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Judgment
G. Rajasuria, J.—Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of these two second
appeals would run thus:
(a) Two suits, viz., O.S. No. 85 of 2001 was filed by one Kuppusamy Gounder, the plaintiff/first respondent herein (S.A. No. 79 of 2009) as
against (i) Nataraja Gounder and (ii) Krishnamoorthy, the defendants/appellants in S.A. No. 368 of 2009 seeking the relief of declaration and
permanent injunction in respect of the following extent of property as described in the schedule of the plaint:
SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED
On the main ground that the suit property along with other properties originally belonged to one Nachiappa Gounder, who died leaving behind his
three sons, viz., Kuppusamy Gounder (respondent in both the second appeals), Chellappa Gounder and Nataraja Gounder (appellant in both the
second appeals). During the life time of Nachiappa Gounder himself, there emerged a partition deed Ex. A1 dated 18.05.1983.
Under that the suit property described in the schedule of the plaint in O.S. No. 85 of 2001 was allotted to the share of Kuppusamy Gounder.
While so, the adjacent sharer, viz., Nataraja Gounder attempted to trespass to an extent of 2 cents in the share allotted to Kuppusamy Gounder,
the plaintiff in O.S. No. 85 of 2001. Hence the suit.
(b) Per contra, the first defendant, viz., Nataraja Gounder filed the written statement, which was adopted by his son Krishnamoorthy/D2 setting
out various facts, a thumbnail sketch of the same would run thus:
The property described in the schedule of the plaint was not clear and the plaintiff and his sons are giving trouble to the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property by misunderstanding the identity of the plaintiff''s share, so to say, Kuppusamy Gounder''s share.
Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
(c) O.S. No. 314 of 2001 was filed by the said Nataraja Gounder D1 in O.S. No. 85 of 2001 as against the Kuppusamy Gounder, the plaintiff in
O.S. No. 85 of 2001 and his wife and son seeking the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the following property,
SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED
almost setting out the averments in the written statement filed by the said Nataraja Gounder in O.S. No. 85 of 2001. Precisely, the plaintiff in O.S.
No. 314 of 2001 would base his allegations as against Kuppusamy Gounder and his wife and son to the effect that they have been high-handedly
conducting themselves so as to disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
(d) The trial Court framed the relevant issues.
(e) Joint trial was conducted in both the suits by the trial court, during which the plaintiff in O.S. No. 85 of 2001, viz., Kuppusamy Gounder''s side
was shown as the plaintiff''s side and D1-Nataraja Gounder and his son''s side were shown as the defendants'' side. Exs. A1 to A12 were marked
on the plaintiff''s side and Exs. B1 to B6 were marked on the defendants'' side. The court documents Exs. C1 to C7 were also marked.
(f) Ultimately, the trial court partly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-Kuppusamy Gounder in O.S. No. 85 of 2001 declaring that he was
entitled to 24 = cents of land and also granted permanent injunction in his favour as against the defendants therein and dismissed the injunction suit
O.S. No. 314 of 2001 filed by Nataraja Gounder. As against which, both Kuppusamy Gounder and Nataraja Gounder filed separate appeals.
The first appellate court after hearing both sides, by a common judgment decreed the suit O.S. No. 85 of 2001 in entirety and confirmed the
judgment of the trial court in dismissing the suit in O.S. No. 314 of 2001.
(g) Challenging and impugning the common judgment and decrees of the first appellate court, these two second appeals have been focussed by the
defendant-Nataraja Gounder and his son Krishnamoorthy on various grounds suggesting the following substantial questions of law:
S.A. No. 79 of 2009:
a. Have not the Courts committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not decreeing the suit after holding that possession
lies with the appellant, since injunction follows possession?
b. Have not the courts committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not decreeing the suit in view of the Ex. A1 to the
effect that boundaries will prevail over the extent?
c. Have not the courts committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not decreeing the suit in view of Ex. A1 being a
registered document which cannot be questioned u/s 92 of the Indian Evidence Act more so when the respondent is party to the same? (extracted
as such)
S.A. No. 368 of 2009:
a. Has not the lower appellate court committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not dismissing the appeal since it is
established position of law that the boundaries will prevail over the extent?
b. Has not the lower appellate court committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not dismissing the appeal in view of
the Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, since Ex. A1 executed between the parties is a registered document and no evidence contrary to the
same can be given and looked into?
c. Has not the lower appellate court committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not dismissing the appeal in view of
the fact that the suit is not maintainable without prayer for mandatory injunction and possession?
d. Has not the lower appellate court committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in dismissing the appeal by holding that
in view of the uninterrupted, continuous and hostile possession with the appellant, the plea of adverse possession will have to be accepted?
e. Has not the lower appellate court committed an error of law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in not dismissing the suit, since the
findings of the courts below are contrary to the pleadings and the case put forth by the respondent?
(extracted as such)
Heard both sides.
The learned counsel for the appellants in both the second appeals, would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out
thus:
(i) The first appellate court was not justified in simply decreeing in entirety the suit O.S. No. 85 of 2001 filed by Kuppusamy Gounder, when the
trial court gave a categorical finding that an extent of 2 cents out of 26 = cents was not in possession of Kuppusamy Gounder but in the possession
of Nataraja Gounder.
(ii) The plea of adverse possession as raised by Nataraja Gounder was negatived unjustifiably.
(iii) The partition emerged as early as in the year 1983; whereas the suit was filed by Nataraja Gounder only in the year 2001. As such, long after
expiry of 12 years, the suit was filed.
