N. Ramana and others vs The Collector, West Godavari and another

A.V. Krishnarao, J.—This batch of writ petitions have been posted before us for bearing as the writ petitions raise for determination substantially the same questions. Therefore all the counsel appearing for the various petitioners have not advanced separate arguments before us. Only some counsel had argued the several aspects and the other counsel had adopted the arguments addressed by them. Our suggestion that such common questions of law as arise in the various writ petitions be argued was accepted. Accordingly depending upon the answers given by us to the various questions raised and argued, we will dispose of the writ petitions of the facts of each case later. Sri D. Venkata Reddy appearing for the Government had replied to the various points raised by different counsel for the petitioners. What gave raise to these writ petitions was the issuance of several notifications u/s 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act and the dispensing with Section 5A enquiry as a result of urgency. The acquisitions under the various notifications were all for the purpose of providing sites to the poor, viz, Harijans by acquiring the land compulsorily by virtue of the power vested in the Government under the Land Acquisition Act or by the Collectors under Andhra Pradesh Land Acquisition Amendment Act XXII of 1976.

The various contentions raised revolve round Section 4, Section 5A, Section 6 and Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and also Section 3A of the Andhra Pradesh Act XXII of 1976 which amended the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The contentions advanced by the counsel on behalf of the various petitioners may be summarised thus:--

Under Section 4 (1) of the Act, the publication of the preliminary notification for the acquisition of any land in a locality should not only be published in the Official Gazette, but the public notice of the substance of such notification should be given in the said locality simultaneously. It is only upon such publication that it shall be lawful for any officer authorised by the Government in that behalf to do the things provided for under sub-section (2) of Section 4 In other words, the contention is that the Gazette publication u/s 4 (1) and the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality where the lands to be acquired are situated must be done at one and the same time. Section 4(1) of the Act is mandatory and not compliance with the requirements of section 4 (1) as to simultaueous publication vitiates the entire proceedings that follow and they must all be quashed.

Section 5A of the Act provides for the hearing of objections. Any person who is interested in any land which is notified u/s 4 (1) may prefer objections in writing to the Collector within thirty days after the issuing of the notification to the acquisition of the notified land. The Collector shall give an opportunity to the objector of being heard and after making such enquiry as he may think fit, shall make his recommendations on the objections along with the relevant record to the Government for a decision. The decision of the Government on the objections shall be final. But in certain cases of urgency provided for under Sub-section (4) of S. 17, in the case of any land to which the urgency provisions in sub-S. (1) or Sub-S. (2) are applicable the Govt. may direct that the provisions of S. 5A shall not apply, and if it so directs, a declaration may be made under sub-sec.(2) of the Act and at any time after the publication of the notification u/s 4, sub-section (1). The contention, therefore, is that it is open to the Government to dispense with the hearing of objections u/s 5A and once such a decision has come to straightaway a declaration u/s 6 of the Act can be made after the publication of the notification u/s 4 (1). Section 6 of the Act provides for a declaration by the Government of the land intended for acquisition. Section 6 declaration may be made only after considering the report, if any u/s 5A. It is contended that the condition precedent for invoking the power u/s 17 (4) resulting in a declaration u/s 4 dispensing with section 5A enquiry can only be made when the urgency is such as not to brook any delay by conducting a summary enquiry u/s 5-A where objections are filed to the notification u/s 4(1). It is further urged that in order to dispense with section 5A enquiry it is not enough if the authority simply states that there is urgency for the acquisition. The authority must positively find and conclude that the nature of the urgency requiring acquisition is such that it cannot brook the delay of even a summary enquiry u/s 5A.

Yet another contention is that in some cases the publication in the Gazette u/s 5A and the Section 6 declaration were made simultaneously and the same should not be done and where a publication u/s 4(1) and a declaration u/s 6 are made simultaneously the same would vitiate the entire proceedings.

It was sought to be contended by one of the counsel that until both requirements u/s 4 (1) are compled, viz, the publication in the Official Gazette and the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality are complied with, the question of a declaration u/s 6 would not arise as section 17 (4) of the Act is quite clear on the point. In other words, the contention is that there cannot be a declaration u/s 6 unless the requirements of section 4 (1) are completed. Section 4 (1) notification and section 6 declaration cannot be done simultaneously.

Before we deal with the several contentions raised, it will be useful to refer to the practice that generally obtained with regard to what precedes before land acquisition proceedings are initiated and which practice is warranted by the procedure indicated in the Land Acquisition Manual published by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Whenever a representation is made by the poor of any locality requiring the acquisition of land for allotment as house sites, the Government Officer concerned makes an enquiry locally, finds out whether the need exists and whether there are suitable lands to satisfy the need. If he is so satisfied, he prepares what is called a draft notification u/s 4 and simultaneously a draft declaration also u/s 6. A plan of the land proposed to be acquired also is prepared. The Officer concerned then submits it to the Collector who sends it on to the Government.

The Government thereafter proceeds to act u/s 4 and invoke the other relevant provisions.

All the present writ petitions are filed questioning the land acquisition proceedings where notifications have been issued for the acquisition of lands for the purpose of providing house sites to Harijans.

Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides for what is called a publication of preliminary notification Section 4(2) provides for the powers of the Government Officers consequent upon the publication of the preliminary notification. Section 4 (2) provides.

Publication of preliminary notification and powers of Officers thereupon;--(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given convenient places in the said locality.

The Supreme Court in Khub Chand and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others 1967 (1) S.C. Reports 120 laid down that requirements of Section 4 (1) are mandatory, The provision as to the causing of a public notice to be issued by the Collector and the substance of the notification published in the Official Gazette cannot but be construed as a mandatory provision. The word ''shall'' occurring therein has not to be construed as ''may'' as otherwise the very object of the sub-section would be defeated. That object is to bring intimation to the person whose land is sought to be acquired, of the intention of the officer to enter on the land pursuant to section 4 (2) of the Act. For such entry by the public officer u/s 4 (2) of the Act, the notice is a precondition for the exercise of the power of entry. The fact that the owner came to know of the particulars of the intended acquisition u/s 5 (2) of the Act does not satisfy the requirements of section 4 of the Act Non-compliance with the requirements of section 4 (1) of the Act would prove fatal to the entire requisition proceedings.

