Nadhamuni Iyyan (Deceased) and Another vs Appu Odayan and Others

The District Judge has based his decision largely on Court Exhibits I and II, which he admitted as evidence produced on the Court''s own

motion. He states that these documents are conclusive on the point of fact.

Order XL, Rule 27, of the CPC makes it imperative that an Appellate Court should record its reasons for admitting additional evidence

whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced.

Apart from the irregularity arising from the omission to comply with this rule, we think that in fairness these documents should not have been

relied on for the purpose of proving that the properties attached by the 3rd defendant (plaintiff in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909) were treated as

the joint properties of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in this case (defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in Original Suit No. 138 of 1909) without giving the 3rd

defendant, Who was examined as 1st defence witness at the original trial, an opportunity of explaining the circumstances under which he made the

application to attach those properties ""and his admission in the application. In considering the other evidence of joint dealing with'' the property, the

District Judge has not considered and met the possibility of the explanation suggested by the District Munsif for the joint execution of the mortgage

deed to Abboy Chetti by plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 being true; and he also appears to have overlooked the point, which the District

Munsif noticed, that the plaintiff''s evidence as to the purchase of the plaint properties by sale of ancestral properties must be hearsay, when he

spoke to what occurred when he was only 2 years old.

We think that it is necessary to call for a fresh finding from the District-Judge on the question whether the plaintiff has any interest in the

properties.

If he finds this question in the affirmative, he will also return a finding on issue No. 3 which he has left undetermined.

Findings should be returned within two months from this date. Ten days will be allowed for filing objections.

In compliance with the order contained in the above Judgement, the District Judge of South Arcot submitted the following

FINDING

This is a case which has been remanded to me for findings on the question, ""Whether the plaintiff has any interest in the properties?"" '' and

secondly, if the above issue is found in the affirmative, ""If the sale is to be set aside, to what equities, if any, is the 3rd defendant entitled?

It has been pointed out by the High Court that I have fallen into an irregularity in not complying with Order XLI, Rule 27, of the CPC in relying

on Court Exhibits I and II which I admitted as evidence produced on my own motion, in that I did not record the reasons for admitting this further

evidence. It is also observed that there was great hardship on the 3rd defendant in admitting this in evidence, because he was not given an

opportunity of meeting this document which contradicted his evidence. It is brought to nay notice by the learned Vakil for the appellant that as a

matter of fact the subject of these two Exhibits I and II was brought to the notice of the 3rd defendant when he gave his evidence in the Court and

that he then had an opportunity of explaining the fact, which must have been present to his memory, that he attached the property as being the

property of the defendants. However, the man is since dead and in view of the High Court''s observation I do not think it advisable that I, should

rely on these documents nor record a reason at this stage why I should admit them, because in any case one obvious explanation and observation

attaches to them, that the general conduct of the parties might have led the 3rd defendant, who would not be intimately acquainted with family

affairs, to believe the property to be joint family property and it is not the conduct or the admissions of a third party, as the 3rd defendant was,

which can affect the nature of the owner-ship of any given bit of property. The learned Vakil for the appellant brings it to my notice that the

decisions in Indar Sahai v. Shaim Bahadur 17 Ind. Cas. 760 : 17 C.L.J. 299 : 17 C.W.N. 509and Madhavaiya Chetty v. Damodaram Chetty 17

Ind. Cas. 347 are a clear basis for holding that, although there may be no nucleus of family property, where the family work together and live

together and eat together and treat the property as joint property, they make a joint family even if there has been no original nucleus of family

property.

As regards the observations of the District Munsif with reference to the joint execution of the mortgage deed to Abboy Chetti by the plaintiff

and the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, I have had my attention directed to it in argument and I have given my attention to it as directed by the order of

reference of their Lordships of the High Court; and I think it is right to observe that this explanation by the District Munsif, that it was possible, that

the sons were also joined in the execution of this document as/they were naturally required to do as a matter of safety by the mortgagee, is an

explanation which was open to the parties and yet was not made by, the, 3rd defendant But as regards the'' explanation that the execution of the

mortgage deads Exhibits I and X to Shroff Abboy Chetti might show that the plaint properties were thrown into the common stock and enjoyed by

the family jointly though acquired by a single member, that does in fact appall to me and that is in fact my final view The decision in Thyalambeal v.

