N. Manimegalai vs The District Educational Officer, The District Elementary Educational Officer, The Secretary, Kamarajar Middle School and P. Sundara Pandian, The Secretary, Kamarajar Middle School

R.S. Ramanathan, J.—Heard both sides.

As the parties are same in all the writ petitions and the issues are connected, with the consent of the both parties, all the writ petitions were

heard together and a common order is passed.

The Petitioner, in all the writ petitions, was working as Headmistress in the Kamarajar Middle School, which is the 3rd Respondent School and

the 4th Respondent was the Secretary of the School, who was impleaded in his personal capacity.

The case of the Petitioner is that she was appointed as Headmistress with effect from 22.04.1990 and on the pretext of some misconduct

alleged against the Petitioner, a charge memo was issued, dated 18.03.2010, by the Secretary of the 3rd Respondent School, containing 11

charges and according to the Petitioner, the charge memo was issued against the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools

(Regulation) Act and hence, it is liable to be quashed and for that purpose, the Petitioner filed W.P.(MD) No. 4575 of 2010.

By order, dated 05.04.2010, the Petitioner was demoted from the post of Headmistress to Secondary Grade Teacher, by the Secretary of the

School and in that order, it has been stated that the decision was taken by the School Committee and also on the basis of the general body of the

Hindu Nadar Uravinar Murai Paribalana Sangam. This order is challenged in W.P.(MD) No. 4520 of 2010.

The Petitioner was also placed under suspension, by order, dated 30.04.2010, on the basis of the resolution of the School Committee held on

29.04.2010 and this order is challenged in W.P.(MD) No. 6594 of 2010.

The Petitioner was again placed under suspension, by order dated 29.05.2010 based on the resolution, dated 28.05.2010 of the School

Committee, which is challenged in W.P.(MD) No. 7230 of 2010 and by Order, dated 29.05.2010, a show cause notice was issued to the

Petitioner on the basis of the meeting held on 28.05.2010 and that was challenged in W.P.(MD) No. 7240 of 2010.

Mr. D. Sadiq Raja, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submitted that the Secretary of the 3rd Respondent School acted in a mala

fide and vindictive manner, without following the procedures contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act,

herein after called as Act, passed all these orders and the orders are liable to be quashed.

According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, u/s 18(1)(c) of the Act, the School Committee shall have the following function

viz., to take disciplinary action against teachers and other employees of the private school and as per Section 16 of the Act, every School

Committee shall have a Secretary who shall exercise such powers and perform such functions as may be prescribed. According to him, the power

to take disciplinary proceedings such as issuance of charge memo and placing an employee under suspension can be done only by the School

Committee and the Secretary of the School has no power to do all these acts and without getting permission from the School Committee, all these

orders were passed by the Secretary and the Secretary has directed the Petitioner to submit her reply to him, which is contrary to provisions of the

Act and the reply shall be addressed only to the School Committee and in this case, it has been stated in the charge memo, dated 18.03.2010,

which is the subject matter of W.P.(MD) No. 4575 of 2010 that the Petitioner was directed to send reply to the Secretary and hence, the

proceedings are liable to be quashed.

He further submitted that the Petitioner was demoted to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher, by order, dated 05.04.2010 and as per

Section 22 of the Act, no such order can be passed without getting prior permission from the competent authority and in this case, without getting

prior permission from the competent authority or approval from the competent authority, the Petitioner was demoted to lower rank and therefore,

the order which is subject matter of the W.P.(MD) No. 4520 of 2010 is liable to be set aside.

He further submitted that the Secretary of the School acted in a mala fide and vindictive manner and the proceedings taken by him, from

March 2010 would amply prove mala fide intention of the 4th Respondent and therefore, all these orders are liable to be quashed and in support

of his contention, he relied upon the reported in S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, , in the case of S. Partap Singh v. State of Panjab and

State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, , in the case of State of Bihar and Anr. etc. v. Shri P.P. Sharma and Anr. He also

relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in K.M. Valliapan Vs. Joint Director of School Education, (Higher Education) and

Appellate Authority and Madras Seva Sadhan Higher Secondary School, and Appellate Authority, College Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-6

and Anr., in support of his contention that action can be taken only by the School Committee either to issue charge memo or to suspend the

employee and in this case, it was done by the Secretary of the School and therefore, the orders are not legal and are liable to be set aside.

