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Judgment
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.—The petitioner seeks for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to take on file the
Industrial Dispute instituted by him u/s 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
As against the order of dismissal dated 19.03.2002, the petitioner had initiated proceedings u/s 2-A of the Act.
The petitioner contends that he joined the services of the Company on 2.11.1991 as a daily wage employee but doing the work of permanent
nature. He was made permanent on 2.7.1996 after completion of service of more than five years. On 28.6.2001 he was issued a show cause
memo stating that he was absented himself for 12 days without prior permission and asking for his explanation. Without any enquiry, the Manager
suspended him for 30 days. Thereafter, a memo of show-cause was issued on 9.2.2002 alleging that he was absent during certain days and that in
respect of show-cause memo an enquiry was conducted and eventually dismissed from service on 19.3.2002. Thereafter the petitioner presented
an Industrial Dispute before the Labour Officer (Conciliation), Kuralagam, Chennai - 600 001. But the said officer refused to receive the
application stating that the petitioner having been employed in the factory at Arakonam, he has raised a dispute at Vellore. However, no written
order was given to the petitioner and hence the said writ petition.
Mr. V. Prakash, appearing for the petitioner contends that there is no specific provision regarding jurisdiction as under the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Company has its office at No.124, Greams Road, Chennai-600 006. The Corporate person owning the establishment under the
third respondent is the second respondent and it was only pursuant to the decision of the second respondent, the petitioner was employed at
Arakonam and the impugned decision of dismissal was also that of the Corporate Office. Therefore, when the Company is situated within the
jurisdiction of the Labour Officer, it was not right on his part to state that the petitioner cannot institute the proceedings in Chennai. It is further
stated that the petitioner was entitled to institute the proceedings both at Vellore or in Madras which are at equal distance from Arakonam and that
for the petitioner it was convenient to come to Chennai as train facility was available and was also more economical.
A counter has been filed by the respondents contending that the termination letter was posted from Arakonam and was received by the
petitioner at his residence at Arakonam. Therefore, the cause of action for this matter has arisen entirely at Arakonam. The Government has
appointed the Labour Officer, Vellore, as the Conciliation Officer for the factory situated at Vellore District including Arakonam and there was
also a separate Labour Court at Vellore. Therefore, the refusal of the Labour Officer, Chennai, to receive the petition of the petitioner was
justified. It is further stated that the factory of the respondent Company at Arakonam was a self contained unit administered by a General
Manager. Separate Standing Orders are in force in each factory and conditions of service are also governed by independent settlements.
Mr. V. Prakash, after reiterating the contentions raised in the writ petition, also contends that the Labour Officers both at Vellore and Chennai
had concurrent jurisdiction and it was open to the petitioner to choose the jurisdiction which is more convenient to him. Even in terms of the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, what was necessary was the cause of action and in the present case, the petitioner was appointed as
well as dismissed only at the instance of the orders of the Corporate Office at Chennai. Disputes relating to employer and the employee being one
governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, a welfare legislation and hence the convenience of the employee has to be given paramount importance.
Learned counsel also relies on the judgment of P. Sathasivam, J. in NESLIN JOSEPH PRIM v. PRESIDING OFFICER, CENTRAL GOVT.
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT (2002 (2) C.T.C., 647).
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents however, contends that the entire cause of action was only in the factory at Arakonam and
hence the contention of any cause of action having arisen at Chennai was not correct. The petitioner himself has given his address at Arakonam and
he was residing only at Arakonam. The domestic enquiry was conducted at Arakonam and the termination order was issued only by the General
Manager of Arakonam branch and also served on the petitioner at his residence at Arakonam. The jurisdiction of the Labour Officers arise out of
the orders which are issued by the Government while constituting a Labour Officer/Labour Court for a particular area. Therefore, the Labour
Officer, Vellore and the Labour Court, Vellore, are having jurisdiction over the disputes arising under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The petitioner cannot be heard to choose his forum and go before any authority who has no jurisdiction. Learned counsel also referred to few
decisions in his favour which will be dealt with below.