Krishna Pattar 32 Ind Cas. 955 is an exact decision in point. As regards the Full Bench case in Ethirajulu Naidu v. Govindarajulu Naidu 32 Ind.

Cas. 12 I have to observe with great respect that it seems to me that a good deal would turn on the date of the Will in question. If after treating the

property in every way as joint property, the acquirer at his very last gasp makes a Will disposing of it as if it was still his sole self-acquired

property, I think it-would be open to the other members of the joint family to show that by his action in treating the property as joint property and

thus keeping the family together they were prevented from going out in the world and setting up on their own account, and, therefore, it was not

open to him, just before his, death, to execute a Will which reversed the tacit agreement among them. If, on the other hand, in such a series of

circumstances, as are detailed in Ethirajulu Naidu v. Govindarajulu Naidu 32 Ind. Cas. 12 the acquirer of the property made and registered a Will

3 or 4 years before his death, that would be a very different matter. However, though I venture to express this proviso, my present finding is not

given in opposition to the decision in Ethirajulu Naidu v. Govindarajulu Naidu 32 Ind. Cas. 12 but because it seems to me, having regard to the

provisions of Exhibit X, dated 1904, and Exhibit I, dated 1903, that after setting forth most clearly that it was self-acquired property it is stated

with equal clearness and precision that the property is in the joint possession of all the members of the family. And this is exactly the course and

conduct which, according to the ruling in Madhavaiya. Chetty v. Damodaram chetty 17 Ind. Cas. 347, where the family all live together, is enough,

to finally invest the property with the charac-tar of joint family property. The learned Vakil for the 4th respondent, would wish to argue from Raw

Kishen Das v. Tanda Mal 10 Ind. Cas. 543 that there can be no joint family unless there is a nucleus of joint family property. But the decision in

1912 Madras Weekly Notes [ Madhavaiya Chetty v. Damodaram Chetty 17 Ind. Cas. 347 is exactly opposed to such a view. It is perfectly true

that the evidence as to the property having been acquired with the grandfather''s own money is mere hearsay, as the High Court has been pleased

to point out to me, and it is true that in certain cases, as set out in the decision in Jangi Nath v. Janki Nath 2 A.L.J. 225, a single owner of a

property may for certain reasons, and to avoid family quarrels, associate with himself persons who in reality have no joint title and may afterwards

insist on his own full separate rights, Personally I incline to the view that this is not a line of conduct which should be encouraged or which in the

end conduces to the peace and welfare of families [to quote the Privy Council in Lala Muddun Gopal Lal v. Khikhinda Koer 18 I.A. 9 because it

seems to me that it is substituting for a temporary disagreement an inevitable, bitterly-contested law suit, which will certainly go as far as the Privy

Council if the family funds or credit permit. However that may be, the present is not such a case. Here there has been a living together in one house

ever since the family migrated to Sandaipettai on acaount of the great famine of ""1876-77. A. house was bought and eventually land; and this land

is the subject of the present litigation. The oral evidence on the side of the plaintiff is indeed meagre and a great part of the evidence he gives as his

own witness is false. But the learned District Munsif found as a fact that the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have been living all along and

messing together and the plaintiff''s present statement to the contrary is a deliberate falsehood. This fact, while lending great weight to the theory of

collusion in the present suit, is also a very important ore in deciding whether the family have been throwing all their income such as it ""is into one

joint stock. Taken with the contents of Exhibits I and X, I am satisfied that the property was altered into joint family property with the full final

consent of the father who acquired it and for this reason I find the issue in the affirmative that the plaintiff has an interest in the properties.

