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Judgment
S. Rajeswaran, J.—Application No. 2988/2006 has been filed by the defendants to revoke the leave granted in Application No. 2751/2006, dated 9.8.2006.
Original application No. 639/2006 has been filed by the plaintiffs for an order of ad interim injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents, representatives or any one claiming under them from alienating the properties described under Schedules A, B and C annexed to the Judge''s summons in the application, pending disposal of the suit.
For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings in the suit.
The plaintiffs filed the above suit for the following reliefs:
a) Directing defendants 1 to 10 to render accounts as regards the monies of the first plaintiff-company and the properties described under Schedules A and B to the plaint;
b) directing defendants 1 to 10 to pay to the 1st plaintiff-company such monies as may be rendered payable, on rendition of accounts;
c) directing the 1st defendant to pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 2.52 crores towards damages together with interest on the sum of Rs. 1.71 crores from the date of filing of the plaint till the date of realization;
d) declaring that the 1st plaintiff-company is the owner of the properties described under Schedules A to D of the plaint;
e) declaring that the sale deeds as regards the properties described under Schedules C to the plaint in favour of defendants 3, 5 to 10 are null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs;
f) declaring that the sale deeds as regards the properties described under Schedule D to the plaint in favour of defendants 1 to 4 are sham and nominal and not binding on the plaintiffs;
g) granting a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents, representatives or any one claiming under them from alienating the properties described under Schedules A, B, C and D to the plaint;
h) directing defendants 1 to 10 to deliver possession of the properties described under Schedules C and D of the plaint, to the 1st plaintiff-company.
The case of the plaintiffs is that the 1st defendant, who is also a director of the 1st plaintiff company along with defendants 2 and 3, by misappropriating the funds of the company and by misusing his position purchased lands in Sirucheri village, Chengalpattu taluk, Kancheepuram District in his name and also in the name of the other defendants, who are his kith and kin. All the lands are the properties of the company and the alleged sale deeds are sham and nominal. Thus the 1st defendant cheated and committed fraud on the plaintiffs. Hence the above suit.
The plaintiffs have also filed O.A. No. 639/2006 for an order of interim injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the properties described under Schedules A, B and C annexed to the Judge''s summons.
This Court by order dated 10.8.2006 granted an order of injunction initially for a period of 3 weeks and the same has been extended thereafter.
The defendants entered appearance through their counsel and filed an application No. 2988/2006 to revoke the leave granted to the plaintiffs by this Court on 9.8.2006 in application No. 2751/2006.
Heard Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs and Mr. K.V. Venkatapathy, learned Senior Counsel for the defendants. I have also perused the documents filed and the judgments referred to by them in support of their submissions.
Learned Senior Counsel for the defendants submitted that the properties are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court and prayers (d)(e)(f)(g) and (h) prayed in the plaint relate to adjudication of title and possession and therefore the suit is a suit for land and in such circumstances, this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and the leave already granted is to be revoked.
Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the registered office of the 1st plaintiff-company is situated at Egmore, Chennai and all the defendants are residing in Chennai. The major part of the cause of action has also arisen in Chennai and in such circumstances, it is submitted by the learned Senior counsel that this Court has got jurisdiction to try the above suit.
I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations.
Clause 12 of the Letters Patent for High Court, Madras deals with the original jurisdiction as to suits. Clause 12 is extracted as under:
Original jurisdiction as to suits: And we do further ordain that the said High Court, of Judicature at Madras in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases, if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the court shall have been first obtained, in part, with in the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court; or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain, within such limits; except the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause at Madras, in which the debt or damage, or value of property the sued for does not exceed hundred rupees.
A reading of the above clause will make it very clear that this Court has got jurisdiction to try any suit if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) In the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court.
(2) In the case of other suits, the cause of action shall have arisen either wholly or in part within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court.
(3) If the entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, there is no need to obtain leave of this Court to institute the suit.
(4) If the cause of action has arisen in part within the jurisdiction of this Court, the suit can be instituted after getting prior leave from this Court.
(5) Suit can also be filed before this Court if the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of this Court.
Therefore a classification has been made by the Letters patent by classifying the suits into (1) suits for land and (2) other suits which are not suits for land. In the case of suits for land, the property should be situated within the local limits of this Court. In the case of other suits, the cause of action shall have arisen wholly or in part (in that case prior leave is to be obtained from the court) or the defendants should be carrying on business or dwelling within the local limits of the court''s jurisdiction.