Accordingly, he would pray for setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/Kuppusamy Gounder would advance his arguments, the gist and kernel of them would run
thus:
The first appellate court though decreed the suit in O.S. NO. 85 of 2001 in toto in favour of Kuppusamy Gounder, yet taking into account the fact
that Nataraja Gounder has been refusing to permit Kuppusamy Gounder to have ingress and egress to the property and enjoying it, he after
passing of the common judgment dated 18.08.2008, has filed a separate suit for recovery of possession and as such, the first appellate court''s
declaration of Kuppusamy Gounder''s ownership over 26 = cents of land, warrants no interference. In concinnity with the partition deed Ex. A1,
both the courts below concurrently negatived the plea of adverse possession raised by the plaintiff.
I would also like to fumigate my mind with the following recent decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Union of India (UOI) Vs.
Ibrahim Uddin and Another, ; an excerpt from it would run thus:
Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of
facts or of law. In State Bank of India and Others Vs. S.N. Goyal, , this Court explained the terms ""substantial question of law"" and observed as
under: (SCC p.103, para 13)
13..... The word ""substantial"" prefixed to ''question of law'' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions
of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ''Substantial
questions of law'' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as
between the parties..........any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A
question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law...........
There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case.
(emphasis added)
In the same precedent, the following decisions are found referred to concerning the entertaining of second appeals.
(1) AIR 1962 SC 3314 [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd.]
(2) Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi,
(3) AIR 1947 19 (Privy Council)
(4) (1949) 17 ITR 269
(5) Oriental Investment Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay,
(6) AIR 192 SC 1604 [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh]
(7) Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan,
(8) Smt. Satya Gupta Alias Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar,
(9) Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co.,
(10) Molar Mal (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works(P) Ltd.,
(11 Bharatha Matha and Another Vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan and Others,
(12) Dinesh Kumar Vs. Yusuf Ali,
(13) Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala,
(14) Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh and Another,
A mere running of the eye over it would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that unless there is any substantial question of law is
involved, the question of upsetting the findings of the courts below would not arise.
With this in mind, I analysed the facts and figures placed before me. The judgment of the first appellate court is based mainly on Ex. A1, the
partition deed over which there is no challenge. Both the courts below concurrently gave a finding to the effect that the plea of adverse possession
as pleaded by Nataraja Gounder and his son was nothing but a plea to be rejected.
I would like to recollect and call up the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. Revamma
and Others, . Certain excerpts from it would run thus:
In that context it is relevant to refer to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring
to the Court of Appeal judgment JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham made the following reference:
Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process
whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right
of access to the Courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages:
there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol.
This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases intention.
...........
Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of
possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the
appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which
is required for adverse possession to materialise.
On intention, Powell v. McFarlane is quite illustrative and categorical, holding in the following terms:
If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual
possession and the requisite intention to possess (''animus possidendi'')
***
If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made in perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has
intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not
having dispossessed the owner.
***
In my judgment it is consistent with principle as well as authority that a person who originally entered another''s land as a trespasser, but later seeks
to show that he has dispossessed the owner, should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he had the requisite animus possidendi in any
case where his use of the land was equivocal, in the sense that it did not necessarily, by itself, betoken an intention on his part to claim the land as
his own and exclude the true owner.
***
What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one''s own name and on one''s own behalf, to exclude
the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the
processes of the law will allow.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and the plaintiff
has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of waiving (willful) or omission (negligent or
otherwise) of the right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper-owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like
other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered
to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence.
While dealing with the aspect of intention in the adverse possession law, it is important to understand its nuances from varied angles.
A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario has been noticed by this Court in
Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Govt. Of India in the following terms: (SCC p.785, para 11)
Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors
that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his
possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession
was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true
owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.
It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse
user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities
of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and
opportunity to the paper-owner.
Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper-owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be
considered. In the instant case the starting point of adverse possession and other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalised,
nature of possession: whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession, have not been disclosed. An observation has been made in
this regard in S.M. Karim Vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina,
Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes
adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse,
if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for ''several 12 years'' or that the plaintiff had
acquired ''an absolute title'' was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not
a substitute for a plea.
(emphasis supplied)
Also mention as to the real owner of the property must be specifically made in an adverse possession claim.
In Karnataka Wakf Board it is stated: (SCC pp. 785-86, para 12) ""A plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title
over the property. He must specifically plead it. In P. Periasami V.P. Periathambi this Court ruled that: (SCC p.527, para 5)
Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.
The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing
with Mohan Lal V. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: (SCC pp. 640-41, para 4)
As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right
thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title
or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period his title by
prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant''s claim is founded on Section 53A, it goes without saying that he admits by
implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the
plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.
(emphasis supplied)
As such, in the wake of the cited precedent also, it is clear that as a matter of course, adverse possession cannot be assumed or presumed unless
there are clinching evidence as contemplated in the aforesaid precedent.
Regarding the finding of fact is concerned, the first appellate court is the last court of facts, which held that there was nothing to indicate that any
portion of the share allotted to Kuppusamy Gounder became the property of Nataraja Gounder by virtue of adverse possession. Hence, in such a
case, I could see no reason to interfere with such a finding.
In regard to the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/Kuppusamy Gounder that his client had filed a suit for recovery of
possession of two cents of land in the suit property herein, I am of the view that the contention raised by the appellant/Nataraja Gounder relegates
to a lower level and it is for Nataraja Gounder to face the said suit and get a judgment thereon. In the result, I could see no question of law much
less substantial question of law involved in this matter for consideration. Accordingly, both the second appeals are dismissed. However, there shall
be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.