As regards the 3rd issue the learned Vakil for the respondent wishes me to go once more over the whole question of fraud and to show that on

account of the fraud being non-existent and the pro-notes being executed with legitimate par poses, his client is entitled to repayment of the

following suing of money, Rs. 600 for Exhibit I Rs. 224 under Exhibit C and Rs. 300 to wards the discharge of Exhibit VI. He argues from the

decision in Palamalai Mudaliyar v. South Indian Export Co. Ltd. 5 Ind. Cas. 33: (1910) M.W.N. 239 that the 3rd defendant is entitled in equity to

have these sums made a charge on the property as there is no evidence to rebut the fact'' of payment; for, as he points out, P. W. No. 1 (the 2nd

defendant) admits in evidence that Rs. 40 is due from him on the pro-notes for which Exhibit C was substituted. On the other hand my attention

has been drawn to the Privy Council decision in Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh 39 Ind. Cas. 280: 31 C.W.N. 698 : 6 L.W. 213 by which it is

said that the sale of joint family property by only one or two members excluding a person who is a common go sharer with them has no effect

whatsoever and cannot bind the property, at all. Thus there is no equity for the 3rd defendant retaining his two thirds of the suit property nor for his

getting his-money back. It seems to me that this is the decision which I must apply in the present case and that my finding on the 3rd issue is the

same as the lower Court''s via., that the 3rd defendant (who is now represented by the 4th respondent) is not entitled to any equities in this case.

Although I base my decision on the ruling in the Privy Council cases noted above and not on the finding as regards fraud-because it seems to me

that I am not bound or justified in reviewing my -finding on that point that there was'' fraud in the matter-if I take that finding as holding good, I will

also day that on account of the fraud practised in the matter to which the 3rd defendant was necessarily a party he is not entitled to any equities in

the case. But my finding as given above is in dependent of the finding on the question of fraud, which '' as it seems to me has been excluded, from

the scope of the reference. I am corrected by the learned Vakil for the respondent as regards his arguments based on 33 Allahabad [Ram Kishen

Das v. Tanda Mal 10 Ind. Cas. 543. He points out that his argument was that there is no presumption as to the existence of joint family, property

and any one who alleges it must prove it. This, of course, I concede, but he proceeded to argue as stated above that there must necessarily be a

nucleus of joint family property before anything can be added to it, and this is not a correct statement of the law. Allowing, as I do, that all the

burden of proof rests entirely on the plaintiff in such a case as this, it seems to me that he has discharged that burden and proved that he has an

interest in the plaint properties.

This second appeal came on for final hearing on the 17th April 1918, after the return of the findings of the lower Appellate Court upon the

issues referred by the High Court for trial.

Messrs. T.R. Vencatrama Sastri and M. S. Vencatrama Aiyar, for the Appellants.- The District Judge erred in passing a decree in favour of

the plaintiff for the whole of the joint properties. Even on the finding of fraud such a decree is not warranted. Here is a case of a Court sale and not

of a private alienation. The decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 by the appellant (3rd defendant) against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was found

to be a sham and a collusive decree and was in respect of a fictitious and non-existent debt. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were, participes criminis"" in

the fraud and their suit to set aside the sale was dismissed. They have no equities to ask instance and they cannot be permitted to obtain an indirect

benefit by setting up the plaintiff to claim the whole property on their behalf. The plaintiff can only lay claim to his share in the joint family pro party.

Kama Bow v. Nukamma 13 M.L.J. 576.

Whatever may be the rights of a private alienee the claim of the 3rd defendant-appellant rests upon his sale certificate and it passes at least the

2/3rds shares of defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

The 3rd defendant''s rights can be worked out in this suit alone and he. need not be driven to bring a general suit for partition. It is settled law

that the alienation by a coparcener is binding on him to the extent '' of his share. In this case, the plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the shares being

determined and assigned.