The contention on behalf of the several petitioners is that the Gazette publication that the land in any locality is intended or is likely to be needed for any public purpose must be done in the Official Gazette and simultaneously or immediately thereafter the Collector should cause a public notice of he substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. It is contended that where the publication in the Gazette and the causing of the public notice of the substance of such publication in the Gazette given in the locality do not synchronise, the entire proceedings are vitiated. In other words, section 4 (1) envisages simultaneous publication in the Official Gazette and causing of a public notice of the substance of the Gazette publication should be given at convenient places in the particular locality.

We think, on a plain reading of Section 4 (1), the contention is untenable. Section 4 (1) states;

Firstly it must appear to the Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. If it so appears to the Government a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette.

We have already adverted to the fact that the land in any locality being required or its likelihood of being required is intimated to the Government by the Collector. On such intimation it may appear to the Government that the land in any locality is required or may be required for a public purpose. Then only a notification ''to that effect'', viz, that the land in any locality is likely to be needed for a public purpose shall be published in the Gazette. Once that is done, public notice of the substance ''of such notification'' is to be given at convenient places in the said locality. In order to enable the Collector to cause public notice of the substance of ''such notification'' to be issued, it is manifest that there must be a prior publication the notification in the Gazette. The Collector shall only give a public notice of the substance of such notification, meaning the notification in the Official Gazette to the effect that land in any particular locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. It is significant that Section 4 does not provide for any simultaneous publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and the substance of such notification at convenient places in the locality where the land to be acquired is situated. The language of section 4 (1) clearly implies that the public notice of the substance of the notification which shall be caused to be given by the Collector can only happen after the publication of the Official Gazette. That they cannot be simultaneous and indeed it is impossible that they can be simultaneous would be clear from the fact that while the Official Gazette of the State Government is published from Hyderabad, copies thereof would normally reach the Collectors in the districts later. It is only on the receipt of the copy of the notification published in the Official Gazette that the Collector can make a substance of ''such notification'' in the Gazette and cause public notice of the substance to be given in the locality. A mere order of the Government directing that a notification shall be published in the Gazette and the sending of the copy of such an order to the Collector and the receipt by the Collector of such a copy of the order directing the publication in the Official Gazette of the requirement for a public purpose of any particular land in any locality does not satisfy the requirements of section 4 (1). What is imperative is the receipt of the copy of the publication in the Gazette by the Collector. Once that is done, it shall be followed by the issuance of a public notice of the substance of such notification by the Collector in the locality. The simultaneous publication contended for, may perhaps be possible in the city of Hyderabad. But it is impossible that there can be a simultaneous publication in the Official Gazette and a public notice of the substance thereof by the Collectors in the Districts. In support of the contention of the requirements as to simultaneous publication urged by the learned counsel, reliance is placed upon the two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, nd State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, The decision reported in State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, was decided in point of time earlier than the decision reported in Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others,

In State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, Hedge, Grover and Palekar, J.J., formed the Bench that decided the case on the 11th of August 1972. The facts are that the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was published in the Official Gazette on 17th August 1961 : but no notices as required by section 4 (1) were published in the locality till November 1st and 9th of 1971. The respondent in the appeal had filed his objections u/s 5A on December 4, 1971. What fell for consideration was whether the notification issued u/s 4 was a valid notification. The High Court quashed the notification as invalid. The Supreme Court on appeal referred to section 4 (1) of the Act and Section 5A of the Act. In the case before the Supreme Court, Section 5A was not disposed with. It is in that background that the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 4 (1). Their lordships pointed out that publication of the substance of the notice in the locality was a mandatory requirement. It should be in addition to the publication in the Official Gazette. The purpose of such a notification in the locality was to enable interested persons to file their objections to the acquisition and their right to file objections provided by Section 5A was a very valuable right. Their Lordships referred to Gangadharaiah vs. State of Mysore 39 My. LJ 893. The Mysore High Court in that case decided that it was only when the notification is published in the Official Gazette and it was accompanied by or immediately followed by the public notice that a person interested in the property proposed to be acquired could be regarded to have had notice of the proposed acquisition, (Underlining is by us). Their Lordships expressed their entire agreement with the rule laid down in that decision.

We have perused the decision in Gangadharaiah vs. State of Mysore 39 My. LJ 893. In the Mysore State, there was a rule quoted in the judgment which would support the reasoning of the learned Judges.

Having regard to the practice obtaining admittedly in the State of Andhra Pradesh, it is not possible to State that the notification in the Official Gazette can be accompanied by the public notice to be issued by the Collector. The Official notification in the Gazette may no doubt be followed by the publication of the substance of the said Gazette Publication by a public notice that the Collector should cause to be issued in the locality. What Their Lordships stated in the above Supreme Court decision would, in our opinion, amount to their stating that the public notice that has to be caused to be issued by the Collector shall follow the notification in the Gazette as soon as possible, in other words, within a reasonable time. In a given case, there may be very valid and sound reasons why the publication in the Official Gazette and the notification cannot be immediately followed by the public notice. What is stated by Their Lordships in paragraph 5 of the report does not lay down that there must be a simultaneous publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and the issuance of the public notice by the Collector in order to render them valid, In the very nature of things, accepting the contention that there should be simultaneous publication is tantamount to requiring the authorities to do an impossible act. The only case where that may be possible, as we have already indicated, where the lands proposed to be acquired are in the city of Hyderabad or continuous urban area. In such a case as soon as the Gazette publication is made in the city, it is just possible that there may be time to issue public notice of the substance of such notification in the city or in the particular locality nearabouts.

The other decision next relied on by the learned counsel is Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, is a case from Allahabad Grover and Mathew. J.J were the members of the Bench. Their Lordships referred to State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, which was by then not reported. The decision of the Supreme Court is dated 24 10-1972. In the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the question that fell for determination was whether in a case where the provisions of section 5A have been dispensed with u/s 17 (4) of the Act non-compliance with section 4(1) would vitiate the proceedings. It was contended before the learned Judges that it is wholly unnecessary that the interested parties should have the requisite information of the acquisition proceedings as they were not entitled to file any objections u/s 5A. In rejecting that contention. Their Lordships observed thus :--

We are unable to accept such a contention. In our judgment the provisions of Section 4 (1) cannot be held to be mandatory in one situation and directory in another. Section 4 (1) does not contemplate any distinction between those proceedings in which in exercise of the power u/s 17 (4) the appropriate government directs that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply and where such a direction has not been made dispensing with the applicability of Sec. 5A. It lays down in unequivocal and clear terms that both things have to be simultaneously done under sec. 4(1), i.e., a notification has to be published in the Official Gazette that the land is likely to be needed for any public purpose and the Collector had to cause notice to be given of the substance of notification at convenient places in the locality in which the land is situated.