Mr. M.E. Elango, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents 3 and 4, submitted that only after convening the meeting of the School

Committee, the School Committee decided to take disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner and approved 11 charges in the meeting held on

12.03.2010 and therefore, by following the procedures only, charge memo was issued on 18.03.2010. He further submitted that the School

Committee consists of six representatives of the educational agency, Head Master, three senior most teachers, one nominee of Parent-Teacher

Association and one senior most non-teaching staff, if available and all these persons can not issue a charge memo and in a duly convened meeting

of the School Committee, the School Committee approved the decision of taking disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner and also approved

the 11 charges and that was communicated by the Secretary and hence, it cannot be contended that the charge memo issued against the Petitioner

by the Secretary, which is subject matter of the W.P.(MD) No. 4575 of 2010 is illegal.

He further submitted that the two suspension orders, dated 30.04.2010 and 29.05.2010 were also issued as per the decision of the School

Committee, which was convened on 29.04.2010 and 28.05.2010 and therefore, the two suspension orders, which are the subject matter of W.P.

(MD) Nos. 6594 and 7230 of 2010 are also valid. He further submitted that on the basis of the School Committee meeting held on 28.05.2010,

decision was taken to issue a show cause notice against the Petitioner and the show cause notice was issued on 29.05.2010, which is the subject

matter of the W.P.(MD) No. 7240 of 2010 and it is also valid and in accordance with law.

The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents 3 and 4 frankly conceded that while demoting the Petitioner, by order, dated 05.04.2010,

no prior approval from the educational authorities were obtained and hence, it is against Section 22 of the Act and therefore, the order is liable to

be set aside and W.P.(MD) No. 4520 of 2010 can be allowed.

I have given my anxious consideration to the submission made by the counsels.

According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. D. Sadiq Raja, as per the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in

K.M. Valliapan Vs. Joint Director of School Education, (Higher Education) and Appellate Authority and Madras Seva Sadhan Higher Secondary

School, and Appellate Authority, College Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai and Anr., essential functions as to the decision to initiate any

disciplinary proceedings, to frame charge, to consider finally the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent and to impose appropriate punishment are

matters, which are coming within the specific jurisdiction of the School Committee and such essential functions obviously cannot be delegated.

He further submitted that as per the Form VII-A, Clause 6, a teacher and the School Committee shall conform to all the provisions of Act and

Rules framed thereunder and as per Rule 13(4) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, the Secretary shall act on the

basis of the resolution passed at the meetings of the School Committee and the reply to the show cause notice can be directed only to the School

Committee and in this case, in the charge memo, dated 18.03.2010, the Petitioner was directed to submit reply to the Secretary of the School,

which is illegal and as per Section 18(1)(c) of the Act, the School Committee shall have the power to take disciplinary action and without passing

any resolution, these orders were passed by the Secretary and hence, they are liable to be set aside.

He further submitted that the President of the School Committee, by name Murugesan, also sent a letter that the meeting held on 29.04.2010

was not approved by him and he was not informed about the said meeting and one another member, Jayachandran also issued letter to that effect

and he was not informed about the meeting held on 29.04.2010.

Mr. D. Sadiq Raja, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, therefore, submitted that the meeting alleged to have been held on

29.04.2010 to suspend the Petitioner, by order, dated 30.04.2010, is illegal and it is liable to be set aside.

It is seen from Rule 13 and 14 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules and as per Rule 13(4), the Secretary of the

School Committee shall act on the basis of the resolution passed at the meeting of the School Committee. As per Rule 14, the meeting of the

School Committee shall be convened by the Secretary of the School Committee with the approval of the President of the School Committee. In

this case, though it has been stated by the 3rd Respondent that a meeting was held on 29.04.2010 and in that meeting, it was decided to suspend

the Petitioner and as per the resolution passed in that meeting, suspension order was issued and the Petitioner was also directed to send reply and

hence, the order of suspension, dated 30.04.2010, which is the subject matter of the W.P.(MD) No. 6594 of 2010 is valid.

As stated supra, as per Rule 14(1) of the Rule, meeting can be convened by the Secretary of the School Committee with the approval of the

President of the School Committee and in this case, as seen from the typed set of papers filed by the Petitioner, the President of the 3rd

Respondent School sent a letter, dated 04.05.2010 that he was not informed about the meeting held on 29.04.2010 and he has not consented for

the said meeting. Therefore, the meeting of the School Committee held on 29.04.2010 was not with the approval of the President of the School

Committee and hence, it is in violation of Rule 14 and therefore, the resolution passed in the said meeting has no legal sanctity and therefore, the

order, dated 30.04.2010 suspending the Petitioner cannot stand and is liable to be set aside and it is hereby set aside.

