High CourtsDivision Bench(2005) 06 MAD CK 0067

N. Priyadarshini vs The Secretary to Government, Education Department and The Secretary, Selection Committee (M.B.B.S)

Madras High Court · Decided on 27 June 2005 · Citation: AIR 2005 Mad 315 : (2005) 3 CTC 449 : (2005) 3 LW 101 : (2005) 3 MLJ 97

HON’BLE JUDGES
Markandey Katju, C.J · F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No''s. 18801 of 2005 and W.P. Nos.18836 to 18838, 18867 to 18869, 18891, 18892, 18902 to 18904, 18926, 18927, 18928, 18954, 18957, 18984 to 18988, 18990, 19028, 19040, 19067, 19072, 19078 to 19082, 19084, 19090, 19091, 19092, 19093, 19094, 1

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

648 paragraphs · 12,076 words

Markandey Katju, C.J.—This writ petition and the connected writ petitions involve a common question of law, i.e., the validity of

G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 abolishing the Tamil Nadu Professional Courses Common Entrance

Examination 2005 and discontinuation of the improvement exam for admission to professional colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu for the academic

year 2005-2006. Since common questions of law and fact are involved, we have heard all the cases together, and are disposing them off by this

common judgment.

2.

In W.P. No. 18801 of 2005, N. Priyadarshini v. The Secretary to Government, Education Department, Fort. St. George, Chennai - 9 and Anr.

(which we are treating as the leading case), it has been alleged in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the writ petitioner

undertook the plus 2 (class 12) examination from the State Board in March 2003 at Rasipuram, Namakkal District and secured qualifying marks.

The petitioner took the plus 2 course improvement examination in the month of March 2004 and secured the following marks:-

Biology -- 200/200

Physics -- 198/200

Chemistry -- 198/200

3.

It is further alleged in paragraph 4 of the petitioner''s affidavit that the petitioner appeared for the Tamil Nadu Professional Courses Entrance

Examination wherein she got an aggregate of 93.66/100. In total she secured 292.66/300, but she failed to get admission in MBBS under

Backward Classes category by a slim margin. Hence, she again took the entrance examination for the academic year 2005-2006, and secured

97.50/100. The total aggregate of the qualifying examination plus common entrance examination secured by the petitioner was 296.5/300. Thus, it

is alleged by the petitioner that she stood a good chance to secure admission for MBBS course for the academic year 2005-2006.

4.

It is alleged in paragraph 6 of the affidavit that the petitioner was shocked to know about the impugned order dated 09.06.2005 by which the

system of admission by common entrance examination and improvement examination for the academic year 2005-2006 has been cancelled.

5.

The aforesaid impugned order dated 9.6.2005 reads as follows: -

ABSTRACT

Professional Colleges - Admission of students - Abolition of Common Entrance Test and Discontinuation of improvement examination from the

academic year 2005-2006 - Orders - Issued .

Higher Education (J2) Department

G.O.Ms.No.184

Dated:09.06.2005

Read:-

G.O.Ms.No.657, Education Department, dated 29.05.1984

ORDER:

1.

Parents and students as also educationists have been unanimous in expressing the need for a simplified system for admission to professional

colleges particularly in undergraduate Engineering, M.B.B.S. and allied courses, B.V.Sc, B.Sc. (Agri.) undergraduate Law and similar other

disciplines.

2.

Prior to 1984-1985 admission to professional colleges was done based on the academic marks plus the marks in an interview. The interview

was replaced by an entrance test conducted by the Anna University for admission to the professional colleges from the year 1984-85. This

procedure of admitting the students to the professional colleges based on the academic marks plus the marks obtained in the entrance tests was

followed upto 1996-1997 and thereafter as a further expansion of the scheme the Government introduced a Single Window System of admission

from the years 1997-1998.

3.

Till 2002 i.e., prior to the Judgment in T.M.A.Pai Case, admission to Government quota seats was being done through Single Window

Counselling System of the State Government and students'' ranking was done based on the +2 marks and the marks in the entrance test. The

management quota seats were however being filled up by the management themselves for which no entrance test was conducted. After the 11

Judges Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment in T.M.A.Pai case the same method of making admission to

Government quota seats by combining the marks obtained by the students in +2 and entrance test through Single Window Counselling is being

continued without any change. However, in respect of admissions under management quota, the management of self-financing professional colleges

were instructed to make admissions in a fair and transparent manner. Following these instructions, during the year 2003-2004 the managements

admitted the students by conducting entrance tests by themselves.

4.

The five Judges Bench of Supreme Court of India in Islamic Academy of Education and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. in its Judgment

dated 14.08.2003 has held that admission under the management quota seats has to be done based on the entrance test conducted by the State

Government or by the Association of self-financing professional colleges of a particular type. In so far as Government quota seats are concerned

the procedure of admission was being continued based on +2 marks and marks obtained in the entrance examination conducted by the Anna

University through Single Window Counselling. In respect of admission under management quota, as per the Judgment in the Islamic Academy of

Education case, the Association of engineering colleges or the Association of Medical Colleges as the case may be, permitted by the Judges

Committee (Justice S.S.Subramani), conducted the common entrance test and admission to self-financing colleges were done based on the marks

obtained in +2 and the marks obtained in the common entrance test conducted by the Association in 2004-2005.

5.

The Government have been considering requests from various quarters for doing away with the common entrance test for admission to

professional colleges. It has been opined that the Common Entrance Examination has now become a traumatic experience for patents and children

as it appears to determine at one stroke the future of the child. In particular, students from rural areas are affected as the Entrance Examination

operates against their chances to gain admission. The +2 examination itself is a serious examination of merit as laid down by the Supreme Court.

With the tremendous expansion in the educational facilities in the State, the opportunities for students in professional Courses have been

substantially enhanced. Parents are now taking enormous effort and interest in helping their wards all through the year to successfully complete the

+2 examination. This allows the student to develop his/her knowledge in a proper school environment over the course of the years.

6.

While considering all aspects mentioned supra the judgment of the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education

case indicates that,

In our view what is necessary is a practical approach keeping in mind the need for a merit-based selection.

The judgment contemplates adopting a practical approach relying on merit which the +2 marks themselves constitute. A merit based system relying

on the +2 marks alone would thus be just and sufficient. The +2 examination is itself verily an entrance to test to get admitted to higher level

courses and admission to Professional Courses. This deviates the need for any separate common entrance test. It is now proposed to make the

admissions by ranking the students based on the marks obtained by them in the +2 examination to ensure that meritorious students gets their choice

of colleges and courses. Further it is considered that the present system of improvement examination has led to a problematic situation in admission

where large percentage of seats are cornered by a small number of students who are in a position to take such improvement examination. It acts

against those who cannot afford to take coaching classes and appear for improvement examinations. It has therefore been decided that admission

of students for undergraduate professional courses based on a common Entrance Test may be abolished and the system of improvement

examination may be discontinued from the academic year 2005-2006.