Lastly, Rs. 280 of the, purchase amount paid by the 3rd defendant-appellant was used to pay 2 decrees which were equally binding on

plaintiff. He also redeemed an order by paying Rs. 600. Plaintiff is bound to pay to the appellant 1/3rd of these amounts. The appellant is entitled

to relief in the nature of subrogation. Palamlai Mudaliyar v. South Indian Export Co. Ltd. 5 Ind. Cas. 33 : (1910) M.W.N. 239 and Chama Swami

v. Padala Anandu 3 M.L.T. 395 : 18 M.L.J. 306.

Mr. C. Padmanabaiyar, for Respondent No. 1.-The appellant, who obtained the decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909, was an active

abettor of the fraud practised on the plaintiff and on the Court. The decree was fraudulent and collusive and the debt or claim in respect of which

the decree was obtained was found to be fictitious. The decree-holder should be treated as having acquired nothing by the decree. His position is

no better than that of a trespasser. His purchase at Court auction should be traced back to the earlier proceedings and the decree and when these

latter were tainted with fraud'' the auction sale and the certificate which purports to convey title to the appellant should be treated as a nullity.

Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to eject the appellant as a trespasser and he could sue on behalf of his co-sharers also.

Assuming that appellant acquired the rights of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by his purchase, he can get no relief in this suit against the plaintiff. At

the best the right secured by the appellant is only an inchoate right, to enforce partition of his alienor''s'' share. He cannot claim to be entitled to any

specific items of property by reason of his purchase. In Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 1 C.L.R. 49 the Privy Council gave the, son

possession of the entire property as against the holder of the decree against the father. See also Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh 6 I.A. 88 :

2 S L.R. 242, Ramanna v. Venkata 12 Ind. Jur. 177 and Nanjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali 29 Ind. Cas. 583.

The appellant is not entitled to any equities in the nature of subrogation as against plaintiff. There can be no such relief where the very

foundation of the claim is tainted with fraud. The equity does not arise by the mere fact that plaintiff was benefited by the payments. The oases

cited by the appellant''s. Vakil do not apply. In Palamalai Mudaliyar v. South Indian Export Co. Ltd. 5 Ind. Cas. 33 : (1910) M.W.N. 239 and

Ummachakutti v. Ummerkutti Haji 29 Ind. Cas. 583 the payments were ""made by persons to whom real sales were effected by persons who

owned the properties, but they were held to be in fraud of creditors, and, therefore, set aside. In this case no consideration was paid by him for the

notes on which he sued.

Mr. T.R. Vencatrama Sastri, in reply. There is no analogy in the position of the appellant with that of a trespasser. It is only plaintiff that is left

unaffected by the decree in the prior suit, Original Suit No. 133 of 1909. The rights of the other coparceners are subservient to that decree, which

is binding on them until it is vacated by proper proceedings instituted by them for the purpose. The certificate of sale passes to the appellant the title

of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the properties.

It is not necessary to drive the appellant to a suit for a general partition. Where there are also properties not comprised in the decree, such a

course may be necessary. Here, however, the decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 comprises all the properties in the family. The rights and

equities of the parties, may be worked out in this suit itself without the plaintiff being in any way prejudiced by it. In the Privy Council case,

Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 1 C.L.R. 49 the Privy Council stated that the purchaser was entitled to have the rights acquired, by him by

purchase ascertained by partition. In Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 3 Suth. P.C.J. 468 and Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh 6 I.A.

88 their Lordships were not dealing with the question of likely prejudice to the parties if a partition were worked out in the co-parcener''s suit itself.

In Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958: (1913) M.W.N. 631: 18 C. L. J. 237 such a right is recognised. In none of

the oases was the point expressly considered as to how the alienor''s equity was to be worked out. In any event, the observations in those oases

are beside the point as they do not relate to purchases at Court auction.

JUDGMENT

Spencer, J.

My learned brother has fully discussed the questions of law which have been raised in the arguments upon the 2pd appellant''s memorandum of

objections and I have little to add to what he has written in the, judgment he is about to deliver.

We must accept the learned District Judge''s findings on the issues referred to him. I think that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover more than

his 1/3rd undefined share and that the decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 is binding on defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who were parties to it.