In respect of suspension order, dated 29.05.2010 and show cause notice, dated 29.05.2010, which are the subject matter of W.P.(MD) Nos.

7230 of 7240 of 2010, those orders were passed on the meeting held on 28.05.2010 and there is no complaint by the President of the School

Committee that he was not informed nor he refused to give approval for the said meeting. It is also proved by the Respondents 3 and 4 that the

meeting was held on 28.05.2010 and the members participated in the said meeting and resolution was passed to take disciplinary proceedings

against the Petitioner and to suspend the Petitioner and that was communicated by the Secretary to the Petitioner. Therefore, according to me, the

orders passed on 29.05.2010 viz., suspension and show cause notice are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules and hence, they

are not liable to be set aside.

I am not able to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the charge memo, dated 29.03.2010 is illegal as

it is stated in the show cause notice that the Petitioner should address the reply to the Secretary and only the School Committee is the competent

authority and the Petitioner must be directed to submit her reply only to the School Committee and not to the Secretary and the issuance of charge

memo and the suspension order should have been issued only by the School Committee and hence, it is violation of Article, Act and Rules.

As stated supra, as per Rule 13(4), the Secretary shall act on behalf of the School Committee and when there are materials to show that the

School Committee was convened and in the said meeting, the Committee took a decision to suspend or issue charge memo, the decision can be

conveyed only by the Secretary and there is no illegal in that. Further, it is seen from the resolution, dated 12.03.2010, the School Committee has

approved 11 charges, which are the subject matter of the charge memo, dated 18.03.2010 and the School Committee also came to the prima

facie conclusion that the complaints made against the Petitioner were proved and therefore, the communication of the resolution of the School

Committee by the Secretary is perfectly legal and it is not against the provisions of the Act.

Further, in the Full Bench judgment referred to above, it has been held in para 19 as follows: ""From the provisions contained in the Act along

with the contents of Form VII-A, it is evident that the decision as to whether a disciplinary proceeding should be initiated or not, whether an

employee should be placed under suspension or not, whether charges should be framed or not has to be taken by the School Committee. These

powers are essential powers of the School Committee and the provisions contained in the Act do not envisage that such essential powers can be

delegated.

Therefore, from the above passage, such powers can not be delegated and in this case, there was no delegation of such power and the decision

was taken by the School Committee in the meeting and the Secretary only communicated the decision taken by the School Committee and the

Secretary is the spokes-man of the School Committee and therefore, there is nothing wrong in the suspension order issued by the Secretary as per

the resolution of the School Committee. The argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the suspension order suffer from

mala fide cannot be accepted.

In the judgment reported in S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, and State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, ,

the party was able to prove the mala fide by producing sufficient materials on record and on that ground, the Honourable Supreme Court held that

the order is vitiated on the ground of mala fide and in this case, the Petitioner is not able to prove mala fide except by making allegations that the

action taken by the Secretary is mala fide. I have already held that in respect of suspension order, dated 30.04.2010, which is the subject matter of

W.P.(MD) No. 6594 of 2010, the same is liable to be set aside as it was passed in the meeting convened by the School Committee without the

approval of the President. In so far as the demoting order, dated 05.04.2010 is concerned, subject matter of W.P.(MD) No. 4520 of 2010, it

was made without getting prior approval from the competent authorities and passed against the provision of 22 of the Act and the learned Counsel

appearing for the Respondents 3 and 4 also frankly conceded that the order cannot be sustained. In respect of subject matter of other three writ

petitions, I have held that the School Committee was properly constituted as stated in those orders and no complaint was made by the members of

the School Committee that the said meeting was not held or they were not informed about the such meeting. When the President of the School

Committee informed the Petitioner that he was not informed about the meeting held on 28.04.2010 and he did not authorise the said meeting, he

did not complain about any such irregularities in respect of the meeting held on 12.03.2010 and 28.05.2010. Further, the School Committee

consists of various persons as stated above and when the Secretary only acted on behalf of the School Committee on the basis of the decision

taken by the School Committee, the allegations of mala fide against the Secretary cannot be a ground to set aside the orders passed by the School

Committee, was only communicated to the Petitioner by the Secretary. Hence, the allegations of mala fide cannot be sustained.

In the result, W.P.(MD) No. 4520 of 2010 and 6594 of 2010 are allowed and the impugned order, dated 05.04.2010 and 30.04.2010 are

set aside. In respect of other three writ petitions viz., W.P.(MD) No. 7230, 7240 and 4575 of 2010, I do not find any infirmity to interfere with

the orders passed by the Respondents 3 and 4 and hence, those writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are

closed. No costs.