7.

The Government accordingly direct that,

(i)a new policy of admissions be introduced for admission to various professional institutions for undergraduate courses from the academic year

2005-2006 to ensure admissions purely on the basis of the marks obtained in the +2 examination and based on the rule of reservation of the State

Government. This will cover admission to B.E./B.Tech and allied courses, M.B.B.S., B.D.S., B.Pharm and allied courses, B.Sc (Agriculture) and

allied courses B.V.Sc., B.F.Sc., Law and such undergraduate courses for which the entrance examination has been prescribed.

(ii) the procedure followed hitherto for the computation of +2 marks in assessing the rank for entry into the courses spelt out in para 7( i) above be

continued to be followed;

(iii) the Single Window System of Counselling for all professional courses be continued to be followed;

(iv) the following order of priority be followed to determine the rank of such students in case of two or more candidates obtaining equal aggregate

marks (tie) in the related subjects:

I Admission in respect of Engineering and allied courses:

i) Percentage of marks in Mathematics

ii) Percentage of marks in Physics

iii) Percentage of marks in Chemistry

iv) Fourth optional subject under part-III v)Date of Birth

vi) By lot

II Admission in respect of Medical and allied courses, B.Sc. (Agri) and allied courses: (A)

i) Percentage of marks in Biology

ii) Percentage of marks in Chemistry

iii) Percentage of marks in Physics

iv) Fourth optional subject under Part-III

v) Date of Birth

vi) By lot

(B)

i) Percentage of marks in Botany and Zoology taken together

ii) Percentage of marks in Chemistry

iii) Percentage of marks in Physics

iv) Percentage of marks in Botany and Zoology taken together*

v) Date of birth

vi) By lot

*This is only in respect of those who take Botany and Zoology rather than a fourth subject in Part-III

III Admission in respect of B.V.Sc., B.F.Sc., and allied courses:

(A) Academic stream

(i) Percentage of marks in Biology (or) Botany and Zoology taken together

(ii) Percentage of marks in Chemistry

(iii) Percentage of marks in Physics

(iv) Percentage of marks in Maths

(v) Date of Birth

(vi) By lot

(B) Vocational Stream (B.V.Sc.)

(i) Percentage of marks in Biology

(ii) Percentage of marks in Vocational theory (Poultry or Dairying)

(iii) Percentage of marks in Practical-I

(iv) Percentage of marks in Practical-II

(v) Date of Birth

(vi) By lot

the practice of allowing students to take improvement examinations thereby improving their +2 marks for admission to professional course be

discontinued from the academic year 2005-2006.

8.

The Government further direct that the marks of the students who have taken the improvement examination during 2005-2006 will not be taken

into account for consideration for admission to professional courses. If they choose to seek admission to professional courses during 2005-2006,

the marks obtained by them in the +2 in their first attempt will alone be taken into account.

9.

Orders in respect of Law courses will be issued separately.

10.

All the Single Window Agencies and the departments concerned are requested to take necessary further action in the matter immediately.

11.

This order comes into effect forthwith.

(By Order of the Governor)

K.S.SRIPATHI,

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

6.

It is alleged that the common entrance examination for admission to MBBS course for the academic year 2005-2006 was held on 23.04.2005

and the result of the same was declared on 12.05.2005. The result of the plus 2 (class 12) State Board examinations was declared on

17.05.2005.

7.

The petitioner''s grievance is that having been permitted to take the improvement as well as common entrance examination for admission to

MBBS course for the academic year 2005-2006, the State has no right to change the procedure for admission/selection, particularly after the

same had been announced for the academic year 2005-2006, and the petitioner had acted on that announcement and had appeared in the

entrance and improvement test after a great deal of preparation involving time and money.

8.

It is alleged in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petitioner''s affidavit that the common entrance examination is conducted by Anna University,

Chennai and nobody has ever complained that the entrance test was not transparent.

9.

It is alleged in paragraph 10 of the petitioner''s affidavit that the State of Tamil Nadu has more than one examining body for plus two

examination, namely, (i) State Board, (ii) CBSE Board and (iii) ISC Board. Hence it is alleged that in view of the regulations on Graduate Medical

Education, 1997 framed by the Medical Council of India and published in the Gazette of India dated 17.05.2005 in Part III Section 4, the

impugned G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 is illegal.

10.

It may be mentioned that prior to 1984-85 admissions to professional colleges was done on the basis of the marks in the qualifying examination

(the class 12 board examination) plus the marks in an interview. From 1984-85 onwards, admission to medical colleges, dental colleges,

engineering colleges, etc. in the State of Tamil Nadu have been done by holding a common entrance test and then adding the marks obtained by a

candidate in the common entrance with the marks obtained in the qualifying examination (i.e. plus two examinations). It is alleged in paragraph 11

of the petitioner''s affidavit that this was a time tested procedure and it continued to be a proven method of selection with simplicity and

transparency for the past 20 years. It is alleged that the new method of selection suddenly introduced by G.O.Ms. No. 184 Higher Education (J2)

Department, dated 09.06.2005 is violative of the regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997, which has statutory force in view of Section

33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and the corresponding Regulations made under the All India Council for Technical Education Act,

1987, Dentists Act, etc. The relevant part of the Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997 reads as follows:-

MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA SALIENT FEATURES OF REGULATIONS ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, 1997

PUBLISHED IN PART III, SECTION 4 OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA DATED 17TH MAY 1997

1.

Short Title and commencement : (1) These regulations may be called the ""Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997

2.

They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

ADMISSION, SELECTION, MIGRATION AND TRAINING: -

Admission to the Medical Course - Eligibility Criteria : No candidates shall be allowed to be admitted to the Medical Curriculum of first Bachelor

of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) Course until:

1.

He/She shall complete the age of 17 years on or before 31st December, of the year admission to the MBBS course.

2.

He/She has passed qualifying examination as under: -

(a) The higher secondary examination or the Indian School Certificate Examination which is equivalent to 10+2 Higher Secondary Examination

after a period of 12 years study, the last two years of study comprising of Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Mathematics or any other elective

subjects with English at a level not less than core course of English as prescribed by the National Council of Educational Research and Training

after the introduction of the 10+2+3 years educational structure as recommended by the National Committee on education.

Note: Where the course content is not as prescribed for 10+2 education structure of the National Committee, the candidates will have to undergo

a period of one year pre-professional training before admission to the Medical colleges;

Or

(b) The intermediate examination in science of an Indian University/ Board or other recognised examining body with Physics, Chemistry and

Biology which shall include a practical test in these subjects and also English as a compulsory subject.

Or

(c) The pre-professional/pre-medical examination with Physics, Chemistry and Biology, after passing either the higher secondary school

examination, or the pre-university or an equivalent examination. The pre-professional/pre-medical examination shall include a practical test in

Physics, Chemistry and Biology and also English as a compulsory subject.