The counsel laid great stress on the observations of their Lordships that section 4(1) laid down in unequivocal and clear terms that both things have got to be done simultaneously u/s 4 (1), viz the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and the public notice by the Collector of the substance of such notification in the locality. Apparently what Their Lordships said supports the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The ratio decidendi of the case before Their Lordships is that the provisions of section 4 (1) cannot be held to be mandatory in one situation, and directory in another. That is, Their Lordships said that Section 4 (1) is mandatory in both cases, viz., where the provisions of section 5A are dispensed with and in cases where they are not dispensed with. Counsel relied upon Article 141 of the Constitution which states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on other Courts within the territory of India. The law declared in the above decision is that whether the provisions of section 5A are dispensed with or not, u/s 17 (4) of the Act, the requirements of section 4 (1) must be complied with The admitted fact in the case before Their Lordships was that the Collector did not cause a public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality and therefore the second part of sub-section (1) of section 4 was not complied with. The question was considered and decided from that angle. In fact, the decision reported in State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, wherein Grover J. who rendered the judgment in Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, was member, did not state that there should be simultaneous publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and a public notice of its substance in the locality.

The above two Supreme Court decisions were cited before our learned brother Gangadhra Rao J., in Tandu Vanamalu and others vs. Govt. of A. P. 1977 (1) An. W. R. 249. The learned Judge in paragraph 7 at page 250 had stated as follows:--

The next question is whether both should be done simultaneously. The section does not say so. Apart from that, it is well nigh impossible The Government should first publish the notification in the Official Gazette. It is only thereafter, the Collector, can cause public notice of the substance of such notification in the locality. Both cannot be done simultaneously. So I am of the opinion that that the publication of the substance of such notification in the locality only follows the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. The next question is as to when the substance of such notification should be published in the locality. The section does not prescribe any time limit if so, it should be normally understood, that it should be published in the locality, within a reasonable time. As to what is a reasonable time, depends on the facts of each case.

We are in agreement with the answer given by the learned Judge to both questions considered by him in the above paragraph. We are unable to hold that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions reported in Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, and State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, lay down the law that things which cannot possibly be done simultaneously must be done simultaneously. In other words, we do not understand Their Lordships as laving down the law that where it is impossible to do two or more things simultaneously they should be so done. The language of section 4 (1) makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature contemplated firstly the publication of a notice in the Official Gazette and that the same should be followed by the Collector causing a public notice of the substance of the notification in the Official Gazette to be given in the locality. Section 4(1) does not permit of any other interpretation. The causing of the public notice of the substance of the notification by the Collector shall be done within a reasonable time of the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette In considering what is reasonable the court undoubtedly should bear in mind whether the provisions of section 5A have been dispensed with in a particular case of acquisition. As pointed out by Gangadhara Rao J. of necessity, each case must turn upon its own facts as to the reasonableness of the time that elapses between the Gazette publication and the public notice to be issued under the latter part of section 4 (1). We therefore, reject the contention that the Gazette publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice to be caused to be issued in the locality by the Collector should be done at once and the same time or that the timings should so synchronise as to describe the two things as being done u/s 4 (1) simultaneously. We, are however, clear that both the requirements of section 4 (1) should be complied with as both the said requirements, viz., (1) publication in the Official Gazette of the public purpose and the acquisition of any land in any particular locality and (2) the publication of a notice containing the substance of the notification in the Official Gazette are mandatory. The fact that section 5A is dispensed with or not dispensed with is immaterial. The public notice of the substance of the notification by the Collector should of course follow the publication of the notification in the Gazette as required by section 4 (1) of the Act and this the Collector should cause to be done within a reasonable time We have earlier stated as to what is a reasonable time, must be decided on the facts of each case. Where prima facie the gap between the two dates of publication of the notification, viz, the one in the Official Gazette and the substance of the notification in the locality is unreasonable, it is of course for the appropriate Government or authority to explain the reason for the unreasonable delay between the two publications. Sri S. Venkata Reddy relied upon a Full Bench decision reported in Rattan Singh and Another Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, . The Full Bench decision had referred to the two Supreme Court decisions reported in State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, and Narindrajit Singh and Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, Referring to those two decisions, the Punjab Full Bench expressed the opinion that there was no escape from the conclusion that the publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality his to be given simultaneously or atleast immediately after the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette.

We have already discussed the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court and the reported decision of this court and expressed our view in the matter. No particular assistance therefore, can be derived from the above Full Bench decision.

The next question for consideration is whether the dispensing with the hearing u/s 5A invoking the power u/s 17 (4), can be sustained in the present writ petitions. The argument is that after all section 5A contemplated only a summary enquiry by the Collector and a report to the Government with his recommendations whose decision with regard to the objections preferred u/s 5 A is final. In each case, it is contended that merely because public purpose is the requirement of providing house sites for the Harijans, it does not follow that section 5A should be dispensed with automatically. There can be no dispute, it was argued, that providing house sites for Harijans is a matter of urgency, but in each case in order to arrive at the subjective satisfaction whether section 5A should be dispensed with, the question must be approached from the angle whether the urgency is such that it does not brook any delay that may be caused by conducting the summary enquiry contemplated by section 5A. It is not enough to merely utter the formula that in the opinion of the Government there is urgency for the requisition, it was contended by the learned counsel Sri S. Venkata Reddy that in all the earlier cases of both this court and the Supreme Court, what was considered was whether there was urgency for the question and not the question whether the urgency was such as to require doing away with the enquiry u/s 5A. The Counsel argued that after the Supreme Court rendered its decision reported in Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, the several decisions which decided that the question of urgency is a purely subjective matter for the authority concerned and the court cannot substitute its own judgment with regard to urgency for that of the authority who is vested with the power to decide whether there was urgency or not, no longer hold the field.

