the ground on which the Government proposes to take action against the servant.

After noticing the judgment of the Judicial Com�mittee in Lull''s case, the learned Chief Justice proceeded to state:

When an inquiry against a dismissed ser�vant is, as it were, in two parts, where a notice to show cause is served upon him by the autho�rity which proposed to dismiss him, the court has got to look at both parts of the inquiry in order to come to the conclusion whether reasonable op�portunity was afforded to the servant to show cause against him. It may not be necessary to du�plicate what has already been clone in the depart�mental inquiry. It may be said that if in fact the dismissed servant has been given a full and proper opportunity to show cause against the alle�gations made against him then it may not be necessary again to require from him practically the same explanation. It may also be said that it may not be necessary in every case to issue a notice in terms calling upon the servant to show cause not only against the quantum of punish�ment but also against the grounds on which the proposed action is based. Even though, as in this case, the notice may be defective, if in fact the servant has been given the opportunity and has availed himself of the opportunity of showing cause against the grounds, then the mere fact that there is an irregularity about the notice may not lead to the Court holding that the Govern�ment servant did not have the opportunity re�quired u/s 240 (3). But we think that there can be no doubt that the Court must be satisfied on a review of all the facts of a particu�lar case that the statutory obligation cast upon the state has been properly discharged by the state and the statutory obligation is to afford reasonable opportunity to the dismissed servant.

As the law on the subject has been, firmly estab�lished, further quotation from decided cases is unnecessary.

Every member of the civil service holds his employment at the pleasure of the State. But the undoubted power of the state to dismiss him Is controlled by the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Except in the cases governed by the proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Article 311, such a servant cannot be dismissed or removed by. an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and that he could be removed only after he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in. regard to him. The action proposed to be taken in regard to a civil servant will be known only after the enquiry is held and after the authority concerned comes to a tentative con�clusion on the merits, for, the punishment would necessarily depend upon the gravity of the offence committed by the civil servant. Therefore, what�ever machinery is provided by the State for the enquiry, whether it be through one of its execu�tive officers or through a Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, the entire enquiry from the beginn�ing till the punishment is imposed on the officer is one process. It is an inquiry held by the autho�rity empowered to remove the servant. Though the enquiry may have to be held in two stages, one up to the time the authority comes to a con�clusion on the question of the offence committed by the. civil servant and the other from the stage notice is .given to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, the entire t process of his enquiry will have to be scrutinised'' by ascertaining whether reasonable opportunity is given to the servant to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The opportunity to show cause is quattnea "toy the word "reasonable." It is for the Court on the facts of each case to scrutinise the entire record to come to a conclusion whether such a reason�able opportunity was given to the Civil Servant. If, as a matter of fact, every opportunity was given to the civil servant to defend himself by examining witnesses and by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, it would be unreasonable to compel the authority to repeat the entire en�quiry after the second stage is reached. It is true that reasonable opportunity to show cause'' against the action proposed to be taken includes an opportunity to canvass the correctness of the reasons for taking the proposed action. The au�thority should necessarily in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause should give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that con�clusion. A civil servant can show cause by plead�ing that the Tribunal''s report is vitiated by gross irregularities committed by it or by violating the principles of natural justice and as preventing him from examining his witnesses or cross-exa�mining the witness who spoke against him or similar others. - If the finding of the Tribunal is the basis for the proposed punishment, he can also attack the correctness of the finding by show�ing that the finding was not based, on the evidence or is not supported by evidence. But it would be unreasonable to compel the authority to ; have trials as it were, one up to the stage of the notice contemplated by Article 311 and the-repetition of it again after notice, though in a particular case, if the enquiry is vitiated by any of the reasons mentioned above, a further inquiry may reasonably be asked by the civil servant. To-put it shortly, the entire proceedings of the in�quiry must be looked into carefully to ascertain whether reasonable opportunity within the mean�ing of Article 311 is afforded to a civil servant or not

If that be the law, can it be said that in the instant case reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to the appellant was not given to him. Learned Counsel argues that under Article 311 of the Constitution as interpreted by the decisions, an opportunity should be given not only to show cause against the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also against the reasons for the proposed punishment, and the Government by their notice dated 7th January, 1953 did not give him any opportunity to show cause against the reasons for the proposed punishment. It is said that in the notice the Government indicated that they agreed with the findings of the Tribunal in respect of the charges as well as the recommendation regarding the punishment, and therefore, the agreement was final and could not be reopened after his representations. We cannot read the notice in the manner indicated by the learned Counsel.