Or

(d) The first year of the three years degree course of a recognized university, with Physics, Chemistry and Biology including a practical test in three

subjects provided the examination is a ""University Examination"" and candidate has passed 10+2 with English at a level not less than a core course.

Or

(e) B.Sc examination of an Indian University, provided that he/she has passed the B.Sc examination with not less than two of the following subjects

Physics, Chemistry, Biology (Botany, Zoology) and further that he/she has passed the earlier qualifying examination with the following subjects -

Physics, Chemistry, Biology and English.

Or

(f) Any other examination which, in scope and standard is found to be equivalent to the intermediate science examination of an Indian

University/Board, taking Physics, Chemistry and Biology including practical test in each of these subjects and English.

Note:

The pre-medical course may be conducted either at Medical College, or a science college.

Marks obtained in Mathematics are not to be considered for admission to MBBS Course.

After the 10+2 course is introduced, the integrated courses should be abolished.

Selection

The selection of students to medical college shall be based solely on merit of the candidate and for determination of the merit, the following criteria

be adopted uniformly throughout the country:

1.

In states, having only one Medical College and one University board/examining body conducting the qualifying examination, the marks obtained

at such qualifying examination may be taken into consideration.

2.

In states, having more than one university/board/examining body conducting the qualifying examination (or where there is more than one medical

college under the administrative control of one authority) a competitive entrance examination should be held so as to achieve a uniform evaluation

as there may be variation of standards at qualifying examinations conducted by different agencies;

3.

Where there are more than one college in a State and only one University/Board conducting the qualifying examination, then a joint selection

board be constituted for all the colleges.

4.

A competitive entrance examination is absolutely necessary in the cases of Institution of All India character.

11.

Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since in the State of Tamil Nadu there is more than one University/

board/examining body conducting the qualifying class 12 examinations (plus two examinations), a common entrance examination is mandatory.

Learned senior counsel submitted that there are several examining boards/bodies in the State of Tamil Nadu i.e., (i) State Board, (ii) CBSE Board

and (iii) ISC Board, and hence under the Regulations it was incumbent on the State Government to hold a common entrance test.

12.

M/s. R. Gandhi, C. Selvaraj, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, Mr. Arvind Datar learned senior counsels, and Mr. Paul Vasantha Kumar and other

learned counsels for the petitioners have supported this submission.

13.

The seats in question with which we are concerned are seats in Government Medical/Engineering/ Dental colleges, as well as Government

quota seats in private Medical/Engineering/Dental colleges.

14.

Learned counsels for the petitioners have strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar Rai Vs. State of

Maharashtra and Others, , in which it was observed: -

We may at the outset point out that inasmuch as there are three Boards in Maharashtra State which conduct the qualifying examination and

inasmuch as there are several universities, the State of Maharashtra would clearly fall under sub-cl. (2) of Regulation 5 made by the Medical

Council and not under sub-cl (3). The contention for the State that candidates from CBSE Board are small in number does not appeal to us.

Inasmuch as there is no dispute that more tha one Board conducts the qualifying examination and the Universities are more than one in number,

Sub-clause (3) of Regulation 5, in our view, is not attracted. It is also not possible for the State to say that conducting a common entrance

examination will delay the admission process or that it will be extremely difficult to conduct the examination. In fact the statement in the counter

affidavit to the effect that the State has been conducting a common examination for 1,80,000 at the 10 + 2 level in the 7 divisional boards would

itself show that the State is capable of conducting a Common Entrance Examination for admission to medical colleges, even if the number of

students is large. We may also say that in several states, Common Entrance Examination is being conducted even before 1997 when these

Regulations made by the Medical Council came into force. In fact in some States, entrance examination is conducted jointly for Engineering and

Medical students also. We fail to see why the State of Maharashtra should say that it will be an arduous task.

In a recent judgment of this Court in Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society and Others and Yasar Shaff and Others etc. Vs. State of J.

and K. and Others etc., in the context of admission to Medical Colleges, and the need for a Common Entrance Examination, this Court observed

(p.738) (of SCC) ; (at p.3782 of AIR) as follows: -

It need not be pointed out that the percentage of marks secured by different applicants at different type of examinations at the higher secondary

stage cannot be treated as uniform. Some of such examinations are conducted at the State level, others at the national level including the Indian

School Certificate examination. The percentage secured at different examinations are bound to vary according to standard applied by such

examination bodies, which is well known. As such a common entrance examination has to be held"" It has been, therefore, held a ''Common

Entrance Examination has to be held''.

15.

Learned counsels have also relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Dr Preeti Srivastava and Another Vs. State of

M.P. and Others, in which it was observed: -

A common entrance examination, therefore, provides a uniform criterion for judging the merit of all candidates who come from different

universities. Obviously as soon as one concedes that there can be differing standards of teaching and evaluation in different universities, one cannot

rule out the possibility that the candidates who have passed the MBBS examination from a university which is liberal in evaluating its students,

would not, necessarily, have passed, had they appeared in an examination where a more strict evaluation is made. Similarly, candidates who have

obtained very high marks in the MBBS Examination where evaluation is liberal, would have got lesser marks had they appeared for the

examination of a university where stricter standards were applied. Therefore, the purpose of such a common entrance examination is not merely to

grade candidates for selection. The purpose is also to evaluate all candidates by a common yardstick. One must, therefore, also take into account

the possibility that some of the candidates who may have passed the MBBS Examination from more '' generous'' universities, may not qualify at the

entrance examination where a better and uniform standard for judging all the candidates from different universities is applied. In the interest of

selecting suitable candidates for specialized education, it is necessary that the common entrance examination is of a certain standard and qualifying

marks are prescribed for passing that examination. This alone will balance the competing equities of having competent students for specialized

education and the need to provide for some room for the backward even at the stage of specialized postgraduate education which is one step

below the superspecialities.

16.

Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar and Others Vs. Motilal Nehru Medical

College, Allahabad and Others, , in which it was observed: -

The State Governments have also been equally guilty of indifference and inaction in not taking any steps for the purpose of holding an entrance

examination which would test the relative merits of the students seeking admission to the minimum 30% non-reserved seats in the MBBS Course in

the medical colleges. Some of the State Governments and Universities, we are informed, are proposing to fill up the minimum 3 0% non-reserved

seats for the MBBS Course on the basis of the mark obtained by the students at the qualifying examinations held by different States and/or

Universities, totally ignoring the fact that the standard of judging at these different qualifying examinations cannot, by its very nature be uniform.

Some Universities may be very liberal in their marking while some other may be strict. There would be no comparable standards on the basis of

which the relative merits of the students can be judged. It would be wholly unjust to grant admissions to the students by assessing their relative

merits with reference to the marks obtained by them, not at the same qualifying examination where standard of judging would be reasonably

uniform but at different qualifying examinations held by different State Governments or Universities where the standard of judging would necessarily

vary and not be the same. That would indeed be blatantly violative of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

17.