Section 5A gives statutory recognition to a principle of universal applicability. The compliance with the requirements of Section 5A is mandatory except in certain instances which are provided in the Act itself. The principle that is recognised in section 5A is as old as the law itself. It is a basic principle that no man''s property shall be acquired unless he has been given an opportunity of being heard, He must be afforded an opportunity to show cause against the acquisition. Section 5A did not exist originally in the Act of 1894. It was introduced by way of amendment by Act 38 of 1923 and came into force from the 1st January 1924, Section 5A was enacted in recognition of the principle of natural justice, viz., the person whose interests are affected, should be afforded an opportunity to show cause against the acquisition. Prior to the introduction of Section 5A the wishes of the owners of the lands were wholly irrelevant. The only objections prior to the enactment of section 6A that could be entertained were regarding the amount of compensation, the measurement of the area etc. The person interested could not raise any objection in respect of the acquisition itself. Before a declaration can be made u/s 6 that any land is required for a public purpose, the Legislature felt that certain time must be allowed after the notification u/s 4 to persons interested in the land to state their objections for the acquisition and for the consideration of such objections. Hence Section 5A was introduced for the hearing of objections by persons interested in the land. Section 17 enacts a provision for the conferment of special powers upon the Government or Collector as the case may be in case of urgency u/s 17(4), of the case of any land to which in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply and if it does so direct, the declaration may be made in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification u/s 4 (1). Wherever, therefore, the appropriate Government feels that there is urgency within the meaning of sub-sections (1) and (2)of section 17, the Government is given a discretionary power to dispense with the provisions of section 5A a direction being given, a declaration may be made u/s 6 after the publication of the notification u/s 4 (1). Madras Act XXI of 1948 substituted the first paragraph of sub-section (2) of section 17 and provided that the Collector, after publication of the notice u/s 10(1) and with the previous sanction of the Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which on such entering, vest absolutely in the Government. One of the things provided for is that if in the opinion of the Collector becomes necessary to acquire immediate possession of any land for the purpose of construction or extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, the principal Act shall have effect in relation to such acquisition. So after the Madras Amendment Act, 1948 referred to, whenever the Collector felt after notification u/s 4 (1) that immediate possession of the land should be taken for the purpose of construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, immediate possession could be obtained by dispensing with section 5A and then make a declaration u/s 6.

Looking at the language employed in section 17 (4), it is plain that after publication of a notification in accordance with the previsions of Section 4 (1), in case of urgency provided for in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 17, the Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A snail not apply. On such a direction being made, a declaration may be made u/s 6. That is to say, merely because there surgency of the nature contemplated by section 17 (1) and (2) there will be no automatic dispensing with the provisions of section 5A. A discretion is vested in the Government to direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply and on such a direction being given, a declaration u/s 6 may be made to the affect that the land is required for a public purpose. Indisputably therefore, even if there is urgency satisfying the requirement of section 17 (1) and (2), it requires the concerned Government to consider whether it should direct that the enquiry u/s 5A need not be held, A discretion is thus vested in the Government regarding the dispensing with of section 5A. Whether the discretion is properly exercised or not cannot be the matter for judicial review. Exercise of the discretion is purely a subjective one for the appropriate authority. The matter also has to be tested with regard to the need for urgency on the date when section 5A is dispensed with. If section 5A was dispensed with, if there is delay in the matter of either the declaration or the notice, u/s 9 an 10 which should follow the delay ipso facto does not vitiate the direction dispensing with Section 5A All that is to he seen is whether on the date of dispensing with section 5A, there was urgency and the authority dispensing with section 2A felt it necessary to direct that 5A enquiry be dispensed with. The fact that subsequently the concerned officers of the Government did not take further action by invoking the other provisions of the Act expeditiously by taking possession of the land, by issuing notices under Secs. 9 and 10 would not have the effect of rendering the dispensing with section 5A enquiry illegal or void. If the position were held to be otherwise, it is not difficult to envisage that the persons interested in the land and affected by the acquisition seek their own methods in bringing about a delay after dispensing with 5-A enquiry. To hold that wherever there is delay in the matter of proceedings subsequent to dispensing with section 5A the proceedings are vitiated would throw the doors open to a lot of fraud and mischief being committed by interested persons. The learned counsel Marimuthammal Vs. The State of Madras and Another,

He submitted that with regard to the purpose of the acquisition and the urgency in some of the cases, it was stated that the Harijans, for whose benefit the acquisition was to be made, were living in congested quarters and that as per the above Madras decision, that is not good ground and that a mere mechanical representation of urgency would not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of law dispensing with the section 5A enquiry, Alagiriwami J. (as he then was) having regard to the particular facts of the case, held that a mere mechanical representation that the provisions of house sites for Harijan was urgent as they were living in congested quarters should never be allowed as an excuse for the dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act, which would take a month or two. On the facts of the case, the learned Judge felt justified in quashing that portion of order u/s 17 of the Act dispensing with section 5A. As a consequence, he also quashed the declaration u/s 6. The relevant facts are : A notification u/s. 4 (1) was published in a Gazette on 22-6-66. After dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A by the same notification, a declaration u/s 6 was published in the Gazette on the same day The learned Judge referred to the fact that the files produced by the Collector showed that the Question of acquisition of the land for the Harijans was pending from 1959, i.e., for a period of seven years, The papers were pending with the Revenue Inspector for a very long time. It was in April 1983, the Collector asked that the matter of acquisition to be expedited The learned Judge observed that even so, three years elapsed before the notification u/s 4 (1) was published. It would appear that the notification u/s 4 (1) was issued, according to the authorities, as they apprehended an outbreak of an epidemic. It was held that the said circumstances "should not be male a cloak for the tardy action of the authorities and as a cover for their laziness".

Reference also was made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Natwarlal Jeerambhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat And others AIR 1971 Guj. 204 for the proposition that section 17 (4) must be lead along with section 5A of the Act and so read, the court must be able to deduce that the urgency in a given case was such that the period required for enquiry u/s 5A of the Act would cause great prejudice or inconvenience so as to defeat the very purpose of acquisition and the purpose cannot be fulfilled unless section 5A enquiry is dispensed with. The urgency must be such that the purpose of acquisition cannot await the period of thirty days for filing objections and the reasonable period of the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. This court has considered this question in a number of decisions, reported and unreported.