Insofar as the present case is concerned, all the defendants are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court and the plaint averments establish that a part of the cause of action has also arisen within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. Prior leave was also obtained by the plaintiffs before instituting the suit. In such circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction to try the above suit if it is not a suit for land. On the other hand, if it is a suit for land, this Court cannot entertain the same as admittedly the suit properties are situated in Siruchery village, Chengalpet Taluk, Kancheepuram District, which is outside the local limits of this Court.
Now the only question that arises for consideration is whether the suit is a suit for land or not?
Before deciding the issue, let me consider the judgments relied on by both the parties to cull out the legal principles settled in those decisions:
In Krishena Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India and others, , the Hon''ble Supreme court held that the doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "proportions wider than the case itself required".
In ICICI Bank Ltd. and Another Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that normally the ratio of the case shall be deduced from the facts involved in the case and the particular provision of law which the court has interpreted and the decision shall be read with reference to and in the context of particular statutory provisions involved in the matter.
In 97 L.W. 486 (Bank of Madurai Ltd. v. Balaramadass and Bros.), a Division Bench of this Court was referred with a point of jurisdiction as to whether a suit instituted on the original side of High court on an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds created at Chennai and in which all the defendants reside in Chennai, but the property is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is a suit for sale of immovable property, the Division Bench without deciding the issue as to whether a suit on mortgage is a suit for land, held that the Original Side of the High Court has jurisdiction when the defendant resides within the local limits, wherever the property may be situated.
In Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Durga Iron Works and Others, , another Division Bench of this Court held that suit for recovery of money by enforcement of mortgage does not involve determination of title to land or decree for possession of land and such suit is not a suit for land.
In 2000(3) L.W. 755 (Hari Krishnan, D. v. M.G.R. Memorial Charitable Trust), a Division Bench of this Court held that a suit for recovery of property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the original Side of this Court is not maintainable as such suit is a suit for land. The Division Bench has also held that the contentions made by the plaintiff that the High court has jurisdiction whatever be the nature of the suit, in case the defendants reside within its territorial jurisdiction is not correct.
In 2005 5 CTC 483 (Thamiraparani Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Meta Films Pvt. Ltd.) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a suit for bare injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the property and disturbing the possession of the plaintiff is a suit for land as it involves determination of prima facie case as to possession. The learned Judge further observed that the judgment of the Division Bench reported in 97 L.W. 485 (cited supra) relied on by the plaintiff cannot be made applicable in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in 2001(4) CTC 39 (cited supra).
The above said decision of the learned Single Judge was challenged in appeal and the First Bench of this Court affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge in 2006(1) CTC 270 (Thamiraparani Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Meta Films Pvt. Ltd.)
From the above decisions, the following principles have been laid down (i.e.)-
(1) a suit for land can be tried by this Court only if the property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court;
(2) In a suit, if the relief relates to adjudication of title to land or immovable property or delivery of possession, it is a suit for land;
(3) A suit for recovery of possession or for delivery of suit property is a suit for land;
(4) Even if the suit is for a bare injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the suit property, it is still a suit for land;
(5) A suit for recovery of money by enforcement of equitable mortgage of immovable property situated outside the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court is not a suit for land; and
(6) The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in 97 L.W. 485 (cited supra) cannot be made applicable in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court in 2001 4 CTC 39 (cited supra).
In the light of the above legal principles and discussions, let me now consider the facts of the case on hand.
A number of reliefs were prayed for in the plaint and out of which, the relief in para 22(d) is to declare that the first plaintiff is the owner of the properties, the reliefs in para 22(e) and (f) are to declare the sale deeds as regards the properties in favour of defendants 3, 5 to 10 and 1 to 4 are sham and nominal and not binding on the plaintiffs and the relief in para 22(h) is for directing defendants 1 to 10 to deliver vacant possession of the properties.
The above said reliefs are definitely relating to title and delivery of possession and the court has to adjudicate the title of the properties and to determine the question of delivery of possession. Therefore the suit is a suit for land. Admittedly, the suit properties are situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court. Hence this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
In the result, the leave granted by this Court in A.No. 2751/2006 on 9.8.2006 is hereby revoked and Application No. 2988/2006 is allowed. Time for presentation of the plaint in the proper court is four weeks. No costs.
In view of the order passed in Application No. 2988/2006, O.A. No. 639/2006 is dismissed. No costs.