Similarly, in Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society and Others and Yasar Shaff and Others etc. Vs. State of J. and K. and Others etc.,

, the Supreme Court observed: -

It need not be pointed out that the percentage of marks secured by different applicants at different types of examinations at the higher secondary

stage cannot be treated as uniform. Some of such examinations are conducted at the State level, others at the national level including the Indian

School Certificate examination. The percentage secured at different examinations are bound to vary according to the standard applied by such

examining bodies, which is well known. As such a common entrance examination has to be held.

18.

In view of the clear pronouncements made repeatedly by the Supreme Court (as quoted above) we are in agreement with the aforesaid

submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners that a common entrance test is mandatory in the State of Tamil Nadu since there are several

examining Boards in the State.

19.

The 1997 Regulations (quoted above) make it clear that in States having only one Medical College and one University board/ examining body

conducting the qualifying examination, the marks obtained at such qualifying examination may be taken into consideration for granting admissions in

M.B.B.S. Course. However, in States having more than one university/board/examining body, an entrance examination is mandatory. This is

because, as pointed out in the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, different examining bodies have different standards of marking, different

syllabus, etc., and hence a student who appears for the examination conducted by an examining body which is stringent in granting marks will be

discriminated against vis-​-vis a student who appears for the examination conducted by an examining body which is liberal in granting marks. This

will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as held in the aforesaid decisions.

20.

Thus, the 1997 Regulation is, in our opinion, really in furtherance of Article 14 of the Constitution which aims at equality. As already mentioned

above, the 1997 Regulations has statutory force as u/s 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 it will amount to delegated legislation. In

Andhra Bank Vs. B. Satyanarayana and Others, it was held by the Supreme Court that a valid regulation once framed would be part of the

Statute. Similarly in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute Vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education and Another, , the

Supreme Court observed: -

The regulations made under power conferred by the statute are supporting legislation and have the force and effect, if validly made, as an Act

passed by the competent legislature (see Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance

Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, ).

It is not disputed by the respondents that the Regulations in question have been validly made under power conferred by the statute. Hence they

have to be treated as part of the relevant Act itself.

21.

Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya

Pradesh and Another Vs. Kumari Nivedita Jain and Others, in which it was held that while Regulation I of the Indian Medical Council Regulations

has mandatory force, Regulation II of the said Regulations (which include Regulations relating to admission in the Medical Colleges) is only

directory and not mandatory. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, .

However, in Dr Preeti Srivastava and Another Vs. State of M.P. and Others, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court took a view contrary to

the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra) and State of M.P v. Kumari Nivedita Jain (supra), and hence

the latter two decisions cannot be said to have laid down the correct law.

22.

Thus, in paragraphs 56 and 57 of Dr.Preeti Srivastava''s case ( supra), the Supreme Court observed: -

In State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Kumari Nivedita Jain and Others, the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act and the

regulations framed for undergraduate medical courses were considered by the Court. The Court said that while Regulation I was mandatory,

Regulation II was only recommendatory and need not be followed. We do not agree with this line of reasoning for the reasons which we have set

out above.

In the case of Medical Council of India Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, , a Bench of three judges of this Court has distinguished the

observations made in State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Kumari Nivedita Jain and Others, . It has also disagreed with Ajay Kumar Singh

and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, and has come to the conclusion that the Medical Council regulations have a statutory force and are

mandatory. The Court was concerned with admissions to the MBBS Course and the regulations framed by the Indian Medical Council relating to

admission to the MBBS course. The Court took note of the observations in State of Kerala Vs. Kumari T.P. Roshana and Another, to the effect

that under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, the Medical Council of India has been set up as an expert body to control the minimum

standards of medical education and to regulate their observance. It has implicit power to supervise the qualifications or eligibility standards for

admission into medical institutions. There is, under the Act an overall vigilance by the Medical Council to prevent sub-standard entrance

qualifications for medical courses. These observations would apply equally to postgraduate medical courses. We are in respectful agreement with

this reasoning.

23.

Thus, in view of the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Dr.Preeti Srivastava''s case it has to be held that all the Medical

Council Regulations, including those relating to admissions in medical colleges, are mandatory and not directory.

24.

As already stated above, the 1997 Medical Council Regulations ( quoted above) amount to delegated legislation, and are hence to be treated

as part of the Medical Council Act. On the other hand, the impugned G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 is a

purely executive order. It is well settled that an executive order cannot over ride the statutory rules or regulations. 25. It is no doubt true that

ordinarily this Court does not interfere with policy decisions of the State Government vide Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. International

Trading Co. and Another, , Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Engineers Association 2005 (1) MLJ 507, Chairman

and M.D., B.P.L. Ltd. Vs. S.P. Gururaja and Others, , Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , (2002)

10 SCC 226 , Federation of Railway Officers Association and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), , etc. However as observed by the Supreme

Court in State of N.C.T. of Delhi and Another Vs. Sanjeev @ Bittoo, , there can be judicial review of administrative action on three grounds

namely: -

(i) Illegality

(ii) Irrationality

(iii) Procedural impropriety

Thus, the policy decision of the State Government will have to be quashed if it is illegal or unconstitutional, or shockingly arbitrary in the

Wednesbury sense.

26.

As observed by the Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, a circular of the State Government laying

down a policy decision must pass the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.

27.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that according to theory of the eminent jurist Kelsen (the pure theory of law) in every country there is a

hierarchy of laws and the general principle is that a law in a higher layer of this hierarchy will prevail over the law in a lower layer of the hierarchy

(see Kelsens''s ""The General Theory of Law and State""). In our country this hierar chy is as follows: -

(i) The Constitution of India.

(ii) Statutory law (which may be either Parliamentary law or law made by the State legislature).

(iii) Delegated Legislation (which may be in the form of rules made under the statute, regulations made under the statute, etc)

(iv) Purely administrative or executive orders.

The 1997 Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India (as also those framed by the All India Council for Technical Education and the

Dental Council) are norms in the third layer in this hierarchy. On the other hand, the impugned G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2)

Department, dated 09.06.2005 is in the 4th layer of the hierarchy. Hence, if there is a conflict between the two, the Regulations will prevail. In our

opinion, there is a clear conflict between the two, because the G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 has done

away with the system of common entrance examination test, although admittedly there are several examining bodies/boards in the State of Tamil

Nadu.

28.

In Virender Singh Hooda and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, it was held that executive instructions which are contrary to the rules

will be invalid. In paragraph 24 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court observed: -

In law if an executive instruction is contrary to the statutory rules, the rules will prevail and not the executive instructions.

29.

In Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy AIR 1986 SC 737 (vide paragraph 15), the Supreme Court observed: -

A notification has no statutory force. It cannot override rules statutorily made governing the conditions of service of the employees.