In Kasireddy Papaiah (Died) and Others Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . Chinnappa Reddy, J. had to consider a case where the Government had taken a decision to acquire certain lands on 15-5-1970 for the purpose of providing housing accommodation to Harijans. The Gazette publication u/s 4(1) was made on 24-9-1970 and thereafter the declaration u/s 6 was published on 25-2-1971. No steps were taken to obtain possession of the land. It was argued before the learned Judge that these facts showed clearly that there was no urgency whatsoever and the invocation of the power u/s 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A was made in a mechanical manner. Further it appeared that section 5A was dispensed with because of a memorandum of Government issued in 1954 that the emergency provisions u/s 17 should be invoked whenever land was acquired for providing house sites for Harijans. The learned Judge observed that he would not agree with the submission that the delay on the part of the tardy officials to take further action in the matter was sufficient to nullity the Urgency Which existed at the time of the issue of the Notification (Italicised by us) as to hold that there was never any urgency. The learned Judge pointed out that it may be a relevant circumstance to be taken into consideration in deciding whether there was any urgency or whether the emergency provision was invoked without the Government applying its mind to the circumstances of the case. The learned Judge further pointed out that the housing conditions of the Harijans all over the country could only be described as miserable and that the courts should take judicial notice of that fact. It was further stated that ''the greater the delay the more urgent became the problem''. It was, therefore, ruled that where emergency provisions were invoked for purpose of providing house sites to Hanjans, the invocation of the emergency provisions was not bad because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter were negligent or tardy in the discharge of their duties. The learned Judge, however, observed that where the acquisition was made with an oblique motive, it may be a different thing. He also pointed out that in a given case invoking of the emergency provision may be mala fide. But subsequent delay on the part of the same Government officials cannot make the dispensing with the Section 5A enquiry mala fide.

We find ourselves in agreement with what is stated by the learned Judge in the above reported decision. We also are inclined to think that after taking a decision to acquire lands for the Harijans the fact that there was considerable delay before a notification u/s 4(1) was issued or the fact that there was even more delay in invoking the provisions of urgency u/s 17(4) of the Act and the further delay in taking possession of the land are not very material, in the absence of mala fides or any oblique motive on the part of the authorities concerned. We agree with Gangadhara Rao J, with his observation in Tandu Vanamuluand others vs. government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its secretary, revenue department, secretariat buildings, Hyderabad and others AIR 1976 A.P. 252 that "what the court has to consider is whether there was urgency or not on the date when the provisions of section 5A are dispensed with. The fact that the matter was pending from 12 would not make any difference if on 17th December 1975 the Govt. felt that there was urgency and dispensed with the provisions of Section 5A of the Act". The learned Judge for his opinion relied upon an unreported decision in writ Appeal No. 370/76 dated 20th of October 1976, The said unreported decision of the Division Bench in its turn placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jage Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, as also on the decision of Chinnappa Reddy, J. reported in Kasireddy Papaiah (Died) and Others Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others,

Writ Appeal No. 370/76 dated 20th of September 1976 is a decision rendered by a Division Bench in which one of us (Punnayya, J.) was a member. The said decision, in dealing with the present question observed as follows:

As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jage Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, the State Government or the officials were lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding whether on the date of notification there was urgency or not. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, though not conclusive, is entitled to great weight. What we have observed earlier would demonstrate beyond any doubt that there was great urgency in acquiring the land when the notification was made. If there were any acts or omissions on the part of the officials, that would not detract from the purpose that promoted the acquisition. Therefore, dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act, or the delays later committed by the officials would not vitiate the notification as such.

The result of the foregoing discussion is that any lethargy or tardiness on the part of the Government or the Collector or other Government Officers is not of any great relevance for deciding the question whether on the date of the notification u/s 4(1) there existed urgency requiring the dispensing with of the enquiry u/s 5A. The Governments or other appropriate authority''s opinion that there was urgency is not only entitled to great weight, if not conclusive, as observed by the Supreme Court in Jage Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, .

Reliance placed by one of the learned counsel for the petitioners on Kothapalli Yanadi Reddy And others Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh And others 1973 APLJ 408 does not render any particular assistance with regard to section 5A. On the facts of the particular case, Kuppuswami, J. held that there was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A which is based upon elementary principles of natural justice.

Another contention is that the notification u/s 4(1) and section 6 declaration cannot be made simultaneously. If they are simultaneously made the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. By using the word ''simultaneously'' the counsel meant that the two publications cannot be made in the same Gazette on the same day. No doubt, u/s 17 (4), the declaration u/s 6 may be made at any time after the publication of the notification u/s 4 (1) in all cases where section 5A is dispensed with. It was urged that the power exercised by the Government for the acquisition of the lands is expropriatory in nature in as much it interferes with the right of a person which is inherent in him to hold and enjoy property and that the statutory requirements should be strictly complied with. In cases when the notifications are made in the same Gazette namely the preliminary notification u/s 4(1), and the declaration u/s 6 after directing that section 5A enquiry be dispensed with, they are bad in law. The question raised is no longer res integra. It is concluded by the majority judgment of Supreme Court reported in Smt. Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, . Their Lordships at page 170 in paragraph 60 had considered the argument that the notifications cannot be made simultaneously. At page 171, it was observed that it was difficult to say why the two notifications cannot be made simultaneously. The following observations put the matter beyond controversy :--

A notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 4, is a condition precedent to the making of notification under sub-sec.(1) of Sec. 6. If the Government therefore, takes a decision to make such a notification and, therefore takes two further decisions that is, to dispense with compliance with the provisions of Sec. 5A and also to declare that the land comprised in the notification is in fact needed for a public purpose, there is no departure from any provision of the law even though the two notifications are published on the same day. In the case before us the preliminary declaration under Sec. 4(1) was made on August 18, 1961 and a declaration as to the satisfication of the Government on August 19, 1961, though both of them were published in the Gazette of August 25, 1961. The preliminary declaration as well as the subsequent declaration both required by law to be published in the Official Gazette. But the law does not make the prior publication of notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 4 a condition precedent to the publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 6, where acquisition is being made after following the normal procedure: The notification under the latter section will necessarily have to be published subsequent to the notification under the former section because in such a case the observance of procedure under S. 5A is interposed between the two notifications. But where section 5A is not in the way there is no irregularity in publishing those notifications on the same day.