The Government necessarily would have to come to a conclusion on the charges framed against the Appellant before they could decide on the punishment to be imposed on him. Indeed, this was exactly what was indicated by the Privy Council in I...a-11''y case when they stated that no action was proposed within the meaning of the Sub-section until a definite conclusion had been come to on the charges and the actual punishment to follow was provisionally determined on. The notice was exactly in the terms of the observation of the Privy Council in the aforesaid case. The fact that the Government agreed with the findings could only be tentative, for, after the Appellant showed cause end if the Government were satisfied with the explanation, they could certainly differ from the Tribunal''s finding. The notice therefore gave not only the proposed punishment but also the reasons for the proposed punishment viz., the acceptance ol the findings of the Tribunal. These notices would be necessary only for questioning the findings. Indeed, the Appellant understood the notice in the sense indicated by us and submitted a written explanation challenging the validity of the Tribunal''s finding and also on the quantum of punishment proposed to be inflicted by the Government. The Government, thereafter by their order dated 26-6-53 considered the representations made by him and saw no reason to revise their provisional conclusion communicated to him, earlier. We therefore hold that the notice issued is in accordance with the terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.

It is then contended that the enquiry was vitiated by the joint trial of the Appellant along with others. This argument is based upon the assumption that the prescribed procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the principle laid down therein should govern the inquiry. The Tribunal conducting disciplinary proceedings is not a court. It is only an agency appointed by the Government as part of a machinery to provide a reasonable opportunity for a Civil Servant to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. A District judge is ordinarily appointed as that fact in itself would in still confidence in any civil servant against whom action is taken. That in itself cannot attract all the technical rules governing criminal trials. What is important is that the rules governing departmental enquiry should accord with the principles of natural justice affording a reasonable opportunity to a civil servant to put forward his case. The Appellant did not take any objection before the Tribunal that the joint trial prejudiced him. Nor after going through the record we can hold that the joint trial in this particular se had in any way prejudiced the Appellant. We cannot therefore accede to this contention.

It is then said that Rule 5 of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948 which govern the present case has been infringed. Rule 5 (f) reads:

An officer deputed by the Special Branch. of the C.I.D. shall, for the purpose of the enquiries before the Tribunal, -act as the Director of Prosecution.

The argument is obviously based upon the amended rule which runs:

There shall be a Director of Prosecution to conduct enquiries on behalf of the Government in disciplinary cases before the Tribunal and the accused officer concerned shall be allowed to be represented by counsel.

It is conceded that the present case is governed by the earlier rule extracted above. Under that rule, there is no necessity for appointing a director of prosecution to conduct enquiries on behalf of Government. Under that rule, any officer deputed by the Special Branch of the C.I.D. shall, for the purpose of the enquiries before the Tribunal, act as the Director of Prosecution. There is nothing on the record to suggest nor any objection was taken in an earlier stage to the effect that the officer who conducted the enquiry was not deputed by the Special Branch of the C.I.D. If he was deputed, it must be assumed that he acted as the Director of Prosecutions. But it is said that the officer who conducted the enquiry was the investigating officer himself. But no rule was brought to our notice that the investigating officer would not make the enquiry, Again, an attempt is made to import the riles governing trials in criminal courts in support of the argument that an investigating officer cannot be,a prosecuting one. In the absence of any such rule, we cannot hold that the enquiry is bad by, the fact alone unless it is established that it has prejudiced the Appellant. The record does not disclose that either the Appellant thought that the procedure prejudiced him or that as a matter of fact it prejudiced him. We reject this objection also.

It is then said that the Government consulted the Board of Revenue before taking final action against the Appellant which they are not entitled to do under the rules. There is no rule prohibiting the government from consulting the Head of a Department before taking final action, The consultation was not only not to the prejudice of the Appellant but it was to his benefit, for, it might as well have been that the Revenue Board took a different view from that of the Tribunal and accordingly advised the Government. The fact that in the particular case, they agreed with the tribunal cannot be a ground for setting aside the order of the Government. That was only an extra-precautionary measure taken by the Government before taking final action against the Appellant. No rule has been infringed on that account.

Learned Counsel then contends that the statements before the officers of the Criminal Intelligence Department were used as substantive evidence and that contravenes Rule 8(a) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948. The material portion of Rule 8 (a) reads:

Copies of statements taken by the special Branch of the C.I.D. in the course of the investigation shall not be communicated to the Government servant but they shall be furnished to him at the commencement of the enquiry in order to enable him, if necessary to cross-examine the witnesses

It is clear from the aforesaid rule that the statements before the O.I.D. officers can only be used-

for cross-examining the witnesses. It cannot be 1 relied upon as substantive evidence. This contention was raised before the Tribunal and the Tribunal pointed out that the previous statements of witnesses, whether recorded by the police or others, were filed not as substantive evidence but only for the advantage of the accused officer for giving him an opportunity for contradicting the witnesses if they had made any statement different from that they said before the Tribunal. He further added that they would never be used as substantive evidence. When the Tribunal explained the purpose for which they were filed and expressly stated that they would not b used as substantive evidence, it is not possible to hold unless the judgment discloses to the contrary that the Tribunal used it as substantive evidence. A perusal of the judgment shows that the said statements were not used as substantive evidence There is therefore, no merits in this contention.