30.

Similarly in Union of India Vs. Madras Tele S.C. and S.T. Social Welfare Association, the Supreme Court observed: -

Once the statutory recruitment rules came into force the earlier administrative instructions cannot be adhered to and will have no force

31.

Similarly in Shish Ram and Others Vs. State of H.P. and Others, , the Supreme Court observed: -

When the statutory rules came to be made increasing their scale of pay and making them eligible for promotion directly to the post of gazetted

cadre class II from Assistants, Head Accountants, Stenographers etc. to a pay scale of Rs.500-900, it would be obvious that the executive

instructions issued earlier had to yield place to the statutory rules.

The same view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. 2005 LIC 505 (vide paragraphs 6 to

11)

32.

The impugned G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 is clearly violative of the selection criteria fixed in the

Regulations on Graduate Medical Education 1997 (as also the A.I.C.T.E Regulations and Dental Council Regulations) because it abolishes the

common entrance test which is mandatory under the 1997 Regulations (and the corresponding Regulations of the A.I.C.T.E and Dental Council)

where there are more than one examining board/examining bodies for conducting the qualifying examinations. Although it is not necessary for us to

go behind the rationale for the selection criteria fixed by the 1997 Medical Council Regulations (or corresponding Regulations of A.I.C.T.E and

Dental Council) it appears obvious to us that it was fixed in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution, because different examining bodies/examining

boards have different standards of marking, the syllabi are different, an d so are the question papers, mode of assessment of the students, etc.

Hence there will be discrimination between the students who appear in the examinations conducted by an examining body which is more stringent

in giving marks vis-a-vis the students who appear in the qualifying examination conducted by a more liberal examining body.

33.

It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution will be violated not only if equals are treated unequally, but also if unequals are treated

equally vide State of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. Nalla Raja Reddy and Others, .

34.

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raja Reddy (supra) the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph 23)

A statutory provision may offend Article 14 of the Constitution both by finding differences where there is none and by making no difference

where there is one.

35.

In New Manek Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of The City of Ahmedabad and Others,

the Supreme Court held that taxation by the flat rate method according to the floor area adopted for determining rent value for fixing the rateable

value was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

36.

In the Constitution Bench decision in St. Stephen''s College etc., etc. Vs. The University of Delhi Etc., Etc., , the Supreme Court observed: -

To treat unequals differently according to their inequality is not only permitted but required.

37.

In Onkar Lal Bajaj Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another etc. etc., the Supreme Court observed: -

Article 14 guarantees to everyone equality before law. Unequals cannot be clubbed.

In our opinion, the impugned G.O dated 9.6.2005 clearly clubs unequals, and hence violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

38.

In the 11 Judge Constitution Bench decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, the Supreme Court

observed: -

Implicit in the concept of equality is the concept that persons who are in fact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on par.

39.

Mr.P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents, submitted that most of the students who appeared in the admission test have passed

their qualifying examinations from the State Board, and there are only a small number of students who passed the qualifying examinations from ISC

or CBSE Board. This precise submission was considered by the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar Rai v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and was

rejected in the following words:-

The contention of the State that candidates from CBSE Board are small in number does not appeal to us.

40.

Mr.Paul Vasantha Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner in some of the cases submitted that in the State of Tamil Nadu about 10,00 0

students appear every year in the qualifying (class 12) examinations conducted by CBSE and about 5000 students in ISC examinations. At any

event in view of the clear decision of the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar Rai''s case (supra) the submission of Mr.P.P.Rao, learned senior

counsel for the respondent in this connection has to be rejected.

41.

Mr.P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents then relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Another

Vs. S.V. Bratheep (Minor) and Others, . In our opinion, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. That decision only

says that the State Government can prescribe a higher criteria than that prescribed by All India Council for Technical Education. For instance, if the

State Government had prescribed that those passing in the common entrance test must have secured more than a certain percentage of marks to

be admitted to the Medical/Technical courses no exception could be taken to such a higher criteria laid down by the State Government. However,

in our opinion, it is not open to the State Government to totally scrap the method of admission laid down by the Medical Council Regulations or All

India Council for Technical Education Regulations or the Dental Council Regulations. .

42.

In the present case, it is not that the State Government has prescribed a higher criteria than that prescribed by the Regulations of the Medical

Council or All India Council for Technical Education or Dental Council. Rather, the State Government has totally abandoned and given a go by to

the method prescribed by the Regulations. This is clearly illegal, as it surely does not amount to prescribing a higher criteria.

43.

Mr.P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents then submitted that we should read down the Regulations and by a judicial

interpretation hold that instead of holding a common entrance test other methods of selection for medical colleges/engineering colleges can be

adopted by the authorities. We cannot accept this submission. In our opinion, the language of the Regulations is very clear and leads to only one

interpretation, namely, that if there is more than one examining body in the State, then there has to be an entrance test.

44.

When the language of a provision is clear we have to go by that plain and literal language, and not try to twist it by probing into the intention of

the statute. Thus Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, First Indian Reprint 1999 (published by Universal Law Publishing Co.Pvt. Ltd., New

Delhi p.65) quotes the decision of the House of Lords in Warburton v. Loveland (1832) 2 D. & CC. (H.L.) 480 wherein it was observed:

Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the

statute speak the intention of the legislature"".

45.

In Kanai Lal Sur Vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, the Supreme Court observed:

If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on

the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act"".

46.

Similarly, in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, the Supreme Court observed:

When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of the statute arises, for the Act speaks

for itself"".

47.

In AIR 1945 48 (Privy Council) the Privy Council observed (per Viscount Simonds, L.C.):

Again and again this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results,

injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used"" (See also Ajay Pradhan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and

Others, , Rananjaya Singh Vs. Baijnath Singh and Others, , Senior Superintendent, R.M.S., Cochin and Another Vs. K.V. Gopinath, Sorter, .

48.

Thus, in Hiralal Rattanlal Vs. State of U.P. and Another etc. etc., the Supreme Court observed:-

In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is

what does the provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid

the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear"".

49.

In view of the above decisions, we cannot accept the submission of Mr.P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel, that we should read down or change

the language of the Regulations. In our opinion, the plain and literal reading of the Regulations can lead to only one interpretation, namely, that if

there is more than one examining body in the State an entrance test is mandatory. We cannot do violence to the plain and clear language used in

the Regulations.

50.

This Court cannot legislate, and it is important that Courts should remember this and maintain judicial restraint as held by the Division Bench of

this Court in Rama Muthuramalingam, State Propaganda Committee Member Vs. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and Others,

51.