In all the present writ petitions, section 5A has been dispensed with and in the light of the expression of opinion by the Supreme Court which we have quoted above, there is no irregularity in publishing the notification u/s 4(1) and 6 simultaneously, in the sense of their being published in the same Gazette on the same day. The contention, therefore, is rejected.

Nextly Sri S. Venkata Reddy, the learned counsel for some of the petitioners has stated that the authority of the several decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court is considerably shaken by the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, In the above said case. Their Lordships were considering appeals which arose out of a common judgment in a Division Bench of the High Court of Maharashtra in certain writ petitions. The writ petitions were concerned with four groups of lands which were sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. A notification was issued on 11th of October 1963 u/s (1) of the Act which was published in the Gazette. The public purpose for which the notification issued was for "development and utilisation of the said land as a residential and industrial area (Italicised by us. As per the same notification, it was stated that as the lands were waste or arable lands and their acquisition was urgently necessary, a direction under sub-section (4) of section 17 was issued that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply in respect of the lands covered by the notification. Thereafter on 19th December, a declaration u/s 6 was issued followed by notices u/s 9 of the Act. It was inter-alia argued before the Supreme Court that the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court with regard to three of the appeals out of the batch of nine appeals before them, the Government had not discharged its burden of showing facts constituting the urgency which impelled it to give declarations-cum-directions u/s 17 (4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiries u/s 5A of the Act. The acquisitions in the case before the Supreme Court where due to certain schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that in the context of the country''s need for increased production and more residential accommodation the need must be held to be urgent. Yet the nature of such schemes of development did not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries u/s 5A, their Lordships observed;

The recitals in the notifications, on the other hand, indicate that elimination of the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act was treated as automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters, (italicised by us). The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Sec. 5A of the Act. It is certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence, to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry u/s 5A of the Act and that mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question.

Considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners upon the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 38 in page 194 which read:

Now, the purpose of Section 17 (4) of the Act is obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry u/s 5A will serve no useful purpose or for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings u/s 5A of the Act should be eliminated It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry u/s 5A which has to be considered.

(italicised by us.)

Reliance also was placed by what was stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 40 at page 195. The said para reads thus:

In the case before us, the purpose indicated is the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes''. This, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for any action, barring exceptional circumstances as to take immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry u/s 5A of the Act imperative. On the other hand such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary enquiries u/s 5A of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry u/s 5A of the Act.

If we may say so, it is an assumption made by the learned counsel that paragraphs 38 and 40 of the above Supreme Court decision lay down any new law or purport to make any departure from what has always been the law. What Their Lordships said does not in any way detract from the several decisions of this Court which considered sections 4 (1), 17 (4), section 5A and section 6 of the Act. In case before Their Lordships, it was observed that the public purpose, viz., the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes required putting into effect several schemes formulated in that behalf and that they would take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary enquiries u/s 5A of the Act be completed without any impediment. What Their Lordships said in that case, was, therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired Indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. In paragraph 37, Their Lordships noticed that sometimes the proceedings u/s 5A of the Act are unduly prolonged. Having regarded to the scope and the summary nature of the enquiry u/s 5A. Their Lordships no doubt observed that there appeared to be little difficulty in concluding enquiries contemplated by section 5A of the Act very expeditiously.

But in actual practice, it has been found that almost in every case the notification issued for acquisition of lands for the poor Harijans for the construction of houses did not go unchallenged. All sorts of objections, tenable and untenable, have been raised pursuant to notices issued dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A. The observations of their Lordships also indicate their awareness that "yet sometimes the proceedings u/s 5A are unduly prolonged": There can be no dispensing with Sec. 5A enquiry merely because of the existence of an urgency as envisaged in section 17 (1) and (2) of the Act. As noticed earlier, a discretion is vested in the authority in the matter of directing that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply. That discretion is vested in the Provincial Government in the Central Act. Under the Andhra Pradesh Amending Act (No. XXII of 1976), it is vested in the Collector. The Legislature assumed and we can presume that, that the Government and the Collector act in a responsible manner and not irresponsibly in the exercise of their when a direction discretion is issued for dispensing with Section 5A enquiry. Ordinarily the direction issued is not open to the scrutiny by the courts except where the direction is issued mala fide or from oblique motives. After thirty years of independence, the plight of many who were poor and homeless at the time when India attained Independence continue to be practically the same. The need for urgent acquisition of lands for this public purpose, namely, providing house sites for the poor was and is urgent. The necessity to dispense with Section 5A enquiry must be decided by the authority applying its mind to each case of urgency in the matter of acquisition. The situation at present is that already there has been a great delay in the matter of providing housing accommodation to the poor and it is a matter of national shame that after a lapse of thirty years the conditions of the poor such as the Harijans and other weaker sections of the Society continue to be deplorable in the matter of providing housing accommodation, though the Constitution itself recognised the need. As the delay in this matter has been great, as observed by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Kasireddy Papaiah (Died) and Others Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, "the greater the delay, the more urgent becomes the problem". Unless the exercise of discretion and dispensing with Section 5A enquiry by the Government or other delegated authority is questioned on the ground of mala fide or other reasons of a like nature, it is always difficult for the court to hold that the discretion is not properly exercised. Where it is merely stated that because there is urgency the enquiry u/s 5A is dispensed with, it will not be in conformity with the requirements of law. In fact, it is the existence of urgency that enables the Government to dispense with the Section 5A enquiry. In other words, the existence of urgency is the sine qua non for a direction dispensing with Sec. 5A enquiry. The Legislature in conferring the power on the appropriate Government u/s 17 (4), vested it with a discretion in the matter of issuing the direction by using the verb ''may''. One may reasonably except the existence of material for the exercise of the discretion and the application of the mind of the Government to that material. The existence of such a material may be found in the records which the Government produces pursuant to the rule nisi or from the averments in the affidavits fixed by the Government.

