Nagarajan, M. vs The Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Dept., Government of Tamil Nadu and The Commissioner of Police

M. Karpagavinayagam, J.—The detenu is the petitioner. He has been branded as a goonda by the detention order dated 11.09.2003.

There is no dispute in the fact that all the adverse cases would relate to the theft alleged to have been committed by the detenu from 26.10.2002

to 23.08.1983. The ground case is on 27.08.2003. According to the sponsoring authority, on 27.08.2003 at about 8.00 pm., when one Mani was

returning home through Broadway, the detenu wrongfully restrained him and took away money from his shirt packet. He also took out a knife from

his hip and attempted to stab Mani with that knife and thereafter, snatched his wrist watch. On the said Mani raising hue and cry, public gathered

there and when they rushed to apprehend the detenu, he pelted stones on them. Then police personnel on coming to know of the incident, rushed

to the spot and apprehended the detenu.

The only ground urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that this is a solitary incident which relates to the public order, on which the case has

been registered under Sections 341, 323, 336, 307, 392 and 506(ii) IPC. In order to establish that the solitary instance of robbery would not give

rise to the cause of action for invoking the Act 14/1982, he cited the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma ..vs..

State of Tamil Nadu and others 2003 SCC (Cri) 537. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the observation made by the Supreme Court

in the above case.

...In the present case, the three alleged incidents to which the Commissioner of Police has referred to are thefts arising u/s 379 IPC and, therefore,

there is only a solitary instance wherein the detenu is alleged to have robbed in a public place, one Kumar. Therefore, there is no material on

record to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the

community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. Though in the grounds of

detention the detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of

insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected the

even tempo of life of the community, but citation of these words in the order of detention is more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any

significance to the content of the matter. Thus, a solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining

the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This

ground is enough to quash the order of detention made by the respondents"".

This observation, in our view, would apply to the facts of the present case. There is no dispute that there is only a solitary instance wherein the

detenu is alleged to have robbed in a public place, one Mani. It cannot be said that the instance would convey any material to show that the reach

and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community. Though in the grounds

of detention, the detaining authority stated that by committing this offence offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, and thereby acted

in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The said statement available in the grounds of detention is more in the nature of a ritual

rather than with any significance to the content of the matter. Therefore, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, a solitary instance of robbery as

mentioned in the grounds of detention cannot be said to be relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner

from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, in our view, the detention order cannot be sustained and is liable

to be set aside.

Accordingly, the impugned order of detention is set aside and the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty

forthwith, unless he is required in connection with any other case.