Under our Constitution the legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary have their own broad spheres of operation. It is, therefore, important

that these three organs of the State do not encroach upon the domain of another and confine themselves to their own, otherwise the delicate

balance in the Constitution will be upset and there will be a reaction. Of the three organs of the state, it is only the Judiciary which has the right to

determine the limits of jurisdiction of all these three organs. This great power must therefore be exercise by the judiciary with the utmost humility

and self-restraint. The judiciary must therefore exercise self-restraint and eschew the temptation to act as a super legislature. By exercising self-

restraint it will only enhance its own respect and prestige.

52.

Judicial restraint is consistent with and complementary to the balance of power among the three independent branches of the State. It

accomplishes this in two ways. First, judicial restraint not only recognizes the equality of the other two branches with the judiciary, it also fosters

that equality by minimizing interbranch interference by the judiciary. In this analysis, judicial restraint may also be called judicial respect, that is,

respect by the judiciary for the other coequal branches. In contrast, judicial activism''s unpredictable results make the judiciary a moving target and

thus decreases the ability to maintain equality with the co-branches. Restraint stabilizes the judiciary so that it may better function in a system of

interbranch equality.

53.

Secondly, judicial restraint tends to protect the independence of the judiciary. When courts encroach into the legislative or administrative fields

almost inevitably voters, legislators, and other elected officials will conclude that the activities of judges should be closely monitored. If judges act

like legislators or administrators it follows that judges should be elected like legislators or selected and trained like administrators. This would be

counterproductive. The touchstone of an independent judiciary has been its removal from the political or administrative process. Even if this

removal has sometimes been less than complete, it is an ideal worthy of support and one that has had valuable effects.

54.

The constitutional trade - off for independence is that judges must restrain themselves from the areas reserved to the other separate branches.

Thus, judicial restraint complements the twin, overarching values of the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers.

55.

In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes, the celebrated Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court in his dissenting

judgment criticized the majority of the Court for becoming a super legislature by inventing a ''liberty of contract'' theory, thereby enforcing its

particular laissez - faire economic philosophy. Similarly, in his dissenting judgment in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, Mr. Justice Hugo

Black warned that ""unbounded judicial creativity would make this Court a day-to-day Constitutional Convention."" In ''The Nature of the Judicial

Process'' Justice Cardozo remarked: ""The Judge is not a Knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness."" Justice

Frankfurter has pointed out that great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing their limitations (see

Frankfurter''s ''Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes'').

56.

In this connection we may usefully refer to the well-known episode in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court when it dealt with the New Deal

Legislation of President Franklin Roosevelt. When President Roosevelt took office in January 1933 the country was passing through a terrible

economic crisis - the Great Depression. To overcome this, President Roosevelt initiated a series of legislation called the New Deal, which were

mainly economic regulatory measures. When these were challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court the Court began striking them down on the ground

that they violated the due process clause in the U. S. Constitution. As a reaction, President Roosevelt proposed to reconstitute the Court with six

more Judges to be nominated by him. This threat was enough, and it was not necessary to carry it out. The Court in 1937 suddenly changed its

approach and began upholding the laws. ''Economic due process'' met with a sudden demise.

57.

The moral of this story is that if the judiciary does not exercise restraint and over-stretches its limits there is bound to be a reaction from

politicians and others. The politicians will then step in and curtail the powers, or even the independence, of the judiciary ( in fact the mere threat

may do, as the above example demonstrates). The judiciary should therefore confine itself to its proper sphere, realizing that in a democracy many

matters and controversies are best resolved in a non-judicial setting.

58.

We hasten to add that it is not our opinion that judges should never be ''activist.'' Sometimes judicial activism is a useful adjunct to democracy

such as in the School Segregation and Human Rights decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, vide Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483

(1954), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, etc. or the decisions of our own Supreme Court which expanded the

scope of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This, however, should be resorted to in exceptional circumstances when the situation forcefully

demands it in the interest of the nation, but always keeping in mind that ordinarily the task of legislation or administrative decisions is for the

legislature and the executive and not the judiciary.

59.

In N.K. Prasada v. Government of India and Ors. (JT 2004 (Suppl.1 ) SC 326 (vide paragraphs 27 & 28), the Supreme Court following its

own earlier decisions observed that the Court while exercising its jurisdiction should ordinarily remind itself about the doctrine of separation of

powers and the rule of self-restraint and must ordinarily be reluctant to assume the functions of the statutory functionaries. The Supreme Court

quoted its earlier decision in Chairman and M.D., B.P.L. Ltd. Vs. S.P. Gururaja and Others, , wherein it was observed: -

If the Courts step outside the area of their institutional competence, the Government may react by getting Parliament to legislate to oust the

jurisdiction of the Courts altogether. Such a step would undermine the rule of law.

60.

We are further of the opinion that since the Medical Council Regulations 1997 have been framed in pursuance of Section 33 of the Medical

Council Act, 1956 which is a law made by Parliament, the field is occupied and hence also the impugned G.O is illegal. For the same reason, the

G.O entrenches on a field occupied by the A.I.C.T.E and Dental Council Regulations.

61.

Thus in Dr Preeti Srivastava and Another Vs. State of M.P. and Others, , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed: -

Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I

which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also coordination

of such standards. A State, has, therefore, the right to control education including medical education so long as the field is not occupied by any

Union legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education.

Because this is exclusive within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for

higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry

66 List I. Secondly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia,

medical and university education, is now in the Concurrent List so that the Union can legislate on admission, criteria also. If it does so, the State will

not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254.

62.

In the same decision the Supreme Court further observed ( paragraph 52): -

These regulations, therefore, are binding and the States cannot, in the exercise of power under Entry 25 of List III, make rules and regulations

which are in conflict with or adversely impinge upon the regulations framed by the Medical Council of India for postgraduate medical education.

63.

In our opinion, if the State Government wanted to depart from the selection method laid down in the Regulations, it was incumbent on it to

pass an Act or Ordinance and then get the assent for it from the President of India under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, but that has not been

done. Moreover, even if that had been done it is doubtful whether it would have been a valid law, since it would still be in violation of Article 14 of

the Constitution, as already observed above. The impugned G.O is not a law which has received the assent of the President of India. As observed

by the Supreme Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and Others, , if the State Government wants to make a

departure from the Regulations or wants to carve out an exception to it, then the State Government has to make a representation to the Central

Government or Medical Council of India and make out a case of justification consistently with the observation of the Supreme Court in State of

Punjab Vs. Dayanand Medical College and Hospital and Others, , wherein it was observed: -

It is not open to the university or the Government to dilute that standard by fixing marks lower than what is set out by the Medical Council of

India. If they had any difficulty they ought to have approached the Medical Council of India for fixing of appropriate standards in that regard. The

State Government could not unilaterally frame a scheme reducing the standard in violation of the terms of the Regulations framed by the Medical

Council of India, which is repeatedly stated by this Court to be the repository of the power to prescribe standards in postgraduate studies subject,

of course, to the control of the Central Government as envisaged in the Act constitution the Council.