The only case referred to us after rendering of the decisions reported in Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, s an unreported order in Write Petition No. 4491, 1975 dated 11-7-1977 of Gangadhara RaO J. The learned Judge, while accepting the contention that before dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A, the authority concerned must apply its mind, had found on the facts of the case before him, that the Government did apply its mind. In Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , their Lordships had pointed out that the mind of the officer or authority concerned has really to be directed towards the formation of an opinion on the need to dispense with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. It was also observed that the formation of such an opinion is a subjective matter. Nevertheless, the administrative authority required to form an opinion must base its opinion upon some relevant material. Their Lordships laid down the test. The test to be imposed in such cases is to see whether the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers where its discretion or opinion can be permitted to have full play. If the court comes to the conclusion that the authority was acting within the scope of its powers and some material, however meagre, on which it can reasonably base its discretionary opinion, courts should not and will not interfere. However, in a given case, the authority may act in exercise of its power in such a manner in utter disregard of actual and undeniable facts so as to leave no doubt that the authority had acted in excess of its power. In some other cases, the Court may also find that the opinion formed by the authority concerned was due to a misunderstanding of the law or not applying its mind to a matter which it was legally imperative for the authority to consider before the formation of its subjective opinion. In such cases, the Court may hold that the mind of the authority was not applied in the formation of its opinion in the exercise of its discretion.

From what is stated above by the Supreme Court, it is clear that there must be some material on which the authority concerned can form its opinion. That material may be meagre, insufficient or very weak material. But no two authorities may come to the same opinion on the same material because the opinion to be formed essentially is a subjective one. What is imperative is the existence of some material to form a subjective opinion, its sufficiency cannot be canvassed before a Court. On the question of sufficiency of any given material, even reasonable minds may not come to the same opinion Once there is some material, however meagre, however insufficient, however weak, the Court will not weigh features and substitute its discretion for that of the authority vested by law with the power to exercise the discretion. But the Court would not hesitate to interfere and find that the mind of the authority was not applied where it appears that the authority concerned had acted so unreasonably as to terra the exercise of the discretion an arbitrary or perverse exercise. The unreasonableness may flow from a misunderstanding of imperative provisions of law or from a violation of some mandatory legal requirement before the subjective formation of opinion can be arrived at by the authority. From what is observed above, it follows that each has to be examined on its own facts to find upon the question whether there is any material or if there are any circumstances which would enable the court to come to an opinion that the mind of the authority was not applied before a direction was given dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A of the Act.

Sri P.A. Chowdary advanced certain arguments concerning the Andhra Pradesh Act XXII of 1976. The Act replaced the Land Acquisition (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance of 1975. The Amending Act provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 12th of September 1975. It purported to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It introduced section 3A into the main Act. As per section 3-A, the State Government is empowered to direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on the State Government by the Land Acquisition Act may, by notification shall in such circumstances and under such conditions. If any, as may be specified in the notification, be exercised or discharged by the Collector. This Act also provides that in section 4(1) of the main Act in sub-sec. (1), after the words ''appropriate Govt.'' the words ''or the District Collector'' and after the words "Official Gazette" or the "District Gazette" should be inserted in sub-section (2) of section 4, for the words "such Government" the words "or the District Collector" were inserted. Section 6 also was amended by the substitution of a new clause in sub-section (1). It is not necessary to refer to the amendments effected to the other sections of the main Act by Act XXI of 1976. It was contended by Sri P.A. Chowdary that it is a universal principle of justice recognised by all systems of civilised jurisprudence that no man can be deprived of his property without proper notice to him of the proposed deprivation. He pointed out that section 5A was introduced specifically in recognition of the aforesaid principle of universal applicability. The Government merely, by opining that there is urgency, is automatically dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5A which provides for an opportunity to the concerned land owner to raise his objections to the Land Acquisition Act provides an exception to the general rule of law embodied in section 5A has to be interpreted so as to harmonies with section 17(4) The decision of Justice Chinnappa Reddy, in Kasireddy Papaiah (Died) and Others Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and the decision of Justice Gangadbara Rao in Tandu Vanamulu and others vs. Govt. of A.P. Represented by its secretary. Revenue department, secretariat building, Hyderabad and others 1977 (1) An. W.R. 242 are the result of an incorrect judicial approach. He drew our attention to a passage in Martell and others vs. consett Iron Co. Ltd. 1955 (1) Chancery 363 at page 414 which reads thus--

But it is an abuse of authorities to extract from judgments general statements of the law made In relation to the facts and circumstances of particular cases and treat them as concluding cases in which the facts and circumstances are entirely different and which raise questions to which their authors were not directing their minds at all.

He urges that Articles 141 of the Constitution of India has not always been correctly understood by the courts. He said that in the several writ petitions with which we are concerned, the manner in which 5-A enquiry was dispensed with would amount to the engrafting of a clause in the Act that whenever the public purpose u/s 4 (1) is acquisition of land for providing house sites to Harijans, Section 5A of the Act stands deleted from the Act. These above contentions of the learned counsel have, however, been answered by the discussion contained earlier in this judgment.