I am further of opinion that on {he District Judge''s finding as to fraud and on the principle that he who comes into equity must come with clean

hands, the 3rd defendant, having been a party to a collusive decree based upon a non existent debt, cannot ask as against a person who was not a

party to that decree for an equitable remedy such as that implied by subrogation [vide Karuppan Ambalagaran v. Muhammad Sakuth Levvai 22

Ind. Cas. 263 : (1914) M.W.N. 131]. The suit, must be remanded to the lower Court for having a partition of the plaintiff''s share effected by

metes and bounds and for passing a final decree for the possession of the ''share allotted to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff will get costs throughout proportionate to the value of his share. The defendants will bear their own costs throughout. The lower

Court''s decree will be modified accordingly.

Erishnan, J.

The learned District Judge has returned findings on the issues remitted to him, adversely to the appellant and he has filed a memorandum of

objections to them.

On the 1st issue the learned Judge finds that the plaint properties were treated as joint family property with the full consent of the father long

before the decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 and the sale in execution of it, and that, therefore the plaintiff has a share in them. It is objected

that this is a new case which had not been set up previously by the plaintiff and that the 3rd defendant has been prejudiced by such a new case

being now made out against him. Plaintiff had stated in the plaint that the properties were ""common family properties"" without specifying how on

the other hand the 3rd defendant had alleged that they were 1st defendant''s self acquisitions. Though there was no direct issue on this question, the

parties treated the second part of the 1st issue as raising it and evidence was given about it by both sides. The plaintiff''s evidence was not only that

they were purchased from family funds but also that they were dealt with by his father and other members of the family as joint property The

District Judge has now accepted the latter portion of his case, though he had originally found that the properties were purchased with joint family

funds. There is, however, no ground for saying that the present finding amounts to the setting up of a new case for the plaintiff. All the evidence was

on record and the finding is on such evidence. I do not think the 3rd defendant can properly be said to be prejudiced, nor has he shown that any

evidence was properly omitted by him from being adduced. As this is the only objection to the finding as to the joint character of the property, and

as it fails, we must accept it.

The next question is, what relief the plaintiff is entitled to on that finding. He claims the right to recover the whole property, whereas the 3rd

defendant contends that he should be given only his one third share. The, District Judge has accepted the plaintiff''s contention. The plaint items

were attached and sold in execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 obtained by the 3rd defendant against defendants Nos. 1 and

2, the father and brother of plaintiff; and they were purchased by the 3rd defendant himself. The Munsif has found that the promissory notes on

which that decree was obtained were sham transactions and without consideration and the decree was a collusive and fraudulent one probably

intended to harass a creditor. On this finding plaintiff''s rights in the property were clearly unaffected by the decree and sale, as he was no party to

them. The District Judge has concurred in this finding of fraud. Defendants Nos. I and 2 had themselves brought Original Suit No. 965 of 1912 to

set aside the decree and sale; but that suit failed for non-payment of costs within the time fixed. They can no longer sue to avoid the sale; and being

parties themselves to the fraudulent decree they would have, even otherwise, no right to recover the plaint properties. See Kama Row v.

Nukamma 13 M.L.J. 576. So far, therefore, as their two-thirds share is concerned, it must thus be taken that the 3rd defendant''s sale certificate is

valid against them and the title to their share has passed to him. That being so, it will not be right to allow the plaintiff to recover the whole property

and thus enable defendants Nos 1 and 2 to get their shares indirectly through him when they cannot get them directly, unless it is strictly necessary

to allow plaintiff to do so to work out his own rights. It has not been attempted to be shown that plaintiff would in any way be prejudiced as to his

own rights in the properties if partition should be directed in this sail) itself and be given his share.

It was, however, urged that the 3rd defendant should be looked upon as a* trespasser and that it was plaintiff''s right as a member of the joint

family to eject him altogether from the properties. This argument fails, as the 3rd defendant is not altogether a trespasser but has got the rights of

defendants Nog. 1 and 2 in the properties.