The next contention is that while the rule enables the personal examination of the officer, the Tribunal rejected his evidence on the ground that he was the officer concerned. The fact that a person has a right to give evidence does not carry with it the obligation on the part of the Tribunal to accept his evidence. The tribunal can certainly reject the evidence of the civil servant concerned on the ground of his interestedness just like he can do in respect of any other witness. In the present case, having regard to the other evidence, he rejected the Appellant''s evidence on the ground, of interestedness. We do not see any defect in that part of the order.

Learned Counsel then argued that Rules 3 (b) and 9 of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948 are void inasmuch as they contravene the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Rules 8 (1)) and 9 are in the following terms:

8 (b). After the enquiry has been completed the tribunal shall send its findings and recommendations to the Government. After the Government have arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall be supplied with a copy of the report of the Tribunal and be called upon to show cause within a reasonable time, not ordinarily exceeding one month, against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted. Any representation in this behalf submitted by the person charged shall be duly taken into consideration by the Government before final orders are passed.

(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the Government shall be the authority competent to impose a penalty in cases enquired into by the Tribunal. The advice of the Tribunal will ordinarily be accepted. If the advice is to be rejected or deviated from, the reasons for such rejection or deviation shall be communicated to the. Tribunal and the remarks of the Tribunal in regard thereto shall be taken into consideration before passing orders."

The argument is that, while under Article 311 of the Constitution not only a reasonable opportunity should be given to the civil servant to canvass the correctness of the penalty proposed to be imposed on him but also the reasons for imposing the said penalty, Rules 8 (b) and 9 do not give any opportunity to question the correctness of the reasons but only enables the civil servant to show cause against the penalty to be imposed. It is, further argued that Rule 9 makes it obligatory on the Government to accept the finding of the Tribunal indicating thereby that the civil servant has no right to question the correctness of the findings on the basis of which the penalty is sought to be imposed. We do not read the said rules in the manner suggested by the learned Counsel. When notice to- show cause against a particular penalty proposed to be inflicted is given to the accused, he can represent against the imposition of the penalty. The representation may be against the severity of the penalty proposed to be imposed or even against the imposition on the ground that the finding of the Tribunal is vitiated by one reason or other. The rule which states that the advice of the Tribunal will ordinarily be accepted by the Government indicates on the contrary that the Government is not bound to accept it.

That it would ordinarily accept the advice of the Tribunal is a safeguard in favour of the civil servant against arbitrary interference, for, the Tribunal is presided over by an experienced District Judge who, by training and experience, is accustomed to look at cases objectively and decide them judicially. The Government, in extraordinary cases where it is proved that the Tribunal''s finding is vitiated by one reason or other, can always interfere to do justice. We do not think that, though Rules. 8 (b) and 9 could have been worded more happily if they are literally construed as they should be, they contravene the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. We therefore reject this contention also.

As no rule has been infringed, it is not necessary to consider the argument that the rules being statutory rules are as much binding upon the Government as on the citizen and if the Government violated these rules, it is the duty of the High Court to quash the order of the Government. It is true some cases have held that even if the rules have been violated, the civil servant has no right to question the order dismissing him unless by the violation of such rules, no reasonable opportunity is given to him within the meaning of Article 311''of the Constitution of India. See Dr. M. Krishnamoorthy Vs. The State of Madras and Another, . The Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules and the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules are statutory rules, and they are as much binding upon the Government as upon a citizen. It can be reasonably argued that if the Government make an inquiry ignoring the said rules, the High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution, direct them to make, an enquiry according to the rules, though in cases where the High Court is satisfied that no prejudice is caused to the civil servant, it may in exercise of its discretion refuse to issue any direction. But, as we have held that no rules have been infringed, we do not propose to express our opinion on that question in this matter.