I have considered the submissions of both sides. It is true that if the provisions of statute under which the proceedings are initiated, confer
simultaneous and concurrent jurisdiction to two different authorities, it may be open to the parties to choose the more convenient forum. In this
case apart from the fact that the Corporate office is at Chennai, there is no other reason or justification for the petitioner approaching the Labour
Officer at Chennai. The fact that the Company has its own factory at Arakonam and that the petitioner was also working at Arakonam are not
denied. As contended by learned counsel for the respondents, the enquiry was conducted only at Arakonam and termination order was also issued
by the General Manager of Arakonam plant and was also served on the petitioner at his residence. In fact, it is very pertinent to note that even in
his petition filed by him u/s 2-A, the petitioner has given the address for service of notices etc., as No.78-A, Third Street, Ganesh Nagar, Jothi
Nagar Post, Arakonam.
Having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner has to show that substantial cause of action had arisen at Chennai. The respondent
does not concede that the Labour Officer at Chennai has any concurrent jurisdiction.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Shri Rangavilas Motors (P.) Ltd. and Another Vs. Shri Rangavilas
Motors (P) Ltd. and Others, . That was a case in which a workman working at Bangalore branch office of the Company, having its office at
Krishnagiri, was transferred by orders of the Head Office. The dispute was taken up by his fellow-workmen at Krishnagiri and subsequently, he
was removed from service. The order of reference was made by the State of Mysore relating to the dispute as to whether the punishment was
justified or not. A question arose as to whether the State of Mysore was the appropriate Government for making reference, as part of the cause of
action arose at Bangalore. The Supreme Court went into the issue and held that the dispute arose at Bangalore where the concerned employee
was working at the time of transfer and that there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State. In that case, the
subject matter of dispute having substantially arisen within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government, it was held that the State of Mysore was the
appropriate Government for making reference.
On behalf of the management, reliance is also placed in the judgment of D. Murugesan, J. in MGMT OF BEST & CROMPTON ENGG.
LTD. v. P.O.,I ADDL. L.C. 2002(2) L.L.N. 306. The learned Judge while dealing with the dispute relating to the jurisdiction held that what was
relevant for consideration was the place where the cause of action arose substantially. After analysing the various judgments, the learned Judge
held that what was relevant for sustaining a dispute before the Labour Court was the place where the cause of action arose substantially, namely,
where the employee was working at that time when the termination order was issued and not the place of initial appointment or to other places
where he might have been transferred.
I have considered the submissions of both sides in the light of the above judgments. There is no doubt over the fact that except for the fact of
the existence of the Corporate office at Chennai, there is no other factor on which the petitioner can rely upon to show satisfactory nexus nor any
cause of action. The factory is an independent unit under the control of a General Manager. It is not disputed that the petitioner was appointed only
at that branch and was working there. It is also specifically pleaded in the counter that the factory at Arakonam was governed by separate
Standing Orders and also by independent settlement. Therefore, I am unable to sustain the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner
considering that no part of the cause of action had arisen at any time within the jurisdiction of the Labour Officer, Chennai. The most important
feature is that even in the petition filed by the employee before the Labour Officer, Chennai, not only in the cause title the address at Arakonam is
given, but also in the body of the petition, the petitioner has given only Arakonam address as the address for service of notice. That being so, there
is absolutely no justification for the petitioner to contend that the Labour Officer at Chennai also will have jurisdiction.
Reliance placed on the judgment of P. Sathasivam, J. reported in 2002 (2) C.T.C. 647, supra, has no relevance to the facts of the present
case. In that case, the impugned order was served on the petitioner''s residential address at Chennai and the worker was residing at Chennai. It is
only in those circumstances, the learned Judge has held that part of cause of action had arisen at Chennai and the petitioner was also residing at
Chennai as could be seen from the records. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that reliance placed on the judgment is not appropriate.
In the result, I am inclined to hold that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established the crucial factor, namely substantial cause of action and
hence, there is no justification for the petitioner to have moved the dispute before the Labour Officer, Chennai. The petitioner''s convenience alone
is not relevant. The respondent (General Manager) should be able to personally represent the Company. Connected records witnesses, if any,
would be available only at Arakonam and it will not be reasonable to expect the enquiry to take place at Chennai only for the reason that the
Corporate/Head Office is at Chennai. There are no merits in the above writ petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.