64.

In Jaya Gokul Educational Trust Vs. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government Higher Education Department, Thiruvananthapuram,

Kerala State and Another, the Supreme Court noted that after the Constitutional amendment (Forty-second amendment Act, 1976) Entry 25 of

List III (the Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule reads: -

Education, included technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I

Thus, the State law made under Entry 25 of List III would be repugnant to any law made by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I, to the extent of

inconsistency. The Supreme Court, further, observed: -

Hence, on the subjects covered by this statute, the State could not make a law under Entry 11 of List II prior to the Forty-second Amendment

nor can it make a law under Entry 25 of List III after the Forty-second Amendment. If there was any such existing law immediately before the

commencement of the Constitution within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution, as the Madras University Act, 1923, on the enactment of

the present Central Act, the provisions of the said law if repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act would stand impliedly repealed to the extent

of repugnancy. Such repugnancy would have to be adjudged on the basis of the tests which are applied for adjudging repugnancy under Article

254 of the Constitution.

65.

In the same decision, in paragraph 27 the Supreme Court observed: -

In Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyarthavathiru Sundara Swamigalme Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, which was a case relating to medical

education and which also related to the effect of a Central law upon a law made by the State under Entry 25 List III, it was held (at SCC p.35,

para 34) that the "" essentiality certificate cannot be withheld by the State Government on any policy consideration because the policy in the matter

of establishment of a new medical college now rests with the Central Government alone.

Therefore, the State could not have any ""policy"" outside the AICTE Act and indeed if it had a policy, it should have placed the same before

AICTE and that too before the latter granted permission. Once that procedure laid down in the AICTE Act and Regulations had been followed

under Regulation 8(4), and the Central Task Force had also given its favourable recommendations, there was no scope for any further objection or

approval by the State. We may however add that if thereafter, any fresh facts came to light after an approval was granted by AICTE or if the State

felt that some conditions attached to the permission and required by AICTE to be complied with, were not complied with, then the State

Government could always write to AICTE, to enable the latter to take appropriate action.

Thus in the aforesaid decision it has been clearly held that the State Government cannot have a policy contrary to the Central Act or Regulations in

view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution as the field was occupied by the Central Act and Regulations.

66.

In Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyarthavathiru Sundara Swamigalme Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, the facts were that the proviso to

Section 5(5) of Dr.M.G.R Medical University, Tamil Nadu Act, as introduced by Dr. M.G.R. Medical University, Tamil Nadu (Amendment and

Validation) Act, 1989 provided that no college shall be affiliated to the University unless the permission of the State Government to establish such

college has been obtained. Section 10A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 as inserted by the Indian Medical Council Amendment Act,

1993 required permission from the Central Government for establishing a new medical college. It was held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid

case that there was repugnancy between the Central and State Acts as regards setting up of new medical colleges, and hence to this extent the

State Act was invalid. This view was taken holding that now the field regarding setting up of new medical colleges is concerned is occupied by the

Central Act and hence the State Act to that extent is invalid in view of Article 254 of the Constitution.

67.

A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Kulwant Kaur and Others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs. and Others etc.,

68.

Learned counsels for the respondents submitted that the common entrance test was abolished because students from rural areas are

handicapped as they could not get facilities (e.g. good coaching) or other resources enjoyed by urban students. We can appreciate and understand

the concern of the State Government that students from rural areas may be handicapped. 70% of India lives in rural areas where generally people

are poorer and lacking in many facilities and amenities which many urban people enjoy.

69.

In the common counter affidavit filed in this batch of writ petitions it has been stated on behalf of the State Government in paragraph 4: -

Students who are studying rural areas are handicapped in writing the Common Entrance Test due to lack of infrastructural facilities. Rural students

have to specially prepare themselves for writing the Entrance Test. On the contrary, students in cities attend special coaching classes by paying

exorbitant amounts and prepare themselves for writing the Common Entrance Test. Due to lack of infrastructure and financial resources, students

who study in rural areas who secure meritorious ranks in XII standard examination are unable to fare well in the Entrance Test. Experience has

shown that the Common Entrance Test has resulted in great disadvantage to students studying in rural areas.

70.

However, we would not like to make any final observation in the matter at this stage as to how the handicap of rural students can be removed

since there are many social and economic factors which have to be carefully taken into consideration in this connection and we are not experts in

this. In fact the word ''rural'' itself has nowadays no clear cut connotation. Rural India today is not the rural India which existed 50 or even 25 years

ago. Many rural areas have become semi-urbanised with facilities like electricity, drinking water, roads, pucca houses, pucca buildings, schools,

Television, etc. Many areas which were earlier rural areas adjacent to cities have now become part of the cities themselves due to the great

expansion of the cities in India and large scale influx of people from rural areas into the cities. The rural countryside of India is not the same which

existed 40 or 50 years ago. There has been significant transformation of the rural countryside in this period. All this requires a detailed study by

experts, and this Court does not consist of experts in this matter. As already observed above, the State Government after making a detailed study

about the rural areas can make recommendations to the Central Government/Medical Council of India or AICTE or Dental Council suggesting

amending the Regulations to remove any handicaps of rural students, and such recommendations can be considered by the authorities concerned

and suitable amendments made in the Regulation, if the Central Government/Medical Council of India/ A.I.C.T.E / Dental Council thinks fit, which

are legally permissible (reservation of seats for rural students may not be legally permissible in view of the Supreme Court''s decision in State of

Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Pradip Tandon and Others, . However, this Court cannot direct the Government or the authorities to legislate as

suggested by Mr.P.P.Rao.

71.

Thus in Supreme Court Employees'' Welfare Association and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (vide paragraph 55), the

Supreme Court observed: -

There can be no doubt that the authority exercising legislative function cannot be directed to do a particular act.

72.

Similarly in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and Another, (vide paragraph 29), the Supreme Court held that the Court cannot

direct legislation.

73.

At any event, cancellation of the common entrance test was not the correct or valid method to give redress to the rural students. The common

entrance test is mandatory in view of the Regulations and the decisions of the Supreme Court (referred to above), and hence cannot be scrapped.

What the State Government could have done, if it thought fit, was to have written to the Medical Council (or A.I.C.T.E or Dental Council) for

amending the Regulations and give some kind of legally permissible help to the rural students so that the handicap could be removed/reduced.

What kind of help could be validly given to the rural students is not for us to decide. The authorities concerned can consult the experts in the matter

and after studying the problem consider whether to amend the Regulations as they stand at present, but this Court can certainly not amend the

Regulations. This court should exercise judicial restraint and should not ordinarily interfere with legislative or executive functions as held by a

Division Bench of this Court in Rama Muthuramalingam, State Propaganda Committee Member Vs. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and

Others, .

74.