Then it was argued that even if we look upon the 3rd defendant as the Court auction purchaser of the shares of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, he is

still not entitled to resist the plaintiff''s suit to recover the whole property, his right being only to bring a suit for partition. In support of this

proposition the learned Vakil relied on the Privy Council judgments in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 1 C.L.R. 49and Suraj Bunsi Koer v.

Sheo Persad Singh 6 I.A. 88 : 4 C.L.R. 226: 2 Ind. Dec. 705 and Bamanna. v. Venkata 12 Ind. Jur. 177: 4 Ind. Deo. 171 and Nanjaya Mudali v.

Shanmug a Mudali 22 Ind. Cas. 555. Though the alienee of a share of an undivided co-parcener is not'' strictly entitled to possession of any

property before suing for partition* he having only an equity to enforce a partition, still in a case like the present where he is in possession of

specific properties, it is not necessary to eject him and drive him to a fresh partition suit, as the rights of the parties could be worked out in this suit

itself without prejudice. In the case in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 1 C.L.R. 49 their ''Lordships of the Privy council no doubt confirmed

the decree giving the son possession of the whole property purchased by the holder of the decree against his father, but they added a declaration

that the purchaser was entitled to have the share ana interest purchased by him ascertained by partition. The case in Suraj Bunsi. Kosr v. Sheo

Persad Singh 6 I.A. 88 takes a similar view. Bat neither of them is in my opinion against allowing the alienor''s equity being worked out in the suit

by the coparcener, if it can be done without prejudice to the plaintiff. That, question was not before their Lordships in the two cases cited. On the

other hand, they have themselves recognised that a partition may be directed in the co-parcener''s suit itself; for in the case of Ramkishorz

Kedaranath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958: 11 A.L.J. 865 their Lord ships, while holding that the co-parcener not party to the

alienation was not bound to sue for partition, expressly say ""that it may well be that it is open to the alienee to insist that he stands in the shoes of

his alienor as to the latter''s share on partition and that the Court then would itself at the alienee''s instance direct partition in that suit."" The case in

Ramanna v. Venkata 12 Ind. Jur. 177 was one of a gift by a Hindu father which"" was found to be invalid and not binding on the son or on the

father. The learned Judges, while giving effect to the power of interdiction by the son in those circumstances, recognised that in the case of a sale

the alienation should be upheld to the extent of the alienor''s share as a matter of equity; which, however, did not exist in that case. They did not

consider how the alienor''s equity was to be worked out; and moreover in the present case we have a Court auction sale binding on defendants

Nos, 1 and 2, and, therefore, the observations in that case do not apply to this case. The decision in Nanjaya Mudali v. Shanrnuga Mudali 22 Ind.

Cas. 555 : 16 M.L.T. 186 is not in point here and the observations in it are not inconsistent with, the view I am taking; in fast the observation in the

case in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrechpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958 11 A.L.J. 865 above referred to is cited and followed.

Where co-parceners alienate their shares in specific properties, the other co-parceners have a right to sue for partition and for recovery of their

shares in those properties alone without suing for a general partition; the validity of such suits has now been settled by the Full Bench in Iburamsa

Rowthan v. Thiruvenkatasami Naick 7 Ind. Cas. 559 (1910) M.W.N. 380. Though no doubt an alienee of a co-parcener''s share in a specific

property has to sue for general partition to work out his rights, still where, as in the present case, there do not seem to be, any other properties., to

be divided than the suit ones there is no object in making him bring a fresh suit. The District Judge has relied on the case in Sahu Ram Chandra v.