The last argument of the learned Counsel is that Rule 5 (b) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948 is void as it offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is said that under that rule the Government shall examine such records, and after consulting the Head of the Department, if necessary decide whether the case shall be tried in a Court of Law or by the Tribunal, and therefore, an arbitrary power is conferred upon the Government to prosecute one civil servant in a criminal court and take disciplinary proceedings against another under similar circumstances, which -would offend the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law, or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It enjoins that every citizen has a .right to equal treatment in similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed by the laws. But the provision does not exclude reasonable classification. Courts of highest authority in America as well as in India have ruled that a classification is reasonable if it lasts on differences pertinent to the subject in respect of which classification is made. The question, therefore is whether, in the present case, the power conferred on the Government to prosecute one civil servant in a criminal court and to take disciplinary proceedings against the other is based upon differences pertinent to the subject in respect of which the classification is made." What is the object of the rule? The object of the rule is to keep unsullied the ranks of the administrative personnel. There would be differences in the nature of the act committed and the material to prove the Act. A particular act may be so grave and reprehensible that it calls for a criminal prosecution. Another act may be trivial enough to be disposed of by departmental enquiry. A particular act, though grave in its nature, there may not be sufficient evidence to establish it in a court of law, whereas the material may be sufficient to take departmental action. It cannot be stated that an enquiry in a Criminal Court and disciplinary proceedings can be equated, for, in one the offence should be brought home to the accused, but in the other grave and suspicious circumstances may end in a removal of the servant. The character of the evidence and the nature of the act committed affords a reasonable basis for classification. There is a nexus between the classification and the object in respect of which the classification is made. But, as we have already pointed out, the object of the classification was to take action against the misfits in the administrative set up, and the classification, having regard to the aforesaid differences, is necessary and reasonable to achieve that object.

Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. Vs. A.V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another, , In support of the contention that the rule in question offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The facts in that case were: The Central Government referred certain cases to the Income Tax Investigation Commission under the Provisions of Section 5 (4) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act XXX of 1947 The Petitioner took the objection by filing an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court that the provisions of Sections 5(1), 5(4), 6, 7 and 8 of the Act XXX of 1947 had become void, being discriminatory in character after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, Section 5 (4) provided that where the commission has reason to believe that some person other than the person whose case is being investigated has evaded payment of taxation on income, it may make a report to the Central Government. The said Sub-section dealt with the same class of persons who fell within the ambit of Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act and are dealt with in Sub-section (I) of the section and whose income can be caught by proceedings under that section. Section 5 (4) of Act XXX of 1947 and Section 34 of the Income Tax Act dealt with the same class of persons. But toy reason of the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 some of the persons belonging to that class could be dealt with under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 at the choice of the Commission though they could also be proceeded with under the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the classification offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the said section was void. In dealing with the point, their Lordships observed:

Classification means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. There is nothing uncommon either in properties or in characteristics between persons who are discovered as evaders of Income Tax during an investigation conducted u/s 5(1) and those who are discovered by the Income Tax Officer to have evaded payment of Income Tax. Both these kinds of persons have common properties and have common characteristics and therefore require equal treatment. We thus hold that both Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act and Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the impugned Act dealt with all persons who have similar characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics being that they are persons who have not truly disclosed their income and have evaded payment of taxation on income.

On that ground, the provision was struck down as unconstitutional. In that case, the object of Section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was to catch the evaders in the net of taxation. There were no differences between the evaders which justified different kinds of enquiry as they were under similar circumstances. The same rule must govern all citizens in similar circumstances. That case, therefore, has no bearing on the present case, where, as we have pointed out, the classification was based upon differences germane to the object to be achieved.

In Budhan Choudhry and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, , the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was challenged on the ground that it was repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. Under that section, the State Government was authorised to invest certain magistrates with power to try all offences not punishable with death and this authority the State could exercise only In the specified places. If the State invested, any magistrate with powers u/s 30, any body who committed an offence not punishable with death and triable by Court of Session u/s 28 read with second Schedule is also liable to be tried by the magistrate u/s 30. This discrimination, it was contended, offended Article 14 of the Constitution. Das J. (as he then was) stated that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely.

(i) That the classification must be found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and

(ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be found on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to the objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.

Having regard to the aforesaid principles, the Supreme Court held that there was no discrimination in the section itself. They further held that in working out the section, the Sub Magistrate did not make at any stage any intentional or purposeful discrimination against the Appellants. This case relates the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution.

As we have already stated, the principle laid down, namely, that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the classification under consideration, is fully satisfied in the instant ease. The object is to cleanse the administrative machinery and the classification is based on differences existing between persons on the basis of the evidence and the purpose of the action. The classification is, therefore, based on differences germane to the object to be achieved. It is not necessary to multiply cases as they are only ''illustrative of the implication of the well settled principle. We therefore hold that the validity of the rule can be sustained on the principle of reasonable classification.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee is Rs. 150/-