The next contention urged by Sri Chowdari concerns section 3A of the Act 22 of 1976 He pointed out that so long as section 5A and section 17 (4) of the Central Act remained unamended, issuance of a notification u/s 3-A leads to anomolous result In the instant case, G.O. Ms. No. 1378 (Revenue-K) dated 15th October 1975 makes a hash of the concerned sections of the Act. It was sought to be contended that section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh Art XXII which amends the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh creates quite arbitrary and unbridled powers upon the State Government to direct that any power or any duty imposed on the State Government by the Land Acquisition Act be exercised or discharged by the District Collector. It is also urged that merely because section 3-A states that there can be a delegation of the functions of the State Government in such circumstances and under such conditions as may be specified in a notification to be issued does not take away its arbitrariness. Section 3-Ais really vague and in practice so far as the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it abolishes the distinction between the State Government and the District Collector. G.O. Ms. No. 1378 (Revenue-K) dated 15th of October 1976 issued u/s 3-A of the Act is attacked on the ground that the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act, XXXII of 1976 had not in any way sought to touch either section 5A or sub-section (4) of section 17 of Central Act No. I of 1894 (Land Acquisition Act) and that therefore, the notification purporting to be u/s 3-A is in excess of the delegated powers. It is, therefore, sought to be contended that the delegation of power to the Collector u/s 3-A and G.O. Ms No. 1378 issued pursuant to that section lead to very inconsistent and undesirable results. It is contended that section 5A which remains untouched by section 4A and the notification thereunder, provides for the Collector hearing the objections at the instance of any person interested in any land which is notified u/s 4 (1). The Collector has to consider those objections and send up a report to the Government containing his recommendations. The Collector is only a recommending authority. The decision of the Government on the objections is final. The effect of the GO is to vest powers u/s 3-A, the powers of the Government in the Collector. The result is the Collector must make a report to himself and on that report he himself takes a decision which becomes final. Such a result could hardly have been contemplated, it is contended, by the Central Legislature, when it enacted section 5A. The State Amendment introduced by section 3-A makes the provision u/s 5A which stands unamended, practically nugatory. (As in each of the writ petitions, section 5A is dispensed with, we do not express any concluded opinion on the above aspect). It is further contended that likewise section 17 (4) of the Act envisages an urgency and it is for the appropriate Government to direct the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land within fifteen days after the publication of the notice u/s 9 of the Act. So also u/s 17 (2), in the circumstances mentioned in that subsection, it is the Collector who immediately after publication of a notice u/s 4 (1) may enter upon and take possession of the land. Section 17 (4) also states that if in the opinion of the Government the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 17 are applicable, it is the Government that may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply and may further direct a declaration to be made u/s 6 after the publication of the notification u/s 4 (1). The argument is that the enactment of section 3-A delegating the powers to the Collector and the particular G. O. Ms No. 1378 issued by the Collector pursuant to the powers conferred by section 3-A render the provisions of Section 5A and Section 17 as they exist incompatible with the language contained therein. It was also contended that section 3-A introduced by the Andhra Amendment Act which purports to confer blanket powers on the Government to confer a general power upon all Collectors of all the powers and duties of the Government is bad. In other words with respect to each acquisition of a particular land in a locality, a separate notification u/s 3-A should be issued. A general notification of the type issued by G.O. Ms. No. 1378 on all the District Collectors of all the powers vested in the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act u/s 5A and 17 (4) of the Act is bad in law.

We do not agree with the submissions. The Government felt and the legislature recognised the need of a crash programme to provide house-sites to the poor, viz. Harijans Girijans and other poor sections of the community who are homeless and hearthless living very precariously and in unhealthy surroundings That was why an Ordinance XII of 1976 was first issued and latter replaced by Act No. XXII of 1975. Section 3 of Act XXII of 1976 states that for the purpose of acquisition of land for the construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, the principal Act shall have effect in relation to such an acquisition subject to the following modification, viz.,

(1) in section 4,-----------

(a) in Sub-section (1) after the words ''Appropriate Government'' the words ''or the District Collector'' and after the words ''Official Gazette'' the words ''or the District Gazette'' shall be inserted.

(b) in sub-section (2), after the words such Government'', the words ''or the District Collector" shall be inserted.

It may be noticed that the purpose of acquisition of the land for the construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor was recognised as an urgent purpose even by Madras Act XXI of 1948 passed on 410 1949 which amended section 17 of the Central Act. Quite obviously, the Legislature felt that there was considerable delay in the matter of publication in the State Gazette, after the taking of a decision for acquisition The legislature may be presumed to have knowledge of the decisions of the Supreme Court which held that the publication in Gazette and the public notice by the Collector in the locality should be done simultaneously or without any interregnum between the aforesaid two publications The object therefore, enabling the Government to issue a notification in appropriate cases u/s 3-A vesting the Collector to exercise any power conferred or any duty imposed upon the Government under the Act was a matter requiring the promulgation of an Ordinance and the passing of an Act subsequently. The fact that Sections 5A and 17 (4) remained untouched by Act XXI of 1976 would, in our opinion does not lead to an anomalous situation. After all, the purpose of introducing Section 3-A in the Central Act is to minimise the delay and provide that whatever powers are exercisable by the State Government under the Central Act may be exercised by the Collector by the issuance of a notification. The conferment of the powers on the Collector which are by the Central Act to be exercised by the Government cannot be said to be an arbitrary conferment of powers. The notification u/s 3-A requires in what circumstances and under what conditions those powers and duties discharged and exercised by the Government under the Act should be discharged by the District Collector The District Collector is thus to exercise only such powers or perform such duties as are imposed upon the Government under the Act which are specifically conferred on him under a notification issued by the Government and published in the Gazette. For instance, the notification issued in the Gazette in the instant case u/s 3-A authorises the District Collectors to exercise all the powers vested in the State Government u/s 5A and Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act only for the purpose of acquisition of land for construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor. Sri P.A. Chowdary contended that section 5A of the Act is neither a power nor a duty and that therefore, the conferment of the Government''s powers u/s 5A is a meaningless conferment on the Collector. He also urged that section 3-A of the Amendment Act has no meaning or Impact on section 5A of the Act. On the objections raised, it is the Collector that has to make his recommendations and send the record to the Government and yet by reason of the G.O. issued, he not only prepares the record for enquiry, makes the recommendations which are only to himself and then decides the question himself which is final. The logic behind the above argument, it is argued, also applies to section 17 (4) mentioned in the notification. There is apparently some force in the submissions of the learned counsel. But in reality, the delegation to the Collector of the powers vested in the Government cannot in the instant case be questioned. We do not find any justification for holding that the delegation in the instant case to the Collector by the Government under the notification is bad and we are inclined to think that the delegation is good in law. Of course, if specific instances of misuse of power delegated are brought to the notice of the Court, the Court may strike down the specific instances where the delegated authority had not acted properly. But that does not mean that the power conferred on the Government to delegate to the Collector should itself be struck down. Further we may observe that in the particular writ petition in which Sri P.A. Chowdary is appearing, the contention was not raised. We are not disposed to consider this contention on its merits in all its aspects. Further on the facts, so far as section 5A is concerned, no argument concerning this section need be countenanced as the enquiry u/s 5A has been dispensed with in view of the urgency. We, therefore, do not express any considered opinion on the contentions raised by Sri P.A. Chowdary touching upon Section 5A in relation to the provisions of Andhra Act XXII of 1976. We will, now, dispose of each of the writ petitions on its own merits in the light of the opinion expressed on the various points raised and discussed in this judgment by us.