Several other submissions have also been made by the learned counsels for the petitioners before us e.g., that the principles of promissory

estoppel and legitimate expectation have been violated, etc. However we do not think it necessary to go into these submissions, since we are

allowing the writ petitions on the aforesaid two submissions mentioned above, namely (1) the impugned G.O violates the Regulations as well as

Article 14 of the Constitution, and (2) it entrenches into an occupied field thus violating Article 254 of the Constitution.

75.

Learned counsels for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have already given the extrance examination on 23.04.2005 and the results

have also been declared on 12.05.2005 and the improvement tests have also been held. Consequently, they submitted that G.O. Ms. No. 184

Higher Education (J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 is arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because it was issued at a

very late stage after the aforesaid entrance test was not only held but also the results have been declared. The students have spent a lot of money

and time in preparing for this entrance test and also the improvement test, and hence all this will be wasted if the new system comes into force. We

need not go into this question also as we are allowing the writ petitions on the two grounds mentioned above.

76.

We are not inclined to interfere with that part of the impugned G.O which abolishes the improvement test, as the decision is a policy decision

which does not conflict with any statutory rule or regulation nor can it be said to be shockingly arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense. However, we

are of the opinion that the said abolition should only apply from next year.

77.

In Poovizhi Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another, , it was observed that a decision can be enforced for the next year. In view of the

aforesaid decision of this Court, we hold that so far as the improvement test is concerned, the abolition is valid but it will come into effect from the

academic year 2006-2007 onwards.

78.

We are further of the opinion that the principles observed above in connection with Medical Colleges will also apply for admission to

engineering and dental colleges. It may be noted that for admission to engineering colleges also there are AICTE Regulations similar to the Medical

Council Regulations. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 23(1) of the Act, the All India Council for Technical Education has prescribed the

following guidelines for admission to students in Engineering and Diploma courses pursuant to Section 2(o) of the Act, which states that the council

may: -

provide guidelines for admission to students to technical institutions and Universities imparting technical education.

79.

Guideline No.3 of the aforesaid Guidelines states: -

Entrance tests: - All States/Union Territories (UTs) should conduct entrance tests in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics at12+

level. The entrance test should be common to all engineering degree institutions in the State/UT. The minimum marks for eligibility for the entrance

test need not be prescribed in the case of degree courses and all students who have passed the qualifying examination may be permitted to appear

in the entrance test. Only the merit ranking in the entrance test should be the basis for admission to engineering degree programmes. Such test

should be conducted by appropriate agencies set up for the purpose.

80.

In addition to the above Regulation 7 of the A.I.C.T.E Regulations states: -

A common merit list in accordance with the provisions of subregulation(5) shall be prepared from amongst all the candidates provided that in

States where no such entrance examination is presently being held, a common entrance examination shall be held for admissions to be made from

the academic year 1995.

In view of the above, the common entrance test is mandatory and not directory.

81.

Similar provision is also there with regard to Dental Colleges vide Dental Council of India B.D.S Course Regulation 1996 which states: -

Selection of Students:

(a) The selection of students to a Dental College should be based solely on merit of the candidate and for determining the merit the marks obtained

at the qualifying examination conducted by the Board/ Examining body conducting such examination, be taken into consideration exception being

MBBS degree holders.

(b) In States, having more than one University/Board/Examining Body conducting the qualifying examination (or where there are more than one

Dental College under the administrative/control of one authority) a competitive entrance examination may be held so as two achieve a uniform

evaluation due to variation of the standard of qualifying examinations conducted by different agencies.

(c) A competitive entrance examination is absolutely necessary in the case of Institutions of all India character.

The above regulation is identical to the one prescribed for admission to MBBS course. Hence the principles, which we have laid down for

admission to Medical Colleges, will also apply to admission to Engineering colleges as well as Dental colleges. Hence entrance test is also

compulsory for admissions to engineering and dental colleges.

82.

Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, leaned senior counsel appearing for a Consortium of Management, submitted that since the 1997 Regulations and other

regulations were framed in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Court in Unnikrishnan P.J. and Others Vs. State of A.P. and Others, , and

since Unnikrishnan''s case has been reversed in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 (8) SCC 48 it has to be held that the

Regulations have ceased to be in force. We do not agree with this submission. The Regulations only give effect to Article 14 of the Constitution,

and surely it cannot be seriously argued that Article 14 is no longer in force.

83.

As we have already held above, there is clear discrimination if the common entrance test is abolished and only the marks in the qualifying

examination alone are taken, since there are different examining boards holding examinations for plus two examinations, and they have different

syllabus, different question papers, and different marking standards.

84.

Learned Advocate General submitted that in view of the proceedings issued by the State in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education

(J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 there will be no discrimination. We have seen the said proceedings, and we do not agree. Merely because

Dr.MGR Medical University has to give eligibility certificate to a student who has passed the qualifying examinations from a board other than the

State Board, this does not mean that there will be no discrimination. It may be clarified that mere passing of the qualifying examination (Plus two)

does not mean that the standard of marking of the different boards becomes the same. As already observed above, different qualifying

examinations have different standard of markings. They are equivalent in the sense that they are all qualifying ( eligibility) examination, which means

that a person who passes the said examination becomes eligible to apply for admission to a graduate course, whether in a University or medical

college, dental college or engineering college etc This does not mean that the standard of marking in different examinations is the same. Thus, this

argument cannot be accepted.

85.

In the circumstances we quash G.O.Ms.No. 184 Higher Education ( J2) Department, dated 09.06.2005 insofar as it relates to abolishing the

common entrance test. However, insofar as the abolition of improvement examination is concerned, we hold that this is a policy decision and

ordinarily this Court does not interfere with policy decisions (unless they violate some statute or constitutional provision or is shockingly arbitrary in

the Wednesbury sense). We do not see any violation of any statute or constitutional provision by cancelling the improvement test, nor do we find it

shockingly arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense. This was only a concession granted to the students who wanted to improve their marks in the plus 2

qualifying examination at their risk. However since in this year the improvement examination has already been held and the common entrance test

has also been held, it would not be proper to cancel the improvement examination for this year, but for the academic year 2006-2007 and

onwards the improvement test need not be held by the authorities, unless they choose to restore it.

86.

The writ petitions are allowed with the above observations. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

After the pronouncement of the orders, Mr. K.M.Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners pointed out that as per the

prospectus now issued after the issuance of the impugned Government Order, the candidates who apply for medical and allied courses will not be

in a position to make their applications based on the marks scored in the Common Entrance Test as well as the Improvement Test for the

academic year 2005-2006.

In view of our order in so far as it related to the cancellation of the Common Entrance Test and the Improvement Test we direct the respondents

herein to prescribe the necessary procedure to be followed by the concerned students to enable them to apply as per the erstwhile procedure that

was hitherto in force prior to the cancellation of the Common Entrance Test and the Improvement Test. The respondents shall carry out the above

direction expeditiously to enable the candidates to apply for the necessary courses.