Bhup Singh (1917) M. W. N. 439 (1917) M.W.N. 439 : 26 C.L.J. 38 (the � same case is reported in ILR 39 All. 437 for his view that the 3rd

defendant his no'' equity''1 target a two-thirds share'' in the properties : apparently he relies on the observation of Lord Shaw that any deed of gift,

sale or mortgage granted by one coparcener on his own account of or over the joint family property is invalid; the estate is wholly unaffected by it

and its entirety stands free of it."" The observation refers to private alienations and does not apply to the present case, which is one of a Court sale;

the right to attach and sell a co-parcener''s share for his decree debt has been established by the decision of the Privy Council itself and has never

been doubted. In our Presidency, even as regards private alienations, it is settled law that-one co-parcener may dispose of the ancestral undivided

estate to the extent of his own share by private conveyance whether for value or by gift; and this was recognised and laid down by the Judicial

Committee itself in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh 6 I.A. 88 above-referred to That being so, an alienation of the joint family property by

one co-parcener will bind his share, though it may not bind the shares of the other co parceners. Their Lordships cannot well be taken to have

overruled this view as they do not refer to it at all. The Madras cases referred to by their Lordships were all cases in which the question was

whether the amount borrowed under a mortgage could itself be considered an antecedent debt justifying a Hindu father in mortgaging his son''s

share aiso in the joint property. As stated'' above, we have here a case of a Court sale but when the question is raised about a private alienation,

the applicability of Sahu Ram-Chandra''s case 39 Ind. Cas. 280: 1 P.L.W. 657may be considered with reference to the observations of the

learned Chief Justice and of Mr. Justice Kumaraswami Sastri with reference to another point dealt with by the same case, in Peda Vetikanna v.

Sreenivasa Dsekshatulu 43 Ind. Cas. 225.

For the above reasons I am of opinion that the plaintiff should be given a decree only for his share in the plaint properties, whic his admittedly

one third.

The next question is, whether there are any equities in favour of the third defend ant. He states that Rs. 280 of the money he paid for the Court

purchase was used to pay off two other decrees binding on the plaintiff and that he subsequently redeemed an other binding on the property by

paying Rs. 600. He claims that he should be paid one-third of these amounts by the plaintiff on his getting one third of the property. Plaintiff on the

other hand contends that the 3rd defendant is not entitled to any equities in his favour as against him, and both the lower Courts have accepted this

view. ''

Whatever the rights of the 3rd defendant may be as against defendants Nos. 1 and 2, we must take it on the findings in this case that the

decree in Original Suit No. 133 of 1909 was a collusive one for a nonexistent debt and that the 3rd defendant was a party, to the fraud by which it

was obtained, His Court-auction purchase was in execution of that fraudulent decree'' and the payments he pleads were made as such purchaser.

The very foundation of his present claim is thus tainted with fraud and it seems to me the lower Courts were, therefore, right in refusing to reocgnise

any equity in his favour against plaintiff who was not involved in that fraud. His payments have no doubt enured to the benefit of the plaintiff but that

consideration by itself is not sufficient to give rise to any equity; as for example in the case of volunteers where no equity is recognised as arising

from such payments. The learned Vakil for the appellant relied on the oases in Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu 18 M.L.J. 306, Palamalai

Mudaliyar v. South Indian Export Co., Ltd. 5 Ind. Cas. 33: (1910) M.W.N. 239, and Ummachakulti v. Ummerhutti Haji 20 Ind. Cas. 958:

(1913) M.W.N. 631 The two last cases referred to payments by persons to whom real conveyances had been executed by owners of property

for consideration paid and which were only set aside against creditors as being in fraud of them. Those cases are clearly distinguishable from the

present case, as here there was fraud from the very beginning and there was no consideration paid by the 3rd defendant for the notes sued on by

him. This is a stronger case against allowing any equity than, the one in Karup. pan Ambalagaram v. Muhammed Sakuth Levvai 22 Ind. Cas. 263 :

(1914) M.W.N. 131, where subrogation was disallowed In the case in Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu 3 M.L.T. 395 : 18 M.L.J. 306 there was

no fraud at all; the sale to the person. who paid off toe prior mortgage failed because of a prior sale to another under whom some of the

defendants claimed. I am, therefore, of opinion that the equitable doctrine of Subrogation cannot be invoked here in 3rd defendant''s favour against

the plaintiff.

In the result I would give a decree for partition to plaintiff for his one-third share in the plaint properties and dismiss the suit as to the balance.

Plaintiff will receive proportionate costs throughout. The case will go back to the 1st